*1 Dist., G036448. Fourth Div. Three. June [No. 2007.] BARBER, LEROY Plaintiff and Appellant, CHANG,
WILLIAM WU-YE Defendant Respondent.
Counsel for Plaintiff and Forensis and Michael J. Emling Ending Appellant. Wianecki, W. and Dana C. Clark Law Offices of Richard J. Paul Rosenfield Defendant and Respondent.
Opinion from trial court’s sum ARONSON, J.Leroy entry Barber appeals William Wu-Ye Chang, on his claim judgment negligence mary Barber. Barber where a tenant shot complex owner small apartment reduce risk of harm had a measures to contends Chang adopt tenant, and claims triable issues of exist by potentially violent fact posed had recently to written notice tenant whether Chang responded reasonably *4 Chang We conclúde failed shotgun brandished a another visitor and tenant. no to to his burden on to show he owed carry summary judgment initial undertake burdensome to alleviate the risk minimally posed by measures violent tenant. we reverse Accordingly, judgment.
I BACKGROUND FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL into one of the Barber and Chanda moved longtime companion, King, had two four units in in 1995. The Chang’s apartment couple young complex children, son, also lived with them. and Chanda’s 6-year-old Christopher, son, Daniel, in That same Carol and moved into another unit year, her Gray mother, old time. Chanda’s Daniel was about at the complex. years Jean into own unit in in 1996. King, Chang’s complex Jean moved her described Daniel “an odd kid.” Over the Daniel Gray years periodically as left with as on things pet other tenants such argued concerning droppings or of visiting common He often took apartments lawn. pictures people in him. annoyed tenants activities engaging claimed Daniel’s out in 2002. later May They Barber and Chanda moved Barber and into a confrontation between harassment had escalated physical lawn. called the had on the Barber Daniel over whose defecated dogs incident; to but did not the matter he police concerning report Anaheim in their rent were behind Barber and Chanda Chang. According Chang, out, “in bad they apartment very shape.” when moved and left they and other services handyman to clean the perform Daniel offered apartment for Chang exchange credit towards rent. When Daniel Chang agreed, and his moved into girlfriend the apartment.
Chanda returned to the often because her son complex gener- Christopher Jean, ally resided there with he so could enrolled at the stay local high school. According between of 2002 and Chang, “May March had Leroy Barber been only back a few At apartments occasions. no time those few did Daniel during visits ever confront Barber.” Gray Leroy
By Daniel had reached April adulthood still lived in Chang’s 4, 2004, On April Chanda complex. off at mother’s dropped Christopher her and, van, vehicle, as she her leave circled the prepared Daniel snapping first, He remained photographs. silent but Chanda two or three bumped exclaimed, times as she made her to the driver’s way seat. He then “Leave alone,” him,” me “Bring over here and Leroy I’ll take care “Bring Leroy here. here” him and “Don’t bother Bring me.” Jean incident witnessed the and saw Daniel run to his settled into up apartment Chanda the van. van, from his
emerged with toward apartment shotgun, ran Chanda’s aimed the at her vehicle as she gun down Daniel said departed alley. and did not nothing but pull trigger, turned and trained the simply shotgun on Jean as he climbed the back stairs to his apartment.
