Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. HouseBarco Auto Leasing Corp. v. House
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Peters
Lead Opinion
The principal issue on this appeal is whether the trial court properly calculated the amount of damages to which the defendants were entitled upon rescission of an instalment sales contract under the Retail Instalment Sales Financing Act (hereinafter RISFA),
The record reveals the following facts. On or about October 11, 1979, the defendants entered into an alleged leasing agreement with the plaintiff to lease a 1979 Audi 5000 automobile for a three year period.1 Attached to the agreement was a rider stipulating that the defendants-lessees were required to purchase the automobile at the end of the lease term for $5500. After driving the automobile for approximately twenty-six months, the defendant Charles House voluntarily surrendered the automobile to the plaintiff on December 31, 1981.
In July, 1982, the plaintiff brought this action against the defendants to recover a deficiency under the agreement and the defendants counterclaimed for damages on several different theories. On February 7,1983, the trial court, Hendel, J., entered a judgment of nonsuit against the plaintiff for its failure to comply with a discovery order. The case proceeded to trial before the court, Hurley, J., on the defendants’ counterclaims, although the plaintiff, allegedly because of lack of notice, did not appear at that trial.
In rendering judgment for the defendants, the trial court ruled separately on several of their counterclaims. The court determined that the defendants were entitled to recover under their first counterclaim because the
In February, 1984, the plaintiff filed a motion to open both the judgment of nonsuit and the judgment hold
On September 20,1984, the trial court, Schaller, J., retried the case solely on the issue of damages. In a decision dated December 5, 1984, the court affirmed the findings of fact made by Judge Hurley regarding the numerous violations of RISFA committed by the plaintiff. It also upheld his decision to rescind the contract between the parties. In order to return the parties to their respective positions prior to the contract, as required under the principles of rescission, the court awarded the defendants a full refund of the amount they had paid under their contract with Barco, $9596.76. In awarding that refund, the court denied the plaintiff’s request for a credit against that amount for the fair rental value of the automobile while it was in the defendants’ possession. The court also awarded the defendants the sum of $5000 as reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to CUTPA. The trial court declined, however, to award the defendants punitive damages in light of “evidence that misstatements by Charles House were a major contributing factor to, if not the producing cause of, the violations involved.”3
I
We may usefully consider the plaintiff’s first two claims of error jointly, since each addresses the validity and the effect of the proceedings held before the trial court, Hurley, J. Neither of these claims is properly before this court. Their merits were addressed both at that trial and in the subsequent proceedings before Judge Santaniello. The plaintiff has failed to furnish us with a transcript of either of those proceedings; Barra v. Ridgefield Card & Gift Gallery, Ltd., 194 Conn. 400, 407, 480 A.2d 552 (1984); see Steve Viglione Sheet Metal Co. v. Sakonchick, 190 Conn. 707, 713-14, 462 A.2d 1037 (1983); DeMilo v. West Haven, 189 Conn. 671, 680-81, 458 A.2d 362 (1983); see
II
In addressing the plaintiff’s third claim of error, we are bound by the established substantive allegations of the defendants’ counterclaims described in the memorandum of decision of the trial court, Hurley, J. The only issue before us is whether, given these substantive findings, the trial court, Schaller, J., erred in its calculation of the rescissory damages to be awarded to the defendants. In particular, the question is whether, in light of the plaintiff’s established and significant violations of RISFA and CUTPA, the plaintiff is entitled to a credit for the use value of the automobile for the twenty-six month period the defendants drove the car prior to returning it to Barco.
We begin our discussion of this issue by clarifying what is not contested in this appeal. There is no claim
Under Connecticut law, as a condition precedent to rescission, the parties to a contract must be restored to their original position as nearly as possible. Keyes v. Brown, supra, 476; Mandeville v. Jacobson, 122 Conn. 429, 433, 189 A. 596 (1937); see Duksa v. Middletown, 192 Conn. 191, 197, 472 A.2d 1 (1984). In restoring the parties to their respective positions prior to the contract, courts generally order the seller to refund the amounts paid by the buyer for the goods and the buyer to return the goods to the seller. See 1 G. Palmer, Law of Restitution (1978) § 4.6, pp. 424-25. In this case, the defendants voluntarily returned the automobile to the plaintiff in December, 1981. Accordingly, the court ordered the plaintiff to refund the sum of $9596.76, representing the amounts paid by the defendants from October, 1979, to December, 1981. The plaintiff contends on appeal, however, that it is entitled to a credit against that amount for the fair rental value of the car for the twenty-six months that the defendants retained possession of it.
