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Barkat U. Khan and Khan & Associates, Inc. v. State Oil Company
93 F.3d 1358
7th Cir.
1996
Check Treatment

*2 Judgе, and POSNER, Chief Before RIPPLE, Judges. Circuit FLAUM Judge. POSNER, Chief “Khan”) operat- (collectively plaintiffs Illinois, County, DuPage gas station a ed under a contract with State Company, rebate the difference between his new distributor products. related price times the number of provided The contract for the gallons lease of the sold at price. the new The contract (which owned), station required and the thus sup- Khan to rebate prof- the entire *3 ply gasoline of ancillary products it raising from price for his without supplier’s his resale, to permission Khan. Mr. Khan was the price actual above the suggested retail signatory contract, by the supplier. rather than his the corporation, operated station, the so it provision The concеrning charg the not appear complaining he is about ing by price Khan of a suggested below the merely injury himself, derivative to price retail price neither fixing nor is which event he would not be a proper party. germane to the price-fixing charge. sup A Transmissions, Hammes v. AAMCO 33 plier obligation is under no to lower price his (7th Cir.1994). to just his customer because the customer the terminated contract wants to supplier’s because resell product for less pay Khan failed to than agreed-upon supplier rent for has suggested without sac the station. The termination precipitated rificing any profit margin. his The con suit, which, this so as far relevant tract in to merely any disclaims such appeal, charges price fixing in obligation, unusual violation of obligation since the section 1 Act, the Sherman has § no basis in U.S.C. law the disclaimer and breach of has significance contract under no antitrust the common either. law of Illinois. judge granted district State Oil also denies provision that the summary judgment for defendant on the contract pertaining to Khan’s charging a both claims. He legality ruled un- price above suggested price retail is a der the Sherman Act alleged price price form fixing. points It out that Khan fixing was to by be tested the rule of reason was free charge to high price as he rather than rule, the wishes. This is true the sense that it plaintiff presented no evidence on essen- would not have been a breach of contract for tial (such elements of a rule of reason case as Khan to price. raise his But the contract power), market study conducted made it so; worthless for and, him to do plaintiffs’ expert economic was inadmissi- realistically, just this was an alternative sanc- ble, and that without study plaintiffs tion termination, and probably equally could not prove even injury. effective one. Generally when a seller raises price, his falls; his volume and if profit his The contract between State Oil and Khan each frozen, unit sold is provided effect his that State Oil would establish a raising price his will be that he loses reve- suggested price (which retail gasoline for nue: units, he will sell fewer at the was same 76”) sold under the brand name “Union profit per contract, unit. The incidentally, gasoline would sell the to Khan for 3.25 required Khan buy all gasoline his from cents less price. than that If Khan believed Oil; State so he could merely switch to high was too he could ask State Oil another brand he wanted charge high- to lower it and if State Oil complied Khan price. er would be purchase entitled to from State Oil at margin, is, the same Practices that have the same effect are not the new minus 3.25 cents. If State Oil always treated the same in law. pre- More refused to suggested reduce the retail cisely, practices two that have one effect in Khan could still charge price, a lower but his may common differ in their other effects. A margin would be smaller because he merger competitors between price- and a not be getting a lower from State Oil. fixing agreement between competitors has If Khan believed the the same effect in extinguishing price compe- was too low he could it, ask State Oil to raise tition parties, between the merger thus preserving margin; his but if State Oil likely more produce offsetting savings cost refused and Khan went ahead and raised his and it is therefore treated leniently more price anyway, the required contract Khan the antitrust laws. So the fact that State 95 L.Ed. 219 in deter- as effective rebate scheme Oil’s (1951). Why might competitors fix