MEMORANDUM OPINION
On January 10, 2014, Richard W. Barry, Chapter 11 Trustee (the “Trustee” or the “Plaintiff’) for the estate of Liberty State
I. FACTS
On July 29, 2011 (the “Petition Date”), the Debtors filed a voluntary chapter 11 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (Case No. 11-12404(KG)). On January 10, 2014, Richard A. Barry (the “Trustee”), acting as Chapter 11 Trustee for the Debtors, commenced this adversary proceeding (the “Adversary Proceeding”) against Santan-der. In the Complaint, the Trustee asserts eleven causes of, action stemming from a series of transactions allegedly designed by the participants (the “Non-Party Conspirators” or the “Conspirators”) to convey various assets of the Debtors to various non-Debtor affiliates for minimal to no value. Compl. ¶¶ 170-261. According to the Complaint, Santander and its employees were instrumental in enabling the Non-Party Conspirators to complete the theft. Id. The four transactions that gave rise to the Complaint follow.
A. The Ministrelli Trust Theft
The Ministrelli Trust (the “Trust”) was the Debtors most valuable asset prior to the Petition Date. Compl. ¶6. The Trust held a life insurance policy of a wealthy individual with a face value of $11.5 million. Id. The Debtors acquired the beneficial interest in the Trust in December 2008. Compl. ¶ 57. Through a series of transactions involving the creation of numerous bank accounts designed solely to facilitate the transfer of the Trust proceeds, Santander allegedly aided and abetted the Non-Party Conspirators in “conspiring] to steal the Ministrelli Trust, selling] the policy to a third party, and laundering] the sales proceeds through their personal Santander accounts to avoid detection before ultimately depositing the funds in an account owned by [certain Non-Party Conspirator affiliates].” Compl. ¶ 58.
Santander and the Non-Party Conspirators allegedly effectuated the theft through a serious of carefully planned stages. The first stage involved removing Michael Kwasnik (“MKwasnik”), the Debtors’ counsel and founder, as trustee of the Minis-trelli Trust. Compl. ¶ 59. The Plaintiff notes that this step was crucial because “[MKwasnik] was already in the crosshairs of a lawsuit commenced by the Debtors’ lender holding a secured interest in the Ministrelli Trust.” Id. Shortly before the Non-Party Conspirators removed MKwas-nik as trustee, Westdale Construction, Ltd. (“Westdale”), a lender with a security interest in the Trust, sent a letter to MKwasnik informing him of its rights in
In October 2009, the Non-Party Conspirators appointed David Chalmers (“Chalmers”) as successor trustee.
The Trustee further alleges that during this time, the Non-Party Conspirators created two additional copies of the Appointment of Successor Trustee document. Compl. ¶ 63. In order to “create the false appearance” that MKwasnik had received notice of the Westdale lawsuit after his resignation as trustee, these duplicates were backdated to June 2009.
In November 2009, Chalmers took the backdated documents to Santander’s West-mont, New Jersey Branch (the ‘Westmont Branch”). Compl. ¶ 64. The Complaint alleges that one of Santander’s employees, Kimberly Hicks-Finnerty
After legal title to the Trust was passed to Chalmers, the Conspirators next “opened up several new accounts at San-tander to enable them to receive and launder the proceeds from their fraudulent sale of the Ministrelli Trust.” Compl. ¶ 70. On September 24, 2008, Non-Party Conspirator Meghan Faiola (“MFaiola”), assisted by Green, opened a new account in the name of “Dillenschneider & Faiola LLC” (the “D & F Account”). Compl. ¶ 71. On November 2, 2009, Chalmers directed Green to open an account “in the name of LSBPA’s Ministrelli Trust (the “Ministrelli Account”), purportedly for the benefit of LSBPA.”
Sometime after this date, the Ministrelli Account was closed. Compl. ¶ 74. In January 2010, Hicks-Finnerty allegedly “reopened” the Ministrelli Account and “misrepresented on the account’s new signature card that the required account-opening deposit had been made.” Id. During this time, a third account was opened at the Westmont Branch. Compl. ¶ 76. According to the Trustee, Green opened an account for MFaiola in the name of MFaio-la (the “MFaiola Account”) solely for the purpose of laundering the sale proceeds from the Ministrelli Account to the D & F Account. Id. Hicks-Finnerty and Green were “given bonus credit for opening the MFaiola Account” as Santander incentiv-ized its employees to open new accounts for its then-existing customers. • Compl. ¶ 77.
The actual theft of the Trust began in late. 2009 when the Leo Group LLC (“Leo”), an Indiana limited liability company, offered to purchase the Trust’s insurance policy for $1.75 million. Compl. ¶ 78. According to the Trustee, the Non-Party Conspirators accepted this offer without obtaining the Debtors’ authorization. Id. In order to permit the transfer to proceed without such authorization, the Conspirators created a “fraudulent Trust Beneficial
On or about July 8, 2010, a $300,000 installment payment on the purchase price was deposited in the Ministrelli Account.
After Chalmers finished disbursing the first installment, MFaiola took the $289,000 she had received from him and deposited the money in her personal account at the Westmont Branch. Compl. ¶ 90. She simultaneously “made out a check in exactly the same amount ... and deposited the check into the D & F Account.” Id. These transfers were immediately flagged by Santander’s fraud alert system but were never investigated by the bank. Compl. ¶ 90-94.
According to the Complaint, after the $300,000 installment was stolen from the Ministrelli Account, the Conspirators “contrived to have the remainder of the purchase price paid directly to them, rather than to the Ministrelli Account.” Compl. ¶ 95. In order to accomplish this, they needed to take a few extra steps to circumvent certain developments in the Westdale lawsuit. The first of these developments occurred on February 18, 2010, when Westdale obtained a court order providing for the “attachment of the Debtors’ assets, and scheduling a further hearing on March 1, 2010, to decide whether to appoint a new trustee for the Minstrelli Trust.” Compl. ¶ 96. However, the court was unaware that the Non-Party Conspirators had fraudulently appointed Chalmers as the new trustee. Id. On March 5, the court issued another order removing MKwasnik as trustee and appointing William J. Hughes, Jr. (“Hughes”) as successor trustee. Compl. ¶ 97.
Notwithstanding the court order appointing Hughes as trustee, Chalmers de
According to the Complaint, the final installment payment of about $1,450,000 should have triggered Santander’s fraud alert system because the wire transfer was “nearly 7,000 times larger than the D & F Account’s balance for that month,” “[t]he entire amount of the transfer was quickly withdrawn from the D & F Account,” the deposit was “inconsistent with the normal financial activity of an insurance business,” and the transactions “involved transfers between related accounts and/or account-holders.” Compl. ¶ 104. Nevertheless, Santander’s system failed to react to these red flags. Id.
