History
  • No items yet
midpage
Barney O. Padgett v. R. James Nicholson
19 Vet. App. 133
Vet. App.
2005
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 PADGETT, Appellant, Barney O. Secretary NICHOLSON,

R. James Affairs, Appellee.

of Veterans

No. 02-2259. Appeals Court of

United States Claims.

for Veterans 19, 2005.

April *2 McClain, Counsel;

Tim S. R. General Campbell, Randall Assistant General Counsel; McNamee, Acting Depu- John D. Counsel; ty Assistant General Cristine D. Senseman; Jr., Cassidy, and Edward all V. D.C., Washington, were on plead- ings appellee. for the IVERS, Before Judge, Chief and STEINBERG, GREENE, KASOLD, and HAGEL, Judges.* KASOLD, Judge, filed the HAGEL, Court. Judge, filed an concurring part dissenting part. and IVERS, Judge, dissenting Chief filed a opinion.

KASOLD, Judge: II Barney World War veteran O. Pad- gett appeals through August counsel an (Board) Appeals Board of Veterans’ decision that denied his claim for VA dis ability compensation for service-connected direct, osteoarthritis of the right hip on presumptive, secondary bases. Rec (R.) 9, 2004, at July ord 1-20. In a panel decision of this Court issued after oral argument, the Board’s decision vacat was ed and the matter readjudi- remanded for September cation. On the Court granted parties motions both for a full- Court decision panel and withdrew the de Padgett Principi, cision. 18 Vet.App. (2004) (en order). banc For the rea below, sons stated the Board’s decision will part be reversed in in part, set aside and the matter will be remanded for fur proceedings ther consistent opin with this ion. Barton F. Stichman and James Stew- W. I. FACTS

art (non-attorney practitioner), both of Padgett Mr. served duty on active D.C., Washington, were on pleadings appellant. Army January U.S. July 1943 to * Moorman, Lance, Davis, matter, Schoelen, Judges participate did not in consideration of began regular all of whom appeal. Operating active service on See Court's Internal V(b)(1)(C). the Court after full-Court deliberations on this Procedures treatment records from Dr. who served obtained is a combat veteran 1945. He Shaw, Africa, Padgett’s private the Middle East. R. Charles H. Europe, records, injured he Dr. orthopedic surgeon. In March those at 22-23. on ice in that in slipping a result of Shaw noted was left knee as *3 July R. at In Plattsburgh, “morbidly degen- New York. 43. obese” and suffered from 1944, during neck, knee in reinjured spine, his left erative arthritis he 1988, In jumped he into a ditch seek- knees. R. at 226. Dr. Shaw combat when 54, x-rays fire. R. at 71. wrote that taken after an ing cover shell October indicate that accident inter depicted, His service medical records 1988 automobile alia, having sprained degenerative a of the diagnosed he was severe arthritis chronic, severe, knee, synovitis changes in left knee with lesser left chronic, severe, knee, secondary degenerative knee and severe arthritis of the left 1945, In a sprain. August right hip changes Id. with lesser in the left the left-knee (RO) him hip. Padgett office awarded ser- R. at 230. Mr. underwent a regional VA arthroplasty of a left-knee at right-total-hip connection for residuals 1989. R. vice 1991, R. at Dr. injury, disabling. rated at 30% 92. 233-37. In Shaw also recom- R. R. rating arthroplasty. was reduced later to 10%. mended a left-total-knee That at 237. at 149. Padgett May

In Mr. filed In the RO found that there September right-hip connection for ar- condi- seeking claims service was no evidence his leg, hip, by left left dis- pain thritis-related his tion had been caused his left-knee R. at 149. R. ability Padgett’s and the left side of his back. and denied Mr. claim. decision, assigned the RO a Padgett appealed In a June 1976 at 242. Mr. to the rating for traumatic arthritis of his 260. In of his support 30% Board. R. at sprain following left knee and for a residual addi- appeal, he submitted ankylosis. R. at private left knee with favorable tional medical statements from his service connection physicians indicating degenerative 185. The RO denied lumbar-spine and further in his experiencing for a disorder disease that he was inju- that the did not indi- right hip determined evidence was related to his left-knee letter, left-hip a current Dr. ry. cate the existence of In a December 1993 Shaw Padgett ap- R. at Mr. disorder. 185-87. stated: Board, claiming that all his

pealed to the historically an in- Padgett Mr. sustained arthritis had been caused his service- jury [s]er- to his left knee while 189-92, injury. left-knee R. at connected injury has resulted in severe vice. This decision, April 201. In an his endstage traumatic osteoarthritis of arthritis, multiple-joint that his oth- found knee. He also states that he thinks he knee, er than that of his left was not injury a result hip sustained an to his service, aggravated by incurred while years incident. of that same Over service, or caused an in-service disease increas- developed progressively he has injury, appeal. and the Board denied his his left ing degenerative disease of both R. at 211-15. right hip. knee and my feeling gait a claim It is that the abnormali-

In March filed severity of the ties associated with the right-hip for service connection for dis- involving ha[ve] his left knee order on the basis that the need for disease adversely impacted progression right-hip replacement was caused his right hip degenerative disease of his disability. left-knee R. at 218. The RO injured right hip oath that he had his aggravated symp- in fact his der and have while in at the time that he my service same feeling it. It is toms with reinjured R. at had his left knee experi- that he has degenerative disease January 296-97. after right hip is related enced in his provide that the did not a suffi- injury. original cient basis for service connection on either R. at 262. basis, secondary again a direct or RO letter, Dr. January In a Robert denied Mr. claim R. at 303-04. Thoburn, specialist in internal private Padgett appealed January rheumatology, stated: medicine and (R. 319) RO decision to the Board injury to the left Padgett] had [Mr. *4 additional statements from Dr. submitted pro- in the This has knee while service. 340). (R. 325, Dr. Thoburn and Shaw gressed to severe osteoarthritis of letter, Dr. In a November 1995 Thoburn secondary to trauma. He left knee opined: my feeling “It is that a shift in injury an to the thinks he sustained plus weight gait] of his altered [because right hip progressive pain and has and obesity his size and contributed to acceler- right hip. stiffness of right hip,” ated osteoarthritis of his there- endstage He has an left knee has by leading right-hip replacement. to a total shifting in to the weight resulted statement, R. at In an 325. October likely It is that this has resulted side. Dr. opined Padgett’s irreg- Shaw that Mr. progression of osteoarthritis of the gait pattern resulting ular from his left- It is consistent that the os- right hip. injury symptoms knee increased his right hip of the and left knee teoarthritis ultimately right hip, required right- which original injury. are related to the hip replacement. R. at 340. Dr. Shaw R. at 261. Padgett’s] concluded that war-relat- “[Mr. injury directly aggravated symp- ed his also an Padgett

Mr. submitted October respect hip.” toms with to his Id. Rawls, from Dr. James A. 1993 letter Dr. that he had treat- which Rawls stated April In the Board remanded the Padgett years ed Mr. for almost 30 (1) adjudicate case to the RO to Mr. Pad- major problem that “a noted most this gett’s compensation claim for based involving time has been osteoarthritis (2) connection, direct service reconsider his knees, joints, weight-bearing hips, and low claim for on a compensation based second- Padgett back.” R. at 263. Mr. also sub- ary basis as a result of the decision Court’s mitted a 1979 letter from Dr. Rawls June in Allen v. Padgett’s pain,

that noted Mr. left-knee (en banc) (holding may that veteran specifically Dr. Rawls did not comment but compensation aggravation awarded Padgett’s gait right-hip on Mr. disabili- non-service-connected condition service- ty. R. at 265-67. In March after disability), connected afford him a evidence, reviewing newly submitted hearing traveling a section of the before deny the RO continued to the claim. R. at R. at Board. 354-57.