a raising his as a threat mini- ring been does price? his lease would have terminate mum resale order make practices treated the two any dictate that engage more difficult them to But identically the antitrust laws. under of their undetected violations rele- identified other wholesale) Oil has not (that is, prices; fix their own the two methods difference between vant supplier losing who observed that he was charging more than dealer from preventing a competitor’s sales his dealers because were price. purely for- suggested retail competitor’s selling product at a low urges that it character of the distinction mal competitor would know that *4 contract by imagining that the can be seen agreement. failing price-fixing to the enforce Khan to exceed the had forbidden Overstreet, Ippolito R. Pauline M. & Thomas provided that if he violat- price and Jr., An Maintenance: Eco- “Resale Price the would be for prohibitiоn sanction ed of the Trade nomic Assessment Federal profit any resulting to State Oil. him to remit Against Corning Commission’s Case no between that practical There is difference 285, Works,” 39 Law & Econ. 293- Glass J. permitting to sell at form of words (1996). Why might competitors 94 fix a he providing that if a price? resale be- maximum difference belongs Oil. profit to so the State charges supplier tween his dealer and what charges what the dealer the ultimate cus- maximum engaged So State is, functionally, compensation question tomer to fixing; the next is se, service; meaning illegal performing dealer for resale so practice per is this prevail plaintiff prove by agreeing to is that need on the resale their all engaged practice; in competing the defendant ‍‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​​​‍reduce goods sellers can their effects is vestigation its actual economic margin competitive price dealers’ below E.g., Business Electronics pretermitted. is a form of for the dealers’ service. This Sharp Corp., 485 Corp. v. Electronics U.S. analytically monopsony pricing, which is 1519, 717, 723, 1515, L.Ed.2d 99 monopoly pricing or cartel and so same as (1988); County Maricopa Arizona v. 808 E.g., by the law. Mandeville Island treated 332, 342-44, 102 Society, 457 Medical U.S. Farms, Co., Sugar Crystal Inc. v. American (1982). 2472-73, 2466, 48 73 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 219, 996, 68 92 L.Ed. 1328 S.Ct. Challenged do not fall within practices that (1948). subject any per categories se step (logically, next questionable broader-ranging inquiry into effect and next) in chronologically, the evolution anti- name goes of the “rule motives trust law was to affix label plaintiff requires and that of reason” single supplier, act- in which a contracts actually prove the defendant’s competitors, ing in of its concert with likelihood) (or competi high reduced prices. Dr. Miles fixed its dealers’ retail 2472; 343, 102 at tion. Id. at S.Ct. Business Co., 220 v. D. Park Sons Medical Co. John & Corp., Corp. Sharp Electronics Electronics (1911). 376, S.Ct. 55 L.Ed. 502 U.S. 31 at 108 at 1519. supra, 485 U.S. S.Ct. fixing Here economic difference between long illegal per se. fixing has Price fixing a maxi- a minimum resale form, pernicious most the term its usual and pronounced, more mum resale becomes conspiracy agreement to an be refers most believe that nei- although economists fix a minimum competing tween firms price fixing pernicious when ther form of By a exten product. modest priсe for their paw is neither the cat’s collud- supplier to an between it refers also sion acting in with his ing concert distributors .nor fix a minimum or a competitors to either unilaterally competitors. supplier acting A prod of their maximum for the resale price in might fix a minimum resale order v. Mari uct their dealers. See Arizona point- dealers to furnish valuable Society, induce his supra, 457 copa County Medical (trained salesmen, 2475; clean rest- of-sale services 102 S.Ct. at U.S. Kiefer-Stew rooms—whatever) customers, they Sons, Joseph Seagram E. & art Co. guaranteed afford to do without a U.S. could not L.Ed.2d (1968), services, margin damages cover the costs of the suit like where the a vigorous would use Court held over because the customers the serviсes dissent that the publisher provided by newspaper then action the full-service dealers but ceiling at which its competing from a deal- distributors could purchase product resell newspaper public illegal per product er sell the at a discount who could