This case presents for our review the issue whether defendant was bound by a consent judgment entered into by plaintiffs in 1994. Defendant appeals as of right from an order mandating that it not interfere with the provisions of a 1994 Tax Tribunal consent judgment that was entered into by plaintiffs and the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community (hereinafter kbic). This case arises out of defendant’s decision to order plaintiff Baraga Township to include, on its regular tax rolls, 123 parcels of land that were owned by members of the kbic and were previously exempt from taxation. We affirm.
Defendant argues that thе trial court erred in granting plaintiffs’ request for a writ of mandamus because plaintiffs did not satisfy the threshold requirements for that remedy. We review a trial court’s decision to grant a Yvrit of mandamus for аn abuse of discretion.
In re MCI Telecommunications Complaint,
Defendant claims that plaintiffs did not establish the first element because they possessed no clear legal right to force defendant to abide by the terms of the consent judgment. Defendant argues that it was not bound by the consent judgment because it was not a party to the Tax Tribunal proceedings. Furthermore, defendant avers, the consent judgment related only to the tax years covered by the consent judgment and did not operate prospectively. Finally, defendant asserts, even if the cоnsent judgment was valid and binding in 1999, it could not remain effective following a substantive change in the law.
We conclude that the consent judgment was binding on defendant under principles of res judicata. Undеr the doctrine of res judicata, a subsequent action is barred between the same parties when the facts or evidence essential to the action are identical to thosе essential to a prior action.
Dart v Dart,
Defendant argues that plaintiffs did not satisfy the fourth element because the Tax Tribunal proceedings and the present case did not involvе defendant or defendant’s privy. A privy is a person who is so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right.
Sloan v Madison Heights,
We acknowledge, however, that res judicata does not bar litigation where a subsequent change in the law alters the legal principles on which the subsequent cаse is to be resolved.
Pike v Wyoming,
We read Leech Lake to hold merely that states and their political subdivisions may only impose ad valorem property taxеs on reservation land made alienable by Congress, sold to non-Indians, and later repurchased by the tribe. Id. at 115. Nothing in the opinion supports defendant’s sweeping conclusion that “[l]ands owned in fee simple by Indian Communities or by individual members of Indian Communities *458 are not exempt from property taxation,” or that “[l]ands located within the boundaries of an Indian reservation and owned by people who are not Indians are also assessable.” We therefore conclude that no substantive change in the law occurred and that defendant remains bound by the consеnt judgment.
We also find
Richland Twp v State Tax Comm,
After this Court decided the Richland Twp case, the Legislature granted defendant the authority to assume jurisdiction over assеssment rolls. MCL 211.10f(l); MSA 7.10(6)(1). Defendant asserts that in so doing, the Legislature effectively overruled Richland Twp. While MCL 211.10f(l); MSA 7.10(6)(1) does allow defendant to seize the tax rolls when a local tax collecting unit is not in substantial comрliance with the General Property Tax Act, it does not allow defendant to effectively overrule an existing consent judgment from the Tax Tribunal. In essence, defendant in this case determined that the consent judgment was *459 no longer warranted under the law and should be vacated. Under the holding in Richland Twp, however, defendant had no legal authority to exercise appellate jurisdictiоn over the consent judgment and then declare it invalid. The authority to do so was within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal. MCL 205.731; MSA 7.650(31).
The trial court correctly concluded therefore that defendant’s actions were without a legal basis. As a result, the first requirement for a writ of mandamus— that the party seeking the writ have a clear legal right to performance of the speсific duty sought — was satisfied. The nature and extent of the duty is a question of law.
Lockhart v Thirty-Sixth Dist Court Judge,
Defendant next contends that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the fourth prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of mandamus because plaintiffs had an alternate legal remedy available to them. Defendant urges us to conclude that plaintiffs had an adequаte legal remedy in the form of an appeal before the Tax Tribunal. Lack of an adequate remedy exists when, in practical terms, no legal or equitable remedy would achiеve the same result.
Delly v Bureau of State Lottery,
Defendant alsо claims that the consent judgment should be read to cover only those tax years that were at issue when the Tax Tribunal entered the consent judgment. Defendant apparently relies on MCL 205.753(4); MSA 7.650(53)(4), whiсh provides that a “decision of the tribunal as to the assessment of real property is binding for the first year of assessment that is determined in the proceeding before the tribunal.” This language dоes not in any way limit the Tax Tribunal’s ability to enter long-term consent judgments.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in enjoining it from carrying out its statutorily prescribed duties. Because we find that the trial court’s order of mandamus was proper, we decline to address this issue.
Affirmed.