In re Petition of Ross CIOPPA to Challenge and Strike the Nomination Petitions of Peter W. Zentner, Marilyn J. Stevens and Richard W. Masten. Appeal of Peter W. ZENTNER, Marilyn J. Stevens and Richard W. Masten. In re Nomination Petition of William BARANYAI, Jr., Gary Lang and Christine Grossman for the Nomination of the Democratic Party for Councilman for the Borough of Millvale, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, Appellants, v. Donald ANDREZJWSKI and John F. Kearney.
No. 36 W.D. Appeal Docket 1991; No. 37 W.D. Appeal Docket 1991
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Argued May 6, 1991. Decided June 2, 1993.
626 A.2d 146
Jay H. Spiegel, Pittsburgh, for appellee in No. 36.
Stanley B. Lederman, Pittsburgh, for appellants in No. 37.
Paul M. Daniels, Pittsburgh, for appellee in No. 37.
Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, MCDERMOTT, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and CAPPY, JJ.
OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
NIX, Chief Justice.
In these consolidated appeals we are asked to decide whether the requirements of the Public Official and Employee Ethics Act (“Ethics Act“),1 specifically with respect to the filing of financial interests statements, were complied with by six candidates seeking inclusion on the May, 1991, primary ballot for municipal office.
In the appeal docketed at No. 36 W.D. Appeal Docket 1991, the nomination petitions of Peter W. Zentner, Marilyn J. Stevens and Richard W. Masten, prospective candidates for council seats in the Borough of Braddock Hills, Allegheny County, were challenged via a petition to set aside by a qualified elector, Ross Cioppa, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. The reason advanced for this challenge centered on the candidates’ alleged failure to timely file their financial interests statements as required by Section 4(b) of the Ethics Act. The Ethics Act requires these statements be filed with the local governing authority on or before the last day for filing a petition to appear on the ballot for election.
The trial court, following a hearing held on the petition, dismissed the challenge and determined that under the particular circumstances, the spirit of the Ethics Act had been observed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, a divided panel sustained the challenge, reversed the decision of the lower court, and ordered the Department of Elections to set aside the nomination petitions of these candidates. 139 Pa. Cmwlth. 314, 590 A.2d 821. The basis of the Commonwealth Court‘s rejection of the nomination petitions was its finding that the candidates failed to timely file their respective financial disclosure statements with the local governing authority as required by the Ethics Act.
Shortly thereafter, on May 3, 1991, this Court granted the candidates’ Application for a Stay pending further order. Oral argument before this Court was held on May 6, 1991, following which we entered, on May 10, 1991, a per curiam order reversing the order of the Commonwealth Court, thus permitting the candidates’ names to appear on the primary ballot. 527 Pa. 284, 590 A.2d 752 (1991). We noted that an opinion would follow.
In the second appeal, docketed at No. 37 W.D. Appeal Docket 1991, Donald Andrezjwski and John F. Kearney, qualified electors, filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County a petition to set aside the nomination petitions of William Baranyai, Jr., Gary Lang and Christine Grossman, candidates seeking the Democratic nomination for the position of Council member in the Borough of Millvale, Allegheny
In this case the candidates timely filed their financial interests statements with the Allegheny County Department of Elections along with their nomination petitions; however, these statements were not filed in Millvale before the March 12, 1991, deadline. When the three candidates attempted to file the statements on March 21, 1991, the Millvale Borough Secretary refused to accept them. The statements were eventually filed with the Borough on March 26, 1991.
The trial court, following a hearing, dismissed the challenge to the nomination petitions and entered an order, dated March 26, 1991, permitting the names to be included on the primary ballot. The Commonwealth Court, however, in a unanimous panel decision, sustained the challenge, reversed the trial court and directed the Allegheny County Elections Department to strike the candidates’ names from the ballot. 139 Pa.Cmwlth. 320, 590 A.2d 824. Following oral argument before this Court on May 6, 1991, we entered a per curiam order on May 10, 1991, reversing the Commonwealth Court order, thereby permitting the candidates to proceed on the ballot. 527 Pa. 285, 590 A.2d 753 (1991). Again, we noted an opinion would follow.
The sole issue presented by these appeals is whether the failure to timely file financial interests statements in the proper manner with the local governing authority is a fatal defect calling for the striking from the ballot candidates who fail to so file.