distinguish se. Oil seeks to expense not borne the because he had by pointing Telser, out the initiative for the providing the services. Lester G. newspaper against plaintiff to take action Fair “Why Manufacturers Want Should distributor had come from (1962); another distribu- Ippoli- 3 Law & Econ. 86 Trade?” J. tor, giving the scheme a “horizontal” Overstreet, flavor. supra, 39 J. Law & Econ. at to & True, but this was not a on which factor (summarizing this and other theories holding Court relied. stated maintenance). broadly: It benign resale рrice fixing maximum illegal per se even if price fixing, maximum ‍‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​​​‍resale unless As for entirely “vertical,” is, even monopsonist is a he cannot supplier parties single picture supplier are a margins squeeze compet- below a his dealers’ dealer, single as in this case. The *5 level; just attempt do so would itive rejected explicitly Court the view that “con- compet- dealers into the arms of a drive the single tracts between a supplier and his however, might, ing supplier A fix supplier. many fix prices dealers to maximum resale price in prevent a maximum resale order to would not violate Sherman Act.” Id. at exploiting monopoly posi- his dealers from 8,n. 152 88 at 873 n. 8. The use anything tion. We do not know about the the Court made the involvement оf the competitive in which Khan environment other distributor to show that it was not operate—which why is the district supplier, permitted a case in by which the right if judge to conclude that the rule of (see Colgate below), merely doctrine had applicable, Khan sup- reason is loses. But cut off a failing dealer for to adhere to a Oil, pose perhaps encourage that State 149-50, suggested price. See id. at 88 S.Ct. mentioned, that we dealer services has at 871-72. It not distinguish is cricket to spaced sufficiently apart dealers far its precedent by pointing to a fact mentioned (or among given limit them even previous the court in opinion clearly territory); each an exclusive of them given no weight it. prece- Otherwise no suppose further that Union 76 is a sufficient- any force, dents would have no two cases ly popular give distinctive and brand to exactly are alike. it at monopoly dealers in least a modicum of power. might place Then State Oil want to points State supplier Oil out that a ceiling on the dealers’ resale right suggest order has the price a retail prevent exploiting them from monop- that terminate a who dealer does not adhere to it. oly True, power fully. It would do this out Co., not Colgate United States & malice, 300, but in its disinterested commercial (1919), U.S. 39 S.Ct. 63 L.Ed. 992 higher price at which self-interest. but irrelevant. In such a case there is no resold, gasoline is the smaller the volume parties between the and so no sold, profit sup- the lower the аnd so to the for invoking basis section 1 of the Sherman plier higher profit per gallon Act, if contracts, at the which is limited to combina being tions, snared the dealer. and conspiracies, all of which involve agreement. element of There was an Despite points, Supreme these explicit agreement that Khan could not make Court thus far has refused reexamine the money if he sold above the cases in which it has held resale price. Had he raised its above that regardless illegal per of the com level, State Oil would have had contractual petitive position fixer or whether right to a rebate. fixed is a floor or a ceiling. The key precedent present so far as the case is argument State Oil’s main is that concerned is Company, Albrecht longer v. Herald Albrecht is no view the Su- argument on the rejected this Albrecht squarely- (That argument was preme Court. “justified be fixing cannot BMW, ground Bayerische Inc. v. in Caribe rejected pernicious conse- 19 F.3d it blunts Aktiengesellschaft, because Werke Motoren practice,” Cir.1994), accepted (1st distribution quences so we of another 745, 752-54 creating namely exclusive at 88 S.Ct. argument would U.S. at State Oil’s a line' of conse- relies now know Oil We split.) territories. State circuit (not practice Albrecht other quences after of that cases decided “antitrust concept rate) anoth- pernicious. So established generally, a suit maintain right to is no There has knocked injury.” Albrecht been prop beneath er defen- unless the laws make the does not although under away, of inter- the kind impaired maybe has because Sylvania, dant’s from argument were intended laws