2004 Ohio 5746 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2004
{¶ 2} Second, appellants argue that the trial court erred in concluding that Prosecutor Beal is immune from suit. However, Prosecutor Beal's decision to maintain the prosecution against Douglas Barstow is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Therefore, Prosecutor Beal has absolute immunity from suit.
{¶ 3} Third, appellants argue that the trial court erred in concluding that the City of Logan and the Logan Police Department are immune from liability. However, none of the exceptions to immunity contained in R.C.
{¶ 4} Fourth, appellants argue that the trial court erred in concluding that Officer Flemming is immune from liability. Officer Flemming supported her motion for summary judgment with an affidavit showing that she did not act maliciously, wantonly, or recklessly. Appellants, on the other hand, offered no Civ.R. 56 evidence regarding this issue. Because appellants failed to demonstrate a genuine issue concerning Officer Flemming's immunity, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Officer Flemming.
{¶ 5} Finally, appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Herman Carson on their legal malpractice claim. Herman Carson supported his motion for summary judgment with an affidavit stating that he did not deviate from the applicable standard of care. Appellants, however, failed to provide opposing expert testimony demonstrating that Herman Carson breached a duty to Douglas Barstow. This failure to provide opposing expert testimony was fatal to appellants' legal malpractice claim.
{¶ 6} In addition to challenging the merits of the court's decision, appellants raise two additional arguments. First, appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting the defendants' motions without a hearing. However, our review of the record indicates that appellants never requested an oral hearing on the defendants' motions. Thus, the court did not err in failing to hold one. Second, appellants argue that the trial court violated their constitutional right to a jury trial by granting the defendants' motions. However, the proper granting of a motion for summary judgment does not abridge an individual's constitutional right to a trial by jury. Moreover, the dismissal of a claim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) renders moot the right to a jury trial in a civil matter. Because appellants' arguments all lack merit, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
{¶ 7} In October 2001, a fourteen-year-old female informed her school guidance counselor that Douglas Barstow had raped her. The guidance counselor immediately notified the Logan Police Department. After investigating the girl's allegations, Officer Rachelle Cook (nka Flemming) arrested Douglas Barstow. Barstow's mother, Rhonda Norris, posted his bond.
{¶ 8} Subsequently, the prosecutor filed complaints against Douglas Barstow for rape, corruption of a minor, and gross sexual imposition. The Logan Police rearrested Barstow and Judge Richard Wallar set Barstow's bail at $100,000. In November 2001, the grand jury indicted Douglas Barstow on charges of rape, corruption of a minor, and gross sexual imposition. Four days later, Judge Thomas Gerken set Barstow's bail at $500,000.
{¶ 9} Douglas Barstow initially retained Attorney Herman Carson to defend him. In February 2002, however, he fired Mr. Carson2 and retained Attorney Charles Knight. One month later, Douglas Barstow's case proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury acquitted Barstow of all charges.
{¶ 10} In October 2002, Douglas Barstow, Jerry Barstow, Rhonda Norris, and Terry Born, II, filed a pro se complaint against Judge Richard Wallar, Judge Thomas Gerken, Prosecutor Larry Beal, Herman Carson, and the City of Logan, the Logan Police Department, and Officer Rachelle Flemming (City Defendants). In their complaint, appellants set forth various claims, including false arrest, malicious prosecution, and legal malpractice. One month later, Judges Wallar and Gerken filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In their motion, the Judges argued that they were immune from suit since they were acting within their jurisdiction. In April 2003, Prosecutor Beal filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that he was immune from suit since his actions were "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." One month later, the City Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that they were immune from liability under R.C.
{¶ 11} In March 2004, the trial court granted the defendants' motions. Appellants now appeal that decision. In their brief, appellants do not set forth traditional assignments of error as required by App.R. 16. Instead, appellants' brief includes a "Statement of Issues Presented for Review." We have chosen to treat these "issues presented" as appellants' assignments of error:
"ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1 — The lower court erred in dismissing the case without trial or hearing. ASSIGNMENT OFERROR NO. 2 — The lower court abused its discretion by granting Defendants' motions for summary judgment.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3 — The lower court abused its discretion by granting Defendants' motion to dismiss.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4 — The lower court erred in granting immunity. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5 — The lower court erred by denying Plaintiffs due process."
