{¶ 3} The minor child resided with his mother and remained under her care from the time of his birth until shortly before his fifth birthday. In October 2003, however, following a hearing on the father's emergency motion for temporary possession, the trial court awarded temporary possession of the child to the father and allowed regular supervised visitation between the mother and the child. At the hearing for temporary emergency possession, the trial court ordered that the child continue seeing his current psychologist and pediatrician and also ordered that a court-appointed psychologist evaluate the child and the parents for purposes of a custody determination. *5
{¶ 4} During the course of the custody dispute, the mother's visitation rights varied because of stated concerns of the guardian ad litem as well as the court-appointed psychologist. But after the mother fled and secreted the child for three days during a supervised visit in September 2005, the trial court suspended all contact between the mother and the child. On September 29, 2005, the trial court named father as the emergency temporary custodian and subsequently designated the child's adult sister as the temporary custodian, who was previously made a party to the action and had filed an application for custody of the child.
{¶ 5} In January 2006, the case proceeded to trial on the issue of custody. After several days of testimony and the submission of numerous documentary exhibits, the trial court ultimately agreed with the guardian ad litem's recommendation and found that the child's best interest required naming his sister as the legal custodian. In its May 19, 2006 judgment entry, the trial court stated:
{¶ 6} "Kim Barry has testified that she has been and wishes to continue to provide a safe and stable home for [the child]. Her demeanor and testimony suggest a sincere regard for [the child's] well being. The GAL, James H. Schultz, Jr., and [the child's] lawyer, Patrick Leneghan have reported that [the child] wishes to live with Kim.
{¶ 7} "Kim is a young healthy and stable woman without emotional problems or any physical impairment that would interfere with her ability to parent [the child]. It is also apparent that [the child] has adapted to his new life in the Barry home, as well as the neighborhood, its school and the community." *6
{¶ 8} Additionally, prior to designating the sistеr, a nonparent, as the legal custodian, the trial court specifically found: (1) that the mother is unsuitable and (2) that the father has relinquished by agreement his right to be declared the residential parent. The court granted the father liberal visitation but restricted the mother's visitation until she complied with a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation. And it further ordered that the mother receive treatment as recommended by the psychiatrist prior to the establishment of any standard visitation.
{¶ 9} The trial court subsequently ordered both the mother and the father to pay child support and ordered the father to pay all future medical expenses not covered by insurance. The court additionally apportioned between the parents the professional fees awarded to the son's guardians ad litem and attorney, with the father to pay 80% and the mother to pay 20%.
{¶ 10} From these orders, as well as other earlier orders made during the seven year custody battle, the mother has filed 14 separate appeals, which have been consolidated.1 The mother rаises 23 assignments of error, which we will address together and out of order where appropriate.
{¶ 12} This deferential standard is particularly important in custody cases where the trial court has the benefit of interacting with the parties, observing their demeanor and attitude, and gaining insight that does not neсessarily translate well to the record. Davis v.Flickinger,
{¶ 13} "The discretion which a trial court enjoys in custody matters should be
{¶ 14} accorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court's determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned. The knowledge a trial court gains through observing the witnesses and the parties in a custody proceeding cannot be conveyed to a reviewing court by a printed record." Miller, supra at 74, citingTrickey v. Trickey (1952),
{¶ 15} Thus, оur inquiry is not whether we would have made the same decision; instead, we must determine solely whether the trial court abused its discretion. Davis, supra at 421.
{¶ 17} R.C.
{¶ 18} "A court may not award custody to the nonparent `without first determining that a preponderance of the evidence shows that the parent abandoned the child; contractually relinquished custody of the child; that the parent has become totally incаpable of supporting or caring for the child; or that an award of custody to the parent would be detrimental to the child.'" Hockstock, supra at 242, quotingPerales, syllabus.
