74 N.Y.S. 301 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1902
Lead Opinion
This action was brought to recover damages for the death of plaintiff’s intestate who was killed by falling from the platform of a toboggan slide, and which is claimed to have been negligently constructed, in that it did not have a sufficient railing or guard around it.
The premises where the accident occurred consisted of a portion of the beach at Charlotte, in Monroe county, a bath house and appurtenances and the toboggan slide in question. The accident occurred during the afternoon of August 26, 1900. The premises, including the structure in question, were owned by the defendant, but at and for a considerable period before the date of the accident were leased to and in the possession of one Briggs. The intestate fell from the platform of the toboggan slide, which was elevated about twenty-five and a half feet above the beach. The construction of this slide and platform, so far as material here, was as follows:
There was evidence showing that in consequence of people coming out of the water the walk from the water to the platform would become wet, and that at least one person had slipped upon it. The platform itself was at times damp when many people came out of the water upon it. There was no evidence, however, that any per
There is no definite or very satisfactory evidence as to the exact manner in which the fall of the intestate, which finally took him over the edge of the platform to the ground and caused his death, commenced. He had been down the slide into the water and had returned with his toboggan to the platform. He had mounted upon the step for the purpose of placing the toboggan on the slide when, in some manner, he slipped or lost his balance and fell. Only two witnesses saw him in the first portion of his fall.
The witness Brazil says: “ He was ready to go down and he had a sled in his hand and he set it on the toboggan, and the stool they step on shook with him and he slid and went through between the rail and the floor.” Hpon' cross-examination, however, he materially qualifies this evidence, saying: “ I do not know exactly what he was doing when he went off. I saw him put his sled down, but I do not know whether he was' to jump on the sled' or not. * * * I did not see his feet before I .saw him go through under the rail. * * * I do not know just what he was doing just before he came through the rail. * * * I could not tell from where I was whether he slipped or whether it was something else. I saw him go and that is all I can tell.”
The witness Shepard says : “ I was looking right at him and the first thing I knew he fell. I wouldn’t say whether he went over or under, he went so quick. * * * When I saw him on the platform he was about in the center of it, the center of the west side. * * * He was just standing with his back to the railing, two or three on each side of him.”
Three fundamental questions were involved and considered upon the trial below, as likewise they have been argued here. . These questions relate to the safety and sufficiency of the construction of the toboggan slide, the assumption of any risks incidental to its construction by the intestate, and the liability of' the defendant for the negligence, if any, in the construction, it being a lessor and not
It may be admitted that the question whether there was evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict of negligence in the construction of the platform and the railing thereon is not entirely free from doubt. It, of course, would have been a simple and inexpensive matter to have put one or even more additional railings around the platform and to have thus made impossible an accident such as happened. It also would be very eásy to say, in the light of the unfortunate occurrence which did happen, that it would have been well to have done this. This, however, is not the method by which we are to determine this question. W-e are rather to say whether before this accident happened there was anything which should have led the person responsible for the structure, in the exercise of ordinary care and caution and thoughtfulness, to apprehend that there was a probability of its happening. As was said in Crafter v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. (L. R. [1 C. P.] 300), and quoted with approval in Larkin v. O'Neill (119 N. Y. 221, 225), “ The line must be drawn in these cases between suggestions of possible precautions, and evidence of actual negligence such as ought reasonably and properly to be left to a jury. It is difficult in some cases to determine where the line is to be drawn.”
Under all of the circumstances of this case we think that it stands upon that side of the line marked by lack of evidence upon which a jury might predicate and find negligence. In considering this question it is proper to keep in mind, as affording some light for its decision, the character and purpose of the structure. It was there simply and solely for purposes of amusement. No one was compelled by necessity or even business purposes to visit it. Moreover, the amusement, for the enjoyment of which it was a necessary means and instrument, was dependent for its attractiveness upon a certain amount of exhilarating excitement. The main feature of the platform which made possible intestate’s death, its elevation from the ground, was absolutely necessary and essential to secure the attractive sport of running rapidly over the slide down into the water. In this respect the structure was somewhat different in
First impressions about the safety and sufficiency of the railing around this platform might differ. Some person, especially if unable to entirely free his mind from remembrance of the fact, that somebody had slipped through the railing, might reason that a space of twenty-one inches between railings was liable to offer an opportunity for such an accident. The space of twenty-one inches* however, between the middle railing and the platform on one side, and the top railing upon the other, was comparatively small. The lower space would not come to a man’s knee. It is not claimed that, a person standing in any ordinary attitude was liable to go over or through it. It was only in case of an unnatural attitude, caused by slipping or falling* that such an accident could happen, and we do not believe that a combination of circumstances which would result in a person being passed through this railing without catching it or being stopped by it was reasonably to be apprehended.
Passing by original reasoning upon the subject, however, we have what seems to us a 'more reliable and accurate test by which to' measure the sufficiency of this structure, and that is the history and result of its actual use. It had been used for the same purposes which it was called to serve, at the time of the accident, for nearly five years. During that time thousands of people had used the platform as intestate was using it when he met with his'death. Sometimes upon a single day the number of its patrons would reach from 100 to 150.- During that time not only had no one fallen over or through the railing, but, so far as the evidence discloses, no one, by slipping or otherwise, had been placed in such a position of peril as . to require the use of the railing to keep him from falling over. There was nothing about the use of the platform calculated to so hurry or distract the attention of a person using it as to lead him into risk or peril.
As We have stated, it would only be some unusual condition which would throw a person upon or against this railing for protection. This was true in the case of intestate’s accident, and the evidence does not clearly indicate just what that condition was, or whether
In Larkin v. O’Neill (119 N. Y. 221) plaintiff fell upon the stairway in defendant’s store. The steps were used by a great number of people and it was claimed that they were negligently constructed in that there were .no footholds, brass plates or rubber pads thereon to keep one from slipping. The court, referring to the fact that these steps had been used daily in safety by a great number of people who passed up and down, say, with reference to plaintiff’s accident: “ There was nothing in the manner in which the stairs were constructed, used or kept, from which such a result could reasonably be anticipated. It is quite probable that the accident occurred from slipping or from a misstep by the plaintiff.”
In Hart v. Grennell (122 N. Y. 371), where it was held that defendant was not liable because plaintiff had tripped and fallen over a truck handle in the latter’s store, it was said that the rule of liability in such a case “ has reference to such dangers as might reasonably be anticipated by a prudent and careful man. * * * The question is could the mischief have been reasonably foreseen.”
In Burke v. Witherbee (98 N. Y. 562) the accident was caused by the slipping of the hook from the bail of a car which was used in defendant’s mine. The plaintiff claimed that there should have been a bolt through the hook, and there was no question but that such an appliance could have been easily used and would have prevented the accident. The car had been used, however, for a long time
In Dougan v. Champlain, etc., Co. (56 N. Y. 1) the deceased was attempting to secure his hat, which had blown of, and in so doing he slipped and went through one of the openings in the rail of defendant’s boat and was drowned. There was proof that the boat had run in the sanie condition for a long timé and that the same situation existed upon other boats and that no accident had occurred before. The court said: “ Had there been any proof tending to show that any such danger would be apprehended by aueasonable, prudent person, the evidence should have been-submitted to the jury.” But it held that in the light of the experiences had with the boat there was no such evidence.
In Loftus v. Union Ferry Co. of Brooklyn (84 N. Y. 455) the plaintiff’s intestate, a child six years old, while passing from the ferry boat to the dock, fell through an opening twenty-two inches high between the bottom and second rail of the float or bridge over which passengers passed in going upon or leaving the boat. . The proof was that this bridge had been in service five or six years, was similar to bridges of other ferries and that, no similar accident had previously happened. In holding that there was no proof of negligence upon the part of the defendant, the court say: “ The rule does not impose upon the defendant the duty of so providing for the safety of passengers that they shall encounter no possible danger and meet with no casualty in the" use of the appliances -provided by it. It was possible for the defendant so to have'constructed the guard that such an accident as this could not have happened; and this, so far as appears, could have been done without unreasonable expense or trouble. If the defendant ought to have foreseen that such an accident might happen, or if such an accident could reasonably have been anticipated, the omission to provide against it would, be actionable negligence. But the facts rebut any inference of negligence on this ground. The company had the experience of years, certifying to the sufficiency of the guard. That it was possible for a child
Within the rules laid down by, and the reasoning of, these and other cases, and in view of the fact that it had safely and securely served all of the purposes for which it was designed for years, we think it was improper to permit a jury to say that this platform and railing was not constructed with reasonable care, and that it was not sufficient to guard against any contingencies which could be reasonably apprehended.
We think this case can clearly be distinguished from that of Donnelly v. City of Rochester (166 N. Y. 316), especially relied upon by plaintiff. There the railing complained,of was two and a half feet high, and was . the only guard to an excavation which extended into the busy portion of one of Rochester’s main streets. The person injured met with his accident, not while voluntarily seeking out a place of amusement, but while necessarily or at least properly upon the street. The railing did not comply with an ordinance adopted by the city of Rochester, and thus at the' outset a presumption of negligence arose. Then again, in answer to the claim of the defendant that the railing had stood in the same condition for years, with a great number of people passing by, it was shown that other accidents had happened at nearly the same point.
If, however, we should assume that this railing not only might have been but should have been more safely constructed, still its defects were open and visible to the most casual glance. The intestate was fifteen years old, and as the counsel for plaintiff states in his brief, “ was a promising boy, bright and active. He already had done some work for which he was well paid, the proceeds of which he gave to his family.” He could foresee and just as accurately determine the risks incident to the use of this structure as the owner or lessee thereof. If, as claimed by plaintiff, he slipped upon the wet boards, we think' that such a contingency was just as much open to and within the limits of his intelligence and experience as within
Some of the cases to which we have already referred, like that of Larkin v. O’Neill and Hart v. Orennell, in holding the defendant not liable, especially refer to the fact that the person injured “ was not exposed to any unreasonable or concealed danger; ’’ that the conditions complained of were obvious to every one as to risks, and were well known to the plaintiff, and that 'the defendant did not expose any one “ to hidden or unforeseen dangers.”
We think also that, within the rule laid down in Koehler v. Syracuse, etc., Co. (12 App. Div. 50); Hickey v. Taaffe (105 N. Y. 26) and Buckley v. Gutta Percha & R. M. Co. (113 id. 540), it is proper to hold that the intestate, although an infant, was to be charged with knowledge of the construction^ which was open to> his view, and of the risks which were incident thereto,, and to the use of the platform.
As stated before, the conclusions reached upon these questions lead us to the belief that the order appealed from should be reversed, without considering the question of defendant’s liability as a lessor.
Adams, P. J., and McLennan, J., concurred; Williams and Spring, JJ., dissented.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting):
Defendant’s exceptions should be overruled, motion for a new trial denied, and judgment ordered for plaintiff upon the verdict, with costs.
The' action was brought to recover damages for the death of the plaintiff’s' intestate, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant.
There was a step from the main platform at the end of the inclined walk about ten inches in height up towards the small upper platform. In order to make a start down the slide, a person placed the sled upon the small upper platform, went up the step* seated himself upon the sled, and started. The slide was used by a great many persons, sometimes as many as 100 to 150 per day. When • in use the inclined walk and the main platform were wet and at times slippery, and there was evidence tending to show that the platform was wet and slippery at the time of the accident in question. The accident occurred about half-past five o’clock in the afternoon of August 26, 1900. Deceased took his sled, stepped upon the step and placed his sled upon the slide platform. At that moment his feet went out from under him, he shot back, feet foremost, between the floor of the main platform and the lower rail thereof, and falling to the ground below, was killed.
The first objection to a recovery in the case is that the defendant was not liable, because the toboggan slide was not in its possession or under its control when the accident occurred, but was in the possession and under the control of its lessee. The property leased consisted of a bath house, a portion of the beach, and other appurtenances to a bathing establishment, including the toboggan, slide. The whole was inclosed by a fence, so that there was no access to them, except through the bath house, where a fee was charged to patrons.
The property was owned by the defendant, but was in the pos
This property was onwed by the defendant as far back as 1894 ¡¡and was leased to the same lessee for the same purpose every season from and including that year until the time- of this accident. The •old toboggan slide was torn down and the present one built in the ¡spring of 1896, and the platform has remained unchanged since that ¡time. When the change was made in 1896 the defendant furnished ¿the materials and the lessee furnished the labor and built the structure according to his own wishes, with the approval of the defendant as to the plan of construction.
This platform was used during all the years from 1896 to 1900, both inclusive, for the propose of the toboggan slide, was frequented by large numbers of persons, sometimes 100 to 150 a day, and no •accident ever occurred before this one.
Under these circumstances, the question is whether the defendant, ¿the lessor of the premises, can be held liable for damages for the •death of the plaintiff’s intestate.
There seems to be no doubt but that the general rule is that an
There are, of course, exceptions to this general rule, but defendant’s counsel claims this case is not within any of the exceptions. Plaintiff’s counsel claims there are exceptions to the general rule which do cover this case.
This action is based upon a negligent construction of the platform in that there was not a third rail around the same between the lower • rail and the floor, and the leasing and use of it in that condition. The complaint does not allege that the platform constructed as it. was constituted a nuisance, and it can hardly be regarded as a nuisance. It was not a public nuisance, because it was upon private property, and it was not a private nuisance, because it in no way interfered with the rights or property of others.
In Beck v. Carter (68 N. Y. 283) an excavation-upon defendant’s land left unguarded, so near the highway as to render traveling thereon dangerous, was held to be a private nuisance.
In Timlin v. Standard Oil Co. (126 N. Y. 514) the wall of a building on defendant’s land, adjoining the lands of a railroad company, which was so out of repair that it fell upon the railroad tracks and killed a trackman, was held to be a private nuisance.
In Clancy v. Byrne (56 N. Y. 129) and Swords v. Edgar (59 id. 28) defective piers owned by the defendants were held to be nuisances by reason of the nature of their use for public purposes in the nature of highways.
The court in Edwards v. N. Y. & H. R. R. Co. (98 N. Y. 255) said of the latter case that the ground of nuisance was the only one on which it could rest, that there were other similar cases in the New England States and in England,, that a dock was regarded as a species of public highway.
In the Edwards case, just referred to, it was held that a gallery in a building used for a public exhibition, which was so insecurely constructed that it fell during the exhibition, was not a private nuisance. And in Sterger v. Vam Sicklen (132 N. Y. 499) it was held that decayed and broken steps from the ground to the steps of a dwelling house were not a private nuisance.
In Fox v. Buffalo Park (21 App. Div. 321) the court did not " hold that the grand stand, so defectively constructed that a portion
It- cannot be doubted that the owner of property who leases the same with a nuisance existing thereon is liable for any injuries occasioned by the nuisance during the term of the lease, but that principle is not applicable to this case, because the defective condition here did not constitute a nuisance, and the case was not submitted to the jury upon any such theory. It was submitted upon the ground of negligence alone. Neither could the action be maintained upon the theory that the defendant was negligent, by reason of a failure to comply with any implied contract, such as was suggested in the Fox case above by Justice Ward, as follows: “ While it is undoubtedly true in ordinary cases, in the leasing of buildings, that there is no implied warranty on the part of the lessor that the buildings aré fit and safe for the purposes for which they are leased, the rule is different in regard to buildings and structures in which public exhibitions and entertainments are designed to be given, and for admissions to which the lessors directly or indirectly receive compensation. In such cases the lessors or owners of the buildings or structures hold out to the public that the structures are reasonably safe for the purposes for which they are let or used, and impliedly undertake that due care has been exercised in the erection of the buildings.” This was the ground upon which Justice Ward based his decision in the case, but a majority of the court did not concur in the decision upon that ground, and we are very sure that the Court of Appeals did not rest their decision upon any such ground.
There is no conflict in the decisions of the Court of Appeals upon the subject of such an implied contract, as suggested by Justice Ward. The court never gave its assent to any such principle. A brief examination of the cases may be useful, because counsel for plaintiff claims that Justice Ward’s opinion was the opinion of tliis court, and that it was adopted by the Court of Appeals, and is, therefore, binding upon us and controlling in the disposition of this appeal.
In the case of Swords v. Edgar (59 N. Y. 28) defendant was the' owner of one-half of a pier in New York city, and leased it to a steamship company May 1, 1865, for five years, the lessees. to keep it in repair. During the term of the lease, plaintiff’s intestate, a longshoreman, was working on the pier when it fell, and he received
In the case of Camp v. Wood (76 N. Y. 92) the defendant owned an inn. In the third story was a hall which he let for one evening for a dance. The entrance to the hall was from the street up two pairs of stairs, one directly over the .other. At the foot of the upper flight of stairs was a door leading out upon a piazza or wooden awning, unprotected by any railing. This door occupied the same relative position to the upper flight of stairs that the street door did to the lower flight of stairs. The plaintiff attended the dance and paid an entrance fee. About eleven o’clock at night he left the hall to go home, went down the upper flight of stairs, and when he came to the bottom, supposing the door in front of him was the one leading into the street, he went out upon the piazza or awning and fell to the street below, receiving injuries. He sought to recover damages from the, owner of the building, the lessor of the hall. The door to the piazza or awning was left open. The court held that the defendant was liable for any negligence with reference to the door, piazza and awning, they being in his possession and not in the possession of the lessee of the hall, the plaintiff having been invited
In' the case just quoted from iiv 98 New York the defendant owned premises in New York city, known as “ Gilmore’s Garden,” and leased them for ten days for the purpose of a pedestrian exhibition. It was agreed that the lessee might make any changes in the interior of the building that he saw fit. There was no agreement by the lessor to make any changes or repairs. There was a gallery at one end of the building, built shortly before the leasing, which had been used on several other public occasions. It was divided into boxes, and these were supplied with tables.and chairs, and were intended for occupation by from four to six persons each, who could be served with refreshments while witnessing the performances on the main floor below. The gallery Was built under the supervision of an architect and was suitable and safe for the purpose for which it was intended, for which it had been used and for which it was leased. It was not suitable or safe for a crowd of people. The use for which it was designed was apparent to every one. The defendant did not know or suppose any other use was to be made of it, that the tables and chairs were to be removed and a crowd of people admitted to the boxes. The tables and chairs were removed, a crowd admitted to the boxes, and by reason thereof the gallery fell and persons were injured. It was held that the defendant, the lessor, was not liable for damages for such injuries; that there was no implied warranty .that the premises leased were fit for occupation, or suitable for the purposes for which they were leased, and that there was no distinction in these respects between the lease of a dwelling house and of premises to be used for
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The court, therefore, makes the liability rest, not upon the principle of -implied contract, but solely upon the ground of negligence or wrong. The case was a close one. There was a strong opinion on either side, and the decision rested upon four affirmative votes against three dissenting ones, and it was distinctly stated in the dissenting opinion that “There is generally no implied warranty upon the part of a lessor of dwellings or other private houses and buildings that they are fit and adequate to the purposes for which they are leased. * - * But the rule is different with reference to erections in which public exhibitions and entertainments are designed to be given, and for admission to which the lessors either directly, or indirectly receive compensation. In such a case the lessor, by renting the premises for such purposes and receiving a compensation therefor, holds out to the public that the structure is fit and safe for the purposes for which it is let, and owes a duty to those who attend such entertainment, requiring him to use all reasonable precautions to protect them from at least any danger arising from the known imperfections of the structure.” The
In Wolf v. Kilpatrick (101 N. Y. 146) the injuries resulted from a defective cover to a coal hole in a sidewalk. It was in perfect condition when the property was leased and was broken during the term of the lease by some third party. The coal hole, with its cover was not. a nuisance when the lease was given, but became such by the breaking of the cover during the term, and the owner had no knowledge or notice of the defect before the injuries were received. The Edwards cáse was considered, and the rule as to the owner’s liability therein laid down was recognized. Franklin v. Brown (118 N. Y. 110) was an action to recover rent ou a lease. A counterclaim was interposed for damages growing out. of the presence in the demised premises of noxious and unhealthy gases and odors, which came from adjoining premises.. Neither party knew of their existence when the lease was made. The lessee examined the property thoroughly before the leáse was made, and there was no deceit or false representation by the lessor. It. was held, citing Edwards N. Y. & H. R. R. Co., (supra), that there was no implied contract and no wrong, and, therefore, that the counterclaim could not be sustained.
Timlin v. Standard Oil Co. (3 26 N. Y. 514) was a case, of nuisance, a dangerous wall, in which the rule of liability of the owner of premises'was extended to a, lessee, who sublet the premises, .and they were in the possession of the sub-tenant when the injuries, were received. Edwards v. N. Y. & H. R. R. Co., (supra) was. cited with approval.
I must, therefore, conclude that the Edwards case correctly laid down the law which must have controlled it in affirming Fox v. Buffalo Park (supra), and which should be followed here.
The liability of a -. lessor, therefore, cannot be based upon an implied contract • in any case, but only upon some negligence or wrong of the lessor, and in that case the defendant was relieved from liability for the fall of the balcony in Gilmore’s Garden, because it did not appear that it was guilty of any negligence or wrong. The balcony was safe and suitable for the purposes for which it was intended and was leased. It was perfectly apparent what it was designed to be used for. It was not safe or suitable for the use which
In the Fopa case the court charged the. same rule of duty, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover in case the stand fell by reason of an unusual strain' which nobody had any thought it would be subjected to.
The. cases in the Court of Appeals all seem, therefore, to be in harmony.
There was no nuisance or implied contract in this case. There was merely the question of negligence, and we are to determine whether under the evidence, construed most favorably to the plaintiff, the defendant could be made liable for the death of plaintiff’s intestate, on the ground of its negligence in the construction and leasing the toboggan slide.
The only theory upon which the defendant, could be charged with negligence was that the slide was constructed and leased for the use of the public as a place of amusement or entertainment, and that the public was allowed to use it for a fee to be charged them, and that the defendant shared in such compensation indirectly by receiving a rental for the premises from the lessee, and that it. was in. its original construction not reasonably safe or suitable for the purposes for which it was constructed and leased. All the facts involved in this proposition were conceded or found by the jury upon sufficient evidence. Upon such facts were the jury justified in finding the further conclusion of fact, the defendant’s negligence ?
In the Edwards casé it was assumed that the lessor would have been liable under a somewhat similar state of. facts. It was said in the prevailing opinion: •“ If it had been .shown,.or could reasonably be inferred, that the defendant knew how this gallery was to be used, and that it was dangerous and unfit for that use, and that it
In the Fox case the Court of Appeals sustained a finding of negligence by the jury, under a similar state of facts as that referred to by the court in the Edwards case, above quoted. There it did not appear that the defendant had actual knowledge of the defects, but it was apparently found that the defendant was chargeable with knowledge, inasmuch as the stand was constructed under the supervision of its architect. It did not disclose the defects, and neither the lessee nor the public were aware of them.
Apparently the only distinction between those two cases and the one I am considering is that in those cases the defects were latent and concealed or at least not disclosed to the lessee or the public, while in this case the slide was actually constructed and used by the lessee, and the alleged defect was not only known to him, but was open, apparent and visible to the public ■ and to any and all persons having occasion to make use of the slide. Did this consideration relieve the defendant from liability for its negligence, which would otherwise exist ? While it would be a consideration bearing upon the question of contributory negligence, I am unable to see how it would affect the question of defendant’s negligence, or relieve the defendant from liability except upon the theory that the death was the result of the contributory negligence of plaintiff’s intestate and not, therefore, of defendant’s negligence. That the defective construction caused the accident there can be little doubt. The platform and step being wet and slippery, the plaintiff’s intestate being thrown feet foremost towards the edge of the platform, there being nothing on the floor for his feet to strike, and there being room under the lower rail for his body to go through, he necessarily went off the platform and fell to the ground, where he met his death. It was fortunate that no other accidents of a like character had taken place. The jury was justified in finding that the construction was a dangerous one, in view of the defect claimed.
It is suggested by plaintiff’s counsel that the court charged the jury that, if the construction was dangerous and unsafe, the plaintiff might recover, in the absence of contributory negligence, whereas
The question of contributory negligence was fairly submitted to the jury, and no exceptions were taken to such submission, either as to its substance or that there was no evidence to support a verdict for the plaintiff upon that question. The defendant’s counsel merely requested the court to charge that if the deceased had the same knowledge of the danger that the defendant had, then there could be no recovery. The court declined to vary its charge upon that point, and there .was an exception. I think this refusal to charge, in view of what the court had already said to the jury on the question of contributory negligence, was proper.
My conclusion is that no error was' committed in the trial, that the exceptions taken by defendant should be overruled, its motion for a new; trial should be denied, and judgment Ordered for plaintiff upon the verdict, with costs.
Spring, J., concurred.
Order reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the évent, upon questions of law only, the facts having been examined and no error found therein.
