OPINION
This dеclaratory-judgment action was certified to this court by the Providence County Superior Court pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 9-24-25. The plaintiffs, Kevin M. Bartlett (Kevin) and his parents, seek to determine whether Kevin may recover under the uninsured-motorist coverage of his automobile insurance policy. We conclude that he may recover.
The facts in this matter are not in dispute. On November 14, 1986, Kevin was injured in a two-car collision in North Kingstown, Rhode Island. The accident occurred when Kevin was struck broadside by an uninsured motorist while passing through an intersection; the uninsured motorist was later charged with failure to obey a stop sign and refusal to submit to a chemical test. At the time оf the accident Kevin was driving his mother’s 1980 Ford Pinto because his own car, a 1966 Pontiac GTO, had failed to start that morning.
The Ford Pinto was insured by defendant, Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. (Arnica), under a policy issued to Kevin’s parents. Kevin’s GTO was insured by Arnica under a separate policy in his own name. Pursuant to his insurance policy Kevin could recover up to $300,000 in uninsured-motorist benefits whereas his parents’ policy limited uninsured-motorist coverage to $60,-000. After recоvering $60,000 under his parents’ policy, Kevin sought to recover under the uninsured-motorist coverage of his own policy on the ground that he had been driving his mother’s car as a temporary substitute for his broken-down GTO. Arnica denied coverage, asserting that Kevin’s operation of a vehicle owned and insured by his parents precluded his recovering uninsured-motorist benefits under his own policy, regardless of the vehicle’s characterization as a temporary substitute.
On April 27, 1990, Kevin and his parents filed a complaint in Superior Court against Arnica, requesting that the court declare the Ford Pinto an insured vehicle under Kevin’s policy. Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the matter cаme to be heard before a trial justice on September 17,1990. The parties moved for certification of the entire action for determination to this court, and the trial justice granted the motions and ordered the сase certified.
We have had numerous opportunities to discuss and debate our uninsured-motorist-coverage statute, G.L.1956 (1989 Reenactment) § 27-7-2.1. The issue presented by this case, however, is one of first impression in this state: whethеr a clause excluding the use of a motor vehicle owned by a family member from uninsured-motorist coverage applies to a vehicle used as a temporary substitute. After reviewing the purposes behind both the exсlusionary clause and the temporary-substitute-vehicle provision, we conclude that Kevin is entitled to recover.
The definitions section of Kevin’s policy states:
“ ‘Your covered auto’ means:
1. Any vehicle shown in the Declarations.
* * * * sf: *
4. Any auto or trailer you do not own while used as a temporary substitute for any other vehicle described in this definition which is out of normal use because of its:
a. breakdown;
b. repair;
*47 c. servicing;
d. loss; or
e. destruction.” (Emphasis added.)
Arnica concedes that Kevin was driving the Ford Pinto as a temporary substitute for his own disabled vehicle and that, therefore, his mother’s Pinto meets the policy’s definition of a covered auto. Nevertheless, Arnica argues that the clear language of the policy precludes recovery of uninsured-motorist benefits when a vehicle owned by a family member is used as a temporary substitute.
The temporary-substitute-vehicle provision serves to provide
“coverage while a substituted vehicle not owned by the insured is being temporarily used, where the described automobile is withdrawn from normal use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss, or destruction. It indicates the intentiоn of the insurer to cover only one automobile of the insured and to avoid covering more than one automobile for a single premium.
“Its purpose is not to narrow or defeat coverage but to make the coverage reasonably definite as to the vehicles the insured intended normally to use * * *.
“The purpose is to give the insured additional temporary coverage when the insured can not use his vehicle scheduled under the policy.” 12 G. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law 2d § 45:219 at 511-12 (rev. ed. 1981).
See generally Home Indemnity Co. v. Godley,
In the uninsured-motorist-eoverage section of Kevin’s policy we find the following exсlusion:
“We do not provide Uninsured Motorists Coverage for bodily injury sustained by any person:
1. While occupying, or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned by you or any family member which is not insured for this coverage under this policy.” (Emphasis added.)
The purpose of this exclusionary clause is twofold: “(1) to prevent an insurеd from receiving coverage on all household cars or another uninsured car of the insured by merely purchasing a single policy, and (2) to provide coverage to the insured when engaged in the infrequent use of non-owned vehicles.”
Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Ward,
When the language in an insurance contract is ambiguous or capable of more than one reasonable meaning, the contract will be strictly construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.
Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Streicker,
“[T]he proper inquiry is * * * whether the insurance policy contract would be meaningful to the layman who at his peril may be legally bound or held to *48 understand the nature and extent of its coverage. The language of insurance policies is to be interpreted in accordance with the way it would be understоod by the average man, rather than in a technical sense. * * * Ambiguous exclusionary clauses, particularly, should be construed in the manner most favorable to the insured." (Emphasis added.) Ward,83 Wash.2d at 358 ,517 P.2d at 969 .
In
Ward
the court found the exclusionary clause ambiguous because of its confusing structure and its placement among the general-coverage provisions, rather than among other exclusionary provisions. The
Ward
court stated that it was the insurer’s obligation to spell out any еxclusion in clear and unmistakable language.
Id.
at 359,
First, the exclusion may be intended to restrict Kevin from using as a temporary substitute any vehicle owned by him or his family. This is the interpretation that Arni-ca would urge us to adopt. It is our considered opinion, however, that “where the equities do not strongly favor the insurance company, a policyholder should not be required to engage in such rigorous analysis to learn that there is no coverage by the carrier for the use of a substitute car.”
Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Kligler,
Sеcond, the exclusionary clause may be intended to apply in all cases except when the vehicle is used as a temporary substitute. Thus, the temporary-substitute-vehicle provision would take precedence over the exclusionary clause. In Lewis v. Bradley the court held that the exclusionary clause did not apply to a situation involving a temporary substitute vehicle:
“The two insuring agreements refer to entirely different fact situations. The temporary substitute automobile coverage is expressly limited to exclude only an automobile owned by the named insured or his spouse if she is a resident in the same household. The use of other automobiles coverage aрplies to a situation where the car is not a substitute automobile and such coverage is expressly limited to exclude an automobile owned by or furnished for regular use to the named insured or any member of the same household, among other provisions.” (Emphasis аdded.) Lewis,7 Wis.2d at 595 ,97 N.W.2d at 413 .
If Arnica had intended to exclude vehicles owned by family members from use as temporary substitutes, it could have defined the temporary substitute vehicle as a vehicle that “you
or a member of your family
does not own,” thereby paralleling the language of the exclusionary clause. For examples of insurance policies that define temporary substitute vehicles to exclude family members’ vehicles, see
Teter v. Corley,
Thus we find that the exclusionary clause is susceрtible of two possible meanings when read in conjunction with the temporary-substitute-vehicle provision, the first favoring Arnica and the second favoring Kevin. In light of this ambiguity we are inclined to accept the second interprеtation.
Streicker,
Arnica contends that this case should be distinguished from other cases
*49
that hold that an exclusionary clause does not apply to а temporary substitute vehicle because this exclusionary clause is contained in the uninsured-motorist-coverage section rather than the liability-coverage section. We do not find this contention persuasive. Thе contract provisions, particularly those delineating uninsured-motorist coverage, are to be interpreted in light of the public policy for which the Legislature enacted the uninsured-motorist-coverage statutе: to protect a named insured against financial loss resulting from the operation of an uninsured motor vehicle.
DiTata v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.,
“The primary objective] remains indemnification for an insured’s loss rather than defeat of his or her claim.
“In order fully to effectuate these purposes, this court has disallowed contractual limitations that curtail an insured’s recovery in instances in which the insured has not recovered the amount of his or her actual loss.” Id. at 247-48.
In our рresent case Kevin has been severely disabled through no fault of his own, he has recovered only a portion of the $300,000 to which he is entitled, and he is not attempting to recover any benefits in excess of $300,000. It would be unjust to deny him recovery of his full benefits in these circumstances. We therefore hold that Kevin is entitled to recover under the uninsured-motorist coverage of his insurance policy.
For the foregoing reasons the certified questiоn is answered in the affirmative, the plaintiff may submit a claim under the uninsured-motorist clause of his policy, and the papers of the case are remanded to the Superior Court for denial of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and for further proceedings as warranted.