Terrified, Jean retreated unit. to her The next she sent a letter day, certified son, Wei Chang’s who The stated: Chang, managed letter fourplex. “Last I had an incident with Daniel me night that has scared to death. At home, about PM Chanda came over she bring got Chris when 8[:]15 [and] *5 out of the van Daniel came to his window and started at ‘leave my us yelling minutest;] Chanda the family came into house and about stayed alone[.]’ the-van, when she left she was the came putting puppy Daniel] [and down the stairs and around running ran the van 3 or times ‘leave screaming my Chanda asked him what the matter he family just was alone[.]’ [but] screamed[;] leave, then she van got into the to he ran and came upstairs [and] right back down with a ran out back and to the of the shotgun, garages at the the van as it went around the comer. He then back pointed gun came towards the front at me pointing my family and ‘Leave gun again yelling ” alone[.]’ him[;]
Jean’s letter continued: “I have done of fact I to as a matter nothing have out to from I realize has bad gone my way stay away him. that he but that . and feelings Leroy, about to take out on . . my daughter my Chris, inexcusable. grandson is He has he is constantly harassed point afraid to be out even when Daniel is around. I did not call the police, [][] because I don’t want but I life. any truthftilly more trouble am afraid for my [!]... [1] I hope that you can do something about this problem so that will I home, this that can discuss Please call me so we feel safe in again my [f] has advised here . . . The her [security guard workplace] matter. [at H] [f] aim a gun is a to felony me I should have called the it police, trouble, Please more But as I don’t want really any I said before anyone. [f] me with this matter.” help he advised her he received the letter. He Jean when
Chang telephoned unless filed a report action as a landlord” she police could “take with He she suggested speak obtained a order Daniel. also restraining incident. Daniel’s mother about the 28, 2004, later, to three Barber visited April complex
About weeks a tool nor her mother had told retrieve from Jean’s Neither Chanda garage. rummaged him about the 4th incident with Daniel. As Barber about April tool, he in the he Daniel. Accord- spotted heard footsteps alley. Turning, Barber, Daniel were and and stared ing eyes “very bulgy big,” Daniel’s Daniel him no Then Barber “heard up “with words whatsoever.” exchanged “a which After bunch his was above apartment, up garages.” around,” Daniel and . . like was chairs throwing . he booming banging, in his hand.” around the comer 12-gauge pump reappeared, “flying a] [with Barber, he later Barber did not know Daniel had called 911. According . . . told that he armed with a shotgun learned Daniel “had Anaheim PD was me, and he me and shoot which that was come down and going interrogate felled he did.” Barber of his exactly stalking family, what Daniel accused teeth, with a out one of Barber’s Barber blast to the kicked shotgun leg, area.” then in Barber’s “rectal leg, gun wounded stomped placed inflicting Barber and Daniel another wound jumped, trigger, pulled and, in which Daniel held Barber’s The arrived after standoff leg. police gun police Barber’s surrendered shotgun temple, finally subdued him. The filed cause action for negligence.
Barber complaint alleging care” Barber “a of reasonable alleged Chang owed complaint generally The from harm.” and “a to take reasonable action to protect plaintiff *6 take care to also breached his Chang by “failing alleged complaint threats and Plaintiff from known reasonable to provide security steps at the premises.” conditions rented present matter, his described Chang telephone
At his in this Wei deposition I said was you he her letter: “What conversation with Jean after received file a need to you call have to file a And you police have to the police, report. I, a or manager, are that landlord order because these things restraining forceful than that’s a little more act I have documentation cannot until upon what one tenant of another.” says According to he treated letter Chang, Jean’s matter,” as “a threat, serious “I think that this is a it acknowledging, if true.” Chang later stated in his that he deposition “believed” Jean’s account of 4th But in incident. the declaration he April filed subsequently motion, he summary judgment referred to repeatedly Daniel’s as a history “good tenant” and to Jean incident an that was have “reporting supposed to 4, 2004, occurred (Italics wherein Daniel April [G]ray brandished shotgun.” added.) Chang stressed in his he declaration “had never received any about Daniel complaints Gray do with kind of having any violence whatsoever.” moved for on
Chang summary judgment solely he owed ground Barber no of care. focused on Chang’s separate statement whether he had a only hire security guards from prevent harming visitors claimed “there complex. Chang was no reasonable that security measure should have been in and is unreasonable for a to be place” landlord “[i]t to hire a expected guard to who security have protect may non-resident confrontation with a tenant when the decides to visit non-resident an premises at unknown date and time . . . .” these claims 'Chang supported witness, with a declaration from his who concluded expert incident “[t]his was not on foreseeable based crimes that have previous occurred on incidents, There is no premises. history similar prior shootings crimes violence at this location.”
n In his Barber contended triable of fact sum- opposition, precluded issues and mary claim his that “so judgment repeated Chang complaint managed the was negligently premises unreasonable plaintiff exposed risk of harm.” In Barber from who support, presented declaration his expert, Chang should have opined Daniel’s assault on reported felonious Jean Chanda to the hired tenants police security and invitees. guards protect motion, The trial Chang’s court and Barber granted now appeals.
