Claiming to have been a surety of the defendant for a certain debt, amounting to $6,500.00 and evidenced by a certain promissory note, the plaintiff obtained a verdict and judgment for the sum of $5,417.18, as for money paid by him, as. such surety, on said debt. The principal assignments of error assume insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict.
Though, in its inception, the debt was admittedly prima facie that of the Bank of Mannington, it is insisted that, in reality, it was the debt of the Mannington Glass Works Co. or Clayton, and that, if Bartlett has any right of recovery, it is against one of them. If this position is not tenable, then it is said E. J. Thomas, Bartlett’s co-maker, assumed the debt and made it his, before Bartlett became a party to the note and that, if he is a mere surety, his right of recovery is against Thomas. If this ground of defense should prove untenable, then it is urged that Bartlett assumed the debt and made it his own, in consideration of the assignment to him of 139 shares of the capital stock of the Mannington Glass Works Co., 39 of which had been held as collateral security for the note, and 100 of which Thomas assigned to him. Finally, it is urged that he is estopped by his conduct from asserting any right against the bank.
The first ground of defense has little or no foundation in the record. No doubt the Mannington Glass Works Co. was the ultimate and final beneficiary of the money borrowed of
The date of Thomas’ alleged assumption of the $6,500.00 note, as, a part of the $12,500.00 debt, was December, 1904. When the note was first divided, in July 1904, the two'notes were made by the Bank of Mannington. When they became due in October 1904, Thomas became the maker of the $6,-500.00 note, but it is not claimed he then assumed payment thereof. He denies that he ever did so. He had been the cashier of the bank for several years. By reason of transactions with the Mannington Glass Works Co., and other con-, cerns the bank’s financial condition Had become very bad, and, in September 1904, its board of directors began an investigation which continued for some time and resulted in the adoption of strenuous measures against the cashier and some of the directors, for restoration or reimbursement of the bank, on account of bad loans made. Very large amounts were charged to Thomas, on this ground, and he was required to secure them by a deed of trust covering practically all of his property. It was not claimed that he had misappropriated any of the bank’s money or was indebted to it for money borrowed. Hamilton, president, and Huey and Tetrick, directors, as indorsers of bad notes, were compelled to make them good. The $6,500.00 note in question was not included in the deed of trust. By way of explanation of the failure so to include it, the directors say he was already bound as maker of the note and they deemed it unnecessary, for that reason, to require him to make a new obligation for it, in any
An admitted, unequivocal and vigorous denial of the agree- . ment of December 1904, was made by Thomas, less than two years after that date, and more than seven years before the date of his testimony in the trial of this case. By a written agreement, dated Sept. 21, 1906, and a contemporaneous •assignment, Virgil T. Clayton, owner of 450 shares of the (capital stock of the Mannington Glass "Works Co., and Josephine B. Clayton, his mother, owner of some right, title or interest in or respecting certain glass-blowing machines used and operated ’in the factory of the Mannington Glass Works Co., made over and transferred to the Bank of Mannington, E. J. Thomas, J. O. Huey, M. F. Hamilton and the widow and heirs of J. M. Tetriek, all of said shares of stock and the interest in the glass-blowing machines, for and in consideration of their release of Virgil T. Clayton from all liability to the bank and the other parties above named or any of them, on account of notes, obligations, due-bills, accounts, choses in action or any other evidence of indebtedness held by any of them, or to which they or any of them might be entitled directly or indirectly, as principals, sureties, indorsers, guarantors or otherwise. This having been done, the creditors of Clayton divided among themselves, the 450 shares of stock, proportionately with the amounts of their debts so released. Thomas took a number of them, at least 100, as creditor for
As to what transpired on the occasion of the execution of the note of Jan. 21, 1905, there is sharp conflict between the testimony of Thomas and that of the president and some of the directors of the bank. On this date, it will be remembered, Bartlett first became connected with the debt. Thomas says he obtained Bartlett’s'signature to the note, at the request the directors of the bank and upon on intimation from them,, that the First National Bank of Mannington desired additional security on the note. In this cbnneetion, as well as others, he contends that his assumption of other debts and his procurement of additional security'on this note, were merely provisional. As cashier of the bank for many years, he had maintained confidential relations with all of its customers, wherefore he felt it to be his duty to keep the institution going and protect the interests of all as far as possible. He says both he and the directors hoped to be able to extricate it from its. perilous situation, and, to that end, they contemplated the taking over of the stock of the Glass Works Co., from Clayton, who or whose company, was the largest defaulting creditor. Moreover, he claims to have been coerced into the assumption of such debts as he secured by his deed of trust, by the threat of the directors to close the bank and thus sacrifice the interests of the depositors, his frineds. Bartlett, in his testimony, insists that he understood, at the time at which he signed the note with Thomas, as maker, that he was doing it for the accommodation- of the bank. He was a stockholder of that institution and, of course, had confidence in the directors and the managers thereof. As to what occurred between him and Thomas, on that occasion, his testimony and Thomas’ are in substantial accord. Thomas says he told Bartlett the paper was the note of the Bank of Mannington and that the
The following facts are relied upon, as proving Bartlett’s assumption of the debt in March, 1909. From the renewal notes dated, March 4, 1909, the name of Thomas was dropped. Bartlett executed the $7,500.00 note, making it payable to S.