{¶ 19} If a court concludes that any one of these circumstances describes the conduct of a parent, the parent may be deemed unsuitable, and "the state may *9
infringe upon the fundamental parental liberty interest of child custody." Id.; see, also, In re S.M.,
{¶ 20} The mother first argues that the trial court's decision must be reversed because the trial court failed to make a finding of unsuitability with regard to the father as required underPerales. The record, however, reflects that the trial court expressly found that the father "relinquished by agreement his right to be declared residential parent and custodian of the minor child." Indeed, the father's counsel at trial expressly stated the father's dеsire to relinquish his claim for custody and asked that the sister be designated as the residential and legal custodian. Accordingly, the mother's first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 21} The mother next contends that the trial court erroneously applied the best interest standard of R.C.
{¶ 22} Likewise, we find no merit to the mother's conclusory claim that the trial court erroneously placed a greater burden on her to gain custody and failed to afford her greater deference as the presumptive residential parent and legal custodian under R.C.
{¶ 23} We likewise find no merit to the mother's claim that the trial court erroneously found that she was unsuitable as the residential parent and legal custodian. The mother argues that the evidence relied on by the trial court was tainted by the unauthorized videotapes created by the sister and disseminated to the treating professionals in direct contravention of a court order. (The videotapes, which were not a part of the record on appeal, allegedly reveal the child talking about incidents of sexual abuse by the mother.) But we find no evidence in the record, nor does the mother cite to any, that corroborates her claim.3 To the contrary, the "Trial *11 Judge's Statement of Evidence" reveals that the trial court relied on numerous different sources. Dr. Judith Shields, a licensed psychologist who was asked to evaluate the child, testified that [the child] did not feel safe with his mother. In reaching this conclusion, Dr. Shields relied solely on her interviews with the child. Indeed, the trial court relied on the mother's testimony as well as its own observations of the mother in making its parental unsuitability determination. As stated by the trial court:
{¶ 24} "Throughout this litigation, Mother's mental health has been at issue. The Court notes that her behavior during the trial reinforced expert testimony that mother has `impulse control problems' and `distorts reality to a serious degree.'
{¶ 25} "Mother's own testimony suggests that she has serious physical and emotional illnesses. She takеs daily doses of Oxycontin, Xanax, and Percocet. This alone makes placing the minor child in her ca[r]e and custody dangerous.
{¶ 26} "During the course of the hearing[,] she repeatedly dismissed her counsel, came late to hearing, interrupted counsel and the Court, rambled on almost incoherently at times, and offered testimony adverse to her own interests."
{¶ 27} Here, we find that a preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that placing the child in the mother's custody at this time is *12 detrimental to the сhild. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding the mother to be unsuitable. Accordingly, we overrule the twentieth assignment of error.
{¶ 28} Finally, we reject the mother's claim that the trial court improperly named the sister as the legal custodian because she was never a party to the proceedings. After years of recognizing the sister as a new party defendant in the case, and seeking orders against her, including contempt of court, the mother, a week before trial, suddenly moved to dismiss the sister's application for custody claiming (1) that no journal entry was ever filed making the sister a party and (2) that the sister failed to support her motion for custody with the required Uniform Child Custody Justification Act Affidavit . The record reveals, however, that the sister filed the required affidavit along with her motion for custody and that the sister was a party to the case since 2004, after the trial court ordered that the sister be made a party. Although the trial court did not immediately journalize its pronouncement from the hearing, it later recognized, in subsequent journal entries, that thе sister had already been made a party to the proceedings.
{¶ 29} Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in designating the sister as the legal custodian; therefore, we overrule the third assignment of error.
{¶ 32} Initially, we note that the record is devoid of any evidence that the trial court admitted the prior guardian ad litem's report at trial or relied on it in making its custody determination. (The Trial Judge's Statement of Evidence makes no mention of the prior guardian ad litem's report.)
{¶ 33} As for the mother's claim that the trial court impropеrly allowed the current guardian ad litem's recommendation and report, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike the entire report. See, generally, Aberthary v. Aberthary, 8th Dist. No. 81675,
{¶ 34} But even if we found that the entire report should have been stricken, the trial court's refusal amounts to harmless error. See, generally, Dunn v. Dunn, *15
2nd Dist. No. 05-CA-104,
{¶ 36} Similarly, in the seventeenth assignment of error, the mother argues for the first time on appeal that the two underlying cases were improperly consolidated. Although we find no error in the consolidation of the two cases, the mother has *16
waived the argument on appeal by not raising any argument below.State ex rel. Zollner v. Indus. Comm.,
{¶ 37} Finally, in the mother's eighteenth assignment of error, she argues that the trial court erroneously denied her motions to compel the father to provide copies of photographs submitted into evidence during the October 22, 2003 hearing, which resulted in the father being awarded temporary possession of the child. The mother claims that, despite the father's representations that he would turn over the photographs, she never received the photographs prior to trial, thereby preventing her from presenting her casе at trial. Notwithstanding the fact that there is some evidence in the record that the mother may have been provided the photographs,4 the mother never raised this argument at trial and therefore has waived it on appeal. See, e.g., Gallagher v. ClevelandBrowns Football Co.,
{¶ 38} Accordingly, the seventh, eighth, ninth, seventeenth, and eighteenth assignments of error are overruled.
{¶ 40} Likewise, we decline to reach the merits of the mother's tenth assignment of error in which she claims that the trial court erred in denying her motion to stay because one of the visiting judges, who presided over the case prior to the custody trial, was not properly appointed. Under this argument, the mother is essentially attacking interlocutory orders by one visiting judge on the grounds that *18
they are voidable. Notably, this same visiting judge neither issued the final order designating the sister as the legal custodian nor presided over the trial. Thus, having already found that the trial court properly designated the sister as the legal custodian, we cannot provide any relief to the mother even if we found merit to her tenth assignment of error. See Janosek v. Janosek, 8th Dist. Nos. 86771 and 86777,
{¶ 42} the grounds that the mother has failed to comply with the appellate rules, namely, App. R. 12 and 16.
{¶ 43} The appellate rules expressly provide what an appellant shall include in the appellant brief and the resulting consequence if appellant chooses to ignore the rulеs. App. R. 16(A)(7) states that appellant shall include "[a]n argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the *19 authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies. The argument may be preceded by a summary." If the appellant fails to comply with App. R. 16(A), this court may overrule the assignment of error as stated in App. R. 12(A)(2):
{¶ 44} "The court may disregard an assignment of error presented for review if the party raising it fails to identify in the record the error on which the assignment of error is based or fails to argue the assignment separately in the brief, as required under App. R. 16(A)."
{¶ 45} This court has consistently overruled assignments of error for lack of briefing. Curtin v. Mabin, 8th Dist. No. 89993,
{¶ 46} In the mother's twelfth assignment of error, she argues that the trial court erroneously denied her motion for electronic recordings, namely, audio tapes, compact discs, and digital video discs. In the fourteenth, fifteenth, and nineteenth assignments of error, the mother argues that the trial court erred in various evidentiary rulings at trial: (1) the admission of the deposition testimony of Ian Lucash, a social worker with CCDCFS; (2) the admission of a finding of misconduct from the mother's prior divorce case; and (3) the admission of the October 22, 2003 court order, placing the child in the father's temporary possession. In the twenty-second assignment of error, the mother states that the trial court erred in ordering her to pay child support. Finally, in the twenty-third assignment of error, the mother states that the trial court erred in awarding fees to the guardians ad litem. But, in all these assignments of error, the mother fails to cite to any statutory or case authority in support of the assignments of error, fails to provide any arguments, and fails to state any reasoning which would provide a basis for sustaining the assignments of error.
{¶ 47} Likewise, in the mother's twenty-first assignment of error, she states that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a new trial. But without providing *21 any argument or supporting authority, she merely incorporates the motion she filed below.
{¶ 48} Accordingly, pursuant to App. R. 16(A)(7) and 12(A)(2), we overrule these assignments of error because of the mother's lack of briefing.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Divisiоn, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, P.J., and MELODY J. STEWART, J., CONCUR