The UCC authorizes a buyer of goods who “rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance,” because of the seller’s breach, to recover “so much of the price as has been paid. ’’(Emphasis added.)
The question before us, in light of this statutory pattern under the UCC, is how to construe the buyer’s right to rescission under RISFA. We note that RISFA itself imposes no conditions upon the buyer’s right to the return of moneys paid, which is the remedy ordinarily associated with rescission. RISFA was adopted “to protect retail buyers of goods from unknowingly assuming excessive charges by requiring that all charges and terms be fully set forth by the retail seller before the contract is signed by the buyer.” Keyes v. Brown, supra, 473-74. The buyer’s remedy must therefore be implemented in a fashion that will take full account of a governing statute that was purposefully designed to correct the often gross imbalance in bargaining power between a retail seller and a retail buyer. Shirley v. State National Bank of Connecticut, 493 F.2d 739, 742 n.3 (2d Cir. 1974). Since RISFA is a remedial statute, we must construe it liberally in order to implement its consumer protection policies. Borzencki v. Estate of Stakum, 195 Conn. 368, 383, 489 A.2d 341 (1985); Sportsmen’s Boating Corporation v. Hensley, 192 Conn. 747, 756, 474 A.2d 776 (1984); Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 190 Conn. 510, 520, 461 A.2d 938 (1983).
We acknowledge that the plaintiff, in reliance on the defendants’ representations concerning their intended use of the car,7 may have inadvertently mischaracterized the transaction as a commercial transaction, and that the RISFA violations committed by the plaintiff followed logically from this mischaracterization. The evidence of the extent of the misrepresentations is murky at best because of the plaintiff’s failure properly to present such evidence in the trial court in the hearings held by Judges Hurley and Santaniello. To the extent that the representations were relevant to the finding of liability under RISFA, they are not properly before this court. To the extent that they are residually relevant to the issue of damages, however, the
Although the plaintiff’s violations of RISFA may have been inadvertent, our primary responsibility is to implement the remedial purpose of RISFA, which seeks to furnish a consumer buyer with all the information needed to make an informed choice about whether to enter into a particular transaction. In this case, this crucial information clearly was not made available to the defendants. As Judge Hurley found, there was a long list of terms that the plaintiff failed to disclose in the contract between the parties. For example, the defendants’ decision to enter into this instalment sales contract was not informed by knowledge of such critical details as the number, amount and due dates of payments for which they were obligated, their termination rights and deficiency liability, or the fact that the total price that they were being charged far exceeded the purchase price of the car. All these factors, if known,
In these circumstances, we conclude that RISFA must be construed to afford to buyers like the defendants, who were injured by the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the requirements of RISFA, no less protection than the UCC provides for buyers who are injured by a seller’s delivery of defective goods. The defendants decided to rescind their purchase because the contract of sale proved to be too economically burdensome. RISFA is meant to provide protection to consumer buyers against precisely this type of substantial economic miscalculation. The defendants’ delay, therefore, like a delayed response to a substantial latent defect in nonconforming goods, is no reason to diminish their right to recover the full purchase price. The facts of this case do not entitle the plaintiff to the offset it seeks.
Even if we were to read the policies of RISFA as permitting the consideration of equitable principles of restitution in appropriate circumstances, we would find no such redeeming circumstances in this case.9 Despite the fact that the defendants benefited from their use of the car, the plaintiff was not left with an inequitable loss. The plaintiff managed to resell the car at wholesale value for approximately $6600 and conceded that it could have sold the car for as much as $8100 at retail value. Furthermore, the plaintiff has realized an additional benefit from its use of the $9596.76 paid by the defendants from October, 1979 to December,
Ill
In its final claim of error, the plaintiff contests the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees on the ground that the defendants are not legally entitled to such an award. Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that, even if such an award is justified, there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to calculate reasonable attorney‘s fees. We agree with the plaintiff’s alternate claim of error.