the antitrust territo- est exclusive grant its dealers does not Bowl- Pueblo matter). Corp. Brunswick protect. on the (the record is silent ries O-Mat, Inc., U.S. infirmities, increas- all its despite Yet such (1977). no there is And L.Ed.2d (see 8 foundations wobbly, ingly moth-eaten monopoly of a maintenance interest Areeda, An Anal- Law: Antitrust E. Phillip and here resale typically If price. Appli- Principles and Their ysis Antitrust merely prevents by a seller ceiling imposed ¶¶ (1989)), has not 1635-38 cation profits, monopoly reaping his dealers (or, what expressly overruled ceiling— from the dealers injury to the case, con- thing, a later same to the amount is, profits monopoly loss, —will not been indistinguishable, has to be ceded requirement suit. an antitrust support overruled). And the expressly waived in injury is not proving antitrust courts, in federal has told lower v.Co. In Atlantic eases. per se *6 Richfield strident, terms, emphatic, even increasingly 328, Co., 110 S.Ct. 495 U.S. Petroleum USA overruling of decision an anticipate (1990), not Supreme 1884, 333 L.Ed.2d 109 overruling Court; leave the are to we pre- competitor of dealers held that Court Lines, Motor Thurston Court itself. raising their from suppliers by their vented 533, Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. K. Inc. v. Jordan the restriction complain that not could prices 1344, 1343, 75 L.Ed.2d 260 535, own S.Ct. his 103 raising him preventing was curiam); Quijas v. (1983) Rodriguez de (per prices. Inc., 490 U.S. Express, Shearson/American with sympathy have considerable We 1921-22, 1917, 104 484, 477, 109 S.Ct. with inconsistent is argument Albrecht 486, at (1989); 109 S.Ct. id. at 526 L.Ed.2d requirement that estаblish cases (“indefensible brand (dissenting opinion) 1923 fact, think we injury. In proving antitrust activism”); Olson see also judicial may well it right and argument is Inc., Curtis, 806 Paine, Webber, & Jackson In Jack Wal- Albrecht. the doom portend Cir.1986). (7th ‍‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​​​‍Al- 731, 734, 741-42 F.2d Inc., Building, Corp. v. Morton & Sons ters decided, is and when unsound brecht Cir.1984), (7th said we 698, 706-07 737 by the Su- decisions later inconsistent validity of Al- continued regarded overruled. be It should preme Court. for a differ- albeit open question, brecht as The Su- be. expect, it will Someday, we Supreme after Albrecht ent reason: Atlantic preme Court Richfield position) previous (reversing its had only “arguendo” assume willing to territories dealer that exclusive recognized decided, 495 U.S. correctly had been Albrecht T.V., Continental procompetitive. may be 5, it cited n. 5,110 at S.Ct. 1889 n. at 335 36, 97 433 U.S. Sylvania v. GTE Inc. commеntary critical academic length at (1977). we As 2549, 568 L.Ed.2d 53 S.Ct. 13, at n. 110 at Id. case. on the as one opinion, and in this pointed out earlier Maricopa in Arizona 13. And n. had in Albrecht dissenting opinions Court, supra, Society, County Medical well, at pointed out against rule per se reaffirming the while a natural 881-82, ceiling is at fixing, noted that maximum horizontal terri- to a scheme incident procompetitive Albrecht, been unlike Kiefer-Stewart, majority opinion exclusivity. The torial case of fixing horizontal maximum related area of territorial nonprice and other generally “horizontal restraints are less placed by suppliers restrictions competi- restraints,” U.S., defensible than vertical tion among their Sylvania dealers. Yet it- S.Ct., at 348 n. at though 2475 n. self reaffirms against se rule vertical opinion quotes length elsewhere the from price restrictions. 433 U.S. at 51 n. Albrecht, apparent approval, and with a den- S.Ct. at 2558 n. 18. The Court must think unciation fixing of maximum not limited that preventing intrabrand variety. to the horizontal Id. at 102 harms an protected by interest the antitrust S.Ct. at 2474. laws even if the restriction increases compe- But all this is an We aside. have been told tition viewed process as a for maximizing judicial superiors our not to read the consumer welfare and even if a restriction sibylline Reports leaves pro- U.S. that had similar effects but was not an explic- phetic overruling. clues to place It is not our regulation of price would be lawful. If this Albrecht; to overrule and Albrecht cannot is what the Court believes —and it ap- fаirly distinguished be from this case. pear to be the Court’s position, current might though