272-74. Padgett In June Mr. underwent a May Padgett

In Mr. a Dr. F. R. filed Notice VA examination Henderson. Disagreement respect to the March at 360-63. Dr. Henderson concluded that and, Padgett multijoint 1994 RO decision from “de- December Mr. suffered hearing generative joint he was afforded a before the RO. disease” that was “a con- At hearing, Padgett sequence aging process” testified un- of the rather than contrast, In R. at 16. nature.” [in] at 363. How- injury. Id. specific any one opin- that “both of VA [the Board stated left- Padgett’s that Mr. ever, he also stated probative value as have tremendous ions] part may “played have injury knee review of thorough based on a both were a left-knee re- required later damage that file, for- which is essential [to] the claims necessarily hip re- but placement, The Board mulating opinion.” a sound Id. addition, Dr. Id. placement.” of record that the medical evidence found not reviewed that he had noted Henderson an in- indicate a nexus between did not orthope- and that a certified claims file injury Padgett’s right hip to Mr. service a more the case “for review dist should disability or that right-hip his current R. at 363. opinion.” definitive disability manifested within right-hip his hearing, Board February During discharge, and thus year one after his under oath again testified connection on direct denied service at the injured right hip that he had R. at 14-17. The presumptive bases. knee in reinjured his left time he had same claim for also denied Mr. Board July In a R. at 393-410. connection, after secondary service med- letter, requested injury was not Padgett’s right-hip that Mr. the chief of staff ical *5 left-knee to his service-connected related Carolina, Columbia, Medical VA South disability. R. at 17-18. (VAMC). As its R. 413-15. Center Padgett argues, inter appeal, Mr. On opinion, the the requesting authority for (1) alia, relying that the Board erred Health Ad- cites Veterans Board’s letter ren medical the June VA (April Directive 10-95-040 ministration Dr. Henderson because he did dered (1999), and 38 1995), 20.901 38 C.F.R. file, Padgett’s claims did not review Mr. Dr. K. R. at 413. John 7109. medical evidence positive discuss the Blincow, tasked employee, was VA file, not consider the claims and did the to review of the VAMC the Chief of Staff injured his Padgett that Mr. had fact provide claims file and Padgett’s Mr. (Br.) at Brief hip (Appellant’s in combat advisory medical requested Board the the (2) 17-18); did not have the the Board After examin- R. at 413-20. opinion. See then-existing regula the authority under file, Dr. Blincow claims ing Padgett’s Mr. 20.901, tion, to secure the C.F.R. (1) Padgett’s right-hip that Mr. concluded Blincow, Dr. opinion of expert medical VA degen- by age-related was caused disorder had the if the Board and even not related to his arthritis and was erative under opinion, such an obtain injury gait or a abnor- left-knee in-service 38, U.S.Code, 7104(a), and Disabled title (2) disability did his left-knee mality Secretary Veter American Veterans an increase in se- or cause aggravate (Fed.Cir.2003) F.3d 1339 Affairs, ans arthritis. R. at 418- right-hip verity of his the Board Sec’y], DAV [hereinafter that without not consider could agency the Board issued the the remanding the matter to August On first Mr. obtaining 1-19. In its jurisdiction R. at appeal. original decision on Br. at 20- medi- decision, (Appellant’s accorded VA waiver Mr. Pad- 24); Board’s that weight opinions than the opinions cal more not related condition is Padgett’s private physi- gett’s right-hip by Mr. rendered injury or his service-connect that an in-service The Board found R. at 14-18. cians. disability clearly erroneous ed left-knee private physicians were medical private because unsubstantiated “equivocal apparently required re- provide etiological Response Sec’y Sur-Reply record Br. at 2-6. lationship decision, for service connection to be In his motion for a full-Court 15-16); 7109(a) (Appellant’s awarded Br. at and Secretary argues that section ais 7104(a) properly the Board could not exception because clear to section and that opinions, rely on either VA the United Appeals States Court of for the (Federal Circuit) properly before Federal Circuit found in exists, are Sec’y the Board or Court those DAV v. exception Padgett’s claim support thereby precluding Mr. and therefore this Court from hold- (Mot.) should reverse the Board’s deci- ing Sec’y Court otherwise. Motion at 3. denying (Appellant’s claim Br. at Padgett argues sion Mr. in his cross-motion for 25). alternative, Padgett ar- Mr. a full-Court decision that the Court has gues the Court should remand the full authority to review the Board’s factual case for the Board to correct findings the errors for clear Appellant’s error. Mot. compliance that he identified and to ensure at 3.

with the notice and require- assistance 5103A, ments sections title II. ANALYSIS Appellant’s Br. U.S.Code. at 26 n. 2. Padgett raises two issues concern- Secretary filed an initial brief ing the Board’s consideration of Dr. Biin- remand, argued primarily which he for a First, opinion. cow’s 1999 failure comply based on his with notice argues he that the Board failed to follow 5103(a). Secretary’s duties under section applicable regulatory procedures in obtain- However, (Sec’y)Br. at 7-13. ing this opinion, thereby rendering “waive[d] Court’s consideration [of] Second, its use invalid. argues he *6 relating duty the errors to the ... if even the Board statutory had the notify in ... Secretary’s discussed regulatory authority to “secure” the opin- Appellant’s Reply brief.” Br. at 1-2. The ion, it did not statutory authority have the Secretary, Court, with leave of the then instance, to “consider” it in the first absent sur-reply filed a brief order to address Padgett. waiver from Mr. We will ad- arguments. Mr. other Although dress each of these contentions in turn. Secretary agrees with Mr. Padgett Regulatory Authority A. to Secure and that the Board in relying erred on the 1997 Expert Consider 1999 Medical opinion VA medical of Dr. Henderson Opinion of Dr. Blincow 10), (Sec’y Br. at Secretary argues that authority had the under section rendering decision, Before its 7109(a) (2002) § 20.901 to obtain the requested Board an expert opinion medical Blincow, opinion 1999 VA medical of Dr. from the Chief of Staff of the VAMC and that pursuant obtained there- Columbia, South Carolina. Mr. Padgett require to do not remand to the RO for argues that the Board lacked authority initial consideration (Sec’y Sur-Reply Br. under the law effect at the time to ask 3-7). provide Chief of Staff to a medical Padgett’s response opinion the Secre- regulations because the provided brief, tary’s alia, sur-reply argues, he inter an opinion such could be solicited (also that Dr. Biincow’s opinion medical did not from VA’s Chief Medical Director 7104(a) fit any exception under to section Secretary Health), known as the Under that would allow the initially Board any and made no reference to per other consider son, additional evidence. Appellant’s including a Chief of Staff of a VAMC. 20; expert employ- medical from VA Br. at see also 38 Appellant’s See 20.901(a). thereby statutory author- provided ees and § C.F.R. ity also find that the practice. We opin- obtaining expert After authority of the Board to secure medical of the Board during pendency ion but authority for the opinion includes decision, Secretary amended opinion. consider 20.901(a) to ob- authorize the Board May Expert 1. Board Secure any appropri- opinion a medical tain Opinions Medical VA, within professional ate health-care Medical Director. See just the Chief outset, At the we note that From Opinions Practice: Medical Rules of already has addressed on several Court Administration, 66 Health the Veterans opin occasions the Board’s use of medical 23, 2001); 38,158, 38,159 (July Fed.Reg. obtained, concluded, it either di ions 20.901(a) (1999) compare 38 C.F.R. rectly that the Board had the implicitly, or 20.901(a) (2002). Given this C.F.R. expert opinions to secure regulation, the Court modification of the employees. from both VA and non-VA Padgett that Mr. cannot and does not find See, West, e.g., Vet.App. Winsett v. Board’s solicitation prejudiced by the was (1998) (holding that section of Dr. Blincow’s preclude obtaining does not Board from regu- the Board had clear opinion because not rendered from out latory authority to take such action Brown, VA); Perry side opinion Dr. Blincow’s consider that, (stating in event that medical- it ultimately upon relied and ren- when remand, was needed on nexus appeal. the decision here on See dered may develop “Board seek to obtain that 7261(b)(2) (Court shall take due through ment itself or non-VA a[VA] [med error). prejudicial account of rule of expert] opinion”); ical Thurber v. Statutory Authority to Secure and (commenting 120-21 B. assumes, although does Expert Opinion Medical that section 7109 Consider authorize, specifically Board’s obtain that, if argues also even experts, and ing opinions of VA medical Dr. Blincow’s obtaining securing *7 20.901(a) § autho holding that 38 C.F.R. by regulation, the Board permissible was promulgation action is a valid rizing such rely upon Dr. Blincow’s medical could statutory sections 7109 and pursuant instance, in the first absent U.S.A., 5107(a)); Inc. v. also Chevron see waiver, deny it claimant’s because would Inc., Council, 467 Natural U.S. Res. Def. “one review on Padgett 2778, 837, 843-45, 104 L.Ed.2d 694 S.Ct. 81 Secretary” provided as to the appeal (1984) (Court to executive gives deference 7104(a); § also v. by 38 U.S.C. DAV regulation making reason department’s Although focus- Sec’y, supra. scheme). statutory interpretation able authority the Board’s lack there- es on —or light subsequent issuance in “consider” Dr. Blincow’s of—-to Sec’y, v. opinion in DAV Federal Circuit’s instance, that we the first it is essential however, to examine we feel constrained statutory first examine to do proceed and thus question anew opinion. For the Board to “secure” the so. below, we conclude that reasons set forth Sec’y, the Federal Circuit In DAV v. the United States Con- authorizing the regulation held that a statutorily recognized and sanc- gress evidence with- Board obtain additional the Board to secure practice tioned the 140 one-appellate-review require- tion to the an RO for initial consider-

