91 N.Y.S. 998 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1905
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting):
I concur in the conclusion reached by my brethren that the -defendant was. plainly chargeable with negligence which caused the plaintiffs injury, and also that the facts of this case do not warrant the conclusion reached by the County Court that the defendant was liable for such injury even though the plaintiff himself was guilty ■of negligence which contributed to it; ,but I do not concur in their ■conclusion that the plaintiff was shown to be free from contributory ■negligence. It seems to me that we should hold in this instance that the plaintiff’s conduct so clearly contributed .to his injury that the verdict of the jury upon that question should not be allowed to stand.
In Fleckenstein v. D. D., E. B. & B. R. R. Co. (105 N.Y. 655) the court lays down this rule: “ Street railways have the lawful right to put their tracks in streets and run their cars thereon. Their ■cars are confined to the tracks, and cannot turn out to avoid obstacles thereon. Hence they have the right of way and persons lawfully ■driving upon the same tracks must not recklessly, carelessly or willfully obstruct the passage of their cars. But such persons are not absolutely bound to keep off or get off from the tracks; they must fairly and in a reasonable manner respect the paramount right of a street railway; and if they do this, and without any fault on their part they are injured by carelessness or fault chargeable, to the railway, the law affords them a remedy by action for damages.”
The plaintiff in the case before us did not give the slightest consideration to the passage of the defendant’s cari, but recklessly and so indifferently as to suggest willfulness,-drove for upwards of five hundred feet through an open and entirely unobstructed street with .abundant room- to turn away from the rail, yet so close to it as to prevent .the car passing his cart until it should slow down and wait for him to turn aside. During the whole of this distance, he was in a position to obstruct the car and risk being hurt, or to turn away about a foot and allow the car free passage and at the same time secure certain safety for himself. Such a method of unnecessarily ■obstructing the track when it could as easily and conveniently be left free, is not, in my judgment, a fair and reasonable manner of respecting “ the paramount right of a street railway.”
Nor does it indicate such reasonable care for his own safety as
I think-the judgment should be-reversed.
Judgment affirmed,, with costs.
Lead Opinion
The right of a street car upon that part of the street upon wliichi are its tracks has been called a paramount right. It is not an. exclusive right. . Those driving horses upon the street have a right'to the .use of the whole street subject only to the paramount right', of the street car company, where the use.of a particular part of the= street is sought by both at the same time. If a driver were bound to avoid the center of the street, where were the tracks of the company, whenever a car was in sight it Would be a serious limitation upon his right to use the street and in a city.of the size of Troy where cars run frequently would well nigh„exclude him from the: use of -that part of the street. If when driving upon the track he: leaves the track when warned by a signal from the motorman of the-car that the track - is needed for his ear we think he has done all that is necessary in recognition of the paramount right of the car to-the use.of that part of the street. At least it cannot be said as matter of law that his failure to leave the track when not warned constitutes such contributory negligence as would defeat his action for injuries sustained through the negligence.of the motorman in running Mm down without warning.
The judgment should be affirmed.
All concurred, except Parker, P. J., dissenting in opinion in. which'Chester, J., concurred.