92 Mich. 552 | Mich. | 1892
This is an action of trover for the conversion of 1 sliingle-mill frame, 1 knot-sawing machine and arbor, 7 small circular saws, 200 feet of belting, 50 feet of shafting, 20 pulleys, 1 gumming machine complete, 1 shingle jointer complete, 1 wheelbarrow, 1 crowbar, 1 cant-hook, and 1 edger complete. Plaintiff had verdict and judgment.
The evidence tended to show the following facts: In 1872 a copartnership, composed of the plaintiff and two-others, under the firm name of Bartlett, Bonny & Saxton, owned a piece of land upon which was situated a portable steam saw-mill, containing a boiler, engine, and double circular mill, with some belting, which was covered by a building so that it could be taken out without injury. The firm, while owning both the land and the mill, gave a mortgage on the land, and a chattel mortgage upon the mill and machinery, to one Gregg. Subsequently plaintiff acquired the interest of his partners in both the land and the mill. This was in 1873. In 1876 the real-estate mortgage to Gregg was foreclosed. After the foreclosure plaintiff continued in possession of both the land and the mill as tenant. In 1880 the purchaser of the land at the foreclosure sale sold and conveyed it to plaintiff's
1. It was said by this Court in Scudder v. Anderson, 54 Mich. 126:
“It is impossible to regard personal property capable of removal from the land, which does not belong to the land-owner, as part of the realty.”
TJpon the question of fixtures this case is ruled by that ease, and Conrad v. Mining Co., 54 Mich. 249. Plaintiff was a tenant at the time he placed the machines upon the land. There was therefore no unity of title to the realty and the machinery. There is no conflict about the material facts, and the court would have been justified
2. I see no reason in holding that plaintiff is estopped to assert title by the fact that he witnessed and took the acknowledgment of his wife’s mortgage. There was nothing in the mortgage to indicate that it covered this property. Plaintiff was in possession, the mortgagee knew it, and understood that he claimed the property. The assignee of the mortgage occupies in this case no other or different position from that of her assignor. There is no room for the doctrine of estoppel.
Objections were raised to the admission of certain evidence, and to portions of the charge of the court, but under the above disposition of the case they become immaterial.
The judgment is affirmed.