Shortly after the Conspirators had completed the theft, WKwasnik stormed into the Westmont Branch and accused Santan-der of “having facilitated the Ministrelli Conspirators’ theft of the Ministrelli Trust.” Compl. ¶ 106. Accusing Hicks-Finnerty of aiding the conspiracy, WKwas-nik claimed that he had never authorized the sale of the Trust and that his signature on the Sale Agreement had been forged. Compl. ¶ 107. By this time, Hicks-Finnerty had been promoted to Branch Manager of the Westmont Branch. Compl. ¶ 108. After her encounter with WKwasnik, Hicks-Finnerty reported the incident to her regional operations manager. Id. According to the Trustee, the matter “quickly reached the highest levels of management at Santander.” Id.
Upon receiving notification of the events that transpired at the Westmont Branch, Santander allegedly took numerous steps to remove all evidence of wrongdoing. See id. at ¶¶ 109-114. For example, San-tander’s notaries were required to keep logbooks detailing the “date of notarization, the signatory’s name, the title of the notarized document, the signatory’s address, and the signatory’s driver’s license number and date of expiration.” Compl. ¶ 109. In her testimony to this Court, Hicks-Finnerty asserted that she scrupulously followed this policy in performing the duties of her job. Id. However, when asked to produce the logbooks documenting the Sale Agreement, Appointment of Successor Trustee agreement, and the Backdated Notice of Assignment, both Hicks-Finnerty and Green claimed that these notebooks had been lost. Compl. ¶ 112. Although the Trustee produces no direct evidence that Hicks-Finnerty, Green or Santander destroyed the notebooks, he alleges that the circumstantial evidence detailed above casts serious doubt on Santander’s claim that the logbooks’ disappearance was merely a coincidence. Compl. ¶ 112. Accordingly, he alleges that their disappearance was merely a part of a massive Santander cover up designed to purge all evidence pertaining to the Ministrelli Trust Theft. The Trustee further notes that in late 2012 or early 2013, “Santander migrated to a new email archive system” and all e-mails relevant to this proceeding were lost. Compl. ¶ 114.
According to the Trustee, the Hope Now Mortgage Fraud (the “Hope Now Fraud” or the “Hope Now Scheme”) was a scheme designed by various individuals and entities including MKwasnik, Santander, and the law firm Kwasnik, Rodio, Kanowitz & Buckley (“KRKB”) (collectively, the “Hope Now Conspirators” or “Hope Now Modifications”) to “steal funds from desperate customers seeking to renegotiate their mortgages.” Compl. ¶ 13. MKwasnik and KRKB formed Hope Now Modifications in December, 2008. Compl. ¶ 117. Adopting a name similar to the federal government’s “Hope Now Alliance Program,” the Hope' Now Conspirators “solicited hundreds of consumers with troubled mortgages, misrepresenting themselves as a ‘powerful ally’ affiliated with the federal government.” Compl. ¶ 13. In exchange for an upfront fee, the Hope Now Conspirators promised prospective clients that they would help them to renegotiate their mortgage loans with their lenders. Id. According to the Trustee, MKwasnik allegedly co-mingled funds between the Debtors’ trust accounts and the Hope Now Scheme accounts (the “Hope Now Accounts”) at San-tander. Compl. ¶ 14. MKwasnik and KRKB allegedly “stole at least $237,000.00 from the Debtors’ accounts to facilitate their Hope Now Scheme and deposited those funds into their account at Santan-der used to launder their ill-gotten proceeds from the scheme.” Id. Moreover, these transfers between the Debtors’ accounts and the Hope Now Accounts constituted a significant percentage of all monies going in to the Hope Now Accounts. See generally Compl. ¶ 125.
The Trustee asserts that Santander profited from the Hope Now Conspirators’ actions by incurring numerous insufficient funds fees and other related fees. Compl. ¶ 15. As was the case with the Minsitrelli Trust Theft, the Conspirators opened multiple accounts at the Westmont Branch in order to facilitate the Hope Now Scheme. Moreover, Santander apparently ignored countless red flags indicative of fraudulent activity including “[u]p to sixteen checks returned on credit card chargebacks per day,” “[d]eposits of up to forty checks in small — often identical — sums every day,” and “multiple stop requests per day.” Id. Additionally, the main Hope Now Account was “overdrawn for twenty-eight consecutive days.” Compl. ¶ 126. In light of this, one of Santander’s employees repeatedly recommended that the account be shut down. Compl. ¶ 127-28. Nevertheless, Santander continued to pay overdrafts and reverse the charges for doing so. Compl. ¶¶ 127-33.
During this time, Santander was aware or should have been aware that the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) had commenced proceedings against the Hope Now Conspirators for fraud in March, 2009. Compl. ¶¶ 135-38. Nonetheless, employees at the Westmont Branch continued to open up new accounts for the Hope Now Conspirators while ignoring these various indicators of fraud. Id. Santander failed to close the accounts until February 21, 2010, nearly one year after the FTC proceedings pertaining to these accounts had begun. Compl. ¶ 140.
C. Michael Kiuasnik’s Ponzi Scheme
According to the Complaint, Michael Kwasnik further defrauded the Debtors by
The Trustee notes that MKwasnik and his confederates routinely laundered the proceeds of the offerings through various Santander accounts they had set up at the Westmont Branch. Compl. ¶ 11. One particular account, the “Kopacz Trust Account,” was created for one of MKwasnik and KRKB’s clients. Compl. ¶ 145^47. MKwasnik allegedly told Kopacz and other clients that he set up the accounts to facilitate note interest payments when in reality “the purpose of such accounts was to facilitate MKwasnik’s money laundering among Santander’s accounts.” Id. Between February 2008 and July 2009, MKwasnik embezzled nearly $200,000 from this one account alone, transferring the money to himself and/or KRKB. Compl. ¶ 149-50. Additionally, some of these transfers never even appeared on the Kopacz Trust Account’s monthly statements. Compl. ¶ 153.
As was the case in the Hope Now Conspiracy, Santander ignored multiple indicia of fraud. Compl. ¶ 11. In addition to overlooking the red flags detailed above, Santander also failed to investigate many high volume accounts with minimal balances, “deposits followed by immediate withdrawals,” “multiple transfers between related accounts,” and “transactions inconsistent with the account holders’ businesses, occupations, or income levels.” Id. In June 2013, MKwasnik pled guilty to second and third-degree money laundering in connection with these schemes. Compl. ¶ 12.
