[11] In 1995, Steven R. Barela (appellant) pled guilty to the second-degree murder of his wife. In 2000, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, primarily due to thе claimed ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. The district court denied this motion. Based on our recent decision in Nixon v. State,
ISSUES
[12] Appellant presents two issues for our review:
ISSUE I
Did the district court deny appellant due process of law by filing a decision letter in lieu of a formal order from which he could appeal?
ISSUE II
Did the district court improperly deny appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea in light of the allegations contained in the mоtion and supporting affidavit when the district court made its decision without holding a hearing?
The State of Wyoming, as appellee, essentially responds to the issues raised by appellant and additionally questions the district court's jurisdiction to consider appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
FACTS
[13] In 1994, appellant was charged with the first-degree murder of his wife. On March 29, 1995, the State filed an amended information charging appellant with second-degree murder. That same day, appellant, represented by counsel, pled guilty to see-ond-degree murdеr, and the district court, on
[14] On April 19, 1996, appellant, represented by counsel, petitiоned the district court to modify his sentence pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 85, primarily alleging that, at sentencing, the district court did not possess complete medical records regarding his psychological diagnosis and condition. The district court held a hearing, denied the petition, and apрellant appealed that denial to this Court. We affirmed the district court's decision in Barela v. State,
[15] In 1999, appellant, pro se, filed a Petition for Post-Convietion Relief in the district court pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Aun. §§ 7-14-101 through 7-14-108 (LexisNexis 2001), contending that: (1) his guilty plea was not supported by a рroper factual basis; (2) his in-custody confession and consent to a search were involuntary; (8) the district court exceeded its authоrity in imposing restitution; and (4) his trial counsel was ineffective in several respects, The State filed a motion to dismiss appellant's petition, which motion the district court granted on February 283, 2000. Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court regarding the denial of his pоst-conviction relief petition. We dismissed the appeal because appellant was required to seek appellate review in the form of a timely petition for writ of review rather than a notice of appeal.
[T6] On October 23, 2000, appellant, pro se, filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea in the district court, arguing that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because his trial counsel was ineffective: (1) in advancing a motion to suppress appellant's confession; (2) in failing to advise appellant regarding the possibility оf a conditional plea in order to preserve the suppression issue for direct appeal; (8) in failing to pursue a direct аppeal on appellant's behalf; (4) in failing to advise appellant that the factual basis for his plea was insufficient; and (5) in failing to advise appellant of possible defenses to the murder charge. The district court denied appellant's motion without a heаring, and by way of a January 30, 2001, decision letter, stated that the decision letter "shall stand as the final order in this matter."
[17] -On July 11, 2001, privately-retained counsel entered an appearance in the district court on behalf of appellant and subsequently submitted a Motion Requesting Submission оf Final Order, wherein appellant argued that the district court's decision letter denying his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea was not in the form of a final order and the time within which to file a notice of appeal from that denial had not yet commenced. After a hearing, the district court denied this motion, and appellant appealed.
DISCUSSION
[18] We agree with the State that the district court was without jurisdiction to consider aрpellant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. In Nixon,
excеpt where there has been a remand following an appeal in a eriminal case, or where one of the statutes or rules mentioned above [i.e., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-27-101 et seq., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-101 through 7-14-108, W.R.Cr.P. 85] otherwise expressly permits a district court to continue to assert jurisdiction over thаt criminal case, no authority exists for the court to act in the case-and its jurisdiction over the case should end-once the defendant's conviction has become final because of his exercise or forfeiture of his right to appeal from that conviction.
In particular, unless "a specific, express exception is created to this general rule by statute or court rule, a district cоurt's jurisdiction to consider a motion to withdraw a plea-or any other motion not specifically provided for by statute or rule-ends when the case becomes final because of the expiration of the time for taking an appeal." Nixon,
[19] In the instant case, appellant filed his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea over five years after the entry of his plea and over five years after his sentence was imposed. Pursuant tо Nizon, appellant's criminal case became final for purposes of the motion to withdraw his guilty plea at the expiration of the time for taking a direct appeal from the district court's judgment and sentence. Accordingly, the district court was without jurisdiction to cоnsider the motion to withdraw appellant's guilty plea and, because this Court has no greater jurisdiction than that of the district court in these matters, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.