The plaintiffs, forty-nine nonresident property owners from the town of Hubbardton, Vermont, brought an action seeking an order in the nature of mandamus to compel defendants, listers аnd selectmen from the town of Hubbardton, Vermont, to perform certain statutory duties pertaining to that town’s 1981 grand list. One of the allegations set forth in plaintiffs’ complaint was that dеfendants had failed to lodge with the town clerk, for the taxpayers’ inspection, a book or books required by law to be furnished for the abstract of individual lists and the grand list. See 32 V.S.A. § 4111(d). Plаintiffs also alleged that defendants had failed to include within the grand list “a brief description and listed valuation of each separate parcel of taxable real estate and separate columns which would show the approximate acreages of woodland, cropland and pastureland.” See 32 V.S.A. § 4152.
In response, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ cause of action on the grounds that it failed to set forth a claim upon which relief could be granted, V.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), and that plaintiffs had an adequate statutory remedy under 32 V.S.A. § 4404 et seq. The trial court agreed and granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal. We reverse.
Plaintiffs have briеfed two exceptions for our consideration : first, whether the allegations as set forth in their complaint, if true, justify the use of mandamus; and second, whether plaintiffs are afforded an adequate remedy under 32 V.S.A. § 4404 et seq. (our standard tax appeal procedure), so as to make an action in the nature of mandamus inappropriatе.
This Court has stated, on a number of occasions, that mandamus will not lie to review the performance of official acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion.
Okemo Trailside Condominiums, Inc.
v.
Blais,
Moreover, “[w]here there appеars, in some form, an arbitrary abuse of the power vested by law in an administrative officer or board which amounts to a virtual refusal to act or to perform a duty imposеd by law, mandamus may be resorted to in the absence of other adequate legal remedy.”
Couture
v.
Selectmen of Berkshire, supra,
When reviewing a dismissal of a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, this Court must assume the factual allegations in plaintiffs’ pleadings to be true.
Jones
v.
Keogh,
In addition, plaintiffs allege that defendants have failed to comply with 32 V.S.A. § 4152 by not providing “a brief dеscription and listed valuation of each separate parcel of tax
*371
able real estate and separate columns which would show the approximate acreages of woodland, cropland and pastureland.” For their part, defendants cite us to
Willard
v.
Pike,
In
Willard
v.
Pike, supra,
this Court had the occasion to construe section 348, R.L., the predecessor statute to the present day 32 V.S.A. § 4152. There, the issue presented was whether section 348, R.L., “so fаr as it pertain [ed] to the form of the list in its subdivisions, its additions and deductions, [were] directory or mandatory.”
Id.
at 210,
Were we dеaling with a situation in which plaintiffs alleged defects as to the form of the grand lists, then Willard would be controlling. Instead, plaintiffs allege a failure on the part of the listers to provide that substantive information mandated by 32 V.S.A. § 4152, an omission which, if true, might very well operate to their substantial prejudice. Thus, we find the statutory duties outlined in 32 V.S.A. § 4111(d) and § 4152 to be ministerial in nature.
Assuming for purposes of a motion to dismiss that these ministerial duties have not been complied with, our next inquiry is whether plaintiffs are afforded an adequate remedy under 32 V.S.A. § 4404 et seq. In evaluating the adequacy of аlternative remedies, we have noted that “ [i] n order to supersede mandamus, the other remedy must be competent to afford relief on the very subject matter in question, and must be equally convenient, beneficial and effective.”
Town of Glover
v.
Anderson, supra,
Defendants assert that the use of mandamus in this situation would be inappropriate, since plaintiffs have at their disposal an adequate statutory aрpeal procedure under 32 V.S.A. § 4404 et seq. Essentially, that procedure allows an individual aggrieved by his or her tax appraisal to appeal first to the listers themselves, 32 V.S.A. § 4221 еt seq., and then to the board of civil authority, 32 V.S.A. § 4404 et seq. Should a grievant remain dissatisfied with the decision of the board, a further appeal for a de novo hearing is permitted tо the superior court or to the director of property valuation, see 32 V.S.A. § 4461 et seq., with a final appeal available to this Court.
A comprehensive reading of the appeal procedure reveals that its main function is to address disparities between the listed value of a grievant’s property and that of comparable property. Without access to the books or grand lists which contain the substantive data required by 32 V.S.A. § 4152, plaintiffs are effectively denied the essential information needed to prepare an adequate appeal. In other words, without the information, the remedy becomes illusory.
Defendants urge that the statutory remedy under 32 V.S.A. § 4404 et seq. also сontemplates grievances of actions other than those of adverse appraisals. They cite for support 32 V.S.A. § 4221, which expressly states that the listers are requirеd to “hear persons aggrieved by their appraisals or by any of their acts.” (Emphasis supplied.) If plaintiffs, who seek enforcement of the above ministerial duties, were limited to this remedy, howеver, they would be placed in the position of first having to appeal the denial of the information they are clearly entitled to, and only after said information is released could they begin to prepare a proper appeal. Moreover, not only is there the potential of having to use the appeal prоcedure twice, but such actions would have to be done within the stringent time framework provided by 32 V.S.A. § 4404 et seq.
As previously stated, in addition to being “clear and adequate,” an alternate remedy must be “equally convenient, beneficial and effective.”
Town of Glover
v.
Anderson, supra,
*373
Accordingly, since plaintiffs have alleged facts which, if truе, would permit an order in the nature of mandamus, they must be given an opportunity at least to introduce evidence in support of those allegations. Since the dismissal of thеir áction denied them this opportunity, the order of the trial court must be reversed.
The order of the trial court dismissing plaintiffs’ action is reversed, and the cause is remanded for hearing consistent with this opinion.