D. Theft of the Lacey Property
Santander allegedly assisted the Non-Party Conspirators in the theft of real property owned by LSBPA in Lacey, NJ (the “Lacey Property”). Compl. ¶ 16. The Trustee claims that the Non-Party Conspirators colluded to transfer the Lacey Property away from the Debtors and reap the profits for themselves in February 2010. Id. He alleges that Santander facilitated the sale when Hicks-Finnerty and Green fraudulently notarized the deed and other documents necessary to complete the transfer. Id. More specifically, WKwasnik transferred the Lacey Property to MFaiola (one of the Non-Party Conspirators in the Ministrelli Trust Theft) for “grossly inadequate consideration (on information and belief, no consideration).” Compl. ¶ 159. MFaiola then sold the property to Hector Rivera, AFaiola’s friend, for $175,000. Compl. ¶ 160.
E. Santander’s History of Unlawful Banking Conduct
On April 13, 2011, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) “identified certain deficiencies and unsafe or unsound practices in [Santander’s] residential mortgage servicing and in the Association’s initiation and handling of foreclosure proceedings.” Consent Order, In the Matter of Sovereign Bank, Wyomissing, Pennsylvania, OTS Docket No. 04410, Order No.: Ne-11-17 (effiApr. 13, 2011) (the “2011 Consent Order”), at 1. After the consent order was issued, Santander was one of ten banks that entered into a settlement agreement with federal regulators. Compl. ¶ 168.
The Trustee asserts eleven causes of action against Santander and seeks to recover damages that the Debtors incurred as a result of the above transactions. His claims include: (a) racketeering under NJ RICO, (b) conspiracy to violate RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), (c) violation of New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act, (d) negligence, (e) aiding and abetting conversion, (f) aiding and abetting fraud, (g) two causes of action for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, (h) unjust enrichment, (i) failure to train and supervise employees, and (j) attorneys’ fees pursuant to NJ RICO and NJ Consumer Fraud Act.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must go beyond “labels and conclusions.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Rules”) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Crv. P. 8(a). Under this standard, substantive sufficiency and sufficient notice are all that are required under the Rules. Id. However, when a plaintiffs allegations involve claims of fraud, he must meet the heightened pleading threshold set forth in Rule 9(b). Fed. R. Crv. P. 9(b). A fraud complaint must “plead with particularity the circumstances of the alleged fraud” by describing the “precise misconduct with which [the defendant] is charged.” Lum v. Bank of Am.,
B. Santander’s In Pari Delicto Defense
Before examining the merits of the Trustee’s substantive claims, the Court will address a significant threshold issue. Santander alleges that because the Debtors were responsible for effectuating the transactions discussed above, the Trustee’s claims should be dismissed on the ground of in pari delicto.
Before addressing the in pari de-licto defense, however, it is first necessary for the Court to determine whether it should permit consideration of certain evidence indicating that the Debtors were at fault. In support of its in pari delicto defense, Santander proffers supplemental facts which indicate that the Debtors’ were primarily responsible for carrying out these transactions and were therefore at fault for causing their own loss. Def.’s Br. 3-7. Ordinarily, a court addressing a motion to dismiss only examines the allegations contained in the complaint itself and accepts these facts' as true. However, a court may take judicial notice of facts not alleged in the complaint in certain circumstances. See, e.g, Kirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
Santander requests that the Court take judicial notice of certain facts alleged by the Trustee in prior adversary proceedings, namely, the prior sworn testimony of the Trustee, and certain findings of fact made by the New Jersey Bureau of Securities in its investigation of the Debtors. The Court determines that these facts clearly satisfy the requirements of Rule 201 as these documents were all previously submitted to this Court under the penalty of perjury. Therefore, the Court will consider Santander’s supplemental facts.
The most significant disparity between Santander’s supplemental facts and the Complaint pertains to the “MKwaznik Ponzi Scheme.” Def.’s Br. 4. According to the Trustee’s sworn testimony and other adversary complaints filed on behalf of the Debtors, the Debtors were actively involved in multiple offerings of unregistered securities and derived a substantial benefit from the fraudulently obtained proceeds.
With these additional facts established, the Court can now address the merits of Santander’s in pari delicto defense. The in pari delicto defense bars recovery by a plaintiff when that plaintiff “bears fault for the claim.” Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co.,
In response to Santander’s motion to dismiss on in pari delicto grounds, the Trustee asserts two counter-defenses. Tr.’s Br. 17. First, he claims that a trustee is “cleansed” of any wrongdoing committed by a debtor’s prior management. Id. Federal courts of appeals, however, have repeatedly rejected this argument, pointing out that Section 541 of the Code mandates that “to the extent [that the trustee] must rely on 11 U.S.C. § 541 for his standing in [a] case, he may not use his status as trustee to insulate the [debtor] from ... wrongdoing.” Lafferty,
The Trustee’s second counter defense is the “adverse interest exception.” The adverse interest exception is a narrow exception which bars the use of the in pari delicto defense in cases of “outright fraud or looting or embezzlement ... where the fraud is committed against a corporation rather than on its behalf.” Picard v. JPMorgan Chase Bank & Co. (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC),
In light of the legal standards and supplemental facts discussed above, the Court finds that all claims arising from the “MKwasnik Ponzi Scheme” should be dismissed on in pari delicto grounds for the following reasons. First, the record indicates that the Debtors did in fact play a substantial role in the fraudulent notes offering. The Initial Report of Fiscal Agent Richard Barry, the complaint filed by the New Jersey Bureau of Securities, and the Trustee’s previous complaint filed against Alternative Financial Solutions all show that the Debtors’ were not “victimized”. by a third party outsider. Rather, the Debtors and their affiliates engaged in a carefully orchestrated notes offering designed to fraudulently obtain capital from elderly and disabled investors. Moreover,
With respect to the other three transactions, the Court concludes that the Trustee’s claims are immune from the in pari delicto defense under the adverse interest exception. The Complaint essentially alleges that the Non-Party Conspirators stole various Debtor assets in the Ministrelli Trust Theft, the Hope Now Scheme, and the Lacey Property Theft. Regardless of whether or not the Debtors bear fault for these three transactions, the fact that all three of them amounted to outright “looting of corporate assets” makes the adverse interest exception applicable. Because Santander has not directed the Court to any evidence indicating that the Debtors derived any sort of benefit from these three schemes, the Court cannot reject the .Trustee’s counter-defense at this stage of the litigation. As a result, the Court determines that it would be inappropriate to dismiss any claims stemming from these three transactions on in pari delicto grounds at this time. This finding does not preclude Santander from raising this defense at a later stage of the litigation if it produces evidence tending to show that the Debtors benefitted from the Minstrelli Trust Theft, the Hope Now Scheme, or the Lacey Theft.
