113 Minn. 132 | Minn. | 1910
Lead Opinion
Appeal by the defendant Forhes from the judgment of the district court of the county of St. Louis adjudging that the plaintiff recover of the defendant Davis $309.21, with costs, and that he has a lien on the shares of the capital stock of the defendant corporation described in the judgment to secure its payment. The cause was tried by the court without a jury. The here material facts found by the trial judge are, briefly stated, to the effect following:
Hansen and James P. Smith were partners doing business as the Merchants Bank, at Duluth. The plaintiff is the trustee in bankruptcy of their estate. In September, 1901, Davis applied to Forbes for á loan of certain shares of the capital stock of the corporation, then owned by her, to be used as collateral security for the payment
The trial court upon these facts found as a conclusion of law that ■the plaintiff had a lien on the shares of stock represented by certificate No. 1,873 to the amount of the judgment against Davis, and that they be sold to pay it. The defendant Forbes made a motion for amended findings of fact and a motion for a new trial, which were denied. The appellant assigns thirty-one alleged errors, but they present only the question whether the finding and decision of the trial court, to the effect that the plaintiff had a lien on the shares of stock to secure the payment of $181.48, were correct, and incidentally whether the court erred in its rulings as to the admission of evidence. Fifteen of the assignments of error relate to the rulings of the court on the admission of evidence. We find no reversible error in any of them.
Another group of alleged errors raise the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of fact, which are separately specified in the assignments of error. We are of the opinion that the findings complained of are supported by the evidence, and that the evidence did not require, as a matter of law, the trial court to amend its findings of fact as requested.
The other assignments raise the question whether the facts found sustain the conclusion of law. It is the contention of the appellant that they do not, for the alleged reasons, with others, that the bank had no right as against the appellant to apply the proceeds from the sale of the ten thousand shares to any debt except the note, or, in other words, that the overdraft was not secured by them; that the new certificate for forty thousand shares was issued in her name, and was not indorsed by her, hence it is within the rule that a pledge of stocks by delivery without indorsement is subject to the equities of third persons; and, further, that as against the true owner it is incumbent on the pledgee that the advances claimed were made on the faith of the security, and that there is no sueh finding.
This last objection is a technical one; for, conceding that there is
The second objection would be potent if the original certificate had not been indorsed in blank according to the usual custom; but it was, and neither Smith nor the bank at any time had any notice or knowledge that any other person had any interest in the shares of stock. They dealt with Davis as the owner of the shares. It is true that one of the renewal certificates was in Forbes’ name; but this must be considered in connection with the fact that she by her indorsement of the original certificate represented that Davis was the owner of all of the shares of stock, and that the bank thereafter dealt with him as such. All of the shares were pledged for his indebtedness when the original certificate was duly indorsed by Forbes and delivered to the bank. The renewal certificate was never delivered to Forbes.
. The first objection is without merit, for by the agreement with Davis the proceeds of the sale of the ten thousand shares, the renewal certificates which were not in Forbes’ name, were applied first to the payment of the overdraft, and the balance on the original indebtedness as represented by the note.
We are of the opinion that the conclusions of law are sustained by the facts found.
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I am unable to satisfy myself that defendant E. W. Forbes consented to the deposit as security for the payment of the overdraft above the $600 note, and therefore dissent.