As set forth above, the trial court determined that the plaintiff violated CUTPA by engaging in a number of unfair and deceptive trade practices and by making numerous deceptive statements to the defendants. Since CUTPA expressly permits the court to award “costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees based on the work reasonably performed by an attorney”;
We agree with the plaintiff, however, that the defendants failed to present sufficient evidence at trial to
There is error, the judgment of the trial court is set aside with respect to the award of attorney’s fees and the case is remanded for further proceedings on that issue.
In this opinion Healey, Dannehy and Callahan, Js., concurred.
Notes
According to testimony presented at trial, the car actually belonged to and was driven by Charles House. Because Barco had determined that Charles House had insufficient credit to enter into the agreement, it required his father, Veota House, Sr., to cosign the agreement.
RISFA
Relying on CUTPA, Judge Hurley had awarded the defendants punitive damages of $19,193.52, which was twice the amount of their actual damages. See Bailey Employment Systems v. Hahn, 545 F. Sup. 62, 73 (D. Conn. 1982). The defendants’ CUTPA counterclaim is not an issue here because the defendants have not appealed from the judgment of the trial court, SehaUer, J., denying them punitive damages.
The provisions of RISFA do not expressly provide the retail buyer with specific remedies. Keyes v. Brown, 155 Conn. 469, 475, 232 A.2d 486 (1967).
We recognize that there are some cases and commentaries that have broadly suggested that the seller’s right to an offset coexists with the UCC’s remedial provisions for the buyer’s right to a refund of the purchase price. Several of these cases, however, are readily distinguishable from the instant case because they involve the buyer’s use of contract goods after he had exercised his right to revoke acceptance under § 2-608 of the UCC. Mobile Home Sales Management, Inc. v. Brown, 115 Ariz. 11, 19, 562 P.2d 1378 (1977); Stroh v. American Recreation & Mobile Home Corporation, 35 Colo. App. 196, 202, 530 P.2d 989 (1974); Lawrence v. Modem Mobile Homes, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 729, 732-33 (Mo. App. 1978); Jorgensen v. Pressnall, 274 Or. 285, 292, 545 P.2d 1382 (1976). No such facts pertain to this case. The remainder of these cases are likewise distinguishable because they do not appear to have taken into account the provisions of UCC § 2-718 (3), a significant factor in our analysis here. Orange Motors of Coral Gables, Inc., v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 258 So.2d 319, 321 (Fla. App. 1972); Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 155 N.J. Super. 373, 379, 382 A.2d 954 (1978); Moore v. Howard Pontiac-American, Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tenn. App. 1973); see also Computerized Radiological Services, Inc. v. Syntex Corporation, 595 F. Sup. 1495, 1511 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 786 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1986); American Container Corporation v. Hanley Trucking Corporation, 111 N.J. Super. 322, 334-35, 268 A.2d 313 (1970); Gawlick v. American Builders Supply, Inc., 86 N.M. 77, 79, 519 P.2d 313 (1974). To the extent that these cases purport to use an equitable balancing test, rather than a per se rule, in determining whether the seller is entitled to an offset, we agree that certain circumstances may compel the award of such an offset to the seller. See, e.g., Stroh v. American Recreation & Mobile Home Corporation, supra; Lawrence v. Modem Mobile Homes, Inc., supra; Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., supra; Moore v. Howard Pontiac-American, Inc., supra; W. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series (Sup. 1986) § 2-608:04, p. 91; J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code (2d Ed. 1980) p. 317; J. Phillips, “Revocation of Acceptance and the Consumer Buyer,” 75 Com. L.J. 354, 357 (1970).
According to testimony introduced by the plaintiff at trial, the fair rental value for such a car was approximately $475 per month on a two year basis. There was additional testimony that the defendants would have incurred an excess mileage charge of approximately $150 per month, resulting in an estimated fair rental value of $625 per month.
Prior to entering into the agreement with Barco, Charles House indicated to a Barco representative that he intended to use the car for business purposes. He subsequently changed his mind and decided that the car would be for personal use. The record fails to indicate whether House expressly notified Barco of this change in circumstances.