Having determined that the District Court should dismiss all claims arising from the Ponzi Scheme, the Court will now address each of the Trustee’s claims as they relate to the Ministrelli Trust Theft, the Hope Now Scheme, and the Lacey Property Theft.
C. Count One: New Jersey RICO
Santander first moves to dismiss the Trustee’s civil RICO Claim under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-2(c). In order to prevail on a New Jersey RICO claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the existence of an enterprise; (2) that the enterprise engaged in or its activities affected trade or commerce; (3) that defendant was employed by, or associated with the enterprise; (4) that he or she participated in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise; and (5) that he or she participated through a pattern of racketeering activity.” Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood Props.,
Under New Jersey law, element one may be satisfied by identifying mem
With respect to element five, “racketeering activity” is defined as the commission of one of numerous offenses arising out of the laws of any jurisdiction in the United States. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-1(a). Among these offenses are robbery, bribery, arson, burglary and extortion. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-1(a)(1)(a)-(cc). The statute also incorporates all activity defined as “racketeering” under Title 18 of the United States Code. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41—1(a)(2). A “pattern of racketeering” is defined as “[e]ngaging in at least two incidents of racketeering conduct one of which shall have occurred after the effective date of this act and the last of which shall have occurred within 10 years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after a prior incident of racketeering activity” and “[a] showing that the incidents of racketeering activity embrace criminal conduct that has either the same or similar purposes, results, participants or victims or methods of commission or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41—1 (d)(1); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-1(d)(2).
When analyzing these five elements, New Jersey’s RICO statute mandates a liberal construction of its provisions. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-6. This provision of the statute was enacted in response to the New Jersey legislature’s extensive findings of fact indicating that the prevalence of organized crime in the state necessitated more effective techniques of combating racketeering activity. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 20:41-1.1.
Santander asserts that the Trustee has failed to plead adequately the existence of an enterprise, the Defendant’s “knowing and purposeful” participation in the affairs of the enterprise, and the Defendant’s participation through a pattern of racketeering activity. Additionally, Santander argues that the Trustee has failed to plead causation, a threshold issue for determining whether or not the claimant has standing to pursue a civil RICO claim. Because causation is an element common to numerous offenses alleged in the Complaint, the Court will address this issue prior to analyzing the merits of the Trustee’s RICO claim.
1. Causation
In order to have standing to assert a civil RICO claim in New Jersey, a plaintiff must plead both actual and proximate causation. Interchange State Bank v. Veglia,
In civil RICO cases where a plaintiffs standing to sue is at issue, the court must examine the chain of events to determine who was directly injured by the predicate RICO acts. If a plaintiff is harmed only in an indirect way by the predicate acts, the plaintiff does not have standing to pursue a RICO claim.
In its brief, Santander claims that Hicks-Finnerty and Green’s alleged false notarizations were not direct and substantial causes of the Ministrelli Trust Theft and the Lacey Property Theft. The Court is not persuaded. The executions of the Appointment of Successor Trustee agreement, the Sale Agreement, and Backdated Notice of Assignment were crucial to the Ministrelli Theft’s success. In the Complaint, the Trustee adequately describes why the Non-Party Conspirators needed to notarize fraudulently these documents in order to appoint the new trustee, permit the sale to go through, and assign the remaining payments to the D & F Account. The sale of the trust is clearly a foreseeable consequence of notarizing a document authorizing the sale of that trust. The same reasoning applies to the Lacey Property Theft as well since the fraudulently notarized sale documents directly enabled the sale to occur.
With respect to Santander’s alleged failure to monitor red flags, Santander argues that “such bald speculation about what might have happened had Santander reacted differently concerning the alleged ‘red flags,’ is clearly not the direct, substantial cause of the Debtors’ alleged injury.” Def.’s Br. 18. However, the issue of proximate cause is one for the finder of fact to determine at a later stage of the litigation. See Reyes v. Egner,
With respect to the Hope Now Scheme, however, the Court agrees with Santander that the Trustee has failed to plead successfully that Santander’s misconduct was a proximate cause of the Debtors’ injuries. Unlike the claims arising from the Ministrelli Trust Theft and the Lacey Theft, the Debtors were not the intended victims of the Hope Now Fraud. The only allegation regarding any injury suffered by the Debtors states that “on information and belief, MKwasnik and KRKB stole at least $237,000 of the Debtors’ funds and placed them into the Hope Now Account.” However, the Trustee fails to allege any specific facts giving rise to an inference that Santander proximately caused this $237,000 loss. Nowhere in the Complaint does the Trustee claim that Santander assisted in stealing money from the Debtors’ attorney-client trust accounts. Moreover, the Trustee does not allege that MKwasnik opened the Debtors’ trust account at Santander. Under any of the proximate causes tests discussed above, there is simply no way that Santander can be held responsible for the $237,000 taken from the Debtors’ trust account under the custody of a different financial institution. Finding that the Trustee has failed to plead any facts demonstrating that San-
2. Element 1: The Existence of an Enterprise
Having dismissed all claims arising from the Ponzi Scheme and all direct claims arising from the Hope Now Scheme, the Court will now address the elements of the Trustee’s RICO claim with respect to the two remaining transactions, the Ministrelli Trust Theft and the Lacey Property Theft.
The first substantive element of a New Jersey civil RICO claim is the existence of an enterprise. In Ball, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that in order to determine whether or not an enterprise exists, the association must have an “organization.” Ball,
The organization of an enterprise need not feature an ascertainable structure or a structure with a particular configuration. The hallmark of an enterprise’s organization consists rather in those kinds of interactions that become necessary when a group, to accomplish its goal, divides among its members the tasks that are necessary to achieve a common purpose. The division of labor and the separation of functions undertaken by the participants serve as the distinguishing marks of the “enterprise” because when a group does so divide and assemble its labors in order to accomplish its criminal purposes, it must necessarily engage in a high degree of planning, cooperation and coordination, and thus, in effect, constitute itself as an “organization.”
Id. (emphasis added). The court’s decision not to require an ascertainable structure is significant because it departed from the more stringent standard used by many other state and federal courts. Id.