{¶ 12} For the sake of clarity, we will address appellants' assignments of error out of order. We begin by addressing appellants' third and fourth assignments of error. Here, appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss filed by Judge Wallar and Judge Gerken. Specifically, appellants argue that the court erred in concluding that Judge Wallar and Judge Gerken are immune from suit. They argue that the Judges "acted outside their jurisdiction."
{¶ 13} Civ.R. 12(B)(6) provides that a court may grant a motion to dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Stateex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs.,
{¶ 14} In their complaint, appellants allege that Municipal Court Judge Richard Wallar acted outside his jurisdiction when he set bail on felony charges. They allege that Judge Wallar acted outside his jurisdiction to protect his deputy clerk and himself from embarrassment and scandal. Thus, they allege that Judge Wallar is guilty of "cover-up and conspiracy." As for Judge Gerken, appellants allege that he violated Douglas Barstow's constitutional rights by setting excessive bail.
{¶ 15} It is a well settled rule that where a judge possesses jurisdiction over a controversy, he is not civilly liable for actions taken in his judicial capacity. State ex rel. Fisher v.Burkhardt,
{¶ 16} Our review of appellants' complaint indicates that appellants have failed to allege sufficient facts to satisfy either of the two exceptions to immunity. First, appellants cannot establish that the Judges' actions were nonjudicial. An act by a judge is "judicial" if it is a function normally performed by a judge and the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Burkardt,
{¶ 17} Second, appellants cannot establish that the judges acted in the absence of jurisdiction. The court of common pleas has original jurisdiction over "all crimes and offenses", except those minor offenses reserved to courts of lesser jurisdiction. R.C.
{¶ 18} In their complaint, appellants allege that Judge Gerken set excessive bail in violation of Douglas Barstow's constitutional rights. At most, however, this constitutes an act in excess of jurisdiction. An act is in excess of jurisdiction if "the act, although within the power of the judge, is not authorized by law and is therefore voidable." Neu,
{¶ 19} It is apparent from the face of appellants' complaint that both Judge Wallar and Judge Gerken had jurisdiction over the case at the time they set Douglas Barstow's bail. Moreover, setting bail in a felony criminal case is a "judicial" act. Thus, Judge Wallar and Judge Gerken are immune from suit. Because appellants can prove no set of facts that would entitle them to relief, dismissal of their claims against Judge Wallar and Judge Gerken was appropriate. Accordingly, appellants' third and fourth assignments of error have no merit.
{¶ 20} In their second assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Prosecutor Beal, Herman Carson, and the City Defendants. Although appellants' argument is not entirely clear, they appear to argue that the defendants failed to support their motions with proper Civ.R. 56 evidence. In addition, appellants argue that there are genuine issues for trial.
{¶ 21} In reviewing a summary judgment, the lower court and appellate court utilize the same standard, i.e., we review the judgment independently and without deference to the trial court's determination. Midwest Specialties, Inc. v. Firestone Tire Rubber Co. (1988),
{¶ 22} Civ.R. 56(C) sets forth the types of documentary evidence admissible in summary judgment proceedings. Under Civ.R. 56(C) a trial court may consider "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations * * *." See, also, Fink, Greenbaum Wilson, Guide to the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure (2004) 56-14, Section 56:8. When affidavits are offered in support of a motion for summary judgment, the affidavits "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit." Civ.R. 56(E).
{¶ 24} Generally, an employee of a political subdivision has qualified immunity under R.C.
{¶ 25} Prosecutors are considered "quasi-judicial" officers.Willitzer v. McCloud (1983),
{¶ 26} Appellants challenge Prosecutor Beal's decision to initiate the prosecution against Douglas Barstow. In addition, appellants challenge Prosecutor Beal's decision to maintain the prosecution against Douglas Barstow even after the DNA results indicated that Barstow did not have sexual intercourse with the girl. As noted, however, a prosecutor has absolute immunity in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the state's case.Willitzer, quoting Imbler. Prosecutor Beal's decisions to initiate and to maintain the prosecution against Douglas Barstow are "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." See Willitzer,
{¶ 28} Under Ohio law, claims for false arrest and false imprisonment require proof of the same essential elements.Rogers v. Barbera (1960),
{¶ 29} R.C. Chapter 2744 establishes a three-tier analysis for determining whether a political subdivision is immune from liability. Carter v. Cleveland,
{¶ 30} The City of Logan and the Logan Police Department are political subdivisions as defined in R.C.
