This is an appeal by the plaintiff, Alan Barkema, who was an unnamed plaintiff in previous class action litigation involving the defendants in this case, WorldCom and Williams Pipeline Company. That litigation ended with a settlement which Barke-ma now challenges, arguing the notices sent to plaintiffs in the previous litigation did not comport with the requirements of due process. Finding no due process violation, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The facts are undisputed. In the 1930s and 1950s, a large number of Iowa landowners granted easements allowing defendant Williams Pipeline Company (WPL) and its predecessors in interest to install and maintain underground pipelines for the purpose of carrying gas and oil. In the 1980s WPL granted defendant World-Com the right to place fiber optic cable in one of the pipelines no longer being used to transport petroleum products.
When property owners realized that fiber optic cable had been installed under
In 1999, Barkema and other landowners involved in the class action learned that fiber optic cable had been installed in the second pipeline running under their land. Barkema filed this class action suit to have the previous judgment set aside on the basis of fraud or due process violations. WPL moved for summary judgment and WorldCom moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted both motions, reasoning the fraud claim was time barred and the requirements of due process had been met. 1 Barkema appeals only the court’s ruling on the due process issue.
II. Scope of Review.
We review the grant of summary judgment for correction of errors at law.
Keokuk Junction Ry. v. IES Indus., Inc.,
We likewise review motions to dismiss for errors at law.
Bauman v. Maple Valley Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
III. Issue on Appeal.
The only question on appeal is whether the notices sent to class members in the first class action fulfilled the requirements of due process. Two notices are at issue— the Notice of Litigation and the Notice of Settlement. Barkema contends both notices were insufficient because they failed to notify class members that the litigation and settlement involved both pipelines running under the plaintiffs’ properties.
A. Litigation notices. Barkema concedes, as he must, that class members received notice of the litigation. He merely argues the notice was constitutionally insufficient to apprise them that both pipelines were at issue.
In the mid-1980’s, Defendant, Williams Pipe Line Company (“WPL”), which in the 1960’s had taken an assignment of Great Lakes Pipe Line Company’s easement rights, installed fiber optic cables in a pipeline located under your property that was previously used to, but does not currently, transport petroleum products. The other Defendant in this case, [WorldCom], operates a fiber optic communications network using those fiber optic cables. For most landowners along this route, there is another pipeline owned by WPL running under the land. That pipeline is still being used to transport petroleum products.
This class action lawsuit challenges the Defendants’ rights to install and maintain the fiber optic cables under your land and under other Iowa land subject to similar easements originally granted to Great Lakes Pipe Line Company. The claims in the case are that the Defendants are in breach of the easement agreement and are trespassing on your property by using this petroleum pipe to house fiber optic cables.
(Emphasis added.)
It is axiomatic that due process requires notice “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
There is no dispute here that affected parties received notice. Barkema merely maintains that due process was violated because the notice contained “incomplete” and “false” information, i.e., that the second pipeline was not at issue. The problem with this argument is that the notice did not say the second pipeline was not at issue. It merely stated the second pipeline was still used to transport petroleum, and there is no evidence that was not true at the time of the litigation.
Plainly the notice of litigation alerted the landowners that the easement on their land for petroleum pipelines was at issue. The notice also explained that the defendants were accused of trespassing and breaching their easements. Finally, the notice supplied an address and telephone number to call to receive additional information. Thus the parties knew that a class action was pending, the nature of it, and that they were given the opportunity to exclude themselves from the proceedings. Due process requires no more.
B. Settlement notice. Barkema also challenges the Notice of Proposed Settlement. The settlement notice gave essentially the same description of the lawsuit as the Notice of Pendency of Class Action. Barkema takes issue with the following additional language contained in the document:
For most landowners along the pipeline route, another pipeline owned by WPL runs under the land. That pipeline is still being used to transport petroleum products and it is not involved in this lawsuit.
(Emphasis added.) Barkema argues this description violated due process because it, too, was “false” and “incomplete.” His argument rests on the fact that the easement for both pipelines was amended in the settlement, and therefore both pipelines were involved in the lawsuit.
It is significant that, in addition to the language quoted above, the settlement notice contained a description of the monetary compensation each plaintiff would receive. Pertinent to Barkema’s claim, the notice explained that plaintiffs could voluntarily amend their easements in exchange for $250. If that option was not exercised, class members were further advised the court would enter judgment amending the easement and the plaintiff would not receive $250. It is true that copies of the amended easements were not included with the notice. But the notice also gave the date, time and place of the fairness hearing and directed plaintiffs to inspect the settlement agreement or other litigation filings if they had any questions.
We are convinced, as was the district court, that the notice of settlement gave the class members ample information to decide whether additional research would be wise or useful. It “unquestionably alerted the recipients that they were members of a pending class action, that a settlement had been proposed, and that they had the right to state their objections at a fairness hearing.”
Petrovic,
Because the notices in the original litigation met the requirements of due process, the district committed no error in dismissing the plaintiffs suit.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. In its ruling, the court characterized World-Corn’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as a motion to dismiss. When a motion for judgment on the pleadings is made prior to an answer denying the allegations in the petition, the court should view the motion for judgment on the pleadings as a motion to dismiss.
Orud v. Groth,