Jаmes BARBER, Appellant, v. Joseph SCHMIDT, Bryan Brandenburg, Sam Edwards, Carmen Gutierrez, Jack L. Earl, Jr. Michael Alexander, Anthony Garcia, Sam Williams, and Tommy Patterson, Appellees. Jack L. EARL, Jr., Appellant, v. Joseph SCHMIDT, Bryan Brandenburg, Sam Edwards, Carmen Gutierrez, Michael Alexander, Anthony Garcia, Sam Williams, Tommy Patterson, and James Barber, Appellees.
Nos. S-15141, S-15152
Supreme Court of Alaska
July 31, 2015
Jack L. Earl, Jr., pro se, Juneau, Appellant. John K. Bodick, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellees Joseph Schmidt, Bryan Brandenburg, Sam Edwards, and Carmen Gutierrez.
Before: FABE, Chief Justice, WINFREE, STOWERS, MAASSEN, and BOLGER, Justices.
STOWERS, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Six Alaska prisoners jointly filed a pro se putative class-action complaint against various Department of Corrections officials. Their complaint detailed 18 causes of action, many of which address changes in Department policy regarding inmate purсhase and possession of gaming systems and restrictions on mature-rated video games.
One of the prisoners moved for class certification and for appointment of counsel. The superior court denied the class action motion on the grounds that pro se plaintiffs сannot represent a class, and denied the appointment of counsel motion as well. The Department moved for dismissal of the prisoners’ complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The superior court granted this motion on the ground that all of the claims were class action claims that could not be pursued.
Two of the plaintiffs, Jack L. Earl, Jr. and James Barber, each filed an appeal. They argue that the superior court erred in denying the motion for class certification, denying the motion for apрointment of counsel, and dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We consolidated the appeals. We affirm the superior court‘s denials of class certification and appointment of counsel, but we reverse thе dismissal of the action and remand for further proceedings.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In May 2012 Alaska prisoners Jack L. Earl, Jr., Michael Alexander, Anthony Garcia, Sam Williams, Tommy Patterson, and James Barber, all signing on the same complaint, collectively filed a putative class-action complaint agаinst Department of Corrections Commissioner Joseph Schmidt and other Department officials.2 The complaint detailed 18 causes of action, alleging violations of their rights under both the Alaska and United States Constitutions. Many of the alleged
Earl moved for class certification under
The superior court denied Earl‘s motion for class certification on the grounds that a pro se plaintiff cannot represent a class in a class-action lawsuit. The сourt also ruled that there was “no provision in [Alaska] statutes or the Alaska Administrative Code for appointment of counsel to inmates for prison rights litigation.” Finally, the court concluded that since the class could not be certified and since there were no claims that werе not class-action claims, the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. It therefore dismissed the complaint. Earl and Barber each filed appeals, which we consolidated.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the denial of class certification for abuse of discretion,3 the denial of a motion to appoint counsel for abuse of discretion,4 and the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted de novo.5
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying The Prisoners’ Motion For Class Certification.
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, the claims оr defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
The issue in this case involves the fourth prong of
Earl concedes that, given our decision in Hertz, the fourth prong of
B. The Supеrior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying The Prisoners’ Motion To Appoint Counsel.
We have held that “an indigent person does not have a right to appointed counsel in most civil cases.”13 However, we have allowed the appointment of counsel in “certain civil cases or quasi-civil proceedings by relying on the principles that justify appointment of counsel in criminal proceedings.”14 We have required the appointment of counsel in cases that involve “termination of parental rights, child custody, paternity suits, and civil contempt proceedings for nonpayment of child support.”15
In Midgett v. Cook Inlet Pre-Trial Facility, 53 P.3d 1105 (Alaska 2002), we noted that the pro se plaintiffs did not fall into one of “the already recognized exceptions for appointment of counsel in a civil proceeding.”16 However, rather than ending our analysis there, we considered whether the plaintiffs’ due process rights might have been violated under the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) balancing test.18 This test provides:
that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: [f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and [third], the Government‘s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute рrocedural requirement would entail. [19]
In Midgett, we held that a claimant‘s economic interests were “not particularly compelling” under Mathews and were certainly less compelling than the aforementioned contexts in which appointment of counsel is required.20 We further held that, while Mid-
Earl‘s motion for appointment of counsel makes clear that none of the categories for which we have required appointment of counsel apply. We next consider the due process analysis. Barber and Earl complain of the Department‘s policies regarding gaming systems and restrictions on mature-rated video games. They argue that these policies pertain to their economic interests (e.g., the possession of property). Thus Midgett is dispositive: These economic interests are insufficient to require the appointment of counsel as a matter of due process.
The appointment of counsel in this context is not required by our jurisprudence, and thus the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying Earl‘s motion.
C. It Was Error To Dismiss The Prisoners’ Complaint For Failure To State A Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted.
We have previously considered Civil Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss with specific regard to pro se prisoners.23 In Larson v. State, Department of Corrections, 284 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2012), we emphasized the standard quoted above, reiterating that “a complaint must be libеrally construed” and a “motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is viewed with disfavor and should rarely be granted.”24 We further held that a complaint should not be dismissed “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to some form of relief.”25
The superior court ruled that there were no claims in the case that were not class-action claims. But there were six plaintiffs individually named on the complaint filed in superior court. The named plaintiffs, including Barber and Earl, sought to assert claims “on behalf of themselves” and othеr Alaska prisoners allegedly affected by the Department‘s policy changes and to challenge the substance of those changes. All of the plaintiffs signed the complaint. We construe the statement that the named plaintiffs were asserting claims “on behalf of themselvеs” as meaning they each were asserting claims in their individual capacity. They also sought to assert claims on behalf of “all other persons who are now or will be similarly situated“: this phrase is the basis for the prisoners’ effort to bring a class action.
Taking the allegations in the cоmplaint as true—as we must when evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim26—the Department‘s policy changes apply to all of the named plaintiffs similarly. The named plaintiffs in their individual capacities may be entitled to individual relief. We therefore conclude that it was error for the superior court to dismiss the case on the grounds that no individual claims were stated in the complaint.27
We AFFIRM the superior court‘s denial of Earl‘s motion for class certification. We also AFFIRM the court‘s denial of Earl‘s motion for appointment of counsеl. We REVERSE the court‘s dismissal of the prisoners’ complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.