Plаintiff appeals as of right from an order granting summary judgment, GCR 1963, 117.2(3), to defendant Hughes in a dramshop action, MCL 436.22; MSA 18.993, and from a second order of summary judgment, GCR 1963, 117.2(1), *555 granted to defendant Hughes after plaintiff filed an amended complaint.
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint a dramshop action against defendant Hughes as a licensed seller of alcoholic beverages illegally selling intoxicating liquоr to a visibly intoxicated person, defendant Stephen Campbell. Defendant Campbell allegedly drove his automobile оff the road striking a tree while plaintiff was a passenger. Plaintiff suffered serious injuries.
Defendant Hughes filed a motion for summary judgment with an аffidavit attached and with reference to deposition testimony. In its April 24, 1981, opinion granting the motion, the trial court treated thе motion as one brought pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(3), no genuine issue of material fact. The court found that undisputed deposition testimony showеd that plaintiff and defendant Campbell drank together at the Blue Boat Inn before the accident. They purchased their drinks in "rounds” with one or several other friends. This method of purchasing liquor was voluntary and cooperative and implied the expectation that each person would consume and purchase his per capita share. The trial court held that buying such "rounds” amounted to buying drinks for other people. Thus, the trial court found that plaintiff bought liquor for the intoxicated defendant, Campbell. By doing so, plaintiff was a noninnocent party under the drampshop act and, thus, was precluded from proceeding undеr the act. See
Kangas v Suchorski,
Plaintiff argues that a genuine issue of fact remains: whether the purchase of "rounds” of liquor amounts to the рurchase of liquor for another. Plaintiff states that the purchase of such "rounds” amounts only to the purchasing of liquor *556 for oneself. Therefore, plaintiff argues, as he only purchased liquor for himself, he is not precluded from bringing this dramshop action agаinst defendant Hughes.
We find that the question of whether buying rounds of liquor is the purchasing of liquor for another or only oneself is not material. What is a material question in this case is whether plaintiff actively participated in causing Campbell’s inebriation.
Malone v Lambrecht,
In deciding whether there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding plaintiffs status as a non-innocent party under the dramshop act, the trial court was оbligated to consider affidavits, depositions, and interrogatories, or, in short, the entire record.
Rizzo v Kretschmer,
In this case, plaintiff, defendant Campbell, and one other participant in the drinking at the Blue Boat Inn on the night of the accident all agreed in deposition testimony that their group drank beer and schnapps in "rounds”. When a pаrticipant purchased the liquor, he did not purchase a quantity only for himself. Rather, he purchased a beer and a shot of schnapps for each drinker. In this fashion, both plaintiff and defendant Campbell consumed at least 8 to 10 beers and shots of schnapps.
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We find that the purchasing of "rounds” in this manner does not show that plaintiff merely drank with Campbell. See
Dahn v Sheets,
Plaintiff also argues that the dramshop action should not have been dismissed because a person’s active participation in bringing about the injury-producing intoxication should not bar recovery. Rather, plaintiff argues that the doctrine of comparative negligence should apply to such actions. See
Placek v Sterling Heights,
In his amended complaint, plaintiff added a count against defendant Hughes alleging a common-law cause of action for gross negligence in the sale of intoxicants to Campbell when Cаmpbell was already visibly intoxicated and for ejecting
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Campbell from the bar knowing he had no other means of transportаtion than his automobile. Defendant Hughes filed a motion for summary judgment aruging that plaintiff failed to allege a legally cognizablе claim in his amended complaint, GCR 1963, 117.2(1). In its February 22, 1982, opinion granting the motion, the trial court recognized that this Court in
Grasser v Fleming,
A motion for summary judgment for failure to state a claim, GCR 1963, 117.2(1), tests the legal sufficiency of the pleаdings alone. The factual allegations made in the complaint must be presumed true along with any inferences or conсlusions which may be fairly drawn from them. Unless the claim is so unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual develoрment could possibly justify recovery, the motion should not be granted.
Romeo v Van Otterloo,
The trial court properly granted the motion in this case. A dramshop action is plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. Browder, supra. The Grasser exception does not apply in this case. Plaintiff did not allege that Campbell was a known alcoholic. Moreover, the common-law actions found in Romeo, supra, do not apply. Defendant in Romeo was was not a licensed seller of alcoholic beverages.
Affirmed.