Barr v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.
185 S.E.2d 714
N.C. Ct. App.
1972
Check Treatment
BROCK, Judge.

Plaintiff’s complaint and evidence before the trial judge, and his entire argument on this appeal, are centered upon his contention that defendant has invaded plaintiff’s right of privacy. North Carolina has recognized, as have most states, a cause of action for an invasion of an individual’s right of privacy, and has recognized in such instances a right to nominal damages where special damages cannot be shown. Flake v. News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55.

For discussions of the beginning and development of the recognition of a cause of action for invasion of an individual’s right of privacy and discussions of the nature of the privacy so protected, see: Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 53 L.Ed. 960, 29 S.Ct. 554 (1908) ; Flake v. News Co., supra; Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) ; Sinclair v. Postal Telegraph & Cable Co., 72 NYS 2d 841; Annot., “Invasion of Privacy by Use of Plaintiff’s Name or Likeness for Nonadvertising Purposes,” 30 ALR 3d 203; Annot., “Invasion of Privacy by Use of Plaintiff’s Name or Likeness in Advertising,” 23 ALR 3d 865; Annot., “Right of Privacy,” 14 ALR 2d 750; Annot., “Right of Privacy,” 14 ALR 2d 750 (ALR 2d Later Case Service); Annot., “Right of Privacy,” 168 ALR 446; Annot., “Right of Privacy,” 138 ALR 22; Hofstadter and Horowitz, The Right of Privacy, (1964); Prosser, Law of Torts, § 117 (4th ed. 1971); ALI Restatement of Torts, § 867; Warren and Brandéis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890) ; Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 526 (1941) ; Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1960) ; Gordon, Right of Property in Name Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. U. L. Rev. 553 (1961) ; Bloustein, Privacy as an *393 Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962 (1964).

In the case now before us, the evidence tends to show that plaintiff consented that his privacy could be invaded by defendant to the extent of publishing his name and picture together in his employer’s advertisement. The evidence further tends to show that defendant published the likeness of someone other than plaintiff and published plaintiff’s name as identification of the person whose likeness was published.

This evidence would justify, although not compel, the jury to find that defendant had gone beyond the scope of plaintiff’s consent and thereby had invaded plaintiff’s right of privacy. Such a finding by the jury would entitle plaintiff to an assessment of nominal damages even though he may not be able to show special damages.

In our opinion the trial judge committed error in granting summary judgment for defendant.

Reversed.

Judges Vaughn and Graham concur.