348 S.E.2d 122 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1986
In these companion cases Barkley appeals from the judgments of February 20, 1986, relative to his conviction on two separate indictments of violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. Appellant was indicted June 4, 1985, and tried in February 1986. The three regular terms of the Superior Court of Spalding County are held in February, June, and October of each year. Barkley asserts that OCGA § 17-7-170 mandates that he should have been discharged and acquitted of the offenses charged because he filed demands for speedy trial on the last day of the July 1985 special session — or special term — but was not tried until the February 1986 term. He contends that the statute requires that since he was not tried during the October 1985 term, the next regular term after the filing of the demands, he should not have had to stand trial in either case. Held:
OCGA § 17-7-170 reads in pertinent part as follows: “(a) Any person against whom a true bill of indictment... is found . . . may enter a demand for trial at the court term at which the indictment ... is found or at the next succeeding regular court term thereafter; ...(b) If the person is not tried when the demand is made or at the next succeeding regular court term thereafter, provided at both court terms there were juries impaneled and qualified to try him, he shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged. . . .”
Georgia courts have consistently construed the word “term” as it appears in the cited statute as meaning “regular term of court” and not “special term.” In Stripland v. State, 115 Ga. 578 (41 SE 987) (1902), the Supreme Court held, at 580, that “the General Assembly ha[ving] by appropriate legislation fixed dates for the holding of regular terms, the right of discharge and acquittal under a demand for trial only becomes effective when the demand is made at a regular term of court as fixed by law. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) In Buxton v. State, 253 Ga. 137 (317 SE2d 538) (1984), the court held, at 140: “Clearly this statute refers to regular terms of court, not special terms.” Accord Hatfield v. State, 139 Ga. App. 535, 536 (228 SE2d 720) (1976).
The state contends that the demand for trial was filed during a
In the instant case the “Demand by Accused for Trial,” dated July 18, 1985, recites that it is being made “at this the term said indictment was found.” The judge’s attestation, headed “Spalding Superior Court, June Term 1985,” acknowledges that the demand is “true” and is “allowed.” We must conclude, therefore, that the demand was made during an extended — or special — session of the regular June term, and not during a special term. Not having been brought to trial within the statutorily mandated time, appellant should have been discharged and acquitted, pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170.
Judgments reversed.