It distinguishable be not if easy were a one that there to defend in class of cases which maximum fixing, terms of theory economic poli- antitrust though wholly vertical, wholly unilateral, cy did may also think that interfering —the injury, cause antitrust even Albrecht and with the freedom of a dealer to raise present case were not members of that may cause injury. not, suspect We Then, class. might while Albrecht itself but we cannot have sufficient confidence in differently decided today, its principle that our view to declare decision of such illegal per se would have Court that has not expressly overruled some application. domain In that event defunct, nevertheless as wе would have to do affirmance here would construe Albrecht nar- in order agree with the district court’s rowly abrogate but not it. But State Oil is ruling that the price provision maximum identify any cases, able to real or hypo- the contract between State Oil and Khan was thetical, in practice which the condemned in illegal per se. Richfield, Atlantic injury could cause an to the inter- despite the Court’s skepticism evident about *7 protected by ests antitrust law. If proof of the continued Albrecht, soundness of the injury antitrust required is in involving cases distinguished it on ground the that the the sort Albrecht, involved in subject dealers a ceiling imposed by no such brought, could be a supplier, their as distinct from their competi- private plaintiff Department or the tors, werе the intended beneficiaries of Al- Justice or the Federal Trade Commission. brecht. 336-37, See 495 U.S. at 110 S.Ct. at point, More to the the Court’s implication 1890. The is that the injury to a conception of injury may antitrust be broader dealer like Khan from being not able to raise than State Oil’s. The Court has never re- his of a because imposed by restriction treated the proposition that vertical supplier his is injury. antitrust (resale minimum price fixing price mainte- nance) Khan, But even if believe, as we illegal per See, e.g., se. not Business ruled out of court the concept Corp. Electronics v. Sharp antitrust Corp., Electronics injury, he supra, prove had to 725-26, injury 485 U.S. at in fact to 108 S.Ct. at 1520. Yet, able to under maintain the the suit. theory only dealer-service The that we evidence sketched, injury and other was report in the theories that of his have the economic support of economists, expert, so if judge antitrust did not resale abuse his maintenance does in impair any discretion excluding report interest we must that the antitrust laws interpreted in affirm the light dismissal of the antitrust count modern economics thought though could be even intended think he wrong was to think protect. It increases rather than reduces impossible made it for Khan to recognized prove injury. —as But we think it was Sylvania decision, dealing with closely abuse discretion. pro make or devoid of ground for exclusion either inadmissible judge’s

