184 Mass. 440 | Mass. | 1903
This is an action of contract in which the plaintiff seeks to recover for money paid by him in advertising in certain newspapers a proposed subscription for and sale of mortgage bonds to be issued by a corporation known as the Boston Breweries Company of which the defendant was to be trustee for the bondholders. The declaration contained three counts, but the first and second become immaterial as the case was tried on the third count, which in substance alleges that the defendant being “ interested in the promotion of a combination of corporations ” desired to place the bonds on the market, and agreed with
The questions raised are so closely connected that they may be considered together. The relation of the parties to this suit is well stated in the closing language of the interview between the plaintiff and the president of the defendant when the contract was made. “ I said, 1 If the money comes in you will pay me.’ ‘ Certainly,’ he said, 11 will pay you out of the money that comes in but I do not guarantee that any money will come in.’ I said, 1 That is satisfactory to me.’ ” Plainly no promise was made by the defendant to pay the plaintiff absolutáty but only on condition that payment was to be made out of such money, securities or subscriptions as might be paid in, and the plaintiff
The money actually received was paid in by subscribers on the direct understanding that "the whole undertaking would be consummated as represented; and it fairly may be inferred that none of those who subscribed would have done so on any other basis. When the defendant, ascertaining that misrepresentations had been made as to the earning capacity of at least one if not more of the various concerns which made up the Boston Breweries Company, refused to go on, and so notified the agent of the proposed combination, and cancelled the underwriting agreement, the money in its possession, received from subscribers for bonds that had not been and could not be issued, belonged to those who had paid it. They subscribed for bonds, and no bonds were ever sold and delivered, for the simple reason that the proposed combination went to pieces and there were no bonds to sell. And the object and purpose of the subscription having wholly failed, each was entitled to a return of the sum so paid. The temporary deposit made by subscribers, was to insure good faith on their part and that they would take and pay for the bonds subscribed for by them, and cannot be regarded and treated as a fulfilment of all the conditions under which
Nor can the force of this understanding, arising from the whole plan to float the bonds and the general situation of the parties and their relation to the subject matter, be successfully met by the argument of the plaintiff that a jury might find that the cancellation of the agreement by the International Trust Company was fraudulent as against the plaintiff and not made in good faith. It would be enough to dispose of the position taken to say that the declaration on which the plaintiff relies alleges performance of the contract, and not a breach of it by the defendant. But, if this had been cured by an amendment at the trial, the plaintiff must have failed to maintain his contention.
The evidence as to the cancellation of the underwriting agreement was given on cross-examination by the president of the defendant company, a witness called by the plaintiff, and against whom no claim was then, or is now made, that he was untruthful or under any bias or prejudice in the case. Not only is fraud never presumed, but it must be affirmatively alleged and proved by the party who relies upon it, either for the purpose of attack or defence. And nothing appears in the evidence recited in the record to show want of good faith by the defendant. If the plaintiff in order to avoid the effect of this evidence sought to charge the defendant or its officers with fraudulent conduct it became his duty to so allege and offer some affirmative proof to overcome the presumption of fact that they had acted honestly. Hatch v. Bayley, 12 Cush. 27, 30. Beatty v. Fishel, 100 Mass. 448. Wood v. Massachusetts Mutual Accident Association, 174 Mass. 217, 221.
Exceptions overruled.