out remand violated the statuto- 7104(a), that evidence Congress ation of ment of section and that 7104(a) that in section ry requirement agree. did so in section 7109. We review of the Secre- appellate there be one starting point interpreting “The a Sec’y, See DAV 327 tary’s decisions. ‘if intent of language, statute is its C.F.R, (invalidating 38 at 1353 F.3d clear, Congress is is the end of the 19.9(a)(2)(2000)). Although the Federal ” 1456, 5 matter.’ Gardner F.3d 7104(a) gen- that section concluded Circuit (Fed.Cir.1993) 1456 Gardner [hereinafter from consider- Board erally precluded 552, II], 115, aff'd, 513 115 130 U.S. S.Ct. instance, ab- the first ing new evidence (1994). claimant, “Determining a by the that court L.Ed.2d 462 stat sent waiver Congress make ex- recognized that could plain meaning requires examining ute’s that Congress and further noted ceptions, specific language at issue and the overall regard to ex- explicitly had done so v. Der structure of the statute.” Gardner opinions at least two statu- pert medical winski, 586 [herein implemented by regula- tory provisions I], nom. after Gardner sub Gardner aff'd the Federal Circuit Specifically, tion. II, (Fed.Cir.1993), aff'd, 5 F.3d 1456 stated: 130 L.Ed.2d 462 U.S. S.Ct. authorize Congress intended to [W]hen (1994); West, Splane v. see also F.3d the Board to obtain additional evidence (Fed.Cir.2000) (“canons 1068-69 without “one review on to the require give construction ... us to effect Secretary,” knew how to do so. Con- language to the clear of a statute and avoid statutory au- gress provided express has rendering any portions meaningless or su thority permit the Board to obtain I, 1 perfluous”); Gardner at 587- evidence, such as medi- additional (“Where plain, language statute’s See, opinions specific e.g., cal cases. clear, meaning and its no room exists for 5107(a) (2000) (authorizing nothing There construction. con Board to obtain medical strue.”). plain meaning Where the (for- Secretary VA’s Under for Health discernible, “plain meaning statute is Director)); merly the Medical Chief given appli must be effect unless a ‘literal (authorizing produce cation of [the] statute will result independent to obtain VA); from outside the 38 C.F.R. demonstrably at odds with the intention of ” 20.901(a) (2002) (authorizing Board to I, Vet.App. its drafters.’ Gardner obtain from the Veterans (quoting v. Oceanic Contrac Griffin Administration); Health 38 C.F.R. Inc., tors, 458 U.S. 102 S.Ct. *8 20.901(b) (authorizing Board to obtain (1982)). 3245, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 opinions medical from the Armed Forces 7109(a) to Section authorizes the Board Pathology). Institute of expert opinions secure medical when Sec’y, 327 F.3d at Al- DAV 1347-48. necessary. Although deemed this section 5107(a) though we note that former section opin- authorizes the Board to secure these (now 5103A(d)) 38 U.S.C. did not ex- experts employees ions from who are pressly authorize the Board to obtain or VA, recognizes of it also and sanctions the opinions, import secure medical the practice to such Board’s secure analysis, at it Federal Circuit’s least as experts employed by from medical VA. case, recogni- relates to this is that court’s 7109(a) Congress may provide excep- part: tion that an Section states relevant Board, required the chief the have VA medical di- When, judgment of the an to opinion to rector to “render the Board opinion, in addition expert medical aspects Department on the medical of the case” within the that available (1) Affairs], every in which an RO had denied a by warranted case [of Veterans (2) claim, medical evi- controversy or service-connection complexity the medical case, dence had been submitted tended to appeal in an involved claim, opinion support the the case was advisory an medial may secure appealed opinion request- medical and such an was independent one more from cases, In opinion of ed. the would have employees are not the such experts who by to “be considered the Board.” Department. (1962) (to 87-1453, at 2 H.R.Rep. ac- No. added). 7109(a) (emphasis 852); 852, company H.R. see also H.R. 7109(a) explic- Although does (2d Sess.), § 1 Cong. (adding 87th new the Board to secure itly authorize U.S.Code) (as section 4009 to title re- VA, experts from within medical 19, 1962); Cong. ported Mar. Rec. addition to that available phrase the “in 1962) (House of (Apr. passage reported Department Af- [of within the Veterans bill). addition, claim after a had been sanctioning of the express is an fairs]” denied, disallowed, reopened, again experts. of Board use such practice the the bill would re- House-passed also have of this reference The inclusion Director, upon quired the Chief Medical the statu- existing practice Board’s within Board, request after to the to refer experts the Board to use tory authority for independent an medical-expert the case to VA, strong implication outside creates review, and it advisory panel would approv- Congress recognizing and was panel have made “bind- existing practice of the Board to ing ing upon Board.” Id. experts from with- secure in VA. The committee United States Senate it by drop- the bill amended

Moreover, any considering extent that there is to the doubt, mandate the Chief history ping of section Medical legislative Board, thereby leaving and the recognition Director demonstrates that this independent experts “the using VA medi use practice Board’s than permissive with Board rather experts in addition to outside medical cal required by mandatory as would have been a deliberate action Con experts was SEC, Repre- House of passed the bill as See 450 U.S. gress. Steadman (1962), Rep. No. 87-1844 sentatives.” S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (Court history may legislative reprinted U.S.C.C.A.N. look intent). noting explained It its that the principal action Congress’ reveal eventually made “no reference reporting be bill was the section that purpose Appeals securing provide was to Veterans’ came section 7109 advisory opinion from the Chief Medical authority an advi Board with the to secure Administration independent Director of Veterans’ sory Agency a matter within experts employees since this is who were not ample 87-671, No. 76 Stat. 557 discretion of VA. See Pub.L. *9 practice (emphasis add-

(1962); now exists.” Id. (redesig 4009 (2d Sess.), 12-40, ed); Cong. H.R. by 7109 Pub.L. No. 87th nated section (1991)). 402(b)(1), § 1 (amending proposed section Stat. The bill) 1962). Aug. 6, House-passed (reported House-passed version of the bill would version of the bill authorizing may Senate “consider” opinions those the first expert opinions instance, the Board seek medical his interpretation of the statute “in addition to that available within the to mean that precluded the Board is from Department,” was concurred in considering so them is inconsistent with Representatives, House of United States analysis Sec’y, supra, DAV v. as well 1962), Cong. (Sept. Rec. 18406 Thurber, as the discussion in Perry and By adding enacted. thereafter was this supra. Padgett’s both interpretation language, mandatory instead the House is also inconsistent with statutory language, Congress recognized ap- legislative scheme and the purpose behind proved continuing authority section produce 7109 and it would absurd opinions Board to seek medical results. experts employed by from medical VA in a. Sec’y, DAV v. Perry, and Thurber: newly granted authority addition to the v. Sec’y, DAV the Federal Circuit stat experts secure such from medical Congress ed: “[W]hen intended to author recognition outside This VA. is demon- ize the Board to obtain additional evidence strated the Explanatory Statement on without ‘one review on to the Secre A, Compromise Agreement on Division ac- tary,’ it knew how to do so.” 327 F.3d companying the enactment of the Veterans 1347-48. If the Federal Circuit was ad Act, 100-687, Judicial Review Pub.L. (or dressing only the obtaining securing) of 103(a)(1), (1988), which, 102 Stat. 4105 sense, evidence in its narrowest as Mr. alia, inter modified then-section 4009 and Padgett would have us construe those stated Committees ... “[t]he note terms, then there would have been no need approval practice the current of ob- for the Federal Circuit to note that Con taining [expert opinions” medical] gress knew how to authorize the Board to (1988), within Cong. VA. 134 Rec. S16653 obtain such evidence “without ‘one review reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. ” on appeal to the Secretary’ because the Thus, provides we hold that section 7109 obtaining mere the Board statutory authority for the Board to secure (without review) could not violate the one- from both VA and other appellate-review requirement of section experts. 7104(a); only the Board’s consideration of We now address Mr. argu- possibly such evidence could do so. We plain ment wording of section view the Federal Circuit’s conclusion in 7109(a) authorizes the Board to se- respect this as integral analysis to its cure, instance, not to consider in the first 7104(a) and therefore not dictum. an expert opinion, and that this generally Raritan, See Co-Steel Inc. v. required means that the Board is to return Comm’n, Int’l Trade 357 F.3d 1307- a case to the RO for initial consideration of (Fed.Cir.2004) (defining dictum as lan any expert medical the Board guage that unnecessary to decision in might secure. For the reasons stated be- case) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary low, reject we interpretation. (7th ed.1999)); see also DaimlerChrysler

