63 N.E.2d 858 | Ill. | 1945
This appeal is from an order of the county court of Champaign county, approving a sale of real estate made by appellee, Cecile Barnard, executrix of the last will and testament of William H. Barnard, deceased, and overruling the answer and objections of appellants, Hazel Michael *132 and Harold O. Michael, her husband, to the report of such sale.
William H. Barnard died testate May 23, 1940. By his will he appointed his widow, Cecile Barnard, executrix without bond, and provided that after payment of all his just debts, she was to have the use of all personal and real estate during her life, with the remainder to appellant Hazel Michael, his daughter by a former marriage. The will was admitted to probate and letters testamentary issued to the widow on June 18, 1940. An appraisement and inventory were made and filed during the course of administration, and claims to the amount of $2887.77 were approved and allowed by the court. They consisted of the widow's award of $1500, indebtedness due the widow in the sum of $1180.83, and funeral expenses of $206.94. August 30, 1940, a statement of the condition of the estate was filed by the executrix and approved by the court, and on the same day the executrix filed a petition to sell certain real estate belonging to decedent in order to pay the debts of his estate. It appears from the statement and petition that the personal property of decedent was taken at its appraised value by the widow upon her award, and that the deficiency of personal assets to liquidate the indebtedness of the estate was $2735.77, plus estimated costs of administration $500. Appellants were made parties to the proceeding and jurisdiction of them obtained by publication. They filed no answer and made no appearance. The cause coming on to be heard on November 4, 1940, an order was entered granting the prayer of the petition and directing the executrix to sell the real estate described in the petition at private sale for not less than two thirds of its appraised value; it having been appraised in the proceedings, at $3500. Nothing further was filed in the cause until August 25, 1944, when the executrix reported to the court that she had sold the property for $3800, to August John Maggio and Gladys B. Maggio, his wife, *133
who had paid $500 down and were ready to pay the balance. Attached to the report of sale was the contract with the purchasers, dated August 9, 1944. Upon objections to the report by appellants, the executrix obtained leave and filed an amended report setting up that although the contract was dated August 9, the sale was not actually made until August 17, 1944. Appellants then filed an answer objecting to the sale and the decree directing sale to be made, and praying that the court refuse to confirm and approve the sale and also vacate the original decree of November 4, 1940. Upon hearing being had, an order was entered October 13, 1944, overruling the objections, approving the amended report of sale and directing the executrix to make conveyance. An appeal was taken from this order, and, because of a freehold being involved, is properly brought to this court.Anderson v. Anderson,
Appellee has made a motion to dismiss the appeal in this case, setting up that no supersedeas had been obtained and, subsequent to the entry of the decree appealed from, the title to the property belonging to the decedent and constituting the subject matter of the sale was conveyed and transferred to the purchasers, August John Maggio and Gladys B. Maggio, who had paid the executrix the purchase price for the same, and therefore the result of the appeal would not affect the title to the property so conveyed or finally determine any questions of substantial interest to the parties hereto. She contends that the controversy involved as to the sale of the property has become moot, and the appeal should be dismissed.
It is elementary that a reviewing court is not bound to determine questions which have become moot or academic and the decision of which will serve no beneficial purpose to the litigants. The duty of a court in the exercise of its power of appellate review is confined to consideration of actual controversies, cases in which the judgment *134
can be given effect. (Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. CommerceCom.
The question whether the issues involved on this appeal have become moot depends upon whether a reversal of the decree appealed from would bestow upon appellants any benefits whatever or would result in giving them any effectual relief; and this in turn involves the question whether a reversal would entitle them to demand any restitution of appellee, and the further question whether the lower court should have sustained appellants' attack upon the decree of November 4, 1940. This decree of November 4, 1940, was a final, appealable order. (Baker v. Devlin,
This being so, it remains to be considered whether a judgment of this court, either of affirmance or reversal, in the case now before us could have any practical, legal effect, or whether the same would be wholly ineffectual for want of a subject matter on which it could operate. The property could not be restored because the purchasers were not parties to the litigation and their title is not subject to attack. All that they were required to do was to look to the question of the court's jurisdiction, and as the court had jurisdiction, they are protected. An affirmance would require something to be done which has already taken place. A reversal would ostensibly avoid an event which has already taken place and cannot be recalled. One would be as useless and unavailing as the other. This court has uniformly declined to adjudicate a cause or to decide questions which no longer exist. (Chicago City Bank and Trust Co. v. Board ofEducation,
As it is obvious that any decision that this court might make in the instant case would be useless and unavailing to either party and that the questions involved in the case have now become moot or academic, the appeal, therefore, must be, and is, dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.