BARRIOS v. HASKELL COUNTY PUBLIC FACILITIES AUTHORITYBARRIOS v. HASKELL COUNTY PUBLIC FACILITIES AUTHORITY
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NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.
0 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma certified several questions of state law to this Court pursuant to the Revised Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act,
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS ANSWERED
Andrew M. Casey, FOSHEE & YAFFE, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs, Jered Barrios ex rel. Estate of Randall Barrios, deceased, and Kelly L. Foutch ex rel. Estate of Russell Ted Foutch, deceased.
Jamison C. Whitson, COLLINS, ZORN & WAGNER, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants Haskell County Public Facilities Authority, Katrina Christy, Sheriff Tim Turner, and Creek County Public Facilities Authority.
Randall J. Wood and Jeffrey C. Hendrickson, PIERCE COUCH HENDRICKSON BAYSINGER & GREEN, L.L.P., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant Brian Hale.
Anthony C. Winter, JOHNSON HANAN & VOSLER, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant Turn Key Health, LLC d/b/a Turn Key Medical and Turn Key.
Devan A. Pederson, OKLAHOMA OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Amicus Curiae, State of Oklahoma.
¶1 Two federal courts have certified to us the following questions:
1. The Governmental Tort Claims Act renders the State immune from any tort suit arising out of the “[p]rovision, equipping, operation or maintenance of any prison, jail or correctional facility.” Do Sections 7 and 9 of Article II of the Oklahoma Constitution nonetheless allow an inmate to bring a tort claim for denial of medical care?
2. If so, is the private cause of action to be recognized retrospectively?
¶2 Answering these questions requires us to determine whether we should extend our holding in Bosh v. Cherokee County Governmental Building Authority, 2013 OK 9, 305 P.3d 994, to include tort claims brought by inmates alleging violations of their rights to due process and to be free from cruel or unusual punishments. Because the Legislature responded to our decision in Bosh by amending the Governmental Tort Claims Act (“GTCA“),
I
¶3 Russell Foutch and Randall Barrios died while incarcerated in county jails, Barrios by his own hand,2 Foutch from complications related to pneumonia.3 Their estates sued the respective jails, one sheriff, and various employees and healthcare contractors of those jails. Their claims included (1) federal civil rights claims under
¶4 In Foutch‘s case, the healthcare contractor filed a
¶5 In Barrios‘s case, the jail and its employees filed a
¶6 Due to the commonality of the questions presented, we made the cases companion cases and now answer the certified questions in this single opinion.6
II
A
¶7 We have long recognized that the Legislature has the final say in defining the
¶8 The Legislature has oft exercised its power to define the scope of the State‘s immunity from suit. After Vanderpool, the Legislature enacted the GTCA and unequivocally abrogated Vanderpool‘s common law decision with a statute declaring that “[t]he State of Oklahoma does hereby adopt the doctrine of sovereign immunity” from tort suits, while simultaneously waiving that immunity for certain tort claims.10 Accordingly, in cases including tort claims against the State and state actors, the Court begins with the understanding that the State is statutorily immune from tort suit unless the Legislature has expressly waived that immunity. We thus look next to the text of the GTCA to determine whether its limited waivers of sovereign immunity from tort suit encompass the particular tort suit at issue.11
¶9 Analyzing a prior version of the GTCA, this Court did just that in Bosh, holding that the GTCA did not bar a tort claim alleging that excessive force was used against a pre-trial detainee in violation of the detainee‘s Article II, Section 30 right not to be unreasonably seized. We read the GTCA as stopping short of “immunizing the state completely from all liability for violations of the constitutional rights of its citizens.”12 The text of the GTCA certainly didn‘t expressly include tort claims arising from alleged deprivations of constitutional rights--and we have always said that “[i]mmunity cannot be read into a legislative text that is silent, doubtful or ambiguous.”13 Accordingly,
¶10 As it did after Vanderpool, the Legislature in 2014 responded to Bosh by amending the GTCA to specify that the State‘s immunity from suit extended even to torts arising from alleged deprivations of constitutional rights.15 The Legislature first amended the definition of “tort” to include tort claims arising from alleged violations of constitutional duties:
“Tort” means a legal wrong, independent of contract, involving violation of a duty imposed by general law, statute, the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma, or otherwise, resulting in a loss to any person, association or corporation as the proximate result of an act or omission of a political subdivision or the state or an employee acting within the scope of employment.16
It next made a similar addition to the section describing the scope of the State‘s tort liability:
The liability of the state or political subdivision under
this actThe Governmental Tort Claims Act shall be exclusive andin place of all othershall constitute the extent of tort liability of the state, a political subdivision or employeeatarising from common law, statute, the Oklahoma Constitution, or otherwise.17
And then lastly, it mandated that even if a court nonetheless recognized a constitutional tort, such a tort claim is subject to the GTCA‘s liability limits.18
B
¶11 We must now determine whether, in spite of the legislative response described above, Bosh‘s holding can be extended to allow inmates alleging violations of their Article II, Sections 7 and 9 rights to bring suit against the State for money damages.