At the pleading stage of litigation, a plaintiff must come forth with specific facts demonstrating the existence of an organization. See id. Courts have held that claimants must plead some of the elements discussed in Ball with a certain degree of particularity. See Refco Inc. Sec. Litig. v. Aaron,
Santander argues that the Complaint fails to allege “any facts supporting the formation of the enterprise and the division of labor, including any allegations as to high level coordination or cooperation by the members of the alleged ‘enterprise.’ ” Def.’s Br. 20. Additionally, it encourages the Court to adopt a narrow definition of the word “enterprise” in requiring that the Trustee establish numerous factors outlined above. Id. The Court disagrees and finds Santander’s position to be inconsistent with New Jersey public policy and the applicable caselaw. In Ball, the court never explicitly stated that a plaintiff must plead each and every factor which demonstrates the existence of an enterprise nor did it specify how many factors were necessary in order to support such a finding. Some New Jersey appellate courts have found the existence of an enterprise even when the plaintiff only
Under this standard, the Court finds that the Trustee has met his burden. Paragraphs 174 through 178 of the Complaint specifically detail each Non-Party Conspirator’s unique role in carrying out the Ministrelli Trust Theft and the Lacey Theft. Furthermore, the Trustee identifies the names of the many individuals and entities that carried out the Theft. Some of these individuals and entities include Michael Kwasnik, the law firm KRKB, Anthony Faiola, Meghan Faiola, D & F, and David Chalmers. The Trustee thoroughly describes the roles and responsibilities of each individual in effectuating the Minis-trelli Trust Theft. For example, the Trustee alleges in the Complaint that Chalmers was appointed successor trustee for the specific purpose of being able to claim ignorance to the Westdale lawsuit; MKwasnik played a behind the scenes role in orchestrating the theft as his direct involvement would have exposed him to civil and criminal liability; MFaiola served as an intermediary for diverting the sale proceeds; and AFaiola set up the account that served as the final destination for the proceeds. Additionally, AFaiola served in a significant ministerial role and completed various tasks that were crucial to completing the Theft. These are just a small number of the allegations contained in the Complaint that support a finding of an enterprise under New Jersey’s liberal standard. The Court therefore holds that the Trustee has satisfied his burden of pleading the existence of an enterprise.
3.Elements 2 and 3: Engaging in Activities that Affect Trade or Commerce
Santander does not dispute that the Non-Party Conspirators’ activities had an impact on trade and commerce. Additionally, it does not deny that it was associated with the Non-Party Conspirators. As a result, the Court holds that the Trustee has adequately pled elements 2 and 3 of its RICO claim.
4.Element 4: Scienter
Santander claims that the Trustee has failed to plead the Defendant’s level of mental culpability. In Ball, the court determined that “to conduct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise means to act purposefully and knowingly in the affairs of the enterprise in the sense of engaging in activities that seek to further, assist or help effectuate the goals of the enterprise.” Ball,
A rigid rule requiring the detailed pleading of a condition of mind would be undesirable because, absent overriding considerations pressing for a specificity requirement, as in the case of averments of fraud or mistake, the general ‘shortand plain statement of the claim’ mandate in Rule 8(a) ... should control the second sentence of Rule 9(b).
Id. (quoting 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1301, p 291 (3d ed.2004)).
Federal courts have held that a plaintiff may establish intent through circumstantial evidence. Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A,
Santander argues that the Complaint’s assertions pertaining to scienter are merely conclusory. Def.’s Br. 21. Some of the allegations Santander refers to include the claims that “Santander colluded with the Non-Party Conspirators” and “had actual knowledge of at least some of the Non-Party Conspirators fraudulent activities.” Id. (citing Compl. ¶ 4). San-tander argues that Hicks-Finnerty and Green’s alleged fraudulent notarizations amount to either ordinary negligence or gross negligence, claiming that the Trustee portrays Hicks-Finnerty and Green as “innocent dupes, not knowing participants.” Def.’s Br. 22.
The Court concludes that Santander’s reading of the Complaint fails to take into account the “circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior.” Lerner,
Notwithstanding the above, Santander argues that even if Hicks-Finnerty and Green knowingly notarized fraudulent documents, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that a bank may not be held vicariously liable for “a notary employee’s breach of duty when the bank has no role in the underlying transaction.” Def. Br. 23. (citing Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Burt Thomas-Aitken Constr. Co.,
[rjather the point is that one who seeks the services of a notary public does not ordinarily rely upon the credit of some third-party employer of the notary ; he asks only for a notary, and any notary will do. So, here, plaintiff conceded before us that it was wholly unaware of the identity of the notary and did not know the notary was connected with a bank. In short, plaintiff never sought the responsibility of someone other than a notary, and if the bank is held, plaintiff will have a windfall.
Id. at 394,
5. Element 5: Participation in a Pattern of Racketeering Activity
Santander argues that the Trustee has failed to plead that it participated in a pattern of racketeering activity. The statute defines a “pattern of racketeering activity” as “[ejngaging in at least two incidents of racketeering conduct one of which shall have occurred after the effective date of this act and the last of which shall have occurred .within 10 years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after a prior incident of racketeering activity” and “[a] showing that the incidents of racketeering activity embrace criminal conduct that has either the same or similar purposes, results, participants or victims or methods of commission or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents.N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-1(d)(l)-(2) (emphasis added). Santander addresses these two elements in reverse order and first argues that the alleged incidents were not “interrelated by distinguishing, characteristics and [were] isolated incidents.” Id.
a. Pattern of Racketeering Element 1: Relatedness of the Acts
In its brief in opposition to the Motion, the Trustee argues that the relevant statutes and caselaw all suggest that courts should apply a liberal standard in determining “relatedness.” Tr.’s Br. 31. The Court is persuaded by this argument for a number of reasons. First, a plain reading of the statute shows that the test for “relatedness” is a disjunctive one. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-l(d)(2). So long as a complaint tends to show that the multiple incidents of criminal conduct have similar “purposes, results, participants or victims or methods of commission,” a court should find the “relatedness” sub-element satisfied.
The Court does not agree with Santander’s assertions that the Ministrelli Trust Theft, Hope Now Fraud, Ponzi Scheme and Lacey Theft were “artificially stiche[d] together” by the Trustee. Def.’s Br. 28. While we do not know the full extent of interrelatedness of these transactions, there are concrete allegations in the Complaint indicating some level of interconnectedness between them. First, Michael Kwasnik was a common participant in all of these schemes. While Santander notes that MKwasnik did not participate in the Ministrelli Trust Theft, the decision to remove himself as trustee was crucial to the Theft occurring. Additionally, the Trustee’s prior complaints, the New Jersey Bureau of Securities’ complaint, and the New Jersey and Delaware indictments all seem to suggest that MKwasnik may have been the mastermind behind all of these schemes. Those facts on their own are enough to satisfy the “relatedness” sub-element. However, other facts in the Complaint support a holding that the individual steps taken to complete the Minis-trelli Trust Theft constituted interrelated criminal acts that were committed for the same general purpose&emdash;to steal the Minis-trelli Trust proceeds and the Lacey Property. Therefore, the Court holds that the “relatedness” element is satisfied under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-1(d)(2).
b. Pattern of Racketeering Element 2: Predicate Acts
In order for a court to find that a defendant was engaged in a “pattern of racke
c. Predicate Act I: Bank Fraud
The first alleged predicate act is Bank Fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344. The statute penalizes any individual or entity who “knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme ... to defraud a financial institution, or ... to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets ... or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises. 18 U.S.C. § 1344(l)-(2).
