46 Conn. App. 112 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1997
Opinion
The plaintiffs
The record reveals the following facts. At the time of the hearing on the claim for an injunction, the plaintiffs
The plaintiffs thereafter filed an action seeking a temporary and permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from (1) shutting off or threatening to shut off the utilities, (2) terminating or threatening to terminate the plaintiffs’ employment if they did not vacate the premises, and (3) evicting the plaintiffs from the premises by any means other than summary process. The trial court denied the plaintiffs’ application for injunc-tive relief. All of the plaintiffs subsequently moved out of the residence halls. They then filed an appeal to this court from the trial court’s denial of their application.
On July 30,1996, two of the plaintiffs, Cheryl Barszck and Louis Fulinello, filed separate actions claiming an unlawful entry and detainer and seeking writs of restitution restoring them to possession of the dwelling units. After a hearing, the trial court denied both writs. The plaintiffs also appeal from this denial.
The plaintiffs first claim that the trial court improperly denied their injunction application. Before we review this claim, however, we must first determine whether it is now moot because all the plaintiffs have moved out of the state residences.
“Mootness implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to resolve. . . . It is a well-settled general rule that the éxistence
It is undisputed that none of the plaintiffs still resides in the state residence halls. It is, therefore, clear that the injunctive relief the plaintiffs seek would have no practical effect. The plaintiffs argue, however, that this claim qualifies for review under the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception. “Our cases reveal that for an otherwise moot question to qualify for review under the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ exception, it must meet three requirements. First, the challenged action, or the effect of the challenged action, by its very nature must be of a limited duration so that there is a strong likelihood that the substantial majority of cases raising a question about its validity will become moot before appellate litigation can be concluded. Second, there must be a reasonable likelihood that the question presented in the pending case will arise again in the future, and that it will affect either the same complaining party or a reasonably identifiable group for whom that party can be said to act as surrogate. Third, the question must have some public importance. Unless all three requirements are met, the appeal must be dismissed as moot.” Loisel v. Rowe, 233 Conn. 370, 382-83, 660 A.2d 323 (1995).
In the present case, we find that the challenged action, the trial court’s dismissal of the injunctive action, is not inherently of such a limited duration that there is a strong likelihood that the majority of cases raising a question about its validity will become moot before appellate litigation can be concluded. Furthermore, the issue presented in this case could arise in a
We next analyze the plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court improperly denied their writs of restitution based on claims of unlawful entry and detainer. See General Statutes § 47a-43.
“The process of entry and detainer is in its nature an action by which one in the possession and enjoyment of any land, tenement or dwelling unit, who has been deprived of it, may be restored to the possession and enjoyment of that property. For a plaintiff to prevail, it must be shown that he was in actual possession at the time of the defendant’s entry. Berlingo v. Sterling Ocean House, Inc., 203 Conn. 103, 108, 523 A.2d 888 (1987). The question of whether the plaintiff was in actual possession at the time of the defendants’ entry is one for the trier of fact. Communiter Break Co. v. Scinto, 196 Conn. 390, 394, 493 A.2d 182 (1985). Generally, the inquiry is whether the one claiming actual possession has exercised the dominion and control that owners of like property usually exercise, although it is not necessary to show a continuous personal presence on the land. Id., 394.” Catropa v. Bargas, 17 Conn. App. 285, 289, 551 A.2d 1282 (1989).
Here, the trial court found that, at the time of the defendants’ entry, the plaintiffs did not exercise any physical control with the intent and apparent purpose of asserting dominion over the premises. “We will not retry the facts since the trial court in its role as fact finder has the unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of the circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Solomon v. Hall-Brooke Foundation, Inc., 30 Conn. App. 129, 132, 619 A.2d 863 (1993). “The factual finding of a trial court on any issue is reversible only if it is clearly erroneous. Practice Book § 4061.” Zarembski v. Warren, 28 Conn. App. 1, 4, 609 A.2d 1039, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 918, 614 A.2d 831 (1992). The plaintiffs argue that the trial court’s finding was clearly
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The plaintiffs named in this consolidated appeal are Cheryl Barszck, Rodney Mailloux, Helen Hogan and Louis Fulinello.
The defendants named are Albert Solnit, commissioner of mental health and addiction services, Reginald Jones, secretary of the office of policy and management, and Ted Anson, commissioner of public works.
This court granted the defendants’ motion to have the three appeals consolidated.
The plaintiffs maintain that the action would not be moot should this court reverse the judgments for the defendants in the two entry and detainer actions and restore their possession of the dwelling units. Because of our resolution of the plaintiffs’ entry and detainer claims, we need not address that assertion.
General Statutes § 47a-43 provides in relevant part: “Complaint and procedure: Forcible entry and detainer; entry and detainer, (a) When any person (1) makes forcible entry into any land, tenement or dwelling unit and with a strong hand detains the same or (2) having made apeaceable entry, without the consent of the actual possessor, holds and detains the same with force and strong hand or (3) enters into any land, tenement or dwelling unit and causes damage to the premises or damage to or removal of or detention of the personal property of the possessor, or (4) when the party put out of possession would be required to cause damage to the premises or commit a breach of the peace in order to regain possession, the party thus ejected, held out of possession, or suffering damage may exhibit his complaint to any judge of the Superior Court. . . .”
See footnote 5.