Barnett v. ReedBarnett v. Reed
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- Before:
- Spear
On March 21, 1968, a preliminary hearing on a criminal charge was held in the probate court of Twin Falls County. Respondent (defendant) as probate judge, presided over the hearing and appellant (plaintiff), the Chief of Police of the City of Twin Falls, was called as a witness by the defense. During the questioning of appellant as a witness, appellant testified that he had made certain notes on December 21, 1967, which notes were to record what had transpired at a conference between him and the accused, wherein said accused allegedly confessed to the crime of preparing false evidence. Chief Barnett (appellant) also testified that he had read his notes a week or ten days before the hearing, but had the notes in his possession in the courtroom at the hearing. Defense counsel then asked appellant to produce the notes. Appellant refused. Defense counsel then
Judge Reed (respondent), on the basis of the statute, ordered appellant to produce the notes for inspection by defense counsel. Appellant refused on the grounds that
Upon appellant’s continued refusal to produce the notes subsequent to a contempt warning, respondent Judge Reed held appellant in contempt of court and fined him one hundred dollars.
Appellant then petitioned for a writ of review in the proper district court. On hearing the district judge reviewed the portion of the record relating to, and including, the appellant’s testimony and the contempt order, and quashed the writ.
From such order this appeal was perfected.
Primarily, appellant assigns as error the action of the district court in quashing the writ of review on grounds that the respondent probate judge exceeded his jurisdiction in holding appellant in contempt. He contends that the respondent incorrectly interpreted
Assuming momentarily for the sake of argument that the respondent’s interpretation of
The question is not a novel one before this court, and the scope and limitations of the contempt power held by the courts previously have been defined and established in Idaho. While the order holding a person in contempt is not appeal-able under
It is also well established in Idaho that where such contempt is reviewed under a writ of review, the sole question for determination is whether the inferior tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction. Berry v. District Court of Third Judicial District, 91 Idaho 600, 428 P.2d 519 (1967); Mathison v. Felton, supra; Specialty Sales v. Graf, 73 Idaho 113, 245 P.2d 820 (1952); Gilbert v. Elder, 65 Idaho 383, 144 P.2d 194 (1943) ; Hawley v. Bottolfsen, 61 Idaho 101, 98 P.2d 634 (1940); McConnell v. State Board of Equalization, 11 Idaho 652, 83 P. 494 (1905). If the court has jurisdiction of the parties, the subject matter and the authority or power to make the order it did, the disobedience of such order constitutes contempt, regardless of whether the order disobeyed was correct or incorrect. Mathison v. Felton, supra; 12 A.L.R.2d 1059, at 1107, § 41.
In the Mathison case (supra), this court upheld a contempt judgment, even though
“Even though the judgment in the case which forms the basis of this contempt proceeding has been reversed, it is our conclusion that such reversal will be of no avail to the petitioner here in the determination of whether the contempt judgment should be upheld. The judgment in the principal cause was not a void judgment for the trial court had jurisdiction of the parties, the subject matter, and the power to enter the judgment it did and the error upon which the reversal is based is not jurisdictional. It is almost unanimously agreed that such a person may not disregard or violate such an order, and set up the error as a defense in a contempt proceeding for violation of such order. See cases cited in the annotation 12 A.L.R.2d 1059, at page 1107, § 41.” (90 Idaho at p. 94, 408 P.2d at p. 461)
The record clearly shows, and the appellant doesn’t deny, that the probate court had personal jurisdiction over him as a witness, and jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the case before the court. Appellant contends, however, that the court misinterpreted
Article 5, Section 2 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho creates the judicial department, and by giving judicial power to the courts, confers on them the power and the duty to construe the laws. Ogden v. Blackledge, 2 Cranch (6 U.S.) 272, 2 L.Ed. 276 (1802); People ex rel. Engley v. Martin, 19 Colo. 565, 36 P. 543, 24 L.R.A. 201 (1894); Stewart v. State, 4 Okl.Cr. 564, 109 P. 243, 32 L.R.A.,N.S., 505 (1910) ; 50 Am.Jur. Statutes, § 219 p. 198. The probate court is a court of record in Idaho created by
The case of MacWatters v. Stockslager, 29 Idaho 803, 162 P. 671 (1917) cited by the appellant is of no avail to him for it presents an entirely different situation. In that case the statutes involved had been previously interpreted by this court in Price v. Grice, 10 Idaho 443, 79 P. 387 (1904); and Wiles v. Northern Star Min. Co., 13 Idaho 326, 89 P. 1053 (1907), as requiring an undertaking to be filed by the person requesting a restraining order before such order could be given. The lower court issued a restraining order although no undertaking had been filed, and held MacWatters in contempt when the restraining order was not obeyed. This court held that since no undertaking had been filed, the injunctive provision of the order to
In the present case the statute involved has never been interpreted by this court. Thus, the order of the probate court was valid, the court had jurisdiction, and the MacWatters v. Stockslager ruling is not controlling here. Similarly, the case of State v. McNichols, 62 Idaho 616, 115 P.2d 104 (1941), cited by the appellant, which was based upon the ruling in the MacWatters case, is also not controlling here for the same reason, and is even less relevant because the order in the McNichols case was not held to be void in the majority opinion.
Since the probate court did have jurisdiction, the next question presented is whether the facts show a contempt of court. The appellant does not deny that the court ordered him to produce his notes pursuant to the court’s interpretation of the statute, nor that he refused to comply with such order. Such order was valid and thus, pursuant to
There is no question here of whether appellant could be purged of his contempt on grounds that his action was legally justified. Appellant gave no reason when asked by the court for refusing to produce the notes. He testified that he had the notes in his possession at that time, and thus, there is also no question of impossibility of performance such as in the case of Hay v. Hay, 40 Idaho 159, 232 P. 895 (1924).
In view of our holding that the appellant was guilty of contempt for disobeying the court’s order, regardless of whether the statute upon which the order was based was correctly or erroneously interpreted, it is unnecessary at this time for us to rule on the correctness of the respondent’s interpretation of
The order of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to respondent.
McFADDEN, C. J., and McQUADE, DONALDSON and SHEPARD, JJ., concur.