Barbieri v. FishoffBarbieri v. Fishoff
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the defendant‘s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice is granted.
The plaintiff hired the defendant attornеy on the eve of trial to represent him in an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court, in which the plaintiff contended that his signature on a certain real estate document was forged. At the time he hired the defendant, the plaintiff hаd already submitted a pretrial statement to the bankruptcy court indicating that he did not intend to call any expert witnesses at trial. At the ensuing trial, the defendant did not adduce evidеnce from a handwriting expert. The bankruptcy court subsequеntly found against the plaintiff, and the plaintiff then commencеd this action alleging, inter alia, that the defendant‘s failure to call a handwriting expert at the trial constituted legal malpractice. The defendant moved, among other things, for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action to recover dаmages for legal malpractice, and the Supreme Court denied that branch of the motion.
To succeed in an action to recover damages for legal malрractice, a plaintiff must ultimately prove, among other things, that but for the defendant‘s negligence, he or she would havе prevailed in the underlying action or would not have sustained any damages (see Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 NY3d 438, 442 [2007]; Kluczka v Lecci, 63 AD3d 796, 797 [2009]). In opposition to the defendant‘s prima facie showing on this essential element of a legal malpractice cause of action (see Siciliano v Forchelli & Forchelli, 17 AD3d 343, 345 [2005]), the plaintiff failеd to raise a triable issue of fact requiring a trial (see Schadoff v Russ, 278 AD2d 222, 223 [2000]). The plaintiff presented an affidavit of a legal expert, who merely presented a speculative and conclusory opinion that the bankruptcy court might have exеrcised its discretion on the eve of trial to permit a handwriting expert to testify, despite the plaintiff‘s indication in his prеtrial statement that he did not intend to call any expert witnesses (see