II
STANDARD OF REVIEW We review a de grant summary (Wiener novo. v. Southcoast judgment Centers, Childcare Inc. review, (Wiener).) our de novo we performing employ “First, we
three-step analysis. the issues raised identify by pleadings. Second, we determine sum- whether movant established entitlement to is, that whether the mary judgment, movant showed the could opponent Third, any raised its prevail theory by the movant has met pleadings. if burden, we consider whether the raised triable fact.” issues of opposition *7 1]; 936, (2006) Cal.Rptr.3d 939-940 (Hawkins v. Wilton 144 Cal.App.4th [51 849-855, 826, (2001) 25 Cal.4th Co. see also v.Atlantic Aguilar Richfield burden, 841, the defendant must To the 493].) P.3d shift Cal.Rptr.2d [107 demonstrate case or element of the necessary plaintiff’s conclusively negate (Hawkins, supra, a trial. there issue of material fact requiring is no triable in the 940.) judgment If the evidence does support favor, without considering we must reverse summary judgment defendant’s is (Ibid.) we evaluate viewed the evidence. evidence Any plaintiff’s opposing we strictly the the losing party; in most favorable light plaintiff doubts or any evidentiary evidence and resolve scrutinize defendant’s (Wiener, in favor. Cal.4th at ambiguities the plaintiff’s m
DISCUSSION Liability A. Landowner Third Criminal Assaults Party in Barber’s we appeal, briefly Before issues raised turning specific á summarize the used in when legal determining applicable principles assault landowner owes a alleviate the risk of a third criminal duty to party on tenants and invitees. is “that the of are when it shown
The elements established negligence owed that the defendant breached legal duty, defendant the plaintiff injuries breach cause of suffered duty, proximate legal and was (1993) (Ann M. Center by Shopping plaintiff.” Plaza Pacific “ (Ann M.).) ‘[E]very [negli Cal.Rptr.2d 207] are rule that all governed persons case is of gence] by general application as the being injured to use care to others from required ordinary prevent to use The a legal duty result of their conduct.’ existence of [Citation.] law for the care of reasonable factual situation particular question However, of that court to decide. the elements breach [Citation.] fact for the determination. causation are ordinarily [Cita questions jury’s Investments, Inc. 118 Cal.App.4th v. Residential (Vasquez tion.]” (Vasquez).) M., these Ann Court applied principles California Supreme is now well established that of landowners: “It general describing land in their possession law landowners to maintain California requires landlord, and, of a this case control in a safe condition” reasonably “[i]n maintenance, has been owed to tenants and patrons, which is general duty common areas include the to take reasonable secure steps held to in the that are to occur likely criminal acts third parties foreseeable *8 1464 M., (Ann supra, 6
absence of such measures.” Cal.4th precautionary at 674.) affirmative duty But “a to take p. action control the acts to. of wrongful a third be will where conduct party imposed only such can be reasonably (Id. 676.) at anticipated.” For example, condominium owners association is liable for potentially injuries caused third by criminal conduct where party the aware of association was similar on the past crimes occurring property (Frances T.v. of Village and circumstances making a similar occurrence likely. Green Owners Assn. 490, (1986) 456, 42 Cal.3d 501-503 Cal.Rptr. [229 v. Peterson San Francisco Dist. Community College 573]; P.2d 723 see also 799, (1984) 842, 36 Cal.3d 807 685 P.2d Cal.Rptr. [205 1193] [landowner “in liable circumstances where the potentially has reasonable cause possessor the anticipate misconduct of third persons”].) Thus, tenant, when the third is crime committed party by foreseeability [‘notice the turns whether landlord had of for propensity [the tenant’s] (Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 578, violence.” Cal.App.4th Madhani v. Cooper (2003) 106 832]; accord, 412, Cal.Rptr.3d [22 Cal.App.4th (Madhani) tenant’s for Cal.Rptr.2d [citing [130 “known proclivity 778] Davis v. assaults”]; verbal and making physical (1989) Gomez 207 Cal.App.3d 1401, 1406 whether shown . . . Cal.Rptr. tenant “had [question [255 743] .was tendencies”; dangerous where disclosed summary judgment review proper “no evidence whatsoever of the ‘brandishing exhibiting’ appel- which Sturgeon Curnutt refer”]; 301, (1994) lants Cal.Rptr.2d. suggested ha[d], evidence” the “tenant violent propensi- 498] [“no v. Trax Delgado ties or while firearms see also drinking”]; unsafely handle[d] Bar & Grill 224,
(Delgado) “similar” ones].) incidents not “identical” [prior required, prior ais “crucial factor” in of