Bartlett admits the purchase of the 193 shares of stock from the bank and his acceptance of the 139 shares of the stock, but denies that he took the latter as owner or otherwise than as collateral security for the debt for which he had obligated himself, first with Thomas and then with his mother.
ITe says, that, at the time he signed the note, he not only believed it to be an obligation of the' bank, but also that the bank was in excellent condition. He and his mother owned about twenty shares of its stock, and one of the directors had informed him, just a few days or weeks before, that the stock was worth par. He denies that, at that time, he knew anything of the investigation which had been concluded in December 1904, and also that he had any knowledge of the deed of trust Thomas had executed in favor of the bank. Having later discovered these facts, or the difficulty into which Thomas had fallen, he says he was induced bj Snodgrass and others to believe the debt" was Thomas’. As to the origin of this impression, he says: “Well about the only information I could get with respect to that was through Mr. Snod-grass. * * * The information I got was. this: That
After his unsuccessful pursuit of Thomas, Bartlett was informed by one Hess, who had been an attorney for the First National Bank of Mannington, that the Bank of Mannington, not Thomas was the real debtor and ultimately liable for the note in question. He says Hess ’ advice or information was: “You are after the wrong party. Thomas never got that money and don’t owe it, and you never got it and don’t owe it; the Bank of Mannington got that money from the First National.” Very soon after the date of this information, he brought this action against the Bank of Mannington.
The motion for a new trial was not founded upon any claim of admission of improper evidence or rejection of proper evidence, nor have any of the rulings relating to the admission or rejection of evidence been made the subjects of special bills of exception. Such errors respecting these matters, as may have been committed, are deemed to have been waived. Parr v. Powell, 74 W. Va. 414; State v. Heneghan, 73 W. Va. 706; Iraland v. Smith, 73 W. Va. 755; Halstead v. Horton, 38 W. Va. 727; Gregory v. B. & O. R. Co., 37 W. Va. 606.