{¶ 31} Our review of R.C.
{¶ 32} As for Officer Flemming, R.C.
{¶ 33} The Ohio Revised Code does not expressly impose liability on police officers for false arrest. Moreover, Officer Flemming was acting within her employment as a police officer when she arrested Douglas Barstow. Thus, Officer Flemming is immune from liability unless appellants can show that she acted maliciously, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.
{¶ 34} "Malice" is the willful and intentional design to do injury or the intention or desire to harm another, usually seriously, through conduct that is unlawful or unjustified.Jackson v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1991),
{¶ 35} Officer Flemming supported her motion for summary judgment with an affidavit designed to show that she did not act maliciously, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. In the affidavit, Officer Flemming detailed the events leading up to Douglas Barstow's arrest. Additionally, she detailed the facts that she relied on to arrest Barstow. Officer Flemming stated: "I felt that I had adequate probable cause to arrest Douglas Barstow based on [A]'s statement and emotional condition, my experience in dealing with sexual assault victims, my training in issues of rape and sexual assault, the statement of [A]'s mother regarding bruising on [A]'s arms, and Douglas Barstow's known propensity as a sexual offender to commit this type of crime." Although appellants responded to the motion for summary judgment, they did not support their response with any Civ.R. 56 evidence.
{¶ 36} When faced with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not simply rely upon the allegations in the pleadings. Civ.R. 56(E); Dresher v. Burt
(1996),
{¶ 37} In the present case, appellants failed to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding Officer Flemming's immunity. Appellants have not pointed to any factual evidence showing that Officer Flemming acted maliciously, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. Moreover, the subsequent negative DNA results and jury acquittal do not render Officer Flemming's initial actions in arresting Barstow malicious, wanton, or reckless. Since appellants failed to present evidence demonstrating a genuine factual dispute that Officer Flemming acted maliciously, in bad faith, or wantonly or recklessly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Officer Flemming. Accordingly, appellants' argument lacks merit.
{¶ 39} Appellants' claims for misrepresentation and malpractice both stem from Carson's comments regarding the independent DNA test. Because the claims both arise out of the manner in which Carson represented Douglas Barstow within the attorney-client relationship, we will, for purposes of this opinion, treat them as a single claim for legal malpractice. See, e.g., Endicott v. Johrendt (June 22, 2000), Franklin App. No. 99AP-935.
{¶ 40} In order to prevail on a claim for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must show: (1) an attorney-client relationship giving rise to a professional duty; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) damages proximately caused by the breach. Krahn v. Kinney
(1989),
{¶ 41} Generally, the law requires plaintiffs in a legal malpractice action to produce expert testimony establishing the applicable standard of care, unless the breach is such that it comes within the ordinary knowledge and experience of the jury.McInnis v. Hyatt Legal Clinics (1984),
{¶ 42} In the present case, Carson provided an affidavit detailing his qualifications and experience. Carson indicated that he is licensed as an attorney in Ohio and has been practicing in the area of criminal defense for over twenty years. He then set forth the facts regarding his representation of Douglas Barstow. In his affidavit, Carson stated that he took care to communicate with Barstow in a clear and understandable manner. Additionally, he indicated that he had fully investigated the facts of the matter, including obtaining discovery of the prosecutor's evidence and witnesses. Finally, Carson stated that he was in the process of preparing every available defense for trial and had met all court and statutory deadlines. Carson indicated in his affidavit that he "represented * * * Douglas Barstow at or above the standard of care for such representation in the community." He further indicated that he "never deviated from the applicable standard of care in the community for criminal defense in his representation of * * * Douglas Barstow."