Foreseeability determining the existence only M., (Ann supra, the legal landowner’s büt its Cal.4th at duty, “scope.”1 M., Ann 678.) the court “the of pp. the explained scope determined in by of the harm balancing part foreseeability ‘ burden to be cases where the burden of imposed. preventing “[I]n [Citation.] future harm is of degree foreseeability required. be great, high may hand, other On the in cases where are reasons strong there policy [Citation.] harm, means, for can preventing the harm be by prevented simple ’ ” (Id. 678-679.) lesser be degree may foreseeability required.” pp. 1 “ Other factors bear on the and scope legal duty, degree also existence of a such as: ‘[T]he certainty plaintiff injury, suffered of the between the closeness connection suffered, injury defendant’s conduct and the defendant’s moral blame attached to the conduct, harm, policy preventing future burden defendant and extent of the consequences community liability imposing resulting to ‘the care with exercise ” breach, cost, M., (Ann availability, and the prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.’ supra, 6 Cal.4th fn. standard, con- court in Ann M. foreseeability the heightened
Applying “did not in that case defendant landowner’s cluded the of the scope *9 674.) (Id. areas.” at p. in the common guards include providing security costs, financial and social security significant guards imposes Because hiring conduct is not well to deter criminal and because providing “adequate patrols in to find that the defined,” order required a of degree foreseeability “high (Id. at of security guards.” a of care includes the hiring of landlord’s scope duty 679.) p. duty are a nevertheless may
Where not landowner’s guards required, tenants less to the risk of harm to posed include burdensome alleviate steps in absence of Delgado, and invitees. As the Court explained Supreme “[T]he no in case that defendant owed heightened merely signifies this foreseeability other similarly to or undertake duty guards special-relationship-based provide measures; it that defendant owed burdensome does preventative signify . . .” duty (Delgado, supra, no other to special-relationship-based plaintiff. duty or bar has a to 245.) Cal.4th at For a restaurant p. example, proprietor inflicted injury by warn of known and to from dangers protect patrons patrons (Id. other measures include may telephoning guests. [preventive assistance].) for police
“When the balance of all relevant factors in favor of weigh imposing others, a to of a someone from conduct duty protéct ‘special relationship’ (Titus (2004) is said to exist.” Lake Owners Assn. Canyon Property “ 807].) is thus ‘Special relationship’ facts, a in of light label conclusion considered ‘simply expressing ” considerations, care.’ duty the existence of a of pertinent legal support (Ibid.] University see also 17 Cal.3d Regents of California Tarasoff v. of duties are not discoverable [“legal Cal.Rptr. that, nature, in of a facts but cases merely conclusory expressions noted, done”].) a As imposed damage should be particular type, liability to take reasonable general duty landlord’s of maintenance includes the duty third criminal acts—where to secure common areas steps party M., (Ann these these acts are Cal.4th With foreseeable. mind, we in this turn the issues raised principles appeal. Duty His Initial Burden to Show He Owed No Chang B. Failed Meet Care care Barber because Daniel’s contends he owed no duty
Chang incident did not argues brandishing assault was not foreseeable. He harm, only a would arise if duty risk of “notice” Daniel posed provide violent incidents was had learned there “evidence of prior potentially Chang his duties as a also argues involving discharging weapon.” Chang [Daniel] landlord did not extend to it Barber because was unforeseeable Barber would n visit asserts no property. Finally, Chang facts support finding heightened and therefore he owed foreseeability no duty any prevent harm We potential hiring security these in the by guards. address issues order raised. Barber’s “a alleged owed to take reasonable complaint Chang action
. from harm.” no arose protect Chang argues as matter of [Barber] law because there is no evidence had discharged an weapon words, earlier other incident. In the law contends Chang requires showing Daniel had committed a nearly identical crime to the one inflicted prior Barber before had a to act. Chang is mistaken. To Chang establish *10 similar the law heightened foreseeability, “prior criminal incidents requires (or other indications of a foreseeable risk of reasonably violent criminal location) that and does a of prior nearly require showing assaults .not identical criminal incidents.” (Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at For p. a bank does not a landlord notice example, robbery put to guard against sexual assault on the but crimes of and property, prior theft vandalism may Arman, make the crime of P. v. a Sharon robbery (See foreseeable occurrence. Ltd. 1181, (1999) 35, 21 Cal.4th P.2d,121] 1197-1198 Cal.Rptr.2d 989 [91 (Sharon P.).) Notably, here does involve the foreseeability question M., (Ann of supra, 678) “endemic” Cal.4th prospect violence 6 generally (Saelzler a universe of Advanced 400 “unknown assailants” v. (2001) Group or 763, 617,. 766 rather Cal.Rptr.2d 1143]),. but a [107 threat, i.e., tenant identified a particular as Daniel.
