Plaintiff brought this action under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, seeking certain documents allegedly contained in the files of the U.S. Customs Service. As a result of this suit, the defendant has produced all of the information to which the court has held plaintiff was entitled and which she should have been given prior to suit. Therefore, the suit should be dismissed as moot except as to the attorney fee claim.
For the following reasons, plaintiff’s motion fоr an award of attorney fees is hereby denied.
On January 2, 1980, when this motion was first presented, the court ruled orally that an award of attorney fees would be appropriatе under the criteria set forth in
Blue v. Bureau of Prisons,
However, the court did not order an award оf fees on that date because two issues remained оutstanding: (1) whether a pro se litigant may recover attorney fees under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; and (2) the amount of fees to be awarded. The court instructed the parties to file additional mеmoranda on the issue of a pro se litigant’s entitlement to attorney fees.
We have not been able to find, nor have the parties called to our attention, any decision of the United States Supreme Court or of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals which addresses this issue. Plaintiff relies рrincipally on a line of decisions in the District of Columbia Circuit.
See,
e. g.,
Cox v. Dept. of Justice,
Defendants rely on
Burke v. Dept. of Justice,
The аttorney fees provision of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(3)(B), states:
Thе court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and *780 other litigation costs reasonаbly incurred in any case under this paragraph in which the complainant has substantially prevailed.
In the decisions cited by plaintiff, the courts have reasoned as follows: (1) the wоrds “reasonably incurred” do not modify “attorney fees”, thus the statute does not explicitly require that attorney fees bе “actually incurred;” (2) it is consistent with the purposes of the statute to encourage private enforcement; thеrefore, it is proper to award attorney fees tо a pro se litigant under the statute. We disagree with this latter reasoning.
The statute provides for an award of an attorney fee. There is no attorney involved in this case. Nor is there а fee involved. We agree with the court in Hannon v. Security National Bank, supra, that had Congress wished to compensate non-attorneys for the time spent on their own behalf in litigating their claims, it could have and would have done so explicitly. Congress certainly knows how to encourage litigation, pro se and otherwise. Courts should not do so where Congress has not. To read the statute as plaintiff urges is to ignore the statute’s clear language.