A plain reading of the statute would seem to suggest that in order to be held liable under Section 1344, a defendant must have either defrauded a financial institution or used fraudulent methods to obtain assets under the control of a financial institution. Id. In spite of this plain language, however, the Third Circuit has openly rejected this disjunctive interpretation. United States v. Thomas,
Here, there is obviously no evidence that Santander intended to defraud itself. Under the holding in Thomas, a claim under Section 1344 cannot survive a motion to dismiss when a complaint is entirely devoid of allegations that the defendant attempted to impose a loss on a financial institution. Accordingly, the Court determines that the Trustee has failed to establish federal bank fraud as a predicate offense to its New Jersey RICO claim.
d. Omnibus Objections to Predicate Acts I through VIII: Scienter
Santander next argues that the Complaint “fails to allege the knowing intent element of the alleged predicate acts of bank fraud, sale and transportation of stolen property, money laundering, and mail and wire fraud and the predicate acts of aiding and abetting those primary predicate acts.” Def.’s Br. 30.
The Court rejects Santander’s argument. As discussed swpra, the Court finds that the Trustee has proffered 'sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a plausible inference that Santander and its employees knowingly intended to assist the Non-Party Conspirators with their fraudulent conduct. Hicks-Finnerty testified to this Court that she scrupulously required all signatories to present valid identification. In light of her familiarity with her job requirements, it is plausible to believe that Hicks-Finnerty and Green’s actions
In the same section of its brief Santander argues that a plaintiff in a civil RICO action may not assert a claim of aiding and abetting a statutory predicate offense. Santander also asserts that there is no private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 2, the federal aiding and abetting statute. Indeed this was the very holding of Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, and the Court is bound by the Third Circuit’s decision in that case.
e. Predicate Act IX: Theft by Deception
Santander further asserts that the Complaint fails to plead a claim for Theft by Deception under N.J.S.A. § 2C:20-4. The Court concurs with Santander’s contention. Paragraph 215 of the Complaint comprises the Trustee’s entire factual basis for the Theft by Deception claim and reads as follows:
By purposely creating and reinforcing false impressions for the purpose of influencing consumers to purchase the Ministrelli Trust, retain MKwasnik’s or KRKB’s loan modification services, or invest in LSBPA’s 12% Notes, and then misappropriating the sales proceeds and investment funds for personal uses and obstructing investors’ inquiries into the uses of their funds, Santander violated N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4(c).
Compl. ¶ 215. The Trustee provides minimal factual basis for these assertions, and none of these allegations rise to the level of particularity necessary to survive a motion to dismiss. Nowhere in the Complaint does the Trustee discuss how Santander attempted to induce consumers to purchase the Ministrelli Trust, the Debtors’ notes or MKwasnik’s services. Moreover, the assertion that Santander “obstructed investors’ inquiries into the uses of their funds” is baseless. Accordingly, the Court holds that the Trustee has failed to allege predicate act IX.
f. Predicate Act X: Falsifying or Tampering with Records
Santander also claims that the Complaint “fails to adequately plead claims
The Court holds that the Trustee has pled this predicate act. The Complaint specifically states that Hicks-Finnerty and Green falsified multiple documents. Furthermore, the circumstances surrounding the transactions create a plausible inference that Hicks-Finnerty and Green knew that these documents were not dated correctly and that the signatures on them were not authentic. Moreover, the timing of the logbooks’ disappearance and the circumstances surrounding their disappearance create a plausible inference that Santander and/or its employees intentionally destroyed the logbooks for the purpose of “concealing any wrongdoing.” Such allegations fall squarely within the statute. Therefore, the Court holds that the Trustee has successfully pled a falsifying or tampering with records claim.
Having addressed all of Santander’s arguments in opposition to the predicate offenses, the Court will now examine the remaining predicate offenses. To summarize the preceding section, the Court rejects the Trustee’s argument with respect to predicate offenses I, II, IV, VI, VIII, and IV. The Court accepts the Trustee’s argument establishing predicate offense X (falsifying or tampering with records). Because the Trustee must establish at least two predicate offenses in order to plead a civil RICO claim, the Court will now determine ■ whether the Trustee has established predicate offenses III, V and/or VII.
g. Predicate Ojfense III: Transportation of Stolen Goods, Securities, Moneys
Section 2814 of Title 18 imposes liability on an individual or entity who “transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud.” 18 U.S.C. § 2314.
The Court determines that the Trustee has pled sufficient facts to establish a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2314. The Complaint explicitly states that the value of the Ministrelli Trust was well in excess of $5,000. It also states that San-tander authorized the transfer of the proceeds via interstate commerce. Having already determined that the Complaint raises a plausible inference of scienter, the Court holds that the Trustee has sufficiently established predicate act III.
h. Predicate Offense V: Laundering of Monetary Instruments
Section 1957 of Title 18 imposes liability on any entity who “knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property that is of a value greater than $ 10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1957. Additionally, the underlying offense must have occurred in the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(d)(1). Section 1956 creates liability for those “knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (emphasis added).
i. Predicate Act VII: Mail and Wire Fraud
Section 1341 imposes liability for whoever “having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses ... “ 18 U.S.C. § 1341. The Court holds that this is not a predicate act for one simple reason — the Trustee has not alleged that Santander devised any of the four schemes detailed above. In both this Complaint and the other complaints incorporated by judicial notice, the Trustee has clearly indicated that MKwasnik, the Debtors and the other Non-Party Conspirators were the masterminds behind the four schemes. Accordingly, predicate act VII must fail.
j. Summary of Predicate Acts and the Trustee’s RICO Claim
Having determined that the Trustee has successfully pled three predicate acts, the Court concludes that the Trustee has alleged sufficient facts to create a plausible inference that Santander engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity as defined by N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-l(d).