{¶ 43} Carson's testimony in his affidavit discharged his burden under Civ.R. 56(E). Appellants, however, failed to provide opposing expert testimony demonstrating that Carson breached a duty to Douglas Barstow. Moreover, the breach alleged by appellants, i.e., Carson's failure and/or refusal to order an independent DNA test, is not the type of obvious breach that is within the ordinary knowledge and experience of the jury. Thus, appellants needed to provide expert testimony regarding the applicable standard of care. McInnis,
{¶ 44} Appellants also allege in their complaint that Carson conspired with Prosecutor Larry Beal to allow the malicious prosecution of Douglas Barstow to continue.
{¶ 45} Civil conspiracy is defined as "a malicious combination of two or more persons to injure another in person or property, in a way not competent for one alone, resulting in actual damages." Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co.,
{¶ 46} In a claim for malicious criminal prosecution, the plaintiff must show: "(1) malice in instituting or continuing the prosecution; (2) lack of probable cause; and (3) termination of the prosecution in favor of the accused." Trussell v. GeneralMotors Corp. (1990),
{¶ 47} An indictment by the grand jury creates a presumption of probable cause. Adamson v. May Co. (1982),
{¶ 48} Appellants' complaint indicates that the grand jury indicted Douglas Barstow on charges of rape, corruption of a minor, and gross sexual imposition. Attorney Carson's affidavit also indicates that the grand jury indicted Douglas Barstow on these charges. Since the grand jury returned an indictment against Barstow, there is a presumption of probable cause. Appellants offered no evidence to rebut this presumption of probable cause. Thus, appellants failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact concerning the issue of probable cause. Because appellants failed to demonstrate a genuine issue regarding the underlying unlawful act, summary judgment on the civil conspiracy claim was appropriate. Accordingly, appellants' argument lacks merit.
{¶ 49} In summary, we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Prosecutor Beal, Attorney Carson, and the City Defendants. Accordingly, we overrule appellants' second assignment of error.
{¶ 50} Finally, we will address appellants' first and fifth assignments of error together. In their first assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial court erred by dismissing their case without a trial or hearing. In their fifth assignment of error, appellants argue that the court violated their constitutional rights by denying them the right to a trial by jury. They argue that granting the motion to dismiss and the motions for summary judgment deprived them of their right to a trial by jury.
{¶ 52} Furthermore, Civ.R. 7(B) permits trial courts to `make provision by rule or order for the submission and determination of motions without oral hearings upon brief written statements of reasons in support or opposition." In accordance with this rule, the Hocking County Court of Common Pleas has enacted Loc.R. 8, which states: "(A) Motions, in general, shall be submitted and determined upon the motion papers hereinafter referred to. Oralarguments of the motions will be permitted on application andproper showing." (Emphasis added.) Here, appellants did not request an oral hearing on the defendants' motions for summary judgment. Therefore, the trial court did not err in ruling on the motions without an oral hearing.
{¶ 53} Additionally, the right to a jury trial is only enforceable where there are factual issues to be tried. Conleyv. Willis, Scioto App. No. 00CA2746, 2001-Ohio-2410. Accordingly, the proper granting of a motion for summary judgment does not abridge an individual's constitutional right to a jury trial. Id., citing Tschantz v. Ferguson (1994),
{¶ 55} Additionally, the right to a trial by jury is not compromised if the plaintiff has not set forth a cognizable claim. See Winkle v. Southdown, Inc. (Sept. 3, 1993), Greene App. No. 92-CA-107; Justice v. Nationwide Ins. Co. (May 27, 1999), Franklin App. No. 98AP-1083; Teichman v. Weltman (May 2, 1996), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 69003, 69005, and 69006. Moreover, procedural motions that properly "winnow out" nonmeritorious claims do not infringe upon an individual's right to a trial by jury. See, generally, Tschantz,
{¶ 56} In summary, we conclude the trial court did not err in granting the defendants' motions without an oral hearing as appellants never requested one. In addition, we conclude that the trial court did not deprive appellants of their right to a trial by jury since the trial court properly granted the defendants' motions. Accordingly, we overrule appellants' remaining assignments of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Hocking County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Kline, P.J. Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.