¶12 It cannot. The Legislature‘s amendment of the GTCA to specify that the GTCA applies even to tort suits alleging violations of constitutional rights was an exercise of the Legislature‘s long-recognized power to define the scope of the State‘s sovereign immunity, which forecloses our ability to expand the common law in a manner that would conflict with statutory law.19
¶13 Even if not barred by sovereign immunity, however, it is doubtful that such claims would exist in the Oklahoma common law. Certainly nothing in the text of Article II, Sections 7 and 9 creates a tort cause of action for money damages as a remedy to vindicate violations of those rights, nor do these plaintiffs point to any common law tradition of the State paying money damages to the families of inmates who take their own lives or succumb to illness while in prison.21 These plaintiffs instead rely primarily on our decision in Washington v. Barry, 2002 OK 45, 55 P.3d 1036, where we assumed for purposes of our decision that Article II, Section 9 creates a cause of action for an inmate to bring a tort claim alleging violations of his or her right to be free from cruel or unusual punishments.22 We resolved that case, however, on the basis that the inmate failed to adequately plead such a claim; so we have never squarely held that such a claim exists.23
¶14 The best support for the notion that violations of Article II, Section 9 rights should be vindicated through tort suits comes from the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), where that Court held that Eighth Amendment rights could be vindicated through tort suits. In the very recent decision of Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017), however, the United States Supreme Court declined to recognize a tort claim brought by detainees who alleged they were abused in violation of their Due Process Rights. In so doing, the Ziglar Court called the continuing validity of Carlson into grave doubt,24 saying that it might decide the case
¶15 “[W]hen the question is whether to recognize an implied cause of action to enforce a provision of the Constitution itself,”26 the Ziglar Court said, “it is a significant step under separation-of-powers principles for a court to determine that it has the authority, under the judicial power, to create and enforce a cause of action for damages against [government] officials in order to remedy a constitutional violation.”27 Because “claims against [government] officials often create substantial costs,” including “the time and administrative costs attendant upon intrusions resulting from the discovery and trial process,” it is the Legislative Branch that has “substantial responsibility to determine whether, and the extent to which, monetary and other liabilities should be imposed upon individual officers and employees of the [State] Government.”28 The Court noted that Congress had in a similar context specified that the Federal Tort Claims Act did not authorize any claim against a federal employee “which is brought for a violation of the Constitution,”29 leading it to conclude that there, “Congress [had] . . . weighed those concerns in deciding not to substitute the Government as defendant in suits seeking damages for constitutional violations.”30
¶16 For all those reasons, the Ziglar Court “made clear” that expanding tort remedies for constitutional violations is now a “disfavored judicial activity.”31 Accordingly, “[w]hen a party seeks to assert an implied cause of action under the Constitution itself, just as when a party seeks to assert an implied cause of action under a . . . statute, separation-of-powers principles are or should be central to the analysis. The question is ‘who should decide’ whether to provide for a damages remedy, [the Legislature] or the courts?”32
¶17 We agree that “[t]he answer most often will be” the Legislature, because “[w]hen an issue ‘involves a host of considerations that must be weighed and appraised,’ it should be committed to ‘those who write the laws’ rather than ‘those who interpret them.‘”33 Thus, because the Legislature amended the GTCA after our decision in Bosh to specify that the GTCA applies even to tort suits alleging violations of constitutional rights,34 we conclude that the GTCA‘s specific prohibition against tort suits arising out of the “operation or maintenance of any prison, jail or correctional facility” is a legislative determination to which we must now defer.
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS ANSWERED
Combs, C.J., and Kauger, Winchester, Reif, and Wyrick, JJ., concur.
Gurich, V.C.J., and Edmondson (by separate writing) and Darby, JJ., concur in result.
Colbert, J., dissents.
EDMONDSON, J., Concurring in result.
