238 N.W. 692 | Minn. | 1931
Thomas Barker, designated as plaintiff, owned a gasolene truck. He hauled timber products, principally jack pine bolts, to the plant of the Bemidji Wood Products Company, designated defendant, from a point 28 miles south of Bemidji. He received an injury through the crushing of a finger when unloading in the defendant's plant at Bemidji. The only question is whether he was an employe within the meaning of the compensation act. G. S. 1923 (1 Mason, 1927) § 4261, et seq. The defendant claims that he was an independent contractor; the plaintiff that he was an employe.
The evidence is hardly in dispute. The plaintiff received an agreed price per cord for hauling. He did not work all the time. The work at hand was not constant. When the yards were full, deliveries were stopped or curtailed. Then the plaintiff had no work or a limited amount. But in a general way he was working for the company with regularity. The timber was gotten out in the woods by men employed by the defendant. Loaders were furnished by the defendant to help load. There was a man supervising. When the plaintiff reached the yard, other men employed by the defendant helped unload. There was a man there who scaled to determine the number of cords; and the plaintiff was subject to directions as to where the timber should be unloaded. There was very little supervision; very little was needed. The plaintiff worked in co-operation with other men employed by the defendant; and, once started, the work went on with a minimum of control in details. The defendant could terminate the plaintiff's work at any time, and the plaintiff could stop when he chose. *368
The case presents the question whether the plaintiff was an employe of the defendant or an independent contractor. No definition of the relationship has been formulated which makes the solution of particular cases free from difficulty. One case may be clearly that of employer and employe; another clearly of independent contractor; and another may be perplexing and uncertain and involve a question of fact. State ex rel. V. R. L. Co. v. District Court,
Other illustrative cases are found in 6 Dunnell, Minn. Dig. (2 ed. Supp.) § 10395; 28 R.C.L. p. 760, §§ 55-57; Am. Dig. Master Servant, §§ 360, 367. The case at bar is fairly within the cases cited sustaining a holding of the commission that the relationship was that of employer and employe within the compensation act; or those holding that as a matter of law such relationship existed. The case of Moore v. Kileen Gillis,
Looking at it broadly, the plaintiff was doing services of a manual kind for the defendant. He was, as we think of it generally, a laborer and not a contractor. He was doing just the work that an employe of the defendant driving one of its own trucks would do. He was getting wages for work, not making profits on a contract. A holding that he was entitled to compensation is quite in accord with the general notion of the compensation act that the industry to some extent should carry the burden of accidental injuries though it is not at fault.
That the plaintiff was receiving pay per cord and not by day or by hour or by month is not important. This was but a way of fixing his compensation much as that of a pieceworker, which the compensation act contemplates. G. S. 1923 (1 Mason, 1927) § 4290.
The evidence sustains the finding of the industrial commission. The finding is not a doubtful one; perhaps it is a necessary one.
Order affirmed.