Here, Jean’s account of 4th' incident demonstrated Daniel com- April mitted the misdemeanor offense of a in an and brandishing shotgun angry Code, 417, (Pen. and, loaded, threatening (a)) manner if the subd. was gun § Code, (Pen. 245, a felony (a)(1); offense assault with firearm. subd. § People Lucas see (1997) 732-735 [64 death a [shooting foreseeable as natural and of either probable consequence or brandishing assault with a alert deadly This would weapon].) reasonably landlord prudent Daniel risk of serious to other tenants and posed injury invitees. own evidence established he knew the remained Chang’s threat statement, particularly acute Barber. Jean According Chang’s separate “did not Wei safety, just King express concerns to about her any Chang concern Leroy about (Italics added.) Barber.” statement Chang’s separate further described Barber Gray’s intended “As Chanda target: King alleg- door, around the van side edly attempted go to the driver’s Daniel Gray told him allegedly King ‘Bring Leroy Bring Chanda here. here’ ‘Don’t ”me.’ bother event, at his that any Chang himself deposition, recognized threat, tru.e,” if “a it and also testified he represented letter] [Jean’s Chang with brandishes a tenant who We “believed” Jean’s account. agree Jean described by poses threats in manner uttering while gun his failed to meet Chang of harm to others. Consequently, foreseeable risk notice, to take he no on lack of owed based demonstrating duty, initial burden M., (See Ann to others. to reduce the risk of harm Daniel posed measures in the context of the existence Cal.4th at [foreseeability law].) duty is question that he owed no also
Chang moving papers suggested (See Palsgraf v. care Barber because Barber was not a foreseeable plaintiff. Island R. R. Co. Long 99].) N.Y. N.E. Specifically, and, accordingly, came over to the apartmentfs]” noted Barber Chang “rarely “in the off chance he no to take steps claimed owed Chang protective But in his Chang acknowledged that Barber come onto the m[ight] premises.” had Given that periodically. statement Barber visited the separate apartments living knew Barber had a “common law” mother-in-law Chang stepson foreseeable. Like other reasonably any Barber’s was property, presence moreover, Barber was entitled to reasonable,protection visitor property, Hardin v. Elvitsky (See (1965) 232 from harm on the Cal.App.2d premises. invitee, visitor is the landlord’s irrespective Cal.Rptr. 748] [“the of whether for the or the tenant’s business purpose, the visit is visitor’s *11 licensee whether the as a social or other guest gratuitous visitor comes mere Baca Lopez 1008,1015 tenant”]; (2002) of the 98 Cal.App.4th [120 see also v. to tenants and duty is well settled that landowners owe a Cal.Rptr.2d 281] [“It invitees”].) Barber could not show the
Chang’s summary judgment motion asserted a to guards. to hire heightened foreseeability required duty security impose above, As focused on demon- solely described statement Chang’s separate But duty. no facts of this strating supported Chang imposition particular as a landlord included failed to address whether maintenance duty to with the foreseeable risk measures less burdensome than deal hiring guards Court Delgado explained, in the “sliding-scale As the posed. Supreme heightened foreseeability formula” for balancing determining duty requires landowners, “but measures on a before imposing burdensome protective degree a of a lesser showing burden be may imposed upon minimal foreseeability.” (Delgado, supra, 243.) at p. 36 Cal.4th “a to reason owed him take duty
Barber’s complaint alleged Chang Thus, based his pleaded to from Barber able action harm.” protect plaintiff a landowner to on the tenants recovery general protect theory violent tenant. This harm a potentially invitees from the risk of posed by and covers guards, than a to hire allegation specific duty security broader under, the circumstances measures” reasonable “minimally burdensome 1468
(Delgado, supra, 245), 36 Cal.4th at which p. include may investigating tenant, incident to determine whether evict the violent potentially threaten- tenant, evict or ing the aid of on a invoking credible of a police report brandishing M., crime committed by (See one tenant another. Ann 6 Cal.4th supra, at 679 p. duty includes the to exercise [“landowner’s reasonable care to discover that criminal acts are or are being to be likely land”]; 1832, committed on (1995) Donchin v. Guerrero 34 [his] Cal.App.4th 1847 Cal.Rptr.2d of eviction or eviction a [41 itself “lever of 192] [threat control” which landlord use could others protect on property]; Delgado, 36 Cal.4th at supra, 241 call p. [noting 911 see protective also option]; Madhani, lesser, 106 of eviction or [threat incrementally measures such as a protective security camera may inhibit tenant]; Rosales problem (1980) v. Stewart Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. tenant].) or threats persuasion dissuade may 660] [landlord’s
Our Supreme, Court has observed that a call is a “placing well recognized generally minimally burdensome method of seeking assis- (Morris tance.” De La Torre Morris, (Morris).) P.3d a member had seized gang who
