BARTELS v. STATE OF IOWA.
Nos. 134, 181, 182, 440
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided June 4, 1923
262 U.S. 404
OCTOBER TERM, 1922. Statement of the Case.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IOWA.
BOHNING v. STATE OF OHIO.
POHL v. STATE OF OHIO.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OHIO.
NEBRASKA DISTRICT OF EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN SYNOD OF MISSOURI, OHIO, AND OTHER STATES, ET AL. v. MCKELVIE ET AL., ETC.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEBRASKA.
Nos. 134, 181, 182, 440. Argued October 10, November 28, 1922, and February 23, 1923.—Decided June 4, 1923.
Decided upon the authority of Meyer v. Nebraska, ante, 390.
191 Ia. 1060; 102 Oh. St. 474; 187 N. W. 927, reversed.
ERROR, (1) to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa, sustaining a conviction of a teacher for teaching German to pupils in a parochial school, below the eighth grade; (2) to like judgments of the Supreme Court of Ohio; (3) to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Nebraska reversing a decision of a trial court, and refusing an injunction, in a suit brought against state officials to prevent enforcement of a statute penalizing the teaching of foreign languages to young children in schools.
Mr. Frank E. Farwell, with whom Mr. Charles E. Pickett, Mr. Benjamin F. Swisher, and Mr. Fred B. Hagemann were on the briefs, for plaintiff in error in No. 134.
Mr. Bruce J. Flick, for defendant in error in No. 134, submitted. Mr. Ben J. Gibson, Attorney General of the State of Iowa, was also on the brief.
The constitutionality of the statute cannot be assailed without showing that the party questioning it has been deprived of property or liberty in some arbitrary way; because some other person might be thus affected, he is not authorized to ask the court to invalidate a law on questions of constitutionality which do not directly affect him.
The constitutionality of acts like the one in question has been upheld in: Nebraska District Evangelical Synod v. McKelvie, 104 Neb. 93; Pohl v. State, 102 Oh. St. 474; State v. Bartels, 191 Ia. 1074; Castello v. McConnico, 168 U. S. 680; Tyler v. Judges, 179 U. S. 410; Strouse v. Foxworth, 231 U. S. 162.
The language of the statute does not violate
When the law operates equally upon all, when the rule of conduct is uniform throughout the State, presumption lying at the foundation of representative government is that the legislator will act wisely and in the interest of all of the people. Such legislation is not open to the objection that it is class legislation. Viermaster v. White, 179 N. Y. 235; Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138; Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U. S. 486; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61; Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425; Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U. S. 572; State v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 153 Ia. 702; Bopp v. Clark, 165 Ia. 697; Hunter v. Coal Co., 175 Ia. 245.
In determining the reasonableness of a police regulation, the legislature is at liberty to act with reference to established usages, customs, and conditions of the people and with a view to the promotion of their comfort and the preservation of the public peace and good order. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 550; Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 556, 559.
It will be presumed that the legislature in passing this statute was familiar with existing conditions, and that no general laws are ever passed either through want of information on the part of the legislature or because it was misled. Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 U. S. 358, 363.
Courts do not sit in judgment upon the wisdom of legislative enactments.
Mr. Timothy S. Hogan and Mr. Frank Davis, Jr., for plaintiffs in error in Nos. 181 and 182.
Mr. E. J. Thobaben, with whom Mr. Edward C. Stanton was on the brief, for defendant in error in Nos. 181 and 182.
The legislature has the right, more than that, the duty, of providing adequate means of education of the young. It surely has the right to prescribe the course of study which shall be taught. In
Experience has shown that it is not wise to keep a young child or one that would be a student in the ele
Sections
The only remaining question is that
Much is said about personal rights, liberty, equality, privilege, due process of law, poison virus, etc. These questions are not involved in the law complained of. The
It certainly is within the province of the legislature to enact laws protective of patriotism and the war power of the country.
Mr. Arthur F. Mullen and Mr. C. E. Sandall, with whom Mr. I. L. Albert was on the briefs, for plaintiffs in error in No. 440.
Mr. Mason Wheeler and Mr. O. S. Spillman, with whom Mr. Clarence A. Davis, Attorney General of the State of Nebraska, Mr. Charles S. Reed, Mr. Guy C. Chambers and Mr. Hugh La Master were on the brief, for defendants in error in No. 440.
Mr. William D. Guthrie and Mr. Bernard Hershkopf, by leave of court, filed a brief as amici curiæ.
The several judgments entered in these causes by the Supreme Courts of Iowa, Ohio and Nebraska, respectively, must be reversed upon authority of Meyer v. Nebraska, decided today, ante, 390.
Number 134. Plaintiff in error was convicted of teaching pupils in a parochial school below the eighth grade to read German contrary to “An act requiring the use of the English language as the medium of instruction in all secular subjects in all schools within the State of Iowa,” approved April 10, 1919.1 He used English for teaching the common school branches, but taught young pupils to read German. The Supreme Court of the State held: “The manifest design of this language statute is to supplement the compulsory education law by requiring that the branches enumerated to be taught shall be taught in the English language, and in no other. The evident purpose is that no other language shall be taught in any school, public or private, during the tender years of youth, that is, below the eighth grade.” 191 Iowa, 1060.
Numbers 181 and 182. Bohning and Pohl, of St. Johns Evangelical Congregational School, Garfield Heights, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, were severally convicted (102 Ohio St. 474) of violating “An act to supplement section 7762 of the General Code . . . and to repeal section 7729, concerning elementary, private and parochial schools and providing that instruction shall be in the English language,” (108 Ohio Laws 614) approved June 5, 1919,2 which prohibits the teaching of German to pupils below the eighth grade.
Number 440. An injunction is sought against the Governor and Attorney General of the State and the Attorney for Platte County to prevent enforcement of “An act to declare the English language the official language of this State, and to require all official proceedings, records and publications to be in such language and all school branches to be taught in said language in public, private, denominational and parochial schools,” etc., approved April 14,
McKelvie and Davis, formerly Governor and Attorney General, no longer occupy those offices. The cause is dismissed as to them. Otto F. Walter is now the County Attorney and the judgment below as to him must be reversed.
Reversed.
We all agree, I take it, that it is desirable that all the citizens of the United States should speak a common tongue, and therefore that the end aimed at by the statute is a lawful and proper one. The only question is whether the means adopted deprive teachers of the liberty secured to them by the Fourteenth Amendment. It is with hesitation and unwillingness that I differ from my brethren with regard to a law like this but I cannot bring my mind to believe that in some circumstances, and circumstances existing it is said in Nebraska, the statute might not be regarded as a reasonable or even necessary method of reaching the desired result. The part of the act with which we are concerned deals with the teaching of young children. Youth is the time when familiarity with a language is established and if there are sections in the State where a child would hear only Polish or French or German spoken at home I am not prepared to say that it is unreasonable to provide that in his early years he shall hear and speak only English at school. But if it is reasonable it is not an undue restriction of the liberty either of teacher or scholar. No one would doubt that a teacher might be forbidden to teach many things, and the only criterion of his liberty under the Constitution that I can think of is “whether, considering the end in view, the statute passes the bounds of reason and assumes the character of a merely arbitrary fiat.” Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, 204. Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U. S. 297, 303. Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264. I think I appreciate the objection to the law but it appears to me to present a question upon which men reasonably might differ and therefore I am unable to say that the Constitution of the United States prevents the experiment being tried.
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND concurs in this opinion.
