Trial No. DR-9402798. | Ohio Ct. App. | Oct 13, 2000
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *940
Since 1994, this case has generated a massive record. The sheer number of motions, and their voluminous, multi-faceted exploration of issues, is testament to a vast consumption of time and resources on the part of the parties, as well as associated court personnel. We wish to commend the trial court's patience and diligence in providing Bardes, proceeding pro se since 1996, with every opportunity to be heard on issues in which she clearly holds a deep conviction. We hope today, however, to finally decide these issues and to close this case so that all parties may move forward with their lives. To this end, we overrule Bardes's assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Unless otherwise stated below as required by a particular assignment of error, we review a domestic relations court's determinations according to an *941 abuse-of-discretion standard.1 In order to recognize an abuse of discretion, we must be confronted with more than an error of judgment.2 Rather, there must be no sound reasoning process to support the trial court's decision.3
We uphold the decision of the trial court for two reasons. First, R.C.
Second, there would be no error even absent the clear statutory authority granted to the trial court. While the Ohio Supreme Court initially had characterized dependency exemptions as marital property,5 upon reconsideration in the context of continuing jurisdiction, the court modified the Hughes syllabus in Singer v.Singer6 to delete any reference to marital property. InSinger, the court considered circumstances that predated the then recently enacted R.C.
Bardes's first assignment of error is overruled.
We begin by noting, as we have recently, that the broad discretion of a trial court in determining whether a class action may be maintained will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.9 Particularly where the trial court has decided not to certify a class, an abuse of discretion *943 should be recognized cautiously.10 We also note, however, that while it is not mandatory for a trial court to make formal findings in support of its decision on a motion for class certification, the Ohio Supreme Court has suggested that the court make separate findings as to each of the class-action requirements and specify its reasoning as to each finding.11 Similarly, it is rare that the pleadings in a case requesting class certification are so clear that it is possible to determine whether certification is proper without first conducting a hearing.12 This is one of those rare cases in which neither an evidentiary hearing nor separate findings on the part of the trial court are necessary for this court to uphold the trial court's decision.
To have a class action certified, the plaintiff must show that all of the seven requirements of Civ.R. 23(A) and (B) are met, and the failure of any one of those seven requirements will result in the denial of certification.13 The seventh requirement of class certification is that one of the three Civ.R. 23(B) requirements be met.14 Without deciding whether Bardes's proposed class meets the initial six requirements, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying certification based only on Bardes's request to certify the class under Civ.R. 23(B)(2) or (3).
Civ.R. 23(B)(2) requires that "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole." From the record, it is clear that Todd has merely asserted his rights under the Revised Code. Not only is injunctive or declaratory relief inappropriate as to Bardes under these circumstances, but Todd would also clearly be unable to satisfy any judgment as to all the Ohio mothers proposed as a class.
For a class to be certified under Civ.R. 23(B)(3), the trial court must find, among other things, that "a class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Again, from the record, it is clear that whatever exception Bardes has taken to Todd's position on matters *944 of child support, the controversy is best adjudicated only between the original parties.
Bardes's second assignment of error is overruled.
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that "[a]ny document appertaining to, or recording of, the proceedings of a court * * * is a `public record' and `required to be kept' within the meaning of R.C.
After a review of the record, we can find no denied motion that could be characterized as a motion for redaction of social security numbers. We also find no motion to have Bardes's record sealed. Consequently, there is no action on the part of the trial court for us to review.
We also note that if Bardes's third assignment of error is intended to be a general complaint regarding the policies of the clerk of courts, it is inappropriately raised here. Todd is not the appropriate party to defend a legal challenge regarding the policies and procedures of the clerk of courts, and the clerk of courts is not a party to this action.
The third assignment of error is not well taken. *945
Bardes first asks this court to hold that her children's constitutional rights have been violated. We find no case law to support a holding that paid attendance at a private school or college of one's choice is a fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution, even for the most gifted of children. We decline the invitation to create a novel fundamental right.
Next, Bardes asks us to hold that her constitutional rights have been violated. Again, we find no case law to support the proposition that Bardes has a fundamental right to be reimbursed for payment of private school or future college tuition in the furtherance of her children's education. We again decline the invitation to invent a novel fundamental right.
Finally, Bardes seems to be unclear as to whether the trial court properly issued a valid separate order for extraordinary medical expenses. She is also unclear whether payment by Todd towards expenses for private education and future college tuition for the minor children were included in the order. If no order issued from the trial court requiring Todd to share in the minor children's private school and future college expenses, then Bardes claims the trial court abused its discretion.
R.C.
From the record, it appears clear that the trial court did issue an appropriate separate order for allocation of extraordinary uninsured medical, dental, hospital, prescription, optical, and orthodontic expenses. It also appears clear that the trial court intentionally did not issue a separate order requiring Todd to share in the costs of the children's private-school education. Instead, in the decree of divorce, the court specifically stated that Todd would not be required, until further order of the court, to contribute to the cost of private elementary or *946 secondary education for the parties' children. This section of the decree specifically adopted the decision of the magistrate.
There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in adopting the magistrate's decision. The record states that, as a result of the parties' stipulations, Todd's disposable income after total expenses was $179 per month, or $2,148 per year. We conclude that the court's decision to exempt Todd under those circumstances from sharing in private-school tuition fees of over $15,000 per year was supported by sound reasoning.
It also appears clear from the record that Todd is under no current court-ordered obligation to set aside or otherwise allocate money for the benefit of his children's future college expenses. There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's failure to order Todd to make such an allocation. Indeed, the court would have erred had it done so. It is well settled in Ohio that, without the specific agreement of the parties and the adoption of the specific agreement by the trial court, the trial court has no authority to order that money be set aside for the future college expenses of a minor child, when the money would be used only after the child reaches the age of majority.18
Bardes's remaining assignments of error are overruled, and the trial court's judgment is, accordingly, affirmed.
Hildebrandt, P.J., and Sundermann, J., concur