The facts alleged in the Complaint create a plausible inference that Santander’s repeated backdating of documents and falsely attesting the presence of multiple signatories combined to proximately cause the Ministrelli Trust Theft and the Lacey Property Theft. Additionally, these facts create a plausible inference that (1) the Non-Party Conspirators organization constituted an “enterprise” as defined by the relevant caselaw; (2) Santander assisted the enterprise in activities that affected trade or commerce; (3) Santander associated with the enterprise; (4) Santander willfully and knowingly participated in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise; (5) Santander participated through a pattern of racketeering activity; and (6) that the Plaintiff was injured by reason of the Defendant’s action. As a result, the Court denies Santander’s motion to dismiss the New Jersey RICO claim with respect to the Ministrelli Trust Theft and the Lacey Property Theft.
D. Count Two: Conspiracy to Violate RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et. seq.
The Federal RICO statute creates an additional cause of action against individuals and entities who “conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection[s] (a), (b), or (c) of this section.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Section (c) of the federal statute mirrors Section (c) of the New Jersey statute; however, the federal statute contains an interstate commerce based jurisdictional hook. Because Santander fails to object on this ground, and the Court has already concluded that there was an underlying RICO violation, the only issue that remains is the conspiracy itself.
In its brief, Santander argues that the 1962(d) claim must be dismissed because the Trustee has failed to plead the substantive elements of a conspiracy. The essence of a conspiracy is the existence of an agreement. See Salinas v. United States,
The Complaint sufficiently alleges the period of the conspiracy. The Trustee describes the specific events that led to the theft of the Ministrelli Trust and the Lacey Property Theft, detailing both when they occurred and where they occurred. He notes the specific dates that Santander aided the Non-Party Conspirators in fraudulently appointing Chalmers as successor trustee, fraudulently permitting the sale of the trust, and fraudulently assigning the sale proceeds to the Non-Party Conspirators. He further notes that San-tander employees were told to be on the lookout for various wire transfers on specified dates. These acts also satisfy the “in furtherance of’ element as they clearly occurred in order to facilitate the theft of the Ministrelli Trust — the sole object of the conspiracy.
With respect to the knowing participation element, Santander argues that the Complaint “relies on conclusory allegations to satisfy the knowledge element.” Def.’s Br. 34. However, the Court believes that this assertion overlooks the numerous facts in the Complaint which create an inference of knowledge. In Shearin, the Third Circuit held that the defendants’ association with one another “gave rise to a necessary inference that [the parties] not only agreed to the ongoing securities fraud scheme, but that all three were aware that the ongoing acts, such as the unlawful collection of fiduciary fees, were part of an overall pattern of racketeering activity.” Shearin,
E. Count Three: New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act
In order to state a claim under New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act (the “CFA” or the “Act”), a plaintiff must plead the following three elements: “(1) an unlawful practice by the defendants; (2) an ascertainable loss by plaintiff; and (3) a causal nexus between the first two elements — defendants’ allegedly unlawful be
The act, use or employment by any person of any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing, concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate, or with the subsequent performance of such person as aforesaid, whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby, is declared to be an unlawful practice ....
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2 (emphasis added). The CFA defines the term “person” to mean “any natural person or his legal representative, partnership, corporation, company, trust, business entity or association, and any agent, employee, salesman, partner, officer, director, member, stockholder, associate, trustee or cestuis que trustent thereof.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8—1(d). Merchandise is also defined broadly and includes any service offered to the public for sale. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-l(c). Additionally, any person “who suffers any ascertainable loss of moneys or property, real or personal” as a result of another’s use of an unlawful practice has standing to assert a claim under the CFA. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-19. New Jersey courts interpret the provisions of the CFA liberally and have noted that the Act is “one of the strongest consumer protection laws in the nationf.]” Weinberg v. Sprint Corp.,
The Trustee alleges that Santan-der’s conduct amounted to an “unlawful practice” under the CFA as it engaged in “unconscionable commercial practices, deceptions, frauds, false pretense, false representations, misrepresentation, or knowing concealment causing an ascertainable loss by the debtors.” Compl. ¶ 225 (emphasis added). Courts have noted that unconscionability is “an amorphous concept obviously designed to establish a broad business ethic.” Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,
The Court agrees that Santander’s conduct, as alleged in the Complaint, fits within this definition. Santander’s backdating of the Successor Trustee Agreement, backdating of the Assignment Agreement, fraudulent notarization of multiple other documents and false attestation of the signature of the Debtors’ CEO collectively rise to the level of an “unconscionable commercial practice” as defined by the court in Cox and Kugler. Santander’s active participation in laundering the Debtors’ funds constitutes a lack of “good faith, honesty in fact and observance of fair dealing.” Accordingly, the Court finds that the Trustee has adequately alleged that Santander engaged in an “unconscionable commercial practice” with respect to the Ministrelli Theft and the Lacey. Theft.
Notwithstanding the above, Santander argues that because the Complaint “has failed to allege that the Debtors purchased or were provided any service by Santan-der,” the Trustee does not have standing
The Court finds Santander’s narrow interpretation of the CFA and its elevation of form over substance to be inconsistent with the policies underlying the Act. Furthermore, New Jersey courts have held that the CFA imposes no direct privity requirement on potential plaintiffs and that certain indirect relationships between a buyer and a seller may give rise to a CFA claim. See Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp.,
Making one final argument, Santander alleges that its conduct cannot be deemed “unlawful” under the CFA because it never induced the Debtors to purchase a good or service. However, courts in New Jersey have repeatedly rejected this argument. See Cox,
In sum, the Court concludes that the Complaint pleads that Santander’s actions with respect to the Ministrelli Trust Theft and the Lacey Property Theft were unlawful under the CFA as they constituted an unconscionable commercial practice in connection with services rendered to the Debtors. Moreover, the Complaint sufficiently alleges that Santander’s actions were a substantial and proximate cause of the Ministrelli Trust Theft, the Lacey Theft and the Debtors’ injuries. Accordingly, the Trustee has stated a valid claim under the New Jersey CFA with respect to these two transactions. However, because Santander’s actions were not a direct and proximate cause of Santander’s
F. Count Four: Negligence .
Under New Jersey common law, a plaintiff in a negligence action must show (1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) actual and proximate causation, and (4) damages. Polzo v. County of Essex,
New Jersey courts have concluded that “[w]hether a duty exists is ultimately a question of fairness. The inquiry involves a weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution.” Weinberg,
Applying this standard, the Court finds that the Complaint sufficiently alleges that the Debtors had a contact with Santander. The Complaint specifically alleges that “Chalmers ... asked Green to open up an account in the name of LSBPA’s Ministrelli Trust, purportedly for the benefit of LSBPA.” Compl. ¶ 72. Additionally, the Trustee alleges that “San-tander’s documents indicate that the Trust Agreement was personally reviewed by the manager of the Westmont Branch, Nancy Cavaluchy.” Id. Moreover, the Complaint states that Hicks-Finnerty and Green were notified the moment the $300,000 installment payment was wired to the Minis-trelli Account. Id. at ¶ 88. Chalmers immediately proceeded to launder $290,000 from the Ministrelli Account to MFaiola, yet Santander failed to investigate this payment despite knowing that the Minis-trelli Account was a trust account. While Santander suggests that its employees were unaware that LSBPA was the beneficial owner of the Ministrelli Account, the Trustee has alleged enough facts to create
G. Counts Five, Six, Seven and Eight: Aiding and Abetting
The Trustee’s next four counts allege that Santander was an accomplice to various non-statutory common law offenses. These claims include conversion, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duties. Santander does not contest that the underlying offenses were committed by the Non-Party Conspirators. Rather, it argues that the Trustee has failed to plead that Santander aided and abetted these offenses.
