125 Mich. 504 | Mich. | 1901
This case was tried before the court without a jury. Defendant filed a request for special findings, which the court made.- Defendant also filed a request after the findings were made to amend the findings of fact and law. This was refused, and counsel then filed exceptions thereto.
The court found that prior to the 1st day of June, 1894;
The defendant requested the court to amend his findings of fact and law as follows:
“1. Under the testimony of the case, it does not appear by a fair preponderance of evidence that there was any agreement on the part of the defendant to vacate the premises in June, 1899.
“2. The acceptance of rent by the plaintiffs from defendant, and defendant’s continued possession, after June 1, 1899, operate as a renewal of the lease to the defendant, and he consequently continued to be a tenant from year to year, the same as he had been under the original arrangement.*506 “3. It appears that the notice to quit was given by the plaintiffs to defendant on June 10, 1899. The rent was payable June 1, 1899, and each month thereafter. Consequently the notice of June 10th would not operate as a-valid or binding notice to quit until September 1, 1900.”
The defendant also requested the court to find in his conclusions of law, from the above facts, as follows:
“1. That the plaintiffs have no cause of complaint; that these proceedings were wrongfully instituted, as they were not entitled to possession of the premises at the time' of making complaint before the commissioner.
“2: That, under the facts, the tenancy was one from year to year, and could not be terminated except by a year’s notice.”
These findings were refused, and defendant excepted to such refusal.
This was not a tenancy from year to year. It was a tenancy continuing five years from June 1, 1894, and terminating June 1, 1899. While the agreement was not in' writing, yet it was fully performed by the parties, and therefore cannot now be treated as a void lease. The rent was payable monthly, and the contract of leasing cannot be treated, after the expiration of five years, in any other manner than as a tenancy or lease from month to-month.
3 Comp. Laws 1897, § 9257, provides: “The time of such notice shall be sufficient if it be equal to the interval between the times of payment.” The only question, therefore, is whether sufficient notice was given for the termination of the lease. The court found that the notice to quit had been given defendant sometime in the early part of June, but that proceedings under that notice were discontinued. That notice shows, at least, that the plaintiffs were no longer willing that the tenancy should continue. Another notice was served on July 10th. This notice is dated July 10, 1899, and reads:
“S. Berger.
“Dear Sir: We hereby notify you to vacate stall No. 20, now occupied by you in the Central Vegetable and Fish Market.
[Signed] “Barlum & Thompson.”
We think no other questions need be discussed in the case. The judgment must be affirmed.