We note, by way of analogy, that an infant who enters into a contract is, as a general rule, entitled to void that contract upon reaching majority, regardless of any misrepresentations of age made by the infant. See 1 Restatement (Second), Contracts (1981) § 14, comment c, p. 40; S. Williston, Contracts (3d Ed. 1959) § 245, p. 63. A consumer buyer is arguably similarly entitled to rescind a contract under RISFA, regardless of any misrepresentations he may have made to the seller.
Because the plaintiff is the party that seeks the offset, it bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to such an award under applicable principles of equity. See, e.g., Lopinto v. Haines, 185 Conn. 527, 535, 441 A.2d 151 (1981); Bronson & Townsend Co. v. Battistoni, 167 Conn. 321, 326, 355 A.2d 299 (1974).
As one commentator has pointed out, even in those circumstances where the seller is arguably entitled to an offset, giving “the seller an offset against the price for the benefit conferred on the buyer in using the goods is unfair” unless the buyer is also given “a credit for the benefit the seller has realized from the use of the money he has been paid by the buyer.” W. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series (Sup. 1986) § 2-608:04, p. 91.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting in part. Although I agree with part I and part III of the majority opinion, I disagree
This backhanded award of punitive damages, which the trial court, Schaller, J., denied after finding that misstatements of the defendants “were a major contributing factor to, if not the producing cause of, the violations involved,” is achieved by permitting the defendants to receive the payments they made without any allowance for the benefits they received from the transaction. The value of these benefits, based upon the defendants’ use of the car for a twenty-six month period at a reasonable rental value of $625 per month, according to testimony not rejected by the trial court, was $16,150.1 The majority opinion approves the action of the trial court in making no allowance in its decree of rescission for this substantial benefit that the defendants have retained, thus ignoring the principle that he who seeks equity must first do equity. “It is the general rule that, where one seeks the advantage of a rescission of a contract ... he should not be permitted to retain the consideration received by him.” Beckwith v. Cowles, 85 Conn. 567, 570-71, 83 A. 1113 (1912). We have expressly held this equitable doctrine applicable to a rescission pursuant to RISFA. Keyes v. Brown, supra. “As a condition precedent to a rescission, the [buyers] were required to allege and prove that they had restored or offered to restore [the seller] to its former condition as nearly as possible.” Id.
In order to justify the lopsided rescission ordered by the trial court, the majority opinion reaches beyond
RISFA expressly provides, as a civil penalty for a “wilful violation” of any of its requirements, only that the owner or holder of the retail instalment contract shall be barred from “recovery of any finance, delinquency or collection charge.”
The majority opinion has selected
Section 42a-2-711, which sets forth the remedies available for a revocation of acceptance pursuant to
The majority opinion does not attempt to distinguish a rescission following revocation of acceptance pursuant to
If the UCC were at all applicable to a nonconformity of documents claimed to have had some effect on a buyer, a more appropriate provision would be § 42a-2-714, which allows a buyer to recover any provable damages, direct or consequential, that he has sustained because of a nonconformity of goods he has accepted, without the necessity of revocation, prompt or otherwise. This remedy as a supplement to the rescission approved in Keyes v. Brown, supra, would adequately redress any loss sustained by a buyer where the rescission remedy is inadequate. In seeking to go beyond compensating buyers for any losses actually sustained and to impose a forfeiture unrelated to actual injuries suffered, however, the majority opinion goes well beyond our proper judicial role. It is not for this court by creating more severe punishments to attempt to curb violations of statutes, remedial or otherwise, for which the legislature has provided specific penalties. To the extent that the present sanctions for RISFA violations may be inadequate, the forum for modificaton is the General Assembly.
I also disagree with the portion of the opinion that attempts to justify on other grounds the failure of the trial court to offset the substantial benefit received by the defendants against their recovery of their payments. It is rank speculation to assume that the $6600 received by the plaintiff in reselling the car at wholesale, plus whatever return was derived from its retention of the periodic payments during the twenty-six month period, would even approximately equal the value of the use of the car during the same period. If the defendants had rented the car from the plaintiff at a monthly rental corresponding to the $16,250 total
I would remand the case for further proceedings to determine the amount of a reasonable allowance for use of the automobile to offset against the refund due the defendants, as well as for a further hearing on the award of attorney’s fees.
See footnote 6 of the majority opinion.
In addition to the civil penalties of