The bill of exception does not purport to set forth fully the action of the court upon the instructions. It shows the giving of one instruction for the plaintiff and the refusal of five asked for by the defendant. As to whether any were given at the request of the defendant, it is wholly silent. Nor does it show whether more than one was given for the plaintiff. It does not say the instructions set forth were all of those acted upon by the court. In the matter of instructions, as in all others, except such as are jurisdictional or rise to the dignity of constitutional guaranties, there is a presumption of correctness as to the rulings of the court, which the party complaining must overthrow, in order to obtain a new trial on account thereof. The appellate court cannot presume error. The record in the court below must be so made up as to overcome a presumption of correctness in the rulings on ordinary questions. Accordingly we have held the refusal of proper instructions not to be ground fo.r a new trial, if others given at the instance of the complaining party, have been omitted
In the absence of instructions which may have been given, it is impossible to say whether the objection made to the instruction certified as having been given at the instance of the plaintiff, is well founded or not. It is a binding instruction hypothetically submitting the plaintiff’s theory of the case. A vast number of evidential facts are omitted, but the rule applicable to such instructions does not require a recital of the evidence in detail, nor even a summary or resume of it. It suffices to submit to the-jury the controling issues of fact. Upon the plaintiff’s theory of the ease, this instruction does that. Beginning with the origin of the debt, the $12,500.00 note of April 7, 1902, and tracing it down to Oct. 21, 1904, it submits inquiries as to whether it was and continued to be the debt of the bank and whether the payments made by Bartlett on renewals of the note of Oct. 21, 1904, were made for the use and benefit of the defendant. In general, this covers the ease, but not minor and subsidiary issues. Its omission of the'defendant’s theory is unobjectionable, if the
From what has been said, it is manifest that the jury could well say the original note for $12,500.00 was the debt of the Bank of Mannington. Whether Thomas assumed payment thereof, and made it his own, depended upon conflicting oral testimony, and was, therefore, a question for the jury. The conflict in the evidence as .to this is. not determined by any undisputed or clearly established fact. As late as March 13, 1909, a resolution passed by the bank’s directors, authorizing endorsement of the Bartlett-IIendriekson notes, by the bank, and delivery thereof in renewals of others, dated Nov. 21, 1908, declared said last two notes were “owing to the First National Bank by'this bank.” None of the circumstances relied upon as proving Bartlett’s assumption of the note are conclusive. For almost three years after maturity of the first ' note he signed, it lay in the First National Bank unpaid, un-renewed and unprovided for. Not until he had been sued on it, did he make any provision for it. In the meantime, he had bought the 193 shares of stock of the glass works company from the Bank of Mannington. This purchase was not contemporaneous either with the renewal of the note, in April, 1908, nor with the introduction of Bartlett’s mother, as a party, in March, 1909. It was not a consideration of his alleged assumption of the debt, for he paid for the stock. Nor had he then received the 100 shares from Thomas, or the 39 shares held as collateral for the $6,500.00 note. He never got them until the early part of the year 1909. For its surrender of the 100 shares, the bank took other and better collateral from Thomas. Obviously that transaction con
In pursuing Thomas, as principal in the debt, Bartlett says he acted under a misapprehension of the real’ situation, superT induced by the conduct and .representations of the bank’s president, and his testimony as to this is not overcome by any undisputed or established fact. Indeed, it is scarcely contradicted. There is no direct and specific evidence of knowledge on his part, of the nature of the debt at the time it was made, until after completion of the stock transaction with Thomas and the legal proceedings against him. His apparent satisfaction with the condition of affairs, until after the loss of the factory by fire, is only an evidential circumstance entitled to such weight as the jury saw fit to give it, and not at all conclusive. 'Whether.it or attorney Hess’ disclosure of the original character of the debt was the moving cause of the present action against the bank, was manifestly a question for the jury. Who is better able to say which circumstance exerted the greater influence? Moreover, he had never, by any express agreement, released the bank from any obligation to which it may have been subject. Believing himself to.be the surety of Thomas, he could accept such provisions for satisfaction or indemnity as Thomas was able or willing to make, 'without any intention to release the bank whose liability was then unknown to him. The admission arising by necessary implication from the legal proceedings against Thomas, though • technically a solemn one, does not amount to an adjudication between Bartlett and'the.'bank. . It’is evidence of high character, but only inconclusive evidence, and its effect is avoided by proof of the misapprehension under which it was made. Lee v. Virginia, etc., Co., 18 W. Va. 299; Ray v. Clemens, 6 Leigh 600; Breathed v. Smith, 1 Pat. & H. 301; Morrison v. Householder, 9 Va. 627; R. C. L. p, 500. The issue here involved was not raised in the e^uity^.spit lagainst Thomas, to which the bank was a party.., ItHwas' mádej'ionly as ■a lien creditor of Thomas. Hence, the admission Makeup','that suit is’óf like character, as the one made' in, the Tai#,, case;'!.
All of the money sued for was paid before the action was brought. That some of it was paid after the date laid in the •declaration is immaterial. Connolly v. Ballinger, 67 W. Va. 30; Tabb v. Gregory, 4 Call. 225.
Seeing no error in the.judgment, we will affirm it.
Affirmed.