"In the United States there is no ' common-law Obligation resting upon quasi сorporations, such as counties, townships, and Hew England towns, to repair highways, streets, оr bridges within their limits, and they are not obliged to do so unless by force of statute. Even when the legislature enjoins upon corporations of this character the duty to make and repair roads, streets, and bridges, and confers the power to levy taxes therefor, the general tenor of the decisions is to treаt this as a public and not a corporate duty, and to regard such corporations, in this respect, as public or State agencies, and not liable to be sued civilly for dаmages caused by the neglect to perform this duty, unless the action be expressly given by statute.” (2 Dillon Mun. Corp. § 996.) Such is the rule in this State. (Sherbourne v. Yuba Co.
It is said for the plaintiff that the legislature, by section 50 of the act, entitled “an act concerning- rоads and highways in Contra Costa County ” (Stats. 1875-76, p. 237), has made that county responsible in damages for injuries resulting from defective bridges therein. The section reads as follows:—
“ The county is responsible for providing and keeping passаble and in good repair bridges and all publiс highways; and the supervisors must appoint semi-аnnually a special meeting, at which the rоad overseers, on days set apart for their respective districts, to hear highway аnd bridge reports and complaints from offiсers and citizens, when such orders must be made and such action had regarding the same as thе public welfare demands.”
It is not an easy mаtter to say exactly what this language does mean, but we are inclined to think that its effect, which is in harmony with previous provisions of the аct, simply is to put upon the county, through its supervisors and road overseers,
Judgment and order reversed, and cause remanded.
McKinstry, J., and McKee, J., concurred.