delivered the opinion of the Court.
When the Sheriff of Montgomery County twice returned non est summоns for appellant Barrie-Peter Pan Schools, Inc., which he had been directed to serve upon Frances Seldin, its resident agent, appellees requested the appointment pursuant to Maryland Rule 116 of a private person to serve process. The Montgomery County sheriff filed a third return of non est and the private person filed a return reflecting “[t]hat he made five separate attempts to effect service on said resident agent but was unable to contact her.” Appellees then directed ser *410 vice pursuant to Code (1969 Repl. Vol.) Art. 75, § 75B and Rule 106 e upon the State Department of Assessments and Taxation (the Department). The Department pursuant to the mandate of § 75B (b) forwarded a copy of the declaration and summons to the corporation at its correct address in care of “Mr. Francis Sеldin” by certified mail on May 28, 1969, which was returned to the Department by the post office marked “unclaimed”, thus producing this litigation. Judgments by default totaling $23,400.00 were entered against appellant on May 11, 1970. Attachments were issued on June 18, 1970, one of which reached a bank account of appellant where there was on deposit more than the amount of the judgments. This brought motions on behalf of appellant to vacаte and set aside the judgments, to arrest execution on the attachment, and to quash the attachment. We shall affirm the denial of those motions.
It is conceded that appellant is a Maryland corporation and Mrs. Seldin is in fact its resident agent. As a matter of fact, in its brief appellant says that she lives on the premises at the address designated as the principal office of the corporation. Aрpellant contends the judgment thus obtained is void because the corporation was “without actual notice of suit”, relying upon
Harvey v. Slacum,
The statute in question provides in pertinent part:
“(a) Except to the extent otherwise specifically provided by a statute of this State —
H» H»
“(2) If any corporation of this State * * *
(2) has one or more resident agents and an unsuccessful attempt has been made to serve process on such corporation in the manner provided by the Maryland Rules of Procedure, such corporation shall he conclusively presumed to have designated the Department as its true and lawful attorney authorized to accept on its behalf *411 service of process in the action in which such process issued, and in such case such process may be served upon the Department as the true and lawful attorney of such corporation.
“(b) When service of process upon any corporation of this State * * * is lawfully made by leaving copies of the process in the office of the Department, it shall be the duty of the Department forthwith to record the day and hour of such service and to forward by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, one copy of the process with a notice of such service, addressed to such corporation at its mailing address, if it has a mailing address on file with the Dеpartment * * (Emphasis added.)
Rule 106 e 1 provides in pertinent part:
“If a corporation required (by statute of this State) to have a resident agent * * * has one or more resident agents, and unsuccessful attempts have been made on different business days to serve process either twice upon one resident agent or once upon each of two resident agents, process inay be served upon the State Department of Assessments and Taxation as the attorney of such corporation.”
Code (1966 Repl. Vol.) Art. 23, § 8 requires every corporation of this state to have “at least one resident agent who shall be either a citizen of this State, actually residing herein, or a corporation of this State.”
Appellant cites the language in Harvey where it was said:
“It is an elementary principle that no valid proceeding can be had against a person until he has been notified of the proceeding by proper summons, unless he voluntarily waives such constitutional right.”181 Md. at 210 .
*412
It takes comfort from the fact that this language was quoted by Chief Judge Bruñe for the Court in
Little,
We have not been cited nor have we located a case precisely on the point here involved. Close to our case is
Silva v. Crombie & Co.,
39 N. M. 240,
“The decisive question in this case is whether the appellee corporation had such notice of the suit, and was so far subject to the jurisdiction and laws of New Mexico, that it was bound to aрpear, or take the consequences of nonappearance.
“Comp. St. 1929, § 32-150, provides for service upon the secretary of state, when the statutory agent of any foreign corporation, who has been designated as the agent upon whom process may be served, dies, resigns, or removes from the state, and cannot be found. This statute also provides that such service is effective tо all intents and purposes as if made upon the president or head officers of the corporation. There is an additional proviso therein to the effect that the secretary of state shall within two days after such service notify such corporation by registered letter directed to such corporation at its registered office, in which letter there shall be inclosed the process or othеr paper served.
“Appellant contends that when the secretary of state is properly served, such service is sufficient.
“Appellee contends that such service was not completed, and not effective, unless the secretary of state notified appellee of such service as provided by section 32-150.
“With this contention of appellee we do not agree. The particular tеrms of our statute we deem decisive of the question. The service upon the secretary of state was effective to all intents *414 and purposes as if made upon the president or head officers of the corporation. If the Legislature had desired to make the service effective only when the secretary of state had notified such corporation, it could have so stated in plain languаge. Such language is discernible in the case of insurance companies. Comp. St. 1929, § 71-114. The neglect of the secretary of state is not chargeable to the appellant. The Legislature chose its terms with discrimination, and made it plain that the service of process on the secretary of state is the effective service, not the notice by the secretary of state to the foreign corpоration that renders it effective.” Id. at 241-42.
❖ * sfi
“The secretary of state acts for and on behalf of the corporation, as effectually as if he were designated in the charter as the officer on whom process was to be served; or, as if he had received from the president and directors a power of attorney to that effect. Notice to him was notice to the corporation, and for whоm, by statute, he was empowered to take notice.” Id. at 243.
It then stated that the matter appeared to have been settled by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Washington v. Superior Court,
“ ‘The state need not have admitted the corporation to do business within its borders. Bank of Augusta v. Earle,13 Pet. 519 ,10 L. Ed. 274 ; Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French,18 How. 404 , 407,15 L. Ed. 451 , 452. Admission might be conditioned upon the requirement of substituted service upon a person to be designated either by the corporation, St. Clair v. Cox,106 U. S. 350 , *415 356,1 S. Ct. 354 ,27 L. Ed. 222 [225] or by the state itself, Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. v. Phelps,190 U. S. 147 , 158,23 S. Ct. 707 ,47 L. Ed. 987 [994], or might, as here, be upon the terms that if the corporation had failed to appoint or maintain an agent, service should be made upon a state officer. American R. Exp. Co. v. F. S. Royster Guano Co.,273 U. S. 274 , 280,47 S. Ct. 355 ,71 L. Ed. 642 [643], The provision that the liability thus to be served should continue after withdrawal from the state afforded a lawful and constitutional protection of persons who had therе transacted business with the appellant. American R. Exp. Co. v. Kentucky,273 U. S. 269 , 274,47 S. Ct. 353 ,71 L. Ed. 639 [642].
“ Tt has repeatedly been said that qualification of a foreign corporation in accordance with the statutes permitting its entry into the state constitutes an assent on its part to all the reasonable conditions imposed. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, supra, 18 How. [404] 408,15 L. Ed. 451 [453] ; St. Clair v. Cox, supra, 106 U. S. [350] 356,1 S. Ct. 354 [27 L. Ed. 225 ] ; Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Spratley,172 U. S. 602 , 614,19 S. Ct. 308 ,43 L. Ed. 569 [573] ; Old Wayne Mut. Life Asso. v. McDonough,204 U. S. 8 , 22,27 S. Ct. 236 ,51 L. Ed. 345 [351] ; Commercial Mut. Acci. Co. v. Davis,213 U. S. 245 , 254,29 S. Ct. 445 ,53 L. Ed. 782 [786].’ ” Id. at 244.
The New Mexico court further commented:
“While the statute requires the secretary of state to forward a coрy of the summons or other papers served to the company sued, by registered letter directed to it at its registered office, we do not think these acts are essential to jurisdiction.” Id. at 244.
*416 In Washington a Delaware corporation qualified in 1926 to do business in the State of Washington. A resident agent for the acceptance of service of process was appointed. In 1929 the company withdrew from the state, cеased to transact business there, and filed formal notice of withdrawal. It was dissolved in accordance with the laws of Delaware, but the appointment of its statutory agent was never revoked. In 1929 he moved to California. In 1932 a civil action was begun in the State of Washington naming as one of the defendants this Delaware corporation with instructions to the sheriff to serve the summons and the complaint upon the Seсretary of State. This was done. As Mr. Justice Roberts put it:
“Neither the summons and complaint nor any copy of them, nor any notice touching the same, were forwarded to [the corporation] by the Secretary of State or any one else. No other form of service was made.” Id. at 362.
The Court said:
“The statute informed the company that if it elected not to appoint a successor to Shaw the Secretary of Statе would by law become its agent for the purpose of service. The burden lay upon the appellant to make such arrangement for notice as was thought desirable. There is no denial of due process in the omission to require the corporation’s agent to give it such notice.”
Id. at 365.
Of interest are Annot.,
“The notices which are presсribed by the statute are as indubitably shown to have been delivered to the defendant, and the trial court to have been advised of that notification by the return receipt, as if the registered mail had been directly handed to the defendant by the postman, and the defendant had thereupon signed the return receipt. The plaintiffs or their attorney made and filed in the actions the affidavits that the statute had been cоmplied with, and the proceedings of record affirmed that the defendant had been regularly summoned, and was under rule to plead. He neither appeared specially to move to quash the process nor to plead in abatement of the actions, so that, for his default in pleading that the return receipt was not his receipt nor signed by his authorization, a judgment was entered and extended against the defendant. So, clearly, he must be held to have authorized his wife’s acts in receiving the mail for him and signing the return receipt in his behalf.” Id. at 282.
Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 75 (1934), states:
“A state cannot exercise through its courts judicial jurisdiction over a person, although he is subject to the jurisdiction of the state, unless a method of notification is employed which is reasonably calculated to give him knowledge of the attempted exercise of jurisdiction and an opportunity to be heard.”
Comment c says:
“It is not necessary that the person against *418 whom the judgment is rendered should have received knowledge of the action in which the judgment is rendered. It is sufficient that steps were taken which under all the circumstances were reasonably calculated to give him knowledge of the action and an opportunity to be heard.”
The illustration is then given:
“A brings an action against B in a court of state X. B is domiciled in X but is temporarily absent from the state. In accordance with a statute, B is served with process by leaving a summons at his usual place of abode in X, with an adult member of his family. B does not receive the summons and has no knowledge of its existence. The court has jurisdiction over B.”
Comment b of § 87 of the Restatement, Conflict of Laws relative to service upon domestic corporations speaks in terms of the requirement that “the method [be] one reasonably calculated to give the corporation knowledge of the action and an opportunity to be heard” and refers to § 75. It then gives as one illustration:
“A statute of state X provides that if an officer or agent of a domestic corporation cannot be found within the state, service of process may be made upon the corporation by publication in a newspaper, or by handing a summons to an officer or principal agent of the corporation outside the state, or by handing a summons to a public official whose duty it is made to mail it to an officer of the corporation. These methods of service are sufficient to confer upon a court of X jurisdiction over the domestic corporation.”
Restatement, Judgments § 27 (1942), relative to service of process on domestic corporations states in Comment b Method of Service of Process:
“At common law the method of service of pro *419 cess upon a corporation was by sеrving its principal officer. Other methods of service, however, may be provided for by statute or otherwise. A method is sufficient if it is reasonably calculated to give notice of the action to the corporation and an opportunity to be heard. Service upon a responsible officer or agent, either within or outside the State, or service by mail, is sufficient. * * * Service upon a public official is insufficient unless he is charged with a duty to take steps to notify the corporation of the action or some other additional method of notification is provided for; but if the corporation has failed to designate an agent to accept service of process, service upon a public official may be sufficient if no better method of service is available.”
We find interesting two earlier Maryland cases, not cited by either side, which seem to be in line with the authorities we have mentioned. In
Boyd v. C. & O. Canal Co.,
*420 “In U. S. Ins. Co. v. Shriver,3 Md. Ch. 381 , [388 (1851),] the chancellor correctly lays down the doctrine, that ‘if notice is given to a director officially, for the purpose of being communicated to the board, although such notice should not be communicated, the institution is bound by it.’ ” Id. at 210.
In
Girard Ins. Co. v. Bankard,
“If the company had a good ground of defense it is to bé regretted that its local agent neglected to communicate the fact of the service of рrocess upon him to the proper persons so that the defense could have been made, but we cannot allow this remissness of the agent to be made ground for striking out a judgment regularly entered, especially when the motion to strike out is made after the term at which the judgment was rendered, had fully passed.” Id. at 543.
In
Madaio v. Madaio,
“In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,339 U. S. 306 (1950), Mr. Justice Jackson, for the Court, pointed out that:
‘An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably cal *421 culated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. * * * The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information, * * * and it must afford a reasonable time for thosе interested to make their appearance * * Id. at 314.”
Id. at 83-84.
In this case the resident agent was returned non est by the sheriff of Montgomery County not once, not twice, but thrice. The record does not tell us how many times during each of those three months the sheriff may have gone to the home of the resident agent which was the place of business of the corporation. We do know that between the second and third returns of the sheriff the private process server by his statеment made no less than five attempts to serve the resident agent. By the law of this state, the state of its incorporation, the Department was thus conclusively presumed to have been designated as the true and lawful attorney of the corporation to accept service of process. It clearly appears that legitimate efforts were made to notify the defendant corporаtion of this action and that those efforts were by means reasonably calculated to bring the attention of the corporation to the pendency of the proceeding. We do not regard the failure of the corporation to claim from the post office the notice admittedly sent to it by the Department as invalidating what under these circumstances was an otherwise valid service of process.
Order affirmed; appellant to pay the costs.