153 P. 47 | Or. | 1915
delivered the opinion of the court.
“It is well understood, though not usually stated in express terms, in works upon the subject, that no one is privy to a judgment whose succession to the rights of property thereby affected occurred previously to the institution of the suit.”
The question as to whether or not Mrs. Barnes can compare her equities in the property in controversy with those of Spencer, who has a judgment which is valid and binding as between him and Barnes, the parties thereto, is an important one. Our statute and decisions thereunder place a judgment creditor in practically the same position as a purchaser holding under a deed subsequent to the equities claimed. In Gottlieb v. Thatcher (C. C.), 34 Fed. 435, it was held by Mr. Justice Brewer, that, as against a prior grantee and purchaser at an execution sale under a preceding judgment, a subsequent judgment against the grantor and debtor is not conclusive, either as to the amount of the debt, or as to the circumstances and character of the transaction out of which the indebtedness arose, and where made defendant to a bill by the holder of such judgment to set the conveyance aside as in fraud of
“The judgment, being altogether inter alios, and in express violation of the understanding of Clark when he surrendered the claim against Leafy, one of the plaintiffs, and paid half the amount of the note in money, in agreed satisfaction of the whole, could have no effect upon the defendant Clark. He is entitled to show that the note was paid before sued, or that the judgment was, for other reasons, fraudulent to him: Atkinson v. Allen, 12 Vt. 619. This compromise of the note by Clark was just as effectual a bar to the claim, in law, and just as effectual a release of his undertaking to pay it at the time of the conveyance, as if he had paid all the money upon it. ’ ’
It is true he did undertake or “promise to pay all the debts of the grantor (his father), but he has in fact
In Boutwell v. McClure, 30 Vt. 676, the court says:
“The judgment upon the plaintiff’s claim in this action, whether rendered before or after the claimant’s appearance, concludes nothing upon the question. In all such cases there is likely to exist the form of a contract of a date early enough to accomplish its purpose, and it is not uncommon that this contract assumes the more solemn form of contracts, such as that of a promissory note, or even a judgment of a court of record. But in either case they are, of course, only conclusive upon the parties to such contracts. Upon any questions arising in regard to the creditor being bona fide such at a particular date, and continuing such to the present time, the contract is but prima facie evidence of the fact. It is always competent to impeach the debt, either as to its bona fide character, its date, or its continuance. For although the debt once existed, and of a date early enough to override the plaintiff’s claim, yet, if it has been extinguished by payment on the part of the debtor, it sinks at once into the common mass of his assets, and cannot be subsequently kept on foot, as the debt of a bona fide creditor.”
In Temple v. Osburn, 55 Or. 506 (106 Pac. 16), plaintiff held title under an unrecorded deed. Defendants,
“As a general rule, unless otherwise provided by statute, a judgment lien only attaches to the actual and not the apparent interest of the judgment debtor in land, and is subject to all equities which were held against the land in the hands of the judgment debtor at the time the judgment was rendered, whether known to the judgment creditor or not. When called upon in a*220 proper case, courts of equity are always ready to protect the rights of those who hold such equities as against the judgment lién, and to confine the latter to the actual interest of the judgment debtor. For this purpose they will correct a mutual mistake in the description in a mortgage, and, as corrected, give it priority over a subsequently acquired judgment” (citing-many authorities).
The syllabus in Dimmick v. Rosenfeld, 34 Or. 101 (55 Pac. 100), is as follows:
“After-acquired property. — Lands purchased through an agent who took the title in his own name, without the principal’s knowledge or consent, and then conveyed to her, are not thereafter subject to execution on a prior judgment against the agent, since he had only the bare legal title without any interest in the property itself. ’ ’
At page 104 of 34 Or. (at page 101 of 55 Pac.) of the opinion we find this quotation from Snyder v. Martin, 17 W. Va. 276 (41 Am. Rep. 670):
“Independent of any statute law, the lien of a judgment is a charge upon the precise interest which the judgment debtor has, and upon no other. The apparent interest of the debtor can neither extend nor restrict the operation of the lien so that it shall encumber any greater or less interest than the debtor in fact possesses. The judgment creditor has a charge on the interests of the defendant in the land, just as they stood at the moment the lien attached; therefore, though he seems to have an interest, yet, if he have none in fact, no lien can attach. The rights of the judgment lien owner cannot exceed those which he might acquire by a purchase from the defendant, with full notice of all existing legal or equitable rights belonging to third persons. ’ ’
“Also beginning at a stake at the intersection of Division and Liberty Streets, in the City of Salem, Marion County, Oregon, and bearing north from the northwest corner of block No. 26 in said city and 99 feet distant, and running north along the east line of said Liberty Street, 165 feet to a stake; thence east 165 feet to a stake; thence south 165 feet to a stake; thence west 165 feet to the place of beginning, and situate in Marion County, Oregon.
“Also the following described premises to wit: Commencing at a stake on the east line of Liberty Street in the City of Salem, one hundred and sixty-five (165) feet north from the point where the east line of Liberty Street intersects the north line of Division Street, as shown by the recorded plat of the City of Salem; thence northerly along the east line of Liberty Street, twenty-five (25) feet; thence easterly, at a right angle to said Liberty Street, one hundred and sixty-five (165) feet; thence southerly parallel with said Liberty Street, twenty-five (25) feet; thence westerly one hundred and sixty-five (165) feet to the place of beginning, being and lying in lot No. seven of the unnumbered block lying immediately north of block No. 26 in the said City of Salem, Marion County, Oregon.”
Practically all the testimony in regard to the funds with which this property was bought is that of Mr. Barnes, to the effect that his wife bought the same from
In reply thereto, tbe plaintiff properly states that Spencer was never a partner of defendant L. S. Barnes, and assails tbe equities of tbe judgment by an appropriate reply concerning tbe consideration of tbe judgment.
With tbe modification above mentioned, tbe decree of tbe lower court is affirmed; neither party to recover costs herein. Modified. Rehearing Denied.