In order to be found liable as an aider and abettor in New Jersey, the plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) that there has been a commission of a wrongful act ...; (2) that the alleged aider-abettor had knowledge of that act; and (3) that the aider-abettor knowingly and substantially participated in the wrongdoing.” Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co.,
With respect to the Hope Now Scheme, the Court has already made a determination that Santander’s actions were not a legal cause of the Debtors’ injuries. However, because the aiding and abetting claims seek to hold Santander vicariously liable for the offenses of the Non-Party Conspirators, the Court may not dismiss the aiding and abetting claims arising from the Hope Now Scheme. The Complaint alleges that MKwasnik and the Non-Party Conspirators proximately caused the loss of the Debtors’ client trust account and that Santander may have had knowledge of the underlying fraudulent activity. Accordingly, the Court denies the Motion to dismiss the aiding and abetting with respect to the Ministrelli Theft, the Lacey Theft, and the Hope Now Scheme.
H. Count Nine: Unjust Enrichment
Unjust enrichment is an appropriate remedy when “one party has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another.” Wanaque Borough Sewerage Auth. v. Twp. of W. Milford,
The central issue with respect to the Trustee’s failure to supervise claim is whether or not Santander owed a duty to the Debtors. Because this issue was resolved in the negligence-claim, the Motion to dismiss count ten is denied.
J. Count Eleven: Attorney’s Fees
Whether or not a party is entitled to attorney’s fees is an issue of fact to be decided at a later time. Accordingly, the Court denies Santander’s Motion to dismiss this count.
III. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, San-tander’s Motion is GRANTED with respect to all claims arising out of the Debtors’ notes offering. Furthermore, the Motion is GRANTED with respect all direct liability claims arising out of the Hope Now Scheme and DENIED with respect to all vicarious liability claims arising out of the Hope Now Scheme. Finally, the Motion is DENIED with respect to all claims arising out of the Min-istrelli Trust Theft and the Lacey Property Theft.
. On June 2, 2014, this Court entered into an order declaring the Trustee's claims to be non-core under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). Order Determining Core and Non-Core Claims, D.I. 62. Thereafter, the District Court denied Santander's Motion to Withdraw the Reference. Memorandum Order Denying Motion For Withdrawal Of Reference, D.I. 65. This Memorandum Opinion constitutes the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 7052 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
. The Trustee notes that Chalmers was ineligible to serve as trustee as the trust agreement required all successor trustees to be licensed attorneys or institutional trustees. Compl. ¶61. Chalmers was neither. Id.
. Apparently, the Non-Party Conspirators believed that this would relieve MKwasnik of his obligation to inform the successor trustee of Westdale's interest in the Trust.
. Hicks-Finnerty was the operations manager of the Wesmont Branch and was promoted to branch manager sometime in 2010.
. The Complaint notes that aside from Hicks-Finnerty, Green was the only other employee at the Westmont Branch authorized to provide notarial services to customers. Compl. ¶ 33.
. While the Trustee alleges that Green was asked to "open an account in the name of ... LSBPA’s Ministrelli Trust, purportedly for the benefit of LSBPA," the Defendant claims that Santander had no knowledge of LSBPA’s interest in the account and denies the existence of a traditional banker-customer relationship between Santander and the Debtors. Compl. ¶ 72; Def.’s Br. 37-38. In support of this claim, Santander attached the "Ministrelli Trust Account Opening Card” which interestingly contains no mention of the Debtors. West Aff., Ex. F, D.I. 24. However, the account opening card does reference a formal separate trust agreement, dated September 14, 2007. Additionally, it states that Chal-mers owned the account as trustee, thus putting Santander on constructive notice that some other entity held a beneficial interest in the account. These facts are particularly relevant to the section on the Trustee’s negligence claim infra and will be incorporated by reference therein.
. Santander's own exhibit demonstrates that it was, at minimum, on constructive notice that this document existed. West Aff., Ex. F, D.I. 24.
. According to the Complaint, Leo proceeded immediately to sell its interest in the Trust for $1,981,625, a $230,000 premium over the value received by the Debtors. Compl. ¶ 85.
. There appear to be numerous inconsistencies between the way the Trustee describes the "MKwasnik Ponzi Scheme” in the Complaint and the way he described the "MKwas-nik Ponzi Scheme” in other complaints. San-tander notes that in other proceedings before this Court, the Trustee specifically alleged that the Debtors derived significant benefits from the Ponzi Scheme and knowingly partic
. More specifically, back when he was the independent fiscal agent of the Debtors, the Trustee submitted an initial report to this Court and the Superior Court of New Jersey in the related proceedings commenced against the Debtors by the New Jersey Bureau of Securities. Initial Report of Fiscal Agent Richard Barry, dated July 1, 2011, ¶ 12 ("Barry Report”) attached as Exhibit D to Declaration of Richard W. Barry in Support of Emergency Motion, dated August 11, 2011, ("Barry Decl.”) (D.1.29-6). Mr. Barry detailed numerous instances of misconduct by the Debtors stemming from their debt offerings and, in particular, the numerous material misstatements in the private placement memorandum (PPM) that allegedly misled investors into purchasing the Debtors’ notes. Id. at ¶ 22-24. Moreover; contrary to the implications in the Complaint's discussion on the “MKwasnik Ponzi Scheme,” the Debtors used $7 million of the $13 million in proceeds to pay down the interest and principal on their other obligations. Id. at ¶ 29.
. A treatise on civil RICO law noted that the Ninth Circuit held that Rule 9(b) established a lower pleading standard for scienter in securities fraud cases. Decker v. GlenFed, Inc. (In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig.),
. The Trustee alleges that the sale proceeds were transferred in and out of New Jersey. See Compl. ¶ 193-195.