22 Iowa 163 | Iowa | 1867
II. An additional point is made, or rather a new argument in the nature of a separate proposition is submitted, in this case. It is in substance this: that the deed by Aiken, Little and others, as attorneys in fact for Marsh, Lee and Delevan, only passed the title to the grantee, Galland, which Marsh, Lee and Delevan then owned, to wit, about forty-one oue-hundredtlis; and that, by the decree of partition, the whole lot was awarded to them, whereby, for a valuable consideration — their surrender of their interest in other portions of the partitioned property — they acquired the whole title to said lot, and thereby fifty-nine one-hundredths had inured to them, and was conveyed by them to Mason, whose deed to defendant Ivins had conveyed that portion, and hence the plaintiff is entitled to recover, as for a consideration, in that proportion of the whole mortgage. There may be several answers to this proposition, but it is necessary to state
There was no error in this particular. See Acts 1 Sess. 38th Cong., p. 309, Schedule B; also p. 302, § 152; Hugus v. Strickland, 19 Iowa, 414; O'Hare v. Leonard, 19 Id., 515; Miller v. Bone, 19 Id., 571.
We have thus passed upon all the errors assigned by counsel, or which could be of any importance to plaintiff; and there remains nothing further, save to order that the judgment of the district court stand.
Affirmed.