¶1 I concur in the result of the Court‘s opinion. The effect of the Court‘s opinion will be sub silentio to disapprove or distinguish language in Bosh v. Cherokee County Governmental Building Authority, 2013 OK 9, 305 P.3d 994, and Washington v. Barry, 2002 OK 45, 55 P.3d 1036. Any statements in either Bosh or Washington impliedly or expressly indicating an alleged state or federal constitutional violation may be used for either (1) a governmental statutory tort claim or (2) a “constitutional tort” claim against the State and its officials, when otherwise expressly forbidden by the State‘s sovereign immunity statutes, should be expressly disapproved by this Court to avoid confusion by the Bench and Bar. The Court‘s opinion today is inconsistent with Perry v. City of Norman, 2014 OK 119, 341 P.3d 689, and Perry should be overruled to the extent it allows a constitutional tort claim against the public purse when such a claim is expressly prohibited by the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act.
¶2 Our 1972 opinion in State ex rel. Department of Highways v. McKnight explained Oklahoma‘s sovereign immunity from a legal action in an Oklahoma court is based upon Oklahoma statutes, and a statute must clearly permit the state to be sued or the right to do so will not exist.1 In McKnight we quoted language from State ex rel. Williamson, Attorney General, v. Superior Court of Seminole County, and again stated “It is fundamental that the State cannot be sued in any manner, or upon any liability, constitutional, statutory, or contractual, unless there is express consent thereto.”2 The petition in State ex rel. Williamson alleged violations of several provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution.3 The fact that the present actions are brought based upon the alleged violation of federal constitutional rights is insufficient to supplant Oklahoma‘s statutory sovereign immunity when the alleged federal constitutional rights are asserted as a basis for a tort action for monetary damages.
¶3 Generally, there are several types of actions where a plaintiff may bring an action against a state governmental agency and assert the personal deprivation of state and federal constitutional rights. One authority has stated the following.
The courts have looked to whether the relief sought would serve an anticipatory or preventive purpose other than to compel affirmative action on the part of, or to establish a claim against, the government or its agents. In the former instance, the action may be maintained, in the latter it is barred. Similar reasoning has been applied where the courts have lifted the bar of immunity from actions for injunctive relief, again, especially in constitutional litigation.
Civil Actions Against State Government, Its Divisions, Agencies and Officers (W. Winborne ed. 1982) 59-60, Section 2.29.
¶4 The issue of paying a judgment from public funds also arises in jurisprudence relating to a state‘s Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal courts, and the power of Congress to authorize an action against a State Treasury pursuant to
Will ‘s holding does not rest directly on the Eleventh Amendment. Whereas the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court “by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury,” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1355 (1974), Will arose from a suit in state court. We considered the Eleventh Amendment in Will only because the fact that Congress did not intend to override state immunity when it enacted
§ 1983 was relevant to statutory construction: “Given that a principal purpose behind the enactment of§ 1983 was to provide a federal forum for civil rights claims,” Congress’ failure to authorize suits against States in federal courts suggested that it also did not intend to authorize such claims in state courts. 491 U.S. at 66, 109 S.Ct. at 2310.
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991).
The remedy of
¶5 A problematic argument may be made for recognizing a cause of action for “constitutional damages” as a state tort claim based upon opinions such as Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), or Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). Bivens was brought as a general federal question jurisdiction case and viewed as a complementary cause of action brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act.10 However, a Bivens remedy does not establish any substantive rights; it authorizes a suit against an individual official, and ”the sovereign still remains immune from suit.”11 Bivens provided a
¶6 Section 153 (B) of Title 51 (O.S.Supp.2015) (emphasis added) states:
B. The liability of the state or political subdivision under The Governmental Tort Claims Act shall be exclusive and shall constitute the extent of tort liability of the state, a political subdivision or employee arising from common law, statute, the Oklahoma Constitution, or otherwise. If a court of competent jurisdiction finds tort liability on the part of the state or a political subdivision of the state based on a provision of the Oklahoma Constitution or state law other than The Governmental Tort Claims Act, the limits of liability provided for in The Governmental Tort Claims Act shall apply.
This statute includes all “tort liability” of the state or political subdivision and the statute makes no distinction in liability between a breach arising from statutory, constitutional, common law duties “or otherwise.” It is consistent with State ex rel. Williamson, Attorney General v. Superior Court of Seminole County, supra, and sovereign immunity applies to an alleged breach of federal or constitutional law when tort monetary damages are prohibited by the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act.
¶7 Bosh includes language as follows.
In Washington v. Barry, 2002 OK 45, 55 P.3d 1036, this Court held that a private cause of action may exist for inmates to recover for excessive force under the provisions of the
Okla. Const. art. 2, § 9 and the 8th Amendment of the United States Constitution --despite the provisions of the OGTCA.
Bosh, 2013 OK 9, ¶ 18, 305 P.3d 994, 1000-1001, notes omitted.
