199 F.2d 189 | D.C. Cir. | 1952
Lead Opinion
Reuben J. Williams, a veteran of World 'War II, took out while in the service and thereafter kept in force a National Service Life Insurance policy in the amount of $10,000. Prior to May 26, 1947, Harold B. Williams, plaintiff below and half-brother of Reuben, was the beneficiary under.this policy. On May 26, 1947, Reuben executed a change in beneficiary, designating Katie Ludwig, an appellee, who is Reuben’s aunt, and Juanita Barone, appellant, in the .amount of $5,000 each. On August 26, 1947, Reuben executed still another change, this time designating Juanita Barone as sole beneficiary.
Appellee Harold B. Williams brought this action in the District Court against the United States to recover the amount of the policy. The complaint alleged that the changes were obtained by fraud, deceit, and undue influence, and consequently that appellee Williams continued to be the beneficiary. At the instance of the United States Katie Ludwig and Juanita Barone were made parties defendant.
After trial the jury returned a special verdict finding that the changes in beneficiary of August 26, 1947, and May 26, 1947, were procured by fraud or undue influence. Judgment was accordingly entered for appellee Williams for the full amount of the policy. This appeal by appellant Barone followed.
First. A review of the record convinces us there was substantial evidence to support the verdict. The jury could reasonably have concluded as follows:
From all this and other evidence the jury could reasonably and honestly have concluded that appellant exercised such undue influence as to make voidable the changes in beneficiaries. The jury need not have reached this conclusion. The evidence was in part conflicting and the jury could have absolved appellant. But the decision was for them and we must not disturb it, resting as it does upon evidence which affords adequate support for the ultimate inference drawn. See McCartney v. Holmquist, 1939, 70 App.D.C. 334, 106 F.2d 855, 126 A.L.R. 375; Sorrels v. Alexander, 1944, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 112, 142 F.2d 769.
“Undue influence, too, is nearly always a matter of inference from facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence of the conditions and surroundings of the parties, and cannot, in its legal sense, be defined and applied in one case so as to present an accurate, measure for the determination of another. Conley v. Nailor, 118 U.S. 127, 133 [6 S.Ct. 1001, 30 L.Ed. 112].”
Barbour v. Moore, 1897, 10 App.D.C. 30, 46, dismissed, 1897, 18 S.Ct. 939, 42 L.Ed. 1211. See, also, 17 Am.Jur., Duress and Undue Influence, § 43.
Second, (a) Appellant, relying upon Louisiana law (see n. 2, supra) as to the burden of proof, argues that fraud must be established by more than a mere preponderance of the evidence.
(b) Again relying upon Louisiana law appellant says that proof of undue influence is limited to the time and place of the act alleged to have resulted from such influence. The argument is predicated on Article 1492, Louisiana Statutes Annotated-Civil Code (1945),
Third. It is contended it was error to instruct on fraud, deceit, coercion and duress because counsel for appellee conceded that undue influence was the sole issue and, in any event, such instructions were inapposite. The concession referred to was made but the broader instructions do not constitute reversible error. Fraud, undue influence, coercion, duress, deceit, all were alleged in the complaint. We need not detail the distinctions which ordinarily might be drawn between them.
This court early pointed out in connection with the validity of a will the “great difficulty, if it be at all possible, to mark with clearness the distinction between * * * undue influence * * * and actual fraud.” Barbour v. Moore, 1894, 4 App.D.C. 535.
We quoted with approval from the leading English case of Boyse v. Rossborough, 6 Ho.L.Cas. 2, 47, 48, where it is said,
“ * * ' * It is, however, extremely difficult tO' state in the abstract what acts will constitute undue influence in questions of this nature. It is sufficient to say, that allowing a fair latitude of construction, they must range themselves under one or other of these heads —coercion or fraud. * * * ”
Since counsel for appellee conceded that undue influence was the sole issue, the trial court might well have so limited his instructions. But analytical nicety in this respect was not essential to the fairness of the instructions as a whole, especially as those given in broader terms did not advantage the plaintiff. Upon a review of the evidence and the relation of the instructions thereto, we think no prejudicial error occurred. The jury we think was well apprized that the issue, though phrased in varying language, was whether appellant or Katie Ludwig, or both, so influenced and affected the judgment of Reuben as to destroy his free agency in the sense of undue influence.
We have examined other points raised and find them not to be meritorious.
Affirmed.
. (a) “ * * * All persons having or claiming to have an interest in such insurance may be made parties to such suit, and such as are not inhabitants of or found within the district in which suit is brought may be brought in by order of the court to be served personalJy or b; publication or in such other reasonable manner as the court may direct. * * * ” 43 Stat. 612 (1924), as amended, 38 U.S.C.A. § 445.
(b) No appearance was entered in the court below for Mrs. Ludwig; default judgment was entered against her.
. The events now to be related occurred in New Orleans, Louisiana.
. As to the requirements for proof of fraud in this jurisdiction, see Lockwood v. Christakos, 1950, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 323, 181 F.2d 805; Public Motor Service v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 1938, 69 App.D.C. 89, 99 F.2d 124.
. “Proof is not admitted of the dispositions having been made through hatred, anger, suggestion or captation.” Article 1492, Louisiana Statutes Annotated-Civil Code (1945). The Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 did not repeal this provision. See 5 Annotations to Louisiana Statutes 1950, p. 227 (Dart, 1951).
. Succession of Schlumbrecht, 1915, 138 La. 173, 70 So. 76; Zerega v. Percival, 1894, 46 La.Ann. 590, 15 So. 476. A contrary conclusion might be drawn from
. See Louisiana Statutes. Annotated-Revised Statutes of 1950, Title 22: § 1521.
. (a) Nothing in Priebe & Sons v. United States, 1947, 332 U.S. 407, 68 S.Ct. 123, 92 L.Ed. 32, and cases there cited is' to the contrary.
(b) For the rule in the District of Columbia which obtains concerning latitude of proof on undue influence, see Barbour v. Moore, supra, 10 App.D.C. at pages 45-46; Duckett v. Duckett, 1943, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 303, 134 F.2d 527.
. See 17 Am.Jur., Duress and Undue Influence, §§ 2, 3, 4, 33; 23 Am.Jur., Fraud and Deceit, §§ 2, et' seq., particularly § 12.
. This was a prior appeal in the same case which later was reported in 1897, 10 App.D.C. 30, cited supra. Certain parts of the opinion in 4 App.D.C. 535 were disapproved in Campbell v. Porter, 1896, 162 U.S. 478 at page 489, 16 S.Ct. 871, 40 L.Ed. 1044, but those parts are not pertinent here.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I cannot find in this record the evidence which my brethren find supporting the allegation of undue influence. I must, therefore, dissent from the judgment.