Pursuаnt to the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 41-4-1 to -4-29 (Repl.Pamp.1989), Plaintiff sued the City of Las Cruces and its animal control officer (ACO), Elizabeth Carver, for false imprisonment and false arrest allegedly resulting from the issuance of a citation by Carver. The Defendants sought dismissal of the charge on several grounds, including failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See SCRA 1986, 1-012(B)(6). To establish this last ground, Defendants relied on a three-step analysis: (1) they are immune from suit under the Act unless immunity is waived by a provision of the Act, NMSA 1978, § 41-4-4(A); (2) the Act waives immunity for liability for false imprisonment and false arrest only if caused by law enforcement officers acting within the scope of their duties, NMSA 1978, § 41-4-12; and (3) a Las Cruces ACO is not a “law enforcement officer” as dеfined in the Act, NMSA 1978, § 41-4-3(D) (Cum. Supp.1992).
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the parties stipulated to the admission of Exhibit 1, a document setting forth the duties and qualifications of an ACO.
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This consideration of evidеnce outside the pleadings converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to SCRA 1986, 1-056. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sydow,
Section 41-4-3(D) states:
[L]aw enforcement officer means any full-time salaried public employee of a governmental entity whose principal duties under law are to hold in custody any рerson accused of a criminal offense, to maintain public order or to make arrests for crimes, or members of the national guard when called to active duty by the governor[.]
We read this language in light of the traditional duties of law enforcement officers, see Anchondo v. Corrections Dep’t,
We look to the duties of a Las Cruces ACO to determine whether an ACO comes within the statutory definition of “law enforcement
POSITION TITLE: Animal Control Officer
POSITION SUMMARY: Answers complaints regarding animals and insures compliance with City ordinances.
SPECIFIC CERTIFICATION AND/OR LICENSE REQUIREMENTS: Valid New Mеxico Class V Operator’s License; free of felony convictions; Radio Operator’s License.
EDUCATION — MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS: High school diploma or equivalent.
EXPERIENCE — MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS: Two and one-half (2%) years expеrience in working with domestic animals on farm, in zoo, in veterinarian clinic, etc.
ABILITIES AND SKILLS — MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS: Must be able to write clear and accurate reