*1 VT Intervenor) (Marilyn Barrup Barrup, Tammy Barrup Kevin [111 414] A.3d No. 12-415 Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Crawford, Present: Robinson JJ.1
Opinion Filed November present argument, participate in Justice Crawford was for oral but did not decision. *2 PLLC, Bruce C. Palmer of Downs Rachlin Martin St. Johns bury, for Intervenor-Appellee/Cross-Appellant. Se, Pond,
Tammy Barrup, J. Pro Island Defendant-Appellant. ¶ Robinson, primary J. The issue in this case involves the of a rights divorcing husband’s mother whose property interests purportedly adjudicated were a final divorce decree an action party. which she was not a Appellant, Tammy former wife an Barrup, appeals modifying order a final property-division order to account for the recorded interest of her former husband’s mother in property that was final purportedly divided decree, and also modifying spousal maintenance. Interve- nor, former husband’s mother Marilyn Barrup, We cross-appeals. *3 affirm.
¶ divorce, 2. This has an been acrimonious with multiple post- judgment procedural motions. The background most relevant this appeal is as follows. The in parties were married 1986 and in separated Court, for the last time 2004. The Superior Family Division, Orleans Unit issued a final order and decree of divorce in this in case November 2007. The court parties found that the owned, among other things, husband’s interest in a closely held family business with parents, by his two other businesses run husband, residences, two and various investments. The court found that LPL parties’ “the Financial Services stock and mutual funds stock) (including the CNB [Community National had a Bank] $363,495.”2 $3,250 value of approximately The court of awarded juncture may thought Community The court at this have that the National Bank part portfolio, they parties actually stocks were of the LPL which were not. The One, part had two stock accounts at CNB that were not of LPL the account. shares, containing undisputedly jointly by 911.80 was owned husband and wife. The consisting shares, dispute. other then of 4818.76 is the one in Unless indicated, latter, otherwise references to the CNB account relate to this disputed account. a pre-separation accounts to wife “to reflect her share of these husband, and then awarded disbursement from this account” to wife, seventy remaining of the funds to while husband percent The court that its remaining thirty percent. explained received the of wife disproportionate award of a share these accounts reflected, offset, the court’s award of his and to some extent in the business to husband.3 maintenance, respect spousal the trial court con- With although property-division might cluded that the award to wife term, meet her reasonable needs the short she would not be herself without those resources. Con- support exhausting able the the of the sidering parties’ respective earning power, length needs, marriage, and wife’s reasonable the court ordered husband $12,000 maintenance to wife the amount of pay spousal per installments, year, quarterly until wife reached the age sixty-two.
¶ 4. Husband filed a motion to amend the judgment, raising host of issues. The final court’s decree included CNB stock $59,000 account valued at of the recitation of part the value portfolio. the LPL Husband that argued improper, that account was not marital contending CNB to distribution. He the evidence at argued presented trial reflected that the funds in this account came from an inheritance from his that was grandmother by to be held his until mother her death. He had testified he was not authorized to withdraw funds from the account. order, January rejected 5. In a the trial court
motion,
the evidence did not
concluding
support husband’s
claim that the stock at issue was held
trust or controlled
his
by
To
contrary,
mother.
the account-holders were identified
exhibits)
(presumably
Tammy Barrup,
as Kevin and
and the
$96,953.
account
value
was identified as
The court’s
jointly
distribution of a stock account allegedly
owned
husband
and his mother was not one of the various issues raised
in his
final
appeal
husband
divorce decree and the decision
*4
Barrup
Barrup,
his motion to alter or amend.
regarding
See
appeal
particular
Because the focus of this
is the distribution of one
we
description
concerning
do not here recount
the court’s
of or order
all of the
parties’
property-division analysis
assets and debts. We discuss
the broader
infra
only to the extent
it is relevant
to the issue in this case.
2010-018,
No.
¶ 6. Subsequently, wife filed multiple motions to enforce the judgment, including a March 2009 motion for division of marital accounts, and husband filed a motion modify spousal mainte- division, nance. Concerning the property husband renewed his contention that one of the two CNB stock accounts was not marital property subject to division. In its November deci- sion, the trial court revisited question of which of the CNB accounts subject were to the property distribution in the final divorce decree. The court that acknowledged the CNB accounts were not actually part of the LPL portfolio, which was undisputedly subject to a pursuant 70%-30% division express order, terms of the final but concluded that the court’s intention in the final divorce subject decree to the CNB accounts to the same 70%-30% was split orders, clear from its prior especially given the valuation assigned to the account that court ordered to be divided. That the CNB account owned jointly by husband subject and wife was to division was also clear and undisputed.
¶ 7. respect With argument the other CNB not, fact, account marital property, the court noted that the (which trial court’s order to divide the disputed account was not appealed) was a final binding order of subject the court not Moreover, to challenge. reviewing a bank record that had been trial, admitted at the court concluded that the account question name, was held in husband’s and that is absolutely “[t]here no indication that these shares restriction, are held to any or in trust status.”4 This order purport did not to address husband’s motion to modify spousal maintenance. order, 8. Following this 2009 husband’s mother moved to
intervene pursuant to Vermont for Family Rule Proceedings 4(a)(1) and 24(b)(2), Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure arguing her property interests were orders, affected the court’s entry she had not been party to the underlying divorce motions, post-judgment that she must be allowed to establish her ownership over which the court juris- had exercised had, time, apparently conveyed Husband his interest in the account any purported back to his mother. The trial court noted that transfer of following husband’s share to his mother the final divorce decree would be invalid as in avoidance of lawful orders of the court.
diction, must afforded due in connection process and that she be Husband’s mother also disposition property. with the — raised, behalf, that argument on her own the same as husband subject account was not marital disputed the CNB In on 59 and accompanying distribution. an motion based V.R.C.P. 60, husband’s mother made the same assertion as hus- V.R.C.P. — made the CNB account was hers previously disputed band had — jointly subject with husband but to her control until her held granted death. The court the motion intervene. in hearing August 9. The court held a 2012 to address the
outstanding concerning disputed issues the account and the en- spousal or modification of maintenance.5 On the first forcement issue, court concluded that its conclusion that there was prior the subject any no evidence that the account was restric- mother was not on good tions interest based intervened, mother nobody presented evidence. Before husband’s actual primary the court with the stock certificates or other by evidence of The bank account statement referenced ownership. in ruling the court its November 2009 was a “consolidated” bank that, convention, in the simply statement accordance with bank’s any reflected a interest in assets within person’s ownership bank’s control without how each account purporting describe token, By was held. the same because he was listed first on the 1099-DIV, applicable husband received the IRS Form but fact, found, that not In did mean he was sole owner. the court husband’s mother had owned the stocks in the account and put husband’s name on the account. At the time of the final divorce hearing, jointly the stocks the account were titled to husband mother, and his with rights survivorship.
¶ 10.
court
testimony by
The
noted the
husband as well as his
put
father6 that husband’s mother had
husband’s name on the
tool,
an estate-planning
stocks as
and that she had never intended
However,
to make a current
to him.
it
that
gift
did not credit
testimony,
that “the act of
citing
presumption
titling property
convey
in another’s name establishes intent to
a present [benefi-
Brousseau,
property,”
interest
Brousseau v.
cial]
VT
delay
hearing
The inordinate
between the initial motions and the court’s actual
continuances,
counsel,
multiple
discovery
seems to be the result
substitutions of
conflicts,
ancillary
other
and other motions.
loss,
memory
testify
point.
Due to
husband’s mother was not able to
at that
¶77, 12,
(mem.),
182 Vt.
¶ 11. Noting presume joint most courts that such accounts shares, in equal are held and that statute law Vermont shares, presumes jointly held real equal held 2(b)(2)(A), § 27 V.S.A. the trial court presumed husband and his mother held *6 equal shares the account. Because it found no evidence to rebut this presumption, the trial court concluded that half of in the shares the account were to mother, distribution. The court thus ordered husband’s to whom 2009, had purportedly husband transferred his interest to convey to -wife seventy percent of husband’s interest in the (exclusive thirty-five percent any of the account of transfer, withdrawals or liquidations made since the account’s any inclusive of dividend reinvestments or share splits).
¶ maintenance, 12. respect spousal With to the court reviewed the of ebbs and flows husband’s income over several years, that compared by income to the income relied trial court upon the assessing spousal maintenance the first instance. The court that concluded the initial divorce decree and spousal-maintenance $78,000, award that assumed husband’s annual income was repre- his from senting salary family the business. The court found that 2009, husband had paid spousal through his maintenance March paid anything but had not thereafter. to respect With husband’s income, trial salary the court found that 2009 husband’s from family $21,230, $28,000 the business plus was reduced to of other income. The court found that this loss and not genuine was rather, contrived by family litigation; husband and his to affect the it arose from conflict in relationship By husband’s with his father. 2010, low, although his income from family business remained own husband’s business had substantial income that returned him by the level assumed the trial court in the final decree. The trial court concluded that it not reliably could determine husband’s income. Husband’s 2011 tax returns had not been at the completed hearing. time The court found that the time, family business was not doing as well but husband’s trucking overall business increased in the wake of Hurricane his trucks and money register had borrow Irene. Husband insurance, the trial court found which buy compensation workers’ making was hundreds testimony husband to undercut wife’s and assets affidavit of income thousands of dollars. Husband’s (Form $4,000 813), per month May reflected dated that he had the trial court to infer leading monthly expenses, expenses. those support income sufficient ¶ trial court concluded that hearing, the 2012 13. As of final to the time of the dropped income had relative husband’s At the divorce, suggested. not as much as husband although working was the court found husband hearing, time of the business, earning up to shore trying full-time week, through more his $1,000 and did not have time to earn per other businesses. the trial court modified findings, 14. the basis of these On 1, 2009 to obligation April from spousal-maintenance
husband’s $200, spousal- restored his prior 2010 to but then April of the final $l,000-per-month to the level obligation maintenance January from 2010 to period April divorce decree for the Thereafter, given findings its prospectively, income, spousal- the court reduced his substantially reduced month. The court calculated obligation per maintenance $850 figures. on the basis of these arrearage due to wife order, trial objecting now from this appeals 15. Wife intervention, the court’s modification permitting court’s decision *7 award, modifica and the court’s downward property-division mother, intervenor, as tion of maintenance.7 Husband’s spousal 7 arguments urges appeal disregard to this or wife’s Husband’s mother us dismiss rules, comply with did not include a because wife’s brief did not this Court’s case, printed and includes a host of documents not admitted into evidence below. below, not documents not in the record we do To the extent wife has submitted 10(a) (explaining appeal that the record on consists of consider them. See V.R.A.P. court, documents, as original and exhibits filed with the trial as well data 30(f)(1) pursuant dispense transcripts). exercise our discretion to V.R.A.P. We printed Although requirement a case. wife has failed to state her with the law, clearly concisely, applicable arguments with citations to the record and 28(a), challenges her several relevant to the V.R.A.P. we can discern from brief objects allowing subject appeal: to this she to the trial court’s order by post-judgment the trial court’s revision mother to intervene motion as well as order, property argues and -she that the trial court’s modification of the division leeway supported by spousal the evidence. Given the that we maintenance was not lawyer, represented by traditionally parties we afforded to who are not have
33 to wife. to transfer shares directing the order cross-appeals appeal. appearance has not entered an Husband CNB Account Disputed I. The A. ¶ husband’s mother The first is whether question 16. narrow case. these in the On parties’ entitled to intervene was a record facts, that insofar as husband’s mother we conclude juris- its the trial court exercised owner of over which intervene. diction, allowing not err in her to the trial court did which Family Proceedings, for The Vermont Rules this, general that provide cases such as govern divorce in divorce cases. V.R.F.P. apply Rules of Civil Procedure Vermont 4(a)(1). rules, turn, right provide Those for intervention an claims applicant . . . when the “[u]pon timely application or transaction which is the relating is so situated applicant of the action and the or impair matter practical of the action disposition interest, unless applicant’s ability protect impede by existing parties.” adequately represented interest is applicant’s 24(a)(2). for interven provide permissive The rules also V.R.C.P. discretion, tion, allow intervention may, in which a court its and the main action have an claim or defense applicant’s “when 24(b)(2). Id. No statute of law or fact common.” question interven an to husband’s mother’s poses impediment other rule standards tion, recognized that the usual previously and we have 24 in divorce apply to V.R.C.P. pursuant intervention governing 38, 10, A.2d 175 Vt. 824 Ihinger Ihinger, cases. v. 2003 VT (mem.). clarity brief with sufficient in wife’s these issues are raised conclude ¶88, 9, Cate, Sandgate Sch. Dist. v. 2005 VT warrant our consideration. See (mem.) “traditionally given wider (noting has A.2d 774 that this Court Vt. 617, 619, Degan, Beyel themselves); representing leeway” litigants Vt. (1983) (considering arguments from brief that could be discerned A.2d by self-represented appellant though appellant to state the even had failed filed resolution, supporting concisely, clearly and to cite delineate the issues for case *8 authority). 34 Here, husband’s mother a has documented record in property over which the court jurisdiction.8 asserted If
husband’s mother intervene, were not allowed to wife could find herself holding judgment for property distribution on which she — cannot likely collect triggering post-judgment motion this case to revisit property-distribution award. Husband could be forced to choose between violating husband’s legal mother’s rights or facing sanctions for in this contempt case. Husband’s mother would be forced initiate a declaratory-judgment action involving all the parties same and issues. And the family division would undoubtedly be called upon to determine the ramifications of the collateral judgment for the final divorce decree this case. Considerations of finality judicial economy favor resolution of husband’s mother’s claims the context of the ongoing post- case, proceedings further supporting the trial court’s exercise of discretion.9
¶ 19.
Nor can we conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in declining
deny
the intervention
untimely.
See
Manchester,
Mohr v. Vill.
562, 562,
Vt.
641 A.2d
(1993) (mem.) (noting that
the trial court has the discretion to
deny intervention as of right when the motion
untimely).
Wife
suggests that we can infer from husband’s mother’s relationship
him,
with
and husband’s mother’s involvement in the litigation,
that husband’s mother was on notice throughout
the divorce
proceedings
the CNB account bearing her name
in play.
But the testimony as to when husband’s mother first learned that
the court had ordered that
the part of the
joint
CNB
stock
account
inconclusive,
be distributed to wife was
and the trial court
made no findings that would support
the supposition that hus
band’s mother knew of the court’s order and sat on her rights. We
have held that “intervention may be permitted even
final
after
8We need not
party
here consider whether a third
ownership
who claims
property without a
record such as a deed or stock certificate
likewise
pending
intervene in a
divorce action.
argues
Husband’s mother
that a refusal
prove
allow her to intervene and
deprived
claim before she is
process
titled in her name would raise due
See, e.g.,
Eldridge,
(1976)
Mathews v.
issues.
(stating
U.S.
requirement
process
opportunity
fundamental
of due
is the
to be heard at a
manner).
meaningful
meaningful
time
Because
affirm
we
the trial court’s
rules,
decision to allow her to intervene on the basis of the
we do not reach question.
constitutional
already
prejudiced,
those
are not
judgment
parties
where
*9
for harm to the intervenor interven-
potential
where there is real
in extreme circumstances.”
untimely only
tion should be denied as
Inc.,
627, 629,
133
349
Mktg. Grp.,
Elwell v. Vt. Commc’ns
Vt.
(1975) (citation omitted).
Elwell,
In
A.2d
220
this Court held
in allowing
the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in
a
judgment
intervention after a final
connection with
tax
in
against
foreclosure where the
the defendant
the case
judgment
was to
that the intervenor claimed it
against property
be levied
627-30,
similar;
very
at
¶ 21. question This has not addressed the apparently Court to which a creditor secure trustee third-party the extent a jointly a account owned between debtor process against bank third-party courts have held that a Many nondebtor. joint share of a bank garnish only creditor can the debtor’s — in the equal account to be an share absence presumed Kondora, See, B.R. contrary e.g., evidence. In re (Bankr. concluding N.D. Iowa Iowa law and (applying no than half of the bank garnish up creditors could to but more ample support finding There the court’s that the CNB evidence was, fact, joint by account account held husband and his mother. account jointly by held debtor and her ex-husband where neither the creditors nor the ex-husband successfully rebutted presump account). tion that debtor and ex-husband each owned half of In Kondora, the bankruptcy court concluded that under Iowa law joint bank rebuttably accounts are presumed to be owned in equal tenants, shares and that “[d]uring joint tenancy, each joint tenant is liable to have the tenant’s fractional interest taken (citations in satisfaction of the omitted); tenant’s debts.” Id. see also Valley Stovall, Walnut State Bank v. 574 P.2d (Kan. 1978) (where creditor garnish seeks to jointly account held nondebtor, debtor and the “presumption of equal ownership prevail should proof absence of ownership some other proportion”); Lazoski, (Mich. Danielson v. 531 N.W.2d Ct. 1995) (“[W]ith App. respect garnishment . proceedings [joint . . account are presumed equal owners] to be contributors and equal owners and . . . under this presumption, garnishment order *10 regarding assets applies only [debtor’s] to his half of the . . . funds.”).
¶ 22. Other courts take the position that a general debtor who jointly owns an account is rebuttably presumed to own the entire account such that the full amount of the account is available to judgment creditor garnishment. See, Conn., for e.g., Fleet Bank Carillo, (Conn. N.A. 691 A.2d (concluding that “a coholder’s property interest in the joint account exposes that account, in its entirety, to the creditor’s collection powers”); Prods., Amarlite Architectural Co., Inc. v. Copeland Glass 601 So. (Ala. 1992) (“[J]oint 2d accounts are garnishable to the extent of the ownership of the debtor . . . there is a [and] rebuttable presumption that joint the funds in the account belong debtor.”); to the Maloy v. Stuttgart Mem’l Hosp., S.W.2d (Ark. 1994) (same); generally Churchill, see Annotation, M. Joint Bank Attachment, Account as Subject Garnishment, to Execution Creditor One Depositor, Joint 86 A.L.R.5th (2001). 7,§§ court, Like the trial we conclude that the former — rebuttable presumption a only pro debtor’s rata share of a joint account subject to garnishment by that debtor’s indi — vidual applies creditors in Vermont. In the context of real property, the Legislature has specifically provided that unless specified, joint otherwise tenants to real property presumed are to 2(b)(2)(A). have equal § interests. See 27 V.S.A. Although rules to necessarily apply personal do not applicable property real accounts, as to starting presumption property such bank statute real-property intentions reflected parties’ likely joint By analogy, force to bank accounts. applies equal with of the determining portion basis for rule reasonable provides of the marital estate. part division as subject equitable account not err the trial court did Accordingly, we conclude direction, that the evidence either persuasive absent presuming, account shared husband and husband’s joint share of the family court’s distribution property mother that was fifty percent.
C. ¶24. share In its as to husband’s distributable light finding account, trial the next is whether the disputed question of the to award amending the final order court abused its discretion of the fifty-percent of husband’s share seventy percent wife of the overall effectively reducing wife’s share Husband’s mother did distribution relative husband’s. of the reducing wife’s overall share necessarily not advocate distribution; the court from simply sought prevent she against argued her assets. She assessing judgment husband, of the order wife the value pay court was free to contests the court’s order that clearly account. Wife disputed CNB received, but also only not the real dollars she effectively reduced estate, she of the. overall marital since share proportionate account. share of the CNB disproportionate was to receive both deferentially the trial court’s decision 25. We review in the disposition division “has wide discretion because the divorce, affirm its decision and we will property upon of marital *11 support findings evidence to the court’s where we find reasonable 36, 43, conclusions,” Johnson, 580 A.2d Johnson v. 155 Vt. of (1990), our review of a trial court’s exercise and because 60(b), 59 or judgment pursuant to amend a to V.R.C.P. discretion 4(a), is deferential. through court V.R.F.P. applied as (1994) D.M., 33, 36, that (stating 641 A.2d In re 162 Vt. 60(b) of on for abuse we review trial court decision V.R.C.P. discretion).11 days than ten after the trial court’s mother filed her motion more Husband’s order, designating for her motion. Even both V.R.C.P. 59 and V.R.C.P. 60 bases deference, Affording this we conclude that the trial expressly
court was within its discretion. The court considered the creditor, in the shares that wife had as a and noted that if rights it considering question property were the of division from scratch it might differently. Although divide the stock the court have of portion had the discretion increase the husband’s interest in light the CNB account to be distributed to wife of fact that the husband’s distributable interest the account was half of what supposed, require the trial court or to some sort of from payment shortfall, separate up resources to make for wife’s it required was not to do so. In this exceptionally rancorous and divorce, trial lengthy opted the court to remove husband’s moth consideration, joint er’s interest in the account from and maintain seventy-thirty proportionate the same division of the remainder. The final proceeds decree awarded wife the from the sale residence, husband, marital payments direct from seventy LPL percent portfolio of the and the stock account that CNB jointly by held husband and wife and is in dispute not here. The $375,000. collectively value of these awards exceeds The evidence reflects the value stock account was about $59,000. Because she is now to seventy percent receive half figure, amount, instead of seventy percent of the full wife (Because $20,000 stands to receive about less than expected. she the court ruled that husband has an interest half of only account, disputed stock and he was thirty percent allocated of that $9,000 husband likewise retains about less expected.) than award, In property-division the context of the overall we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to readjust division to mitigate impact on wife’s proportionate share of the total distribution.
D. ¶27. briefly We address husband’s mother’s claim on cross-appeal joint that both account holders have an undivided joint the whole and therefore the account cannot be pay debts, breached to husband’s individual including obliga- his applied, notwithstanding delay, if ruling V.R.C.P. 59 the trial court’s would be Leinwohl, Houghton 380, 382, to the same deference. 135 Vt. 376 A.2d (1977) (stating that decision on V.R.C.P. 59 motion “is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court” and will not be disturbed the absence of discretion”). “manifest abuse of *12 courts on Although presumption tions to wife. are divided which — joint a account own applies presumption equal holders a that a debtor has a presumption garnishable interests versus joint in the courts in both of these camps entire — that a share of a account with agree joint debtor’s determined presumption presumptions reference to whichever the courts — subject supra, garnishment by is creditors. See apply ¶¶ 21-22 Although and cases cited therein. division a divorce case is not identical to the attachment of funds creditor, closely analogous. it is Insofar as we have concluded that subject satisfy of the funds are to attachment portion creditors, husband’s and thus available to judgment help meet debts, and expenses they properly part husband’s are considered of marital To argues estate. the extent husband’s mother joint that as a of law no of portion matter her account with wife, argument husband distribution flies face of a widespread consensus. Spousal II. Maintenance ¶ objections 28. Many spousal-maintenance wife’s to the order upon the evidence which it was based relate to the final Barrup, appeal, divorce order. This Court affirmed that order on 2010-018, long No. WL and the order has been final. will not revisit the trial court’s conclusions findings We in its final order and decree of divorce.
¶29. Many of wife’s relate to failure to arguments order, pay spousal her the maintenance the court’s required and her motion to enforce. has not cross-appealed Husband trial court’s him to compelling pay spousal-maintenance order arrearages, so we do not review the trial court’s order enforcing maintenance. spousal objects 30. Wife also the trial court’s downward modification spousal-maintenance obligation. interpret
of husband’s We arguments challenge sufficiency as a of the evidence to order, and to trial support the court’s modification court’s exercise of discretion in connection with the modification motion. real, substantial, In of “a unanticipated the event circumstances,” a court change may modify spousal- § In mainte- modifying spousal maintenance order. 15 V.S.A. 758. nance, § a court the factors set forth in 15 V.S.A. 752. apply finding standard of review a trial court’s regarding “[T]he one. . . . will not [W]e is a deferential changed circumstances unless its exercise discretion the court’s determination disturb untenable, or the exercise clearly or for reasons grounds was on Meyer clearly unreasonable extent.” of discretion was to a (2001). Moreover, 195, 197, A.2d Meyer, “[a] Vt. determining the amount and dura- court has broad discretion *13 award, it and we will set aside tion of a [spousal-]maintenance Stickney v. it.” support is no reasonable basis to only when there (1999) (mem.). 548-49, 1228, 547, 742 1231 Stickney, 170 A.2d Vt. ¶ in trial court’s order 32. We conclude The trial court found that husband case was within its discretion. 2009, in income in drop significantly had suffered substantial $12,000 in annual ability pay spousal his wife undermining temporary trial court further found that after a maintenance. The 2012, experienced another rebound in his income husband challenges facing sustained in his income attributable drop He and the effective end of his other businesses. family business $52,000 $78,000 contem earning opposed around court that this in the final divorce decree. The trial found plated testimony wife offered and drop though income was real. Even contrary, support there was evidence to the trial evidence to the ¶ 22, 326, Wright, v. Smith 2013 VT 194 Vt. findings. court’s (“As matter, factual uphold findings we will on general A.3d 876 them, any supports if evidence the record appeal credible fact.”) (alteration determinations to the trier of leaving credibility omitted). drops marks And these income were quotation and real, finding the trial court’s of a support implicit sufficient to substantial, unanticipated change and of circumstances.
¶ circumstances, the trial court’s modest changed 33. Given the month, $1,000 from per reduction of maintenance spousal $150 month, in to husband’s income per per response month to $850 $2,000 month, likewise did not exceed its drop per of over making money wife believes husband is more Although discretion. husband’s evidence acknowledges, than he the trial court credited — — concluded that the modest reduction in to an extent and was warranted. That conclusion was within spousal maintenance the trial court’s discretion.
Affirmed.
¶ J., Skoglund, urge I write concurring. separately to intervene in divorce cases. This allowing parties caution third seeking has an intervenor approved is the first time this Court only in a The proceeding. interests divorce protect situated, Stearns party time we dealt with a third so other Steams, (1838), request we denied creditors’ Vt. without discussion. Courts in other states have limited intervene cases, and our instruction given repeated intervention jurisdiction, is a court of we family ought that the division limited to do the same. of finality 35. To strike a balance between “[considerations ante, hand, judicial preventing on one and economy,”
and cousins, banks, a host of intervening strangers distant and other proceedings undermining from often tense divorce protracting engaged litigation, such on privacy dignity spouses hand, we should limit who intervene in divorce may the other Indeed, circumstances under which do so. they cases §33, I which outlines the division’s believe V.S.A. § and 15 which the division of jurisdiction, governs V.S.A. Luthen, Luthen v. assets, marital these limitations. compel See (Minn. (denying Ct. intervention App. 596 N.W.2d reasoning of husband’s creditors based in on general part statute, marital division similar to 15 Minnesota’s V.S.A. *14 751, § no mention of creditors . . . third-party having “makes interest in the marital of either the husband or vested wife”). would, my opinion, The restrictions strike following (1) that the third interest be in the form of party’s balance: asset, claim as to a rather than an proprietary particular direct general, unvested future interest or unsecured debt (2) spouses; prima one or both that the intervenor show against proof facie of her interest and that such interest will be purported of the matter in which intervention directly by disposition affected (3) that of sought; particular property the amount share (4) sought only directly that the intervention be dispute; be claims party of to which the third challenge distribution (5) matters; interest, any ancillary an not to address other adequately represented by the intervenor’s interest not be one of the party-spouses. Strong rights spouses dictates that the public policy can their they present
their own divorce
where
proceeding,
maintenance,
marital
respective
property,
individual
claims to
by
cannot be clouded
intervenors outside the
support,
child
stake in one
they
who
have a financial
marriage
speculate
spouse
than
“A
getting
money
more
the other.
third party seeking
intervention
a divorce
for the
proceeding
purpose
protecting
a property interest assumes the burden of
an
demonstrating
interest which will outweigh
privacy
the substantial
interests of
(W.
401,
v.
divorcing parties.” Boyle Boyle, 459 S.E.2d
Va.
1995)
(interpreting
virtually
rule
identical to
V.R.C.P.
that courts
holding
parties’
must balance the
substantial privacy
interests against
relating
considerations
to potential
intervenor’s
interests).
especially
We should be
mindful of the
lan
limiting
guage of
Vermont Rule
Civil Procedure 24 in
proceed
ings
light of the emotional and private nature of such cases and
jurisdiction
the circumscribed
of that
tribunal. See
Golden
¶¶ 35,
Cooper-Ellis,
15,
43-46,
359,
2007 VT
181 Vt.
intrusion to resolve the property dispute. e.g., (Conn. 817, Aarestrup Harwood-Aarestrup, 868 A.2d Super. 2005) Ct. (granting motion to intervene in divorce action for limited of purpose holding hearing to determine ownership question). Courts should consider whether potential any alleged intervenor could enforce rights separate action and the extent to which third party’s interest would be adequately represented by one of the spouses, “thereby avoiding their inappropriate insinuation into the private affairs of married couple.” Gonzalez, 28, In re Marriage UT P.3d also, Fisher, (N.D. e.g., 1074. See Fisher v. 546 N.W.2d (denying minority intervention closely shareholders of held corporation by divorcing spouses, owned noting minority shareholders’ “many routes to speculative, [other] relief’ and complicated process valuing shares); minority Ex parte Kirkley, (Ala. 1982) 418 So. 2d (finding intervention of first wife in divorce action between husband and second wife inappropriate because first wife had “right no or title” to marital and could seek to obtain money owed to her prior under suit). decree through separate contempt ¶ 41. In factors, consideration of the above husband’s mother in properly joined intervenor, case was as an I but stress the grounds upon narrow which I agree with the result.
Ski Resort
LLC
[
Opinion Filed November