We later stated in Perry v. City of Norman, that a Bosh action was not available when a claim was available pursuant to the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act. We stated Bosh recognized “notwithstanding the OGTCA” “a private constitutional excessive force action may exist for prison inmates against prison officials.”13 The Court recognized a “constitutional tort” against the State of Oklahoma when the claim fell outside the statutory boundaries set by the Legislature in the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims
¶8 In Vanderpool v. State, this Court acknowledged the Legislature‘s right to enact sovereign immunity by statute. Nothing has changed since Vanderpool on the question whether the Legislature may determine the scope of liability for tort claims seeking money from the public purse. Our legislative body, the Oklahoma Legislature, has expressly stated in
¶9 The U.S. Supreme Court has stated “[t]he immunity of a truly independent sovereign from suit in its own courts has been enjoyed as a matter of absolute right for centuries.”14 Statutory sovereign immunity granted to the State of Oklahoma and its officials and employees does not violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution.15 The doctrine of sovereign immunity was a well-established principle of common law at the time the Oklahoma Constitution was created.16 Limiting tort claims for damages against the State to those allowed by the OGTCA does not violate either the federal or Oklahoma Constitution.
¶10 Any statements in Bosh v. Cherokee County Governmental Building Authority, 2013 OK 9, 305 P.3d 994, or Washington v. Barry, 2002 OK 45, 55 P.3d 1036, indicating an alleged constitutional violation may be either (1) the basis of an OGTCA claim when expressly prohibited by that Act, or (2) a viable tort claim against the State and its officials, when otherwise expressly forbidden by the State‘s sovereign immunity statutes, should be expressly disapproved. Our opinion in Perry v. City of Norman, 2014 OK 119, 341 P.3d 689, should be expressly overruled on Perry‘s statement a constitutional tort claim may brought against the State when the OGTCA prohibits the claim. The Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act provides the State of Oklahoma shall not be liable for a monetary tort damages if a loss or claim results from provision, equipping, operation or maintenance of any prison, jail or correctional facility.17 If the OGTCA bars a plaintiff‘s tort claim, then the fact that the alleged breach is based upon a constitutional duty does not thereby authorize a state law claim based on constitutional, statutory, or common-law claim in tort for damages against the State.
Notes
Accordingly, in assessing whether a certified federal question of law should be answered by this Court, both factors mentioned by section 1602 should be addressed: (1) Would the answer be dispositive of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court? (2) Is there established and controlling law on the subject matter? In this matter, there is no controlling Oklahoma precedent. In Barrios, the questions certified would be dispositive of Barrios‘s “constitutional” tort claims in the underlying federal action. In Foutch, however, the federal district court has already dismissed the relevant claims and has denied a motion to reconsider that ruling, which raises doubt about whether the questions from the Foutch case are certifiable. See Cray v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 1996 OK 102, ¶¶ 6, 8, 925 P.2d 60, 62 (declining to answer a certified federal question where, much like Foutch, the federal court had granted a dispositive motion, denied a motion to reconsider, and granted a motion to certify, because such actions indicated “the trial court [had] finalized its determination on the question” and because this Court did not wish “to afford appellate review of a ruling made by a federal judge under the guise of a certified question of law“). But even if the questions in Foutch are not properly presented, we will nonetheless answer the substantively similar questions in the Barrios case. Thus, we see no need to quibble with the certifiability of the Foutch questions. Civil Actions Against State Government, Its Divisions, Agencies and Officers, 73, § 2.34 citing Armory Comm. v. Staudt, 388 So.2d 991 (Ala. 1980) (appropriations for Commission payable from state treasury); Rogan v. Bd. of Trustees For State Colleges, 178 Conn. 579, 424 A.2d 274 (1979) (cost of expanded services would draw on public treasury); Lostumbo v. Board of Education, 36 Conn. Super. 293, 418 A.2d 949 (1980) (judgment paid from wholly nonstate funds); Weinstein, Bronfin & Heller v. Le Blanc, 249 La. 936, 192 So.2d 130 (1996) (wages of state senator would be drawn from state); State ex rel. Department of Highways v. McKnight, 1972 OK 3, 496 P.2d 775 (partial payment of judgment from local funds would not defeat immunity); Garrettson v. Commonwealth, 46 Pa. Cmlth. 136, 405 A.2d 1146 (1979) (monies collected by agency were paid into state treasury); Ables v. Mooney, 164 W.Va. 19, 264 S.E. 2d 424 (1979) (sovereign immunity bars relief sought to obtain a monetary recovery against the official based on official‘s acts).The Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals may answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States, or by an appellate court of another state, or of a federally recognized Indian tribal government, or of Canada, a Canadian province or territory, Mexico, or a Mexican state, if the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and there is no controlling decision of the Supreme Court or Court of Criminal Appeals, constitutional provision, or statute of this state.