knife from restaurant kitchen stabbed a while lot three patron parking restaurant looked on without aid. The Court employees summoning Supreme “there be recognized may situations in which that is response ‘appropriate and reasonable under includes circumstances’ not such call— making invitee, when so doing would increase the unreasonably to a danger patron, else employee, anyone (Ibid.) . . . legally upon .” On the premises however, record the court presented, could “conclude as a matter of law that defendant’s acted employees reasonably call declining place or undertake other any minimally burdensome measure behalf. plaintiff’s That issue must disputed by be resolved in connection with jury its determination of whether (Id. defendant breached his plaintiff.”
Here, we conclude the facts in Chang alleged moving summary failed to establish that judgment measures such simple protective calling the after Daniel’s were too police brandishing attack unreasonable or burden call, some as a matter law. the Chang of Jean should have suggested placed but attempting to shift onto another the onus of does not absolve a acting of landlord the to take the face duty simple measures in of preventative most, foreseeable harm. At actions invoking others have undertaken might merely suggests additional factors have may contributed shooting Barber’s injuries. But failed to causation as a resulting Chang ground identify event, for summary in his initial motion. In judgment causation and any the whether landlord’s conduct is “reasonable under the circumstances—that is, care,” whether there was a breach of the of defendant’s are generally of (Nola fact for a M. questions jury. v. Southern University of California
1469 Thus, 97].) while we (1993) 426-427 Cal.App.4th as a matter of failed in his establish moving have determined Chang papers of his it the' scope duty, law that measures were simple beyond protective for future the circumstances as whether—considering remains determination the his tenant reasonably posed. to notice of whole—Chang danger responded breach, still remains the And even determines there was there jury “[i]f (Ibid injuries.” whether that breach was the cause of plaintiff’s question 278.) at Vasquez,supra, Cal.App.4th see p. sum, less burdensome than Chang’s hiring failure address measures of broadly theory recovery.2 did not refute Barber’s
security guards pleaded Wilton, (See, therefore his Hawkins v. carry failed to initial burden. Chang e.g., not at the motion did supra, negate Cal.App.4th [“because that theories trial court should have held employer liability, [defendant] there”].) initial failed to burden and carry Chang’s his stopped Consequently, failure to deal of his summary with this denial aspect duty required motion. judgment
We that we do not the issue of here. emphasize security guards decide While that was too burdensome Chang’s security guards contention hiring at some he have merit in these may prove subsequent point proceedings, Proc., (Code did not move for of that Civ. summary adjudication issue.3 437c, did (f)(1).) subd. relief he not Accordingly, we consider may § We therefore hold that the 4th incident only brandishing request. April undertaking rendered one or danger posed enough foreseeable minimally law—beyond more burdensome measures was not—as matter of landlord’s of maintenance on the scope Chang presented. facts Because failed to move for measures Chang summary judgment protective less burdensome than and therefore failed carry imposing security guards, “ ” initial burden of Barber’s ‘conclusively his element negate[]’ (Hawkins, we must reverse. complaint, remand,
For the benefit trial court on we observe that parties calculus is to security more with duty/foreseeability complex respect than for burdensome measures. Whether a protective less guards particular 2 (Singer Superior Court may plead negligence general ... terms.” party “[A] If, 305].) summary crafting motion for Cal.Rptr. Cal.2d Barber believed Chang security definite of the measures judgment, desired a more statement (Id. disposal. at his *13 Chang neglected, interrogatories discovery and other mechanisms were General, 56, 324; (1965) Cal.Rptr. Colvig v. RKO Inc. Cal.App.2d 75 p. see also [42 discretion, may, require complaint”].) the clarification of court its [“trial 3 claim, based on Chang sought summary adjudication only of Chanda’s loss consortium summarily adjudicated issue couple the fact were not married. The trial court favor, Chang’s appeal. no Chanda filed measure within falls of a landlord’s of care or scope duty is as precluded a matter of law on a depends formula” “sliding-scale balancing that weighs the burden foreseeability against the measure. (Delgado, supra, attending 243.) Cal.4th at Other factors determination. affect this may For example, Ann M. emphasized only social and financial costs of hiring security guards, but also the whether this uncertainty measure is an effective deterrent M., (Ann third against crimes. supra, party 679.) 6 Cal.4th at As the observed, Court Supreme has such considerations dictate “may ex of a panding landowner’s to include scope third protecting against crime, even party where there is sufficient evidence of foreseeability.” P., (Sharon 1189-1190, Cal.4th at fn. pp.