We begin our discussion with the recognition of the longstanding and overriding policy in this Commonwealth to protect the elective franchise. See In re Jones, 505 Pa. 50, 476 A.2d 1287 (1984); In re Recount of Ballots, 457 Pa. 279, 325 A.2d 303 (1974); Miller Election Contest Case, 351 Pa. 469, 41
In Commonwealth, State Ethics Commission v. Baldwin, 498 Pa. 255, 445 A.2d 1208 (1982), a case factually similar to the instant cases, a unanimous Court concluded that failure to timely file the required financial interests statements, in that case with the State Ethics Commission, was not a fatal defect to the nomination petition and could be cured by amendment. Our General Assembly, however, in apparent response to our Baldwin decision, amended and reenacted the Ethics Act in 1989 to include the following language: “Failure to file the [financial interests] statement in accordance with the provisions of this act shall.... be a fatal defect to a petition to appear on the ballot.”
When we entered our orders reversing the Commonwealth Court, our foremost concern was to insure that the challenged candidates’ names appeared on the ballot given the time constraints imposed by the fast-approaching primary election. This concern was chiefly motivated by our perception that in
We are now left with the question of crafting a remedy in this case. As a result of our May 10, 1991, orders, the six candidates involved here were permitted to appear on the primary ballot. To now void the results of an election where all candidates were submitted to the voters, with late but nonetheless filed financial statements which left adequate time for study by the electorate, would be an unnecessary disenfranchisement. Of course, to those candidates who were unsuccessful in the primary election, this issue is moot.
The power to vitiate a ballot for minor irregularities should be used sparingly. It should be done only for very compelling reasons. Norwood Election Contest Case, 382 Pa. 547, 116 A.2d 552 (1955). As stated by this Court in Appeal of James, 377 Pa. 405, 105 A.2d 64 (1954):
[I]n the sphere of popular elections which, after all, constitute the very warp and woof of democracy, nothing can be more vital in the accomplishment of an honest and just election than the ascertainment of the intention of the voter. “Election laws will be strictly enforced to prevent fraud, but ordinarily will be construed liberally in favor of the right to vote. All statutes tending to limit the citizen in his exercise of the right of suffrage should be liberally construed in his favor. Where the elective franchise is regulated by statute, the regulation should, when and where possible, be so construed as to insure rather than defeat the exercise of the right of suffrage. Technicalities should not be used to make the right of the voter insecure....”
Id. at 408, 105 A.2d at 65-66 (citation omitted).
Guided by these principles and in the spirit of liberality in construing our Election Code, we decline to vacate our
MCDERMOTT and ZAPPALA, JJ., did not participate in the decision of these cases.
PAPADAKOS, J., files a concurring opinion in which LARSEN, J., joins.
CAPPY, J., concurs in the result.
PAPADAKOS, Justice, concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the Court, but I disagree with the short shrift given to the facts in the matter of Ross Cioppa, et al., No. 36 W.D. Appeal Docket 1991.
As stated in the Per Curiam Opinion, the Ethics Act requires that financial statements be filed with the local governing authority on or before the last day for filing a petition to appear on the ballot for election. Mr. Zentner hand delivered his financial statement and those of Marilyn J. Stevens and Richard W. Masten to Mr. Leonard Cunic, a council member for the Borough of Braddock Hills. Mr. Cunic accepted the statements and assured Mr. Zentner that they would be delivered to the Borough Secretary that evening during the Borough meeting. He neglected to do so and they were subsequently deposited with the Borough Secretary after the deadline had expired.
The problem I have with the case is that the Ethics Act does not define the phrase “local governing authority.” The majority assumes, sub silentio, that the Borough Secretary is the local governing authority. Without more, I cannot make that assumption.1 I believe that the mayor and council are the
In many small municipalities, the office of Borough Secretary is handled by one person. Would the majority come to the same conclusion if the borough secretary were unavailable and the police chief unofficially filled in during the absence of the borough secretary? Or is the majority saying, again sub silentio, that delivery of the financial statement must be made to the office of the borough secretary, no matter what Borough official or employee may be manning the desk? If so, they should say so. Because I find that the delivery of the financial statements of Zentner, Stevens and Masten were made to the local governing authority by handing same to a member of the governing body, I believe that the mandate of the Ethics Act was met. I, therefore, concur in the result.
LARSEN, J., joins this concurring opinion.