The only ground entirely on the bative value. The on which it report turns that “the was argued to operated onе could be be inadmissible would be who experience of one receiver although Be a in period.” expert, that the Ph.D. econom a five-month gas station over terminated, reputable university expe issued a ics from a and an Khan was fore economics, and, rienced consultant in antitrust ground of termination notice inventory qualified in and hence to offer economic selling expert which State was case, reim in this security without evidence had failed interest a- retained Oil, study professional from a state court that satisfied norms. As bursing obtained State emphasized involving in operate the we have cases scien appointing receiver an order (The testimony—and principle applies five months. tific did so for station. He happened at the the social sciences force that it not reveal what same record does scientist, does to the natural period. assume State sciences—a end of that We permitted operation reputable, however is not to offer took over the Oil either lessee.) generated by evidence that he has not or obtained another station itself methods he would use in his normal plaintiffs’ expert obtained the receiver’s academic work, professional say in from the which is to work financial and determined records figures expecta in without to or and revenue them ‍‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​​​‍undertaken reference cost litigation. disregarded possible have tion of in must use Braun v. receiver (7th Lorillard 84 F.3d ceiling with State Oil. The Cir. 1996); Ciba-Geigy Corp., figures that the receiver had realized Rosen F.3d showed (7th Cir.1996); margin gasoline in excess of on his sales of Bammerlin Nav Transportation way Corp., he have done istar cents. The could Int’l 3.25 (7th Cir.1994). judge charging price in The district identi bywas excess basis, none, rebating no point fied Oil can suggested retail price. generated by higher supposing expert’s report for higher mar-gin regarding expert had Khan been flunked this test. The inference inferred that profit margin, suggest drawn from the to raise his above the receiver’s allowed data, straight have price, he would station’s cost revenue was ed and, income, forward, pay appears, so enabling him to his rent and far made just way that an economist interestеd avert termination. therefore margins for unrelated profit a firm’s reasons may competitive have course conditions Of it; litigation would make and likewise changed during the time receiver enjoyed the that if Khan had free inference ability A dealer’s operating the station. evidently thought he dom that the receiver for price depends his on the demand his raise charged higher price, had he would have general, demand product; *8 money, If more than he did. made brands, may to other or for Union 76 relative overqualified was anything, the economist over. after the receiver took have increased easily give as have been evidence that could so, ability his a If maintain accountant; overqualification given by аn suggested retail would not than recognized disqualifica yet not a basis for ability. a similar prove that Khan had had tion. if could not have maintained a And Khan suggested simply price, retail price above the admissibility. Weight is different from permit- not have because report might admissible but expert’s An be so, by hurt him to then he wasn’t ted do lacking weight in as not to block so complains. provision of which he contractual judgment granting summary for other of a of the antitrust There would be violation Peters, F.3d side. v. Wittmer laws, injury. but no (7th Cir.1996); Fertilizer Co. Mid-State Bank, just say Nat’l 877 F.2d 1338- Exchange that the evi But this is (7th Cir.1989); Dynam Douglas Hayes presented by expert not con was dence Cir.1993). (1st ics, indeed, But subject injury—was, clusive on the of put being That did that is not the situation here. State very far conclusive. from contrаry diversity citizenship parties.) in In the absence of of no evidence. between evidence, Bamberger’s presumption relinquishment from his The Dr. inference favor of all experience that Khan when federal claims fall out study the receiver’s before trial of rebuttable, id., provi- lightly but it by hurt the maximum should had been abandoned, legitimate as it is based on gasoline supply was suffi- a sion of the contract summary minimizing substantial concern with judg- federal ciently plausible to defeat purely intrusion into areas of injury. state law. question ment on of supplemen- Since the absence of merit of claim should not have claim in tal this case is clear as a of matter turn to of been dismissed. We the breach elementary interpretation, contraсtual so Although primary contract claim. Khan’s jurisdiction purposes that the retention of for complaint prevented is that was he dismissing claim require of did not complains raising price, his he that there also judge speculate meaning district about the wanted lower were times when he his law, judge think right of state we nonpremium gasoline. As said jurisdiction upon retain rather than visit outset, standing this claim has no parties and state courts the burden of But an antitrust claim. State Oil concedes Bmzinski, litigation. further As we said obligated contract implicitly that cases, citing a slew of earlier the correct (and adjust prices suggest retail its wholesale disposition supplemental claim is so prices accordingly, maintain the 3.25 cents clear as a matter of state that it law can be margin suggested between wholesale and re determined without a trial and without en- guarantees) tail that the contract law, tanglement in difficult of issues state light competitive of condi were realistic judicial economy considerations of counsel facing tions Khan. The evidence Khan decision, prompt retention and rather than presented concerning competitive those con remission to state comet. Id. But we that on occa ditions was evidence sixteen presumption remind the district courts of the during operation sions his of the station he jurisdiction against retaining supplemental told had called other dealers state-law when claims the federal claims are рrices sug their retail were lower than the trial, dismissed before and of the concomitant ¡Jhis gested prices retail fixed State Oil. importance stating ground on which establishing gen falls far evidence short the court particular believes case that concerning uine fact issue material presumption has been rebutted. breach of contract. There is no evidence judgment of the district court is af- competitors the dealers were actual part firmed in part, and reversed in as ex- prices charged those plained opinion, and the ease is re- prices grades dealers were the same manded for proceedings further consistent Khan, gasoline which, remember, sold opinion. with well-recognized sold that hаs AFFIRMED PART, In REVERSED PART AND perfectly brand name. The evidence is con Remanded. sistent assumption State Oil’s competitively were RIPPLE, Judge, concurring. Circuit realistic. Today employs rigorous appli- court rightly claim So the contract cation of the rules stare prece- decisis and *9 law, dismissed as a contract matter of we in dent this antitrust matter. This methodol- any note the of the absence from record ogy is certainly, general proposition, as a a why judge, having indication of district the prudent approach to antitrust decision-mak- trial, the dismissed federal claims before re ing judicial in the context. Antitrust issues than, tained rather is the norm in such as pose crucial policy the choices for economic situations, jurisdiction relinquished and, indeed, over the Country. social life of the Nev- supplemental ertheless, claim. state law 28 U.S.C. Congress, content passage with the 1367(c)(3); § Brazinski v. Amoco generally statutes, Petroleum of great worded has left a Co., 1176, (7th Additives 6 policy-making 1182 Cir. deal through the courts 1993). (It appear process by does not that there is of case decision-making.