Here, issue, with the properly presented if trial court could consider the that burden hiring security guards would have on an individual owner of a unit, small apartment larger commercial enterprises residential opposed M., center in Ann like the also the benefit in shopping weigh net safety an invitee who made Pamela (See W. v. sporadic on the appearances property. Millsom (1994) be Cal.Rptr.2d may 690] [what a minimal burden for the owner of a or large building apartment shopping center create may significant for the of a four-unit hardships owner project].) Issues unresolved our remain by for the opinion parties address on remand as they choose.
rv
DISPOSITION The summary judgment is reversed. Barber is entitled to costs on appeal. J.,
Fybel, concurred. J., RYLAARSDAM, But Concurring. I concur. I write to note separately that it was because the limited of the landlord’s that was scope to the trial court that I presented to reverse the Not agree judgment. only existence of a landlord’s but also the of that duty, scope duty, question to determine the existence law. when scope “Foreseeability, of a analyzed (Ann is a M. v. duty, of law to be decided question court.” by Plaza Pacific Center Shopping 207], added.) italics , his motion for summary judgment defendant did not contradict
other measures he have taken would also exceed the of his might scope He asserted duty. only that he had no I guard service. provide agree *14 at this four-unit service guard 24-hour
that to impose provide would be unreason- incident of the brandishing because apartment complex burdensome. ably Center, the Ann M. v. Shopping Plaza Pacific center, In the inside her store. was raped who worked in a shopping
plaintiff, center, it failed negligently the she claimed the owner of suit against The court determined the rape. sufficient security prevent provide such that criminal conduct cause to anticipate owner did not have “reasonable unless it provided center would occur in the shopping premises as rape (Id. id. 676; see in the common areas.” security patrols Here, at a guard fourplex, a round-the-clock security the burden of hiring Ann M. the court did not incident, is extreme. In of the one light prior needed, If a were guard for an entire center. security guard shopping require than would at far less expense could have had one to him accompany plaintiff on the landlord. be imposed could have taken to act defendant
My colleagues suggest precautionary Jean, allegedly witnessing call the the person was to plaintiff police. protect act, that, reluctant she was initially stated in her although prior deposition so, When she did to the police. to do after the incident she brandishing speak be word was told “it would called and what she happened [her] explained investigate “would at least his.” she Although expected police done. was ever knowledge nothing fact that had a to her gun,” [Daniel] landlord, circumstances, who call from the these would a second Under incident, to result be more likely not claim to have witnessed the could And, not, the landlord’s that the breach of action? if how can we say police that police shooting injured incident to call contributed to the plaintiff? might that defendant also refer indirectly possibility
My colleagues tenant to evict a have a legal duty Daniel. But does a landlord have evicted witness reports fail to take action after purported where police had the have incurred liabilities a landlord might incident to them? What police unreasonable for a landlord require to be false? Is it report proved learns of after he eviction begin proceedings or a order to restraining report occurred here? allegedly brandishing an incident such as *15 These are issues that were not the trial court. In litigated in concurring the reversal of the I do not intend that the summary judgment, should opinion be read so as to the court preclude from such matters. considering