2. Board Initially May Expert Consider States, Corp. v. United 361 F.3d Medical Opinions It Secures (Fed.Cir.2004) n. that, (noting even if Although Mr. Padgett correctly dictum, *10 (same); together (Fed.Cir.2001) statute must be construed with- Stone Con- States, according importance single F.3d out undue to v. Corp. United

tainer (same). Moreover, (Fed.Cir.2000) portion). or a “statute isolated 1349-50 given that effect Moreover, Sec’y, should be construed so consistent with DAV provisions, part that no the to all its so will implicitly recognized has this Court void inoperative superfluous, insignif- or or of the Board’s consideration propriety icant, Perry, 9 and so that one section will opinions it obtains. See medical destroy provision another the is the that on the unless (stating at 6 remand or through a ease result of obvious mistake error.” Suth- develop could itself Board 46:06; Splane, § supra. see also expert opinion); a VA medical erland, use of Thurber, (noting at statutory pertinent to our scheme to opportunity a claimant and notice to in this includes au- separate review case before could required were Board respond Secretary the thorities for obtain medi- expert opinion that it rely on a VA medical opinions cal the RO level. See 38 obtained). 5103A(d), §§ 5109. medical Those Sec’y language if the DAV v. Even RO, are an first considered us, the upon based on binding was not appealed whose decisions can be following analysis agree we with the Fed- 7104(a), §§ 7105. Board. See 38 U.S.C. conclusion as section eral Circuit’s gives separate Section Board independent authority to advi- Statutory Although the and secure

b. Scheme: when, sory judg- autho “in the language of the statute —here plain Board, expert opinion, rizing the Board to “secure” an ment in addition to that available within the opinion from both VA and non-VA the medical experts starting point Department, warranted —is II, statute, controversy or involved in an analysis complexity of that see Gardner 7109(a). I, case”. Con- supra, and all it is not 38 U.S.C. Splane, Gardner concert, these totality analysis. interpreting sidering provisions When statute, it would have meaning concludes that been part of a “each Court Congress given to have incongruous of a statute should be construed.in discretionary authority to Board to every part with other or section connection initial require a medical but produce as to a harmonious whole” obtain so RO, which interpretation confine review of proper “it is not already opportunity 2A N. had an to seek to be construed.” to the one section Statutory obtained under its review medical Singer, Con Sutherland on (6th ed.2000) authority in separate 46:05 own [hereinaf struction Sec’y, not a is, this is That court will 5109. Unlike DAV ter “the Sutherland], involving authority particular regulatory case only consider the statute that conflicts to consider evidence legislative but also the entire Board question, one statutory right review part.” of which it is a Sutherland, scheme Rather, here 46:05; issue King appeal. v. St. Vincent’s also 570, 116 Re- 215, 221, 112 statutory scheme itself. U.S. involves Hosp., 502 S.Ct. (when to send information interpreting quiring L.Ed.2d statute, statutorily to secure back permitted to look at context it is required court is whole); is inconsis- the RO for initial consideration of law as Imazio provisions statutory Greenhouses, 69 tent with the overall scheme Nursery, Inc. v. Dania (described (all (Fed.Cir.1995) below Congress the intent of parts F.3d *11 II.B.1.c) i.e., part that the Board resolve gett, con remanding to the RO for initial expert flicts in evidence. consideration of medical opinions requested and by pur- obtained the Board Congress Our conclusion intended 7109(a), suant to section nothing does expert to consider the opin- improve the appellate proce- referenced that it under section ions obtained difficult, dures. We believe that it is if not by the fact that supported is further Con- impossible, escape the conclusion that gress provided due-process protec- also Congress, by specifically referencing ap- (c) tions. Subsection of section 7109 re- pellate procedures by vesting quires the Board to furnish notice and a (VA’s appellate body) copy opinion to the claimant. See procure expert opinions, such medical (“subsection Winsett, 11 Vet.App. at 426 intended that the Board be able both to (c) 7109[, by] requir[ing] of section notice procure and to review the medical opinions provision copy of a the [VA] 7109(a). obtained under section (as 5109[(e)]), ato claimant does section d. Avoiding Absurd Finally, Results: merely procedural process restates Mr. Padgett’s interpretation of section a claimant higher due under law before a 7109(a) would lead to absurd results. See made”); 20.903(a) § decision is 38 C.F.R. Video, Inc., United States v. X-Citement (2004) (Board give claimant notice and 64, 68-69, 513 U.S. 115 S.Ct. opportunity respond to evidence ob- (1994) (“Some L.Ed.2d 372 applications of 20.901, tained under the regulation im- respondent’s position produce would re- plementing section see also 7109(a)); odd, sults that merely were not posi- but Thurber, at 122 (concluding tively absurd.... We do not assume that 20.903, that 38 C.F.R. which requires Congress, laws, in passing intended such notification to claimant by of use Board of results.”); V.I., Timex Inc. v. United expert opportunity States, (Fed.Cir.1998) 157 F.3d respond, “applies to both independent and (“statutory construction that causes absurd opinions”). VA If an expert opinion ob- results to be avoided if all possible”). by tained the Board had to be sent to the It would be absurd to conclude that Con- RO before could be considered gress authorized the Board to “secure” but Board, there would be no need for the not “consider” expert opinions, VA provide Board to notice a copy to the when the Board already was authorized to claimant because the RO is otherwise re- remand matters to the RO consider- quired 5109(c); to do so. See 38 U.S.C. ation, and the RO was authorized to obtain 3.328(d) (2004). 38 C.F.R. and consider expert opinions. VA c. Legislative Purpose: express 5103A(d), §§ See 38 U.S.C. 5109. The-in- purpose for enacting provision that is congruity of a conclusion that the Board is now codified as section 7109 im- was “to obtain, authorized to but not consider prove appellate procedures applicable instance, first opin- to veterans’ claims authorizing the re- ion is further illustrated application ferral of such independent claims to medi- of-that conclusion to another section of the experts” cal in order to “resolve conflicts scheme, statutory title of evidence in questions involving service U.S.Code. Under section if Mr. Pad- connection of disabilities or deaths.” S. gett’s position that the Board can do Rep. (1962), No. reprinted in 1962 explicitly correct, what authorized. is U.S.C.C.A.N. 2585-86. The inter- then the Board could hold a hearing and pretation of the urged by scheme but, Mr. Pad- record Mr. Padgett’s testimony be- *12 the Court holds that supra. Accordingly, explicitly fails to state section 7107 cause testimony consider Board’s of Dr. Blincow’s the Board can the consideration that instance, hearing transcript the opinion was-fully the first consistent expert initial the RO for have to be sent to would as statutory exception the scheme with (where Padgett may al- with, consideration to, not in conflict the “one review and see, hearing, e.g., had ready have Secretary” provision of -the 7105(a) that, the (stating § after U.S.C. 7104(a). section Disagreement, Notice filing “[e]ach of a of ... hearing will accorded appellant be III. REMEDY 3.103(a) §§ (requiring

rights”); 38 C.F.R. reversal of the Board seeks hearing citing 38 right and notice of argument that the 501(a) decision based on his statutory authority for § U.S.C. as 3.105(i) (affording op- properly rely could not on either claimant Board right); this of portunity hearing prior opinion, leaving for severance the of VA medical connection, in compensa- reduction service and as the medi- Drs. Shaw Thoburn reductions and pension, and other tion or Board. opinions properly cal before the discontinuances) (2004)). This mean would rejects Although the Court the contention longer Board no assess that the could the the Board could not consider VA that the credibility the the first instance nev- any purpose, for we claimant, a well- hearing testimony of appropriate find reversal ertheless role Board. recognized See Cuevas secondary-ser- denial of Mr. Principi, Vet.App. v. claim. right-hip-disability vice-connected required that is to “address (noting Board with Additionally, appropriate remand is credibility testi- appellant’s sworn presumptive to his claims for regard for mony provide discounting or reasons right-hip for his direct service connection Derwinski, 2 testimony”); v. Wilson disability. (1991) (same); 16, 20 Smith Secondary as to A. Board Decision Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 237-38 Right-Hip for Connection Service (“[djetermination credibility func- is a Disability will be Reversed [Board]”). Pad- Because Mr. tion for gett’s interpretation would lead to Secondary may connection be service results, it avoided. absurd should be above disability proxi granted any is of a Summary mately

S. due to service- or result injury. 38 C.F.R. connected disease summary, In we conclude 3.310(a) Allen, (2004); 7109(a) gives author section (allowing secondary service connection ity to secure of non-service-connected aggravation experts, both VA non-VA disability). by service-connected condition authority includes that such finding regarding Board’s decision infor to consider the first instance the finding secondary service connection is conflict mation so obtained and does not under the that the Court reviews of fact appel the section one with set “clearly erroneous” standard review review, particularly given the fact late 7261(a)(4). Hard in 38 See forth protections provided are due-process (1993). Brown, Vet.App. er v. regulation, the statute 38 U.S.C. 7261(a)(4) directs 20.903(a). regard, 7109(a); In This 38 C.F.R. any Thurber, or set to “reverse aside” conclusion, effect, the Court reaffirms fact “finding of material adverse Sec’y, is supra, and consistent DAV (Fed.Cir.2001) (“benefit finding if clearly claimant ... erro- F.3d “ 7261(a)(4). may ‘A the doubt rule shifting viewed as neous.” although nonpersuasion’ the ‘risk of when there onto the VA to ‘clearly erroneous’ it, prove that the veteran is not entitled to support reviewing is evidence to benefits”). application, this rule creates left with court on the entire evidence is a preponderance-against-the-claim eviden- firm that a the definite and conviction *13 ” tiary applies every standard that finding committed.’ mistake has been Gilbert Mariano, Robinette, of material fact. See Derwinski, 49, Vet.App. 1 52 Gilbert, and all supra. The Court cannot added) (emphasis (quoting United States v. 7261(b) carry responsibility out its section Co., 364, 395, Gypsum U.S. 333 U.S. 68 to “review the record of proceedings be (1948)). 525, course, S.Ct. 92 L.Ed. 746 Of “ Secretary fore the and ... and if the Board’s ‘account of the evidence is Secretary’s ... take due of account in plausible light in of the record viewed 5107(b)”, application of section 38 U.S.C. entirety, appeals may its the court of ” 7261(b), (b)(1), § referring without to the Gilbert, it.’ 1 Vet.App. reverse at 52 probativeness of the evidence that (quoting City Anderson v. Bessemer weighed finding that the evidence 564, 573-74, 1504, City, 470 U.S. 105 S.Ct. preponderated Indeed, against the claim. (1985)). L.Ed.2d 84 518 exactly that is what the Court did three Additionally, when assessing the Mariano, times in its 17 Vet. Board, factual determinations App. 313-17. required Court 38 U.S.C. Although in Gilbert the Court indicated 7261(b)(1) § to “take due account” of the that a application review of the Board’s application 5107(b), § of 38 U.S.C. the benefit-of-the-doubt rule would un be every “benefit-of-the-doubt” rule in case. “arbitrary, der the capricious, an abuse of rule, Secretary charged Under this discretion, or not in otherwise accordance duty with the to consider all information with pursuant law” standard of review and, evidence and of record when there is 7261(a)(3)(A), Gilbert, § 38 U.S.C. 1 Vet. “approximate positive balance of and App. (dictum), at 58 such a review was not negative evidence regarding any issue ma carried out there because the Court con matter, terial to the determination of the cluded that the Board’s statement of rea Secretary give shall the benefit of the sons or inadequate, thereby bases was doubt to the claimant.” remand, warranting id. at 59. More re 5107(b); see also Principi, Mariano v. cently, the Court held that it reviews the (2003) (also Vet.App. referring application “outcome” the Board’s of the

