This suit is for the enforcement of the lien of special taxbills issued by Excelsior Springs, a city of the fourth class, in payment of the cost of paving a public street. Defendants, the owners of the property against which the taxbills were issued, demurred to the petition on the grounds, first, that the petition fails to state a cause of action and, second, that it does not show that the city “had any authority by law to páss its ordinance to pave the street therein mentioned for the reason that said ordinance could only be passed after the proper publication of a-resolution.” The demurrer was overruled. Defendants declined to plead further and, standing on the demurrer, brought the case here by appeal from the judgment rendered against them.
The petition is in three counts, but present purposes will be satisfied by a statement of the substance of one of them. It is alleged that an ordinance providing for the improvement was enacted and approved by the city; that pursuant thereto, a contract was made by the city with plaintiff; that the work was completed in accordance with the terms of the ordinance and contract and was accepted by the city, and that the .assessment was levied and the taxbill issued. There is an averment that “each and all of the requirements of the statutes and ordinances in regard to the work and improvements and the taxbill herein referred to were duly complied with.” The taxbill is set out in haec verba.
The courts of this State have held in a number of cases that in actions on special taxbills, the plaintiff is not required to plead compliance with the preliminary steps leading to the issuance of the taxbill. “It is sufficient for the plaintiff to allege in the first instance that the officers of the municipality duly authorized so to do have issued to him the special taxbill on which he sues setting out its provisions and stating that the defendants named therein are the owners of the lot sought to be charged. [Vieths v. The Planet, etc., Co.,
But defendant contends that this rule of pleading had its origin in statutes which as in the case of Hunt v. Hopkins, supra, specifically provided that “it shall be sufficient for plaintiff to plead the making and the issue of the taxbill sued on giving the dates and contents thereof and assignment thereof in case of assignment”
The statutes relating to cities of the fourth class do not contain a provision similar to that quoted but they do provide that “such special taxbills shall in any action thereon, be prima-facie evidence of the regularity of the proceedings for such special assessments, of the validity of the bill, of the doing of the work, and of the furnishing of the materials charged for and of the liability of the property to the charge stated in the bill.” [Section 5986, Revised Statutes 1899.] It is true this statute goes no further than to establish the character of a special taxbill as evidence and does not deal with the question of pleading. [Cushing v. Powell,
We do not consider that the case of Carthage v. Badgley,
The judgment is affirmed.