1367 (1990), 1884, the re- 333 ensure, 109 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. circumstances, ought to we In these [price] vigorous to inhibit decisis “threatened of stare straint application through the strict sufficiently who bound by the dealers were law is that precedent, and to become permit businesses it and because “threatened by certain it” predictable 335, under a clear Id. at with price-fixing affairs scheme.” their to order minimum agree, requires. I law stаnding of what at 1889.1 S.Ct. 110 methodology em therefore, basic factual context arises in a present case The reaching the in decision by the court ployed in at issue from the one far removed that note separately to today. I write announced case, to the presented as Albrecht. This criti my colleagues’ substantive I share that appeal,2 this court on and to court district applied been as it has per se rule cism single single contract between a involves ques fixing and to maximum to vertical single that sets retailer wholesaler like to eases rule of that the extension tion price for the of maximum resale equivalent hori the threat in which one present plead- Neither commodity question. in or, very at the is absent zontal cartelization contract ease nor the between ings in this It is difficult least, diminished. greatly any enti- implicate other and State Oil ef “manifestly anticompetitive discern therefore, confronted, awith ties. We are T.V., Sylva v. GTE fect,” Inc. Continental hint is no arrangement; there wholly vertical 2549, 2557, 36, 50, nia, Inc., 97 S.Ct. U.S. 433 effect. horizontal concrete (1977), justifies invoca that 568 L.Ed.2d Co., Inc. Video Industrial Center rule. per se tion (7th Media, Inc., Cir. 995 F.2d 735 United applied the first Supreme Court centrality of 1993), discussed the we in price-fixing maximum to vertical rule in effects of horizontal or absence presence 145, Co., U.S. Albrecht Herald re particular vertical determining (1968). The defendant L.Ed.2d by the anti ought prohibited to be straint set case, newspaper publisher, in existing Supremе Reviewing laws. trust many distribu- price for suggested retail addressing re vertical precedent sought to distributors one tors. When that, in straints, noted we suggest- than more charge his customers justifica view, “only legitimate one Court’s attempted disci- publisher price, the ed re prohibiting vertical exist[s] for tion entity assume hiring another by pline him lack by who imposed manufacturers straints recalci- handled of the business some tendency proved power: a significant market Supreme Court held trant carrier. forma agreements facilitate such sec- per se under unlawful restraint this We Id. at 737. cartels.” of horizontal tion because, as the Act the Sherman 1 of tion mecha “two Video Center addressed in Atlantic later recounted Richfield price maintenance a vertical by which Co., 110 nisms” 495 U.S. Petroleum v. USA Co. in the is involved that Defendant and believe re- Atlantic Although Court in Richfield 1. ser- operation numerous other an "unadul- lease to the situation and/or ferred vertical, arrange- Metropolitan Area. Chicago maximum-price-fixing in the vice stations terated ment,” Richfield, Although at n. final R.l, para. Complaint, 7. Atlantic alleges harm identified n. arguably at 1890 paragraph 110 S.Ct. of this sentence stemmed largely dealers, horizontal Albrecht was clear State Oil of other existence subject multiple were dealers the fact did that Khan in this case from the record was "the manner At issue to the restraint. district court to the present the case competi- might arrangement] restrain [the is devoid summary judgment record theory. The at 1890. Id. at dealers.” tion suggesting other any evidence subject restraint to the also dealers complaint contain Khan’s noteWe 2. the case challenged by Khan. Because allegation: following theory that on the presented to the district court this action Defendant times relevant At all multiple imposed had been the restraint leasing engaged business of has dealers, do not multiple upon wholesalers or as that stores such service stations/convenience *10 allegation com- in Khan’s unsupported this view Plaintiffs, as in sale well operated by as factually to make plaint as sufficient service products to such petroleum and other analogous to Albrecht. public the "Un- under to the resale statiоns for are informed Plaintiffs 76” trademark. ion agreement might be used to price restraints, facilitate the to vertical I am unable to First, formation of horizontal cartels. Id. possibility rule out that the Justices explained, vertical might maintenance ar- per intend the se rule to be broad rangements facilitate cartelization at the re- enough reach State Argu Oil’s conduct. level; provides tail the restraint ably, a mecha- might its action implicat viewed as conspiring nism which ing dealers are able to some