inferentially to rule as benefit-of-therdoubt benefit-of-the-doubt rule under the “clear standard”); “equipoise 38 C.F.R. 3.102 ly erroneous” standard of review set forth (2004). way, Put another under the bene 7261(a)(4), in 38 U.S.C. and then pro rule, fit-of-the-doubt “the preponderance apply ceeded to that standard of review. against evidence must be the claim Mariano, supra (quoting Roberson v. Gilbert, for benefits to be denied.” 1 Vet. (2003)). Principi, 17 Vet.App. “ 54; App. at see Robinette v. 8 Accordingly, if the Court has ‘the definite (“the unique eviden- and firm conviction that a mistake has ” tiary adjudication sys burdens the VA been committed’ finding the Board in ... permit tem merits disallowance preponderated against preponderates where the evidence against fact, claim finding on a of material claim”); 7261(a)(4) see also Principi, Ortiz v. 274 then section section “un- 7261(b)(1) claimant’s evidence was—it was finding such require that This clearly and be reversed controverted”. characterization erroneous held Gilbert, supra (quoting Hersey presented U.S. was not the evidence set aside. Co., “clearly (reversing lower or different criterion for supra as a new Gypsum Hicks, “clearly erro supra; of fact under Court’s erroneous” review. See review)); see also Vet 47- Principi, neous” standard of also Wells (VBA), order) (en J., Pub.L. (Steinberg, Benefits Act of erans banc dissent 107-330, decision) (ana 116 Stat. No. to denial of full-Court ing 7261(b)(1) revising (enacting section Hersey Hicks relation to lyzing Mariano, (not 7261(a)(4)); supra Gilbert); Anderson, Co., Gypsum U.S. of review ing “clearly erroneous” standard (Kasold, J., deni dissenting at 49-51 id. of “outcome of decision) (same). to assessment applies al full-Court of benefit-of-doubt application” Board’s *14 Co., Gypsum Mari It is clear U.S. rule, application of holding thrice Board’s ano, and Gilbert that the existence of some 5107(b) erroneous, clearly section (that is, controverting evidence evidence reversing setting once it it and twice favor) appellant’s that is not the does (not Roberson, aside); Vet.App. at 147 17 preclude carrying this Court from out change “clearly stan ing no erroneous” 7261(a)(4) and mandates in section review). Wells v. Princi dard of But see (b)(1) of proceedings to “review the record (2004) (en 33, Vet.App. banc pi, 18 39 Secretary and the before the Board” order) J., (Steinberg, dissenting to denial “take account of then to due the Secre decision) (opining that VBA full-Court 5107(b)” tary’s application of [the] major expansion of the brought “about a (i.e., rule prepon “the benefit-of-the-doubt as to responsibilities Court’s review against of the evidence must be derance factfinding”). BVA denied,” claim for to be Gil benefits 7261(b)(1), bert, supra), 38 U.S.C. argues Secretary The decisionmaking as to governs the Board’s clearly Court cannot erroneous hold fact, “set every finding of material and to finding the evidence is un- Board unless application or reverse” that when aside against finding; controverted Board’s erroneous,” “clearly is 38 Secretary specifically, states: 7261(a)(4). Mariano, 17 at Vet.App. See Reversal warranted Court (twice holding findings Board’s 313-17 absolutely plausi- when there is no clearly though erroneous even evidence ble basis decision [Board’s] uncontroverted); also U.S. was not clearly decision is [Board’s] where Co., 395-96, 68 S.Ct. Gypsum 333 U.S. of the uncontroverted light erroneous clearly (finding finding court’s lower a]ppellant’s favor. evidence [the uncon- where evidence was not erroneous Brown, Hicks troverted). To the extent that Hicks (1995). regarding The evidence relying Hersey can precedent other aggravation in this case is con- nexus or support proposition read troverted, is not appropriate. so reversal clearly erroneous cannot be language Sec’y Sur-Reply at 3. Hicks finding is against that unless the evidence for not Secretary cited uncontroverted, precedent is over unless the finding clear error unanimously. ruled Hersey uncontroverted was derived from Derwinski, (1992), decision reviewing Board’s connection strong deny secondary service it was to describe how where used disability in right-hip light ry, of the entire including direct observation of the al case, we gait, record note that there are teration of his are the of Drs. Blincow, Henderson and knowledge two doctors with intimate the VA doctors. but, Dr. Henderson examined Mr. Padgett Padgett and his medical status who contrary to what the Board stated in its opine injury “directly that his left-knee decision, he did not review the claims file. “adversely aggravated,” impacted,” or oth- (Dr. R. at report Henderson’s stat to” erwise “contributed or “resulted in” his review”). ing, “C file was not available for 261-62, 325, R. at right-hip problems. Dr. report Henderson’s also made no men Thoburn, rheumatologist, Dr. was aware Padgett’s tion of Mr. right-hip in-service of Mr. knee condition since at injury. R. at 360-63. These factors ren Dr. least when Thoburn was consult- der Dr. report “questiona Henderson’s ed another doctor who believed that Mariano, probative ble value.” 17 Vet. Padgett degenerative had severe ar- (flawed App. at methodology in creat a possible thritis and torn medial meniscus ing medical report report renders of the left R. at knee. 162. In Dr. “questionable value”); probative Bielby v. for, Thoburn treated Mr. inter (1994) (“In 7 Vet.App. alia, degenerative arthritis of the left knee. order expert’s for an opinion to be based Shaw, R. at 189-91. Dr. an orthopaedic upon case, the facts or data of a those facts surgeon, began treating Mr. Padgett *15 in or data must perceived be disclosed to or 1982, performed his right-total-hip arthro- expert pñor rendering opin 1989, in plasty and evaluated his medical ion!;] opinion merely otherwise the is con in follow-up condition medical evaluations jecture and of no assistance to the trier of through 1991. R. at 226-37. Dr. Shaw fact.”) (emphasis in original); Grreen v. provided copies periodic of his evaluations Derwinski, (1991) 1 Vet.App. throughout to Dr. Thoburn his treatment (duty requires to assist providing claimant of R. Padgett. at 226-37. “thorough with contemporaneous” The Board noted Dr. opinion Shaw’s medical examination that “takes into ac Padgett’s that Mr. “in service left knee count the prior records of medical treat injury resulted in severe traumatic os- ment”); (2004) (“It 38 C.F.R. 4.1 is ... teoarthritis of the left knee which ad- essential in both the examination and in versely impacted progression of de- disability, evaluation of a that each generative right disease of the hip disability be in viewed relation to its histo aggravated symptoms” his and that his ry.”). “in injury service left knee in resulted an Moreover, Dr. Henderson’s diagnosis irregular gait pattern directly which ag- definitive, was not stating that the “fact gravated right hip his symptoms.” R. at hips both and knees are affected Further, the Board noted Dr. Tho- (i.e., problem this degenerative joint [ dis- opinion burn’s that Mr. Padgett’s “left ease) suggest[s] ] that it a consequence is knee condition resulted in weight his aging process,” further stating that side, shifting to the right which resulted the “fact that injure he did the left knee progression of osteoarthritis of the suggests] ... years ago may right hip.” Id. played part have a damage to the opinions contrast of Drs. Shaw required replacement, a knee but not nec- Thoburn, which personal are based on essarily a hip replacement,” and further examinations and knowledge of Mr. Pad- noting that opinion, “[f]or more definitive gett’s pertinent physical medical and suggested histo- it is that a certified orthopedist is with the circum (emphasis R. evidence consistent at 363 this case.” review stances, hardships of such added). conditions statement diminishes The latter Brown, service”); 7 Vet.App. Caluza v. report proba of this further the value cf. (1995) (lay evidence of veteran’s v. Espiritu See tive medical evidence. injury accepted by must be (1992) combat-related Derwinski, Vet.App. 494-95 proof of in- Board as sufficient in-service re special knowledge involving (question injury aggravation currence or absent area); in that see skilled quires witness convincing proof contrary), clear Brown, also Sklar (Fed.Cir.1996) (table). aff'd, 78 F.3d 604 (1993) mat on medical (specialist’s Indeed, report Dr. Blincow notes specialty given his or her ter outside any no recorded record of there “is Brown, 4 Vet. Guerrieri v. weight); little hip at the time injury patient’s right to the (“probative value App. 470-71 (R. 418) injury]” at left-knee [1944 is based on the medical any is no mention of “[t]here and that expert’s personal examination hip in the medical injury rec knowledge and patient, physician’s (R. 419). It not the province ords” data, and the medical analyzing the skill to speculate on the extent to Court reaches”); physician that the conclusion cf. knowledge Padgett’s right- of Mr. which West, Bloom v. injury would have affected hip service opinion cannot estab (speculative medical indeed, conclusions; Dr. Blincow’s service). nexus to in-service medical lish materiality and relevance of that bet Dr. fares not much report Blincow’s It knowledge question. itself medical Although examination of Mr. ter. direct however, is, axiomatic that without knowl is not neces Padgett by injury, edge Padgett’s right-hip Dr. report sary expert’s to make to the regard Blincow’s conclusions 10 Vet. competent, Black right-hip etiology of Mr. *16 current (1997) (Kramer, J., dissent App. 286 on disability are based incom necessarily (“medical from ... ing) opinions obtained suspect. information and rendered plete experts provide sufficient bases Dr. Blincow’s conclusions Accordingly, awarding physi a ... and those for claim regard Padgett’s right-hip Mr. dis cians, definition, only records, examine absence of ability, having been made 20.901(a), § 38 patients”) (citing not C.F.R. fact, and potentially material relevant (d)), complete of and the lack accurate probative value.” “questionable are also record, least to material and relevant at as Mariano, 317; at see also Vet.App. facts, expert medi certainly undercuts an supra; Reonal Vet. Bielby, Bielby, value. See opinion’s probative cal (“opinion upon based App. supra. no pro has premise an inaccurate factual value”). bative

