110 F. 972 | 7th Cir. | 1901
after the foregoing statement of the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
It is doubtless true that the letters patent to Barr afford a prima facie presumption that he is the original and first inventor of what is therein described as his improvement, and that the burden to establish the contrary rests upon the defendant below, who asserted the fact. Agawan Woolen Co. v. Jordan, 7 Wall. 597, 19 L. Ed. 177; Stimpson v. Woodman, 10 Wall. 122, 19 L. Ed. 866. But that prima facie presumption may be rebutted so as to shift upon the patentee the duty of overcoming the probative force of the evidence produced by his opponent, and this prima facie presumption, we think, is, in the first instance at least, fully met and .overcome by the fact that Barr several years before the date of his application prepared specifications and drawings for an application for a patent for the same device then claimed to have been invented by White, and which plans and specifications he signed, as a witness for White. If that act is to stand as of probative force, Barr is convicted out of his own mouth, and cannot be held to be the original inventor. He seeks to avoid the effect of this act under the claim that what he then, did was done under some sort of compulsion or duress. He does not claim any active compulsion by White,' but that he then acted under fear that, if he
“Interested as he is in the result of the suit, his own testimony cannot be allowed to prevail against a course of conduct so utterly at variance*976 with it. It may be true; but we cannot give it effect against what he himself did, and did not do, without disregarding the ordinary laws that' govern human conduct.”
The decree is affirmed.