This is an action of tort to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the sale of intoxicating liquor by the defendant to the plaintiff’s minor son. There was evidence that the son, who was between seventeen and eighteen years of age, purchased a quart of wine at the defendant’s store at about eight “o’clock on the evenmg”of MarchT26, 1938; that, after he had consumed most of the wine, he went to a moving picture theatre from which he was removed by a police officer at about half past nine o’clock on account of disorderly conduct; that he returned to the defendant’s store and purchased a small quantity of wmsicey, winch Jie drank; that later he met TwWtriMdJ^ufTefi!sed~to go home with them; that after drinking the whiskey he lost consciousness and remembered nothing until he found himself in the police station, whither he had been taken after his arrest at about midnight for an assault with intent to commit rape; ■ that he subsequently pleaded guilty to tho,t offence in the Superior Court and was sentenced to State Prison. The son lived with the plaintiff, to whom he contributed a part of his earnings. The plaintiff excepted to the ruling directing a verdict for the defendant.
The first count of the declaration alleged a sale of intoxicating liquor by the defendant to the minor “in violation of the General Laws of the Commonwealth”; that the minor consumed said liquor and thereby became intoxicated; and
Statute 1933, c. 376, § 2, substituted a new chapter 138 for the old chapter. This new chapter in § 34, as amended by St. 1937, c. 424, § 5, provides, in so far as material, that “whoever makes a sale or delivery of any such [alcoholic] beverages or alcohol to any person under twenty-one years of age . . . shall be punished by a fine” or by imprisonment or both. The plaintiff relies upon a violation of this section to support the count. But the mere violation of this statute, in and of itself and apart from and independent oi any other"§round, does not give the plaintiff a cause of action to recover damages. The statute does not expressly or by necessary implication manifest any legislative intent that its violation shall have that effect. The ruling of the judge directing a verdict for the defendant upon the first count was right. Palmigiani v. D’Argenio,
The remaining count of the declaration is based upon negligence of the defendant in selling liquor to the plaintiff’s minor son which, it is alleged, resulted in disgrace and shame • to the plaintiff, the expenditure of money for the defence of
A person who is injured on account of the criminal act of another ought not to be allowed to impose liability upon a third person on the ground that the negligence of the latter was an efficient and contributing cause of the crime, unless the act of the third person was such that be ought to have reasonably anticipated that the, commission of crime would result from his act. It has been held that the perpetration of a crime is not the natural and probable consequence of furnishing intoxicating liquor to the criminal. Belding v. Johnson,
The plaintiff is pursuing a common law remedy to recover damages for expenses incurred and loss of services sustained on account of a wrong suffered by his son which, he alleges, was caused by the negligence of the defendant. Horgan v. Pacific Mills,
The cases of Colburn v. Spencer,
Exceptions overruled.