Dr. Blincow makes no reference Padgett’s of Mr. com- in-service incurrence reports Despite the infirmities Blincow, right-hip injury, which the bat-related and and the lack Drs. Henderson Mr. having opinions occurred as accepted regarding as infirmities of such Thoburn, 16; R. at see 38 Padgett had asserted. Shaw and Drs. 3.304(d) 1154(b); opin- § value of the probative C.F.R. that the found “far (“[satisfactory lay or other evidence Drs. and Blincow ions of Henderson outweighed” was incurred or the value of injury

that an or disease on this and Thoburn. Based will be as Drs. Shaw aggravated accepted combat evidence, the Board found weighing if of the connection the proof of service sufficient Padgett’s right-hip injury preponderance that Mr. of the was evidence be must connected secondarily service because the against the claim benefits to de be preponderance against nied”). of the evidence was Accordingly, claim However, given that claim. R. at 18. disability benefits of a -basis weight, if any, probative little that can disability right-hip -secondary ser to his reasonably legally be accorded the vice-connected left-knee-disability will Blincow, Henderson of Drs. assignment disability remanded for of a as opposed to the of Drs. Shaw rating and the date effective thereof. See strongly support Thoburn second West, Fenderson v. ary service connection for the right-hip (1999) (remanding for consideration of injury, the of the Board that the staged ratings connection with initial preponderated against evidence this claim connection). award of service simply “plausible in light Finally, the *17 argu- Court’s review the Board’s (Court or clearly must “reverse set aside” ably clearly erroneous denial of a claim fact); finding erroneous of material Pull is to stand the statute and common Swint, man-Standard v. 456 U.S. sense on heads. their (1982) (re 102 S.Ct. 72 L.Ed.2d 66 versal appropriate Padgett Principi, where “the 18 Vet.App. record 226 permits order) only one (per J., resolution of the factual curiam (Steinberg, issue”); Mariano, Ortiz, supra; decision) see also dissenting to denial of full-Court (“benefit (citations omitted). F.3d at 1365 of the doubt rule may be viewed shifting as the ‘risk of B. Board Decision as to Direct and nonpersuasion’ prove onto the VA to that Presumptive Service Connection benefits”); the veteran is not entitled Right-Hip Disability will be Re- Robinette, (“a at 76 merits dis- manded permitted] only allowance [is where the e evidenc preponderates against also denied Mr. Pad- claim”); Gilbert, (“the 1 Vet.App. gett’s at disability claims for a benefits for reports these on the bative value to basis disability presump- on and direct right-hip Padgett’s report dis- they upon that Mr. doing, so relied tive bases. of Drs. injury during the favorable a hip counted combat. “ap- they Thoburn because Shaw and Moreover, above, Dr. as noted neither on Pad- largely based Mr. to be

pear[ed] or Blineow nor Dr. Henderson knew un- sus- history having self-reported gett’s actually had Padgett that Mr. or derstood injury in service.” The right-hip tained a presumably injured right hip during his alia, finding upon, inter its Board relied II, accepted in World War as was combat medical evidence probative that “the most by the R. at 16. With- as true Board. See faulty previously file”-—the discussed on information, out this these doctors could and Drs. Henderson Blineow— reports of (and not) opinion regard- did form an right-hip that failed to demonstrate ing the in-service incur- nexus between aggravated injury was incurred or injury right- his current rence of injury that the was manifested service or Caluza, disability. hip See ser- year discharge after within one (service requires medical connection vice. R. at 16-17. or ag- between in-service incurrence nexus outset, incon At we a serious note gravation injury appellant’s current accepts correctly that the Board gruity in disability). Accordingly, as insofar these Padgett injured true his as presumptive- or reports relate to direct- II, War hip during combat World assessment, they have service-connection 3.304(d) 1154(b); 38 C.F.R. probative no value. See Mariano and (2004); Caluza, rejects supra, but then cf. Reonal, supra. both opinions of Shaw Drs. probative as Thorburn, they part, because relied secondary with the service-con Whereas in Padgett’s report that he had issue the record contains substan nection R. at 16. jured right hip his service. Padgett’s right-hip tial that Mr. evidence Having accepted as true that Mr. secondary to his service- disability was war, it injured right hip during was injury left-knee and the Board’s connected reject reports of Drs. error then preponderated decision they relied on and Thorburn because Shaw erroneous, clearly against that claim was Derwinski, Bailey v. 1 Vet. fact. Cf. reversal, warranting the record is silent as (reversing clearly as App. between Mr. to medical nexus 1990 Board that arthritis erroneous disability the incur- right-hip current rath process was to aging of shoulder due rence, presumptive bas either on direct when Board had er than trauma es, injury in right-hip service. See of his found that “almost identical evidence” Moreover, Caluza, necessary supra. arthritis to arthritis wrist showed made cannot be factual determinations nature); see also Otero- posttraumatic *18 first instance. See Hens this Court 375, 382 Principi, Vet.App. 16 Castro v. (Fed.Cir. 1255, West, 212 F.3d 1263 ley v. supra); (2002) Bailey, Thomas (relying 2000) appropri tribunals are not (appellate (2002) Vet.App. 16 200 Principi, factfinding); also see 38 ate fora for initial that (citing Bailey, supra, proposition 7261(c). § be because inconsis Board “must reversed of the Board Accordingly, the decision in ‘arbi factfinding tent VA was reached disability Padgett’s claim for as to Mr. of trary capricious’ manner violation 7261(a)(3)(A)”). right-hip disability on di- remand, for his § benefits On bases will set aside pro- presumptive rect or be may assign diminished the Board 152 readjudica

and the matter remanded for REMANDED for further con- proceedings any development tion and additional neces sistent this opinion. Bucklinger v. sary. See 5 Vet. PART; REVERSED IN SET ASIDE (1993) (remand

App. appro 440 PART; IN and REMANDED. when priate remedy the Board has failed fact); necessary findings to make 38 Board, (requiring