of the concerns articulated in Al- against wayward enforce the example, brecht. For Supreme Court in members of “[mjaximum the horizontal conspiracy. explained See Albrecht that prices id. at 737. We further noted may that vertical be fixed too low for the dealer to furnish agreements may maintenance also as- services essential to the value goods sist in the formation of cartels at the manu- have for the consumer or to furnish services By facturer level. requiring prospective and conveniences which consumers desire members of a impose manufacturer cartel they for which willing pay.” are dealers, restraints on their cartel mem- U.S. at By S.Ct. at eliminating 873. bers have an determining any effective method of motive for Khan prices to increase his partners abiding by their price, above retail rules of the cartel. “The effectively members of the may relegated have Khan to the cartel then need monitor the retаil gasoline BMW, discount market. See Caribe distributors, partners’ of their Bayerische secure Inc. v. Motoren Aktienge Werke in knowledge any that sellschaft, (1st deviation from a Cir.1994) 19 F.3d 753-54 given that, indicate that a mem- (noting plaintiff because the dealer was ” ber of the cartel had broken ranks.... Id. keep forced below the level it at 738. In allegation the absence of preferred set, the challenged agreement the restraint at in issue this case was im- plaintiff provide forced less of what posed by multiple or upon wanted, manufacturers customers leading potentially low dealers, multiple neither of justifi- these two profits). er potential One less entrant in the cations for application of the per se rule full-service market means that deal applies. ers that market are able to charge price for the same package of services. See myAs colleagues recognize, the anticom- Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 88 S.Ct. at 873 petitive implications of vertical re (noting that a vertical maximum-price agree straints are often difficult to discern. The ment, “by substituting perhaps erroneous difficulty in discovering injury actual to com judgment of a seller for the forces of the petition potential even the inju for such —or competitive market, may severely intrude ry compounded where, here, —is upon ability buyers compete wholly restraint in question is vertical ‍‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​​​‍market”). survive nature imposed by and has single upon single wholesaler distributor. It sim Supreme Court also noted in Albrecht ply is not plaintiff that, clear can show an by limiting ability of small dealers “injury type laws to engage nonprice competition, a maxi- prevent.” were intended to Corp. Brunswick mum price-fixing agreement might “channel Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., v. Pueblo through large distribution specially few 690, 697, (1977). 50 L.Ed.2d 701 advantaged Here, dealers.” Id. the net ef- my therefore, Like colleagues, I have serious fect of the restraint imposed on Khan doubts as to the viability continued of Al- State Oil is to limit margin Khan’s to $0.325 especially in the context of per gallon which, margin view, in Khan’s brecht — —a is devoid of horizontal anticompetitive is unrealistically run, low. long Over implications. application Our per high-volume gasoline dealers, who are able to rule to this limited restraint therefore marks margins maintain low longer periods a considerable extension time, of the Albrecht rule might benefit arrangement from the beyond presented the facts in that case. on Khan foisted State Oil. Nevertheless, until Supreme At point future, some limits the use of respect se rule may revisit Albrecht and further de- *11 rule in the se per scope of the fine price-fixing. maximum of vertical context however, be sure time, cannot Until than is broader rule of interim, In the it birth. gave facts precedent decisis stare considerations to the to adhere continue us to require price-fixing maximum against vertical

rule ef- anticompetitive in which identifiable

cases absence Although the present.

fects makes this implications horizontal concrete case, Oil’s

considerably closer outlined above for the reasons present, at least majority’s opinion, iden- effects anticompetitive

possibility Albrecht. On Supreme Court by the

tified therefore, in the court’s I concur ground,

decision. DISTRICT,

YANKTON SCHOOL

Appellant, SCHRAMM, Appellees. Angie

Harold 95-3343.

No. Appeals,

United States

Eighth Circuit. May 1996.

Submitted Aug. 1996.

Decided Rehearing Suggestion

Rehearing and 1, 1996. Denied Oct.

En Banc

Case Details

Case Name: Barkat U. Khan and Khan & Associates, Inc. v. State Oil Company
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date Published: Aug 29, 1996
Citation: 93 F.3d 1358
Docket Number: 96-1309
Court Abbreviation: 7th Cir.
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