C.F.R. 19.9 HAGEL, Judge, concurring in part development necessary, when additional dissenting part: development RO for remand to further join I the Court’s the ex personnel to direct Board undertake tent prece overrules Court’s action). appropriate dents “can read support Proceedings C. Remand proposition that a Board finding [of fact] remand, Padgett On will have the be clearly cannot erroneous unless the evi opportunity present any additional evi against dence is uncontrovert- argument dence and support ed.” Ante at 147. Reversal is not limited claim, any and the Board must consider to instances where the evidence is uncon- argument evidence and presented. so See in an appellant’s troverted favor—that lim Kay Principi, 16 Vet.App. 534 itation sets the prohibitively high. bar (2002). The Court notes that Mr. Rather, can Court reverse a Board years is a combat veteran who is now 83 finding of fact possesses when Court old already and has waited over twelve “a definite and firm conviction that a mis years to finally have his claim decided. take has been committed.” Hersey v. Der this, light judgment will be entered and winski, 2 Vet.App. (quoting days mandate will issue after date Co., United Gypsum States v. U.S. on which this is issued. See U.S. 364, 395, U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed. 746 (mo rules), R. 2 (suspension of (1948)). It is unfortunate that uncon- reconsideration), tion (entry judg crept troverted-evidence standard has into 41(a) (issuance ment), mandate); jurisprudence, our I pleased am (same Mariano, also 17 Vet.App. at 318 today the Court emphatically eradicates mandate). order regarding judgment and that errant said, That standard. for the expects Secretary Court that the will below, provided I reasons dissent from the provide expeditious treatment of this mat Court’s conclusion that opin VA medical 5109B, ter on §§ remand. See 38 U.S.C. ions ordered pursuant to VA 7112; Vargas-Gonzalez see also v. Princi 20.901(a) (2004) regulation 38 C.F.R. are (2001). pi, 15

exempt from an appellant’s statutory to “one review on Secretary” IV. CONCLUSION 7104(a). provided for in 38 U.S.C. On consideration of foregoing, In Disabled American Veterans v. Sec August 2002, decision of the Board with retary Affairs, Veterans the Federal regard Padgett’s secondary-service- to Mr. regulation Circuit invalidated VA right-hip connection disability claim is RE- 19.9(a)(2) (2002) C.F.R. VERSED; because that the decision with to Mr. regard *19 regulation Board, would have presumptive and allowed the direct service- only connection right-hip disability appellate “the claims is tribunal under the Sec ASIDE; SET retary,” and the entire matter “to gather and consider evidence considering in the first evi- regional of from instance the been before that had not obtaining appel- to either an having the case dence without to remand fice without consideration regional ‘for initial lant’s waiver of office consider- regional the office appel statutory to obtain the having express and without ation of that evidence or ” (Fed. 1339, 1347 327 F.3d the authority lant’s waiver.’ to consider such evidence in Cir.2003) Sec’y The ]. DAV v. [hereinafter of a a waiver. absence such sec its on Circuit based Federal 5107(a) First, § I note that 38 U.S.C. 7104(a), ques that “all provides tion which (2000) the expressly did not authorize subject ... to in a matter which tions opinions medical from Board obtain subject Secretary by the decision shall that Secretary for Health and VA’s Under Secretary” to the appeal review on one majority to concede as much. appears view, because, in its “[w]hen 5107(a) (2000) (providing, § U.S.C. See 38 that was not considered obtains evidence prior to the enactment the Veterans [regional and does not obtain office] No. Assistance Act of Pub.L. Claims waiver, appellant ... an the appellant’s 106-475, Stat.2096, that Secre- “[t]he review on has to obtain ‘one no means tary sueh a claimant in devel- shall assist Secretary’ because the Board appeal to the claim”); pertinent to the oping the facts only under the appellate tribunal is the (“[W]e note ante at 139 that decision, Secretary.” reaching Id. 5107(a) expressly does not authorize stated, then in what the Federal Circuit opin- Board to or secure medical obtain dicta, fairly as as can be characterized ions”). I that VA is not Con- also note follows: regulation cited to gress Furthermore, Con- we note that when 20.901(a) Circuit, § 38 C.F.R. Federal authorize the Board to gress intended to (b), support the proposition cannot without “one obtain additional they cited, namely which are that “Con- Secretary,” it appeal on to the review provided statutory au- gress express has pro- Congress do has knew how to so. addi- thority permit the Board to obtain authority statutory express vided evidence, expert medical tional such permit Board to obtain additional Sec’y, opinions specific cases.” DAV v. evidence, expert opin- medical such as 1347; Jameson & 327 F.3d see William See, specific e.g., cases. ions 173-174, Morgenthau, 307 U.S. Co. v. (authorizing § 1189(1939) (noting 83 L.Ed. 59 S.Ct. opinions Board to obtain regulation administrative does an Secretary for Health Under the VA’s Congress). an Act of equate to Director)); the Chief Medical (formerly (2000) (authorizing that that appears for section As independent obtain Board to cited to statute is VA); arguably from outside can Circuit that even Federal 20.901(a) (authorizing Congress per- C.F.R. support proposition from the Veter- Board obtain to obtain mitted Administration); Health 38 C.F.R. ans such evidence opinions and to consider 20.901(b) obtain (authorizing Board to entitling ap- without an the first instance from the Armed Forces to the pellant to review “one Pathology). 7104(a). Institute of Never- Secretary.” 38 U.S.C. added). theless, assuming for the sake even In other (emphasis Id. at 1347-48 enacting sec- argument Congress, words, Sec’y in DAV v. the Federal Circuit exception tion carved out prohibited that the Board is instructed us *20 appellant right of an to one review ultimately became is what now section in Secretary, my to the view Mr. making was therefore “no reference implicate case does not section to the Board securing advisory an opinion only way majority 7109. The can con- from the Chief Medical Director of VA.” § 20.901 S.Rep. excep- clude that establishes an (1962), reprinted in No. 87-1844 tion to section is conclude that regard, U.S.C.C.A.N. that I 2586. provides adequate section congres- note the existence of authority sional regulation. for this Be- provided which the Administrator (1962), majority’s premised cause the decision is (now Secretary) with the “to authority on the conclusion that pro- section 7109 assign ... duties to such ... employees as authority vides for the obtain and may he necessary.” my find It beyond is consider medical opinions VA in addition comprehension Congress that pass would a independent opinions, medical I cannot purpose statute whose was to authorize concur in portion that of the opin- Court’s that already which was authorized and to Further, ion. whether section 7109 estab- provide authority practice already for a exception lishes an principle to the ex- by supported ample authority. pounded in DAV v. Sec’y cases where Artfully casting Congress having “ap- independent medical opinions request- are proved” a preexisting practice of or as and, so, ed parameters if of such an having “sanctioned” a practice such does exception appropriately would be more ex- not transform what recogni- is essence a amined in a case those where issues are tion of then-preexisting authority squarely into presented. This is not such a grants instrument that such authority. case. See at Ante 141. As I read section 7109 majority’s conclusion to the con- legislative its history, that did section trary solely turns on the existence sec- thing one and one thing only; it authorized tion phrase nonessential “in the Board to obtain addition to that available within De- experts who were independent of VA. The partment.” view, Ante at In my 141. of initiation the legislative process that majority, analyze in its rush to the evi- culminated passage what now dence and reach a conclusion with I which section 7109 was motivated desire am in sympathy, adopted has an interpre- combat perception of VA bias tation of section 7109 that stretches the veteran, “inspire, in the confidence phrase “in addition to that available within that objective his claim is receiving consid- the Department” Congress, too far. Cong. eration.” 108 (Apr. H5518 section 7109 itself and in the legislative Rec. 1962) (statement Lane). history Rep. underlying statute, For that merely that reason, above, in addition recognized existed, to those that there stated the time enacted, strikes as improvident very me preexisting statute was cite the authority statute practice for the that authorized the pro- Board’s Board to ob- taining cure VA non-VA medical au- author- as the —such ity thority was not vested in for the Board to obtain VA section opinions. said, The Senate committee’s That do question statement I makes clear that “ample authority” whether the permitted for the Board is to obtain practice securing Board’s opinions; VA medical simply express my I already from within VA existed at vested in the 20.901(a) time 7109’s enactment and Board rooted in sec- bill, the Senate version elsewhere, which tion 7109 but instance *21 of Dr. Blin- authority regional office consideration cites 20.901 5103A(d) to he done opinion. in addition cow’s If had so before I do not believe that section us, Because not us inappropriate it would to that the Board permits the is findings the Board’s of fact with review opinions, I see because obtain VA respect to that of evidence. Howev- piece 5103A(d) that section no reason believe er, argument he not such an has advanced 7104(a), exception to section establishes request. Specifically, such a he nor made statutory authority and because no other not based on a review does seek reversal permit the has advanced that would been by all of the evidence considered the the Board to consider in first instance Board, only portion but thereof —his ar- opinions, an ex Board-ordered VA is on gument premised for reversal his 7104(a)’s grant of “one ception to section contention the Court should exclude Secretary” not appeal on the review due alleged from consideration to various in the instant case. Absent implicated inadequacies procedural or defects VA Federal Circuit’s exception, such an the including that of Dr. opinions, Sec’y in v. me to compels DAV decision (Br.) 16-26; Brief Appellant’s Blincow. the Board can consid conclude before argued He has Br. at 6-7. never Reply opinion that it orders er a VA reversal on a review of all the based 20.901, §to it must either obtain pursuant record, i.e., totality of the the evidence regional waiver of office the claimant’s by the in upon evidence relied ren- .or remand consideration of waiver, he dering Regarding its decision. adjudication. regional the matter for office ability well aware his to waive his was Sec’y, DAV v. 327 F.3d at 1347. in have to a remand order to the right open foregoing leaves discussion his merits of claim. Court reach the question appro- of whether reversal is fact, he waived consideration of specifically remedy Reluctantly, I case. priate respect any potential error with defi- compelled to conclude that is not. am notice under Veterans Claims cient agree I with the Although would tend 1-2) and (Reply Act Br. at Assistance evidence, majority’s evaluation of be- reaffirmed limited representative permitted was to con- cause the Board questioned scope of that when on waiver without Mr. report sider Dr. Biincow’s argument. Ac- subject during oral of regional waiver office consid- cordingly, this matter should be remanded (2) remanding eration of that evidence and, in absent a turn and adjudication, regional the matter for office Board to Padgett, waiver findings to that respect the Board’s adjudication regional office for initial It report are void. follows then that appro- and after on the full-record based opinion, ma- evaluating Dr. Biincow’s opportuni- regional office action priate first jority engaged factfinding to the Secre- ty for “one review instance, prohibited by it is law from which invoke that tary,” if Mr. should 7261(c); doing. Hensley See 38 U.S.C. timely (Fed.Cir.2000) fashion. West, F.3d 7104(a). (stating “appellate tribunals are factfinding”). for initial

appropriate fora Padgett had us to review If Mr. wanted IVERS, Judge, dissenting: Chief factual conclusions with re- Board’s Hagel finds that the ma- Judge he Because opinion, to Dr. could spect Blincow’s regarding the analysis argued jority have waived errs its have so and could applicability of Disabled Am. Veterans to reach its order conclusion that reversal *22 Affairs, 327 F.3d Sec’y here, Veterans 1339 rather than remand proper is the (Fed.Cir.2003), matter, to while engag- this majority that, certainty must know with factfinding ing impermissible in to reach examinations, in but for the flaws the VA reversal, its rather than conclusion appel- the Board would have found in the remedy, appropriate join remand the I is By favor. and weighing discounting lant’s However, I in his statement. separate evidence, of majority only some the leaves my to own separately write address con- favoring appellant’s medical evidence the that, clearly in cerns its effort to reach a evidence, claim. That the by Court’s ac- outcome, sympathetic majority ignores the tion, then becomes uncontroverted. appellate body, this Court’s role an and as majori I with disagree While do not the parses the evidence of record to ty’s statement that “the existence of some at that arrive outcome. controverting pre evidence ... does not Judge Hagel correctly As in states carrying clude this Court from out the dissent, Court, an appellate body, this 7261(a)(4) (b)(1)”, mandates in section prohibited longstand both statute and I with strongly disagree majori must the ing precedent, making findings initial ty’s treatment our jurisprudence in both 7261(c); fact. See 38 U.S.C. Andre v. Derwinski, Hersey (1992), 2 Vet.App. 91 (Fed.Cir.2002); Principi, 301 F.3d (1995). Vet.App. and Hicks v. (Fed.Cir. Gober, Elkins v. 229 F.3d 1369 language in Hicks that reversal is the 2000); West, Hensley v. 212 F.3d 1255 appropriate remedy when there abso (Fed.Cir.2000). The Federal Circuit has lutely plausible no for stated, basis the BVA’s clarity, with uncompromising factfinder, clearly decision and where that á decision is lest this Court become rather review, in light than a court of erroneous appellate “fact- the uncontroverted finding performed is to be appellant’s the evidence the favor derives BVA”, judges the of this Court. from our in Hersey, decision which had Elkins, Here, however, 229 F.3d at 1377. characterized the appel evidence the determines majority that a mistake has lant’s favor as “uncontroverted” and did made, beyond been then goes well not add that criterion to the standards for appellate bounds of jurisprudence, and en “clearly Hersey erroneous.” gages factfinding support the credi and Hicks were thereafter followed bility findings of its own in support of that number of requiring that the evi determination. reviewing Rather than appellant dence favor of the uncon- be Board’s application of the and arriving law reversal,- troverted for an unanticipated re at its decision reverse the Board’s find See, e.g., sult. v. Principi, Pentecost ing that preponderates (2002); Vet.App. Ardison v. against claim for entitlement Brown, (1994). 6 Vet.App. to service connection osteoarthritis of Judge I agree Hagel that correct- right hip basis, secondary ing our jurisprudence the course of where because is left with a “[it] definite and firm it appears to veer from conviction that a its intended mistake has been course commit ted”, Derwinski, is a welcome outcome Gilbert of this and I matter (1990), majority correction, concur in that appears though even this novo, review the evidence de pars appropriate but also is not case in which to evidence, es the substituting judgment Hersey its overrule majority Hicks. The of the Board. Ante at 146-48. In against here eliminates the VA evidence may appropri at 94. While one bases that claim on the Gilbert, timely premise inaccurate ate reexamine on an was based without case do'not lend themselves the other was rendered facts regard extenuating again, claims file without fac appellant’s doing so. Here By of the evidence of record. entirety weight, medical and appellant’s of the tors manner, and in this parsing the evidence degenerative arthritis family history ap- extenuating factors ignoring confronting complicate the evidence both *23 (described variously as weight pellant’s appeal. this on the Board below and Court (R. obese”) at “morbidly 226- “obese” and throughout this majority’s approach The 27, 325), history family of medical and danger inher matter is illustrative the (R. 226, 230, 325, arthritis at degenerative arguably subjective in applying ent the 363, 340, 418-20), only remaining medi- the that, reviewing “the when court standard claim, appellant’s cal evidence favors ... and firm convic left with definite Hicks, and, Hersey and where unlike both (Gil made,” has been tion that mistake uncontroverted, was, indeed, the evidence 52) bert, 1 the tem Vet.App. without uncontro- truly here becomes the evidence “entire” pering effect of review of the action. verted as a result Court’s rarity recognition evidence and a it would decide case different- Because fact-finding appellate process. in the below, majority, ly than made, has does feeling that a mistake been majority, without Lastly, I note that of the weigh all merely consider rejec addressing longstanding the Court’s evidence, among the evi- discriminates (see Physician Rule” “Treating tion its result. dence and then reaches West, (1998); Vet.App. 420 v. 11 Winsett the con majority’s desire elevate 467, Brown, Vet.App. 4 473 v. Guerrieri Gilbert, expressly in without currence 169, (1993); Brown, Vet.App. 4 Chisem v. holding, palpable, overruling Gilbert’s (1993)), close its perilously 176 comes in to do so. but this is the case which appellant’s adoption approach its agree if we concurrence Even By failing to private treating physicians. given weight, to do Gilbert should be more of the Treat nonapplicability address responsibility our as an by slighting so Rule, ap appearing while ing Physician Gilbert, wrong. this appellate court is it, question majority leaves ply “clearly the definition of adopted Court position on long-held of this Court’s status put Supreme forward erroneous” fact, silentio, matter, sub may, this Gypsum v. States U.S. Court United holdings previous our appear overturn 364, 525, Co., L.Ed. 68 S.Ct. 92 333 U.S. this matter. (1948), City v. Anderson 746 564, City, 470 U.S. 105 S.Ct. Bessemer (1985). 1504, Since 84 L.Ed.2d 518 Gil

bert, apply has the Court continued Principi, Duenas 18

definition. See v. (2004); Burris v. Princi

Vet.App. (2001); Bowling v.

pi Vet.App. (2001);

Principi, Vet.App. 15-16 West, (1999);

Pond 10 Vet.App. 249-50

Villano v.

(1997); Principi Slater order); Hersey, (per curiam notes court “would feel obligated to fol that section authorizes the Board low the Supreme explicit Court’s and care to “secure” expert fully statements”); considered Ins. Co. of does not explicitly state that States, the West v. United 243 F.3d

Notes

notes Court that it would be entirety,” Gilbert, record viewed in its 7104(a), anomalous use Anderson, (quoting at 52 provision provide designed to VA claim- 1504); U.S. 105 S.Ct. see also 38 protection ants the benefit ad- of an 3.303(a) (2004) (“[djeterminations C.F.R. VA, appeal process ministrative within as to service connection will be based on deny judicial meaningful review in this record”), review of the entire evidence of Court. “ Such an aberrant shield-to-sword and the Court ‘the has definite and firm transformation, which was embraced conviction that a mistake has been commit ” panel opinion now-withdrawn that this Gilbert, ted.’ supra (quoting Gyp U.S. opinion replaces, full-Court was addressed Co., Mariano, sum supra); 17 Vet. case, in the earlier consideration of App. at 314-17. follows: plausible key resolution of the The right to “one review on appeal to factual issue on record in this case is provided the Secretary” in section Padgett’s right-hip disability was process right guaranteed is a aggravated by his service-connected left- claimants, VA not the Secretary who disability, knee and the Board’s decision clearly has no to this preponderated against permit Court. To the appellant’s pro- be, be, this claim must therefore and will operate cess right to as a shield from 7261(a)(4) reversed. See 38 U.S.C.

Case Details

Case Name: Barney O. Padgett v. R. James Nicholson
Court Name: United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
Date Published: Apr 19, 2005
Citation: 19 Vet. App. 133
Docket Number: 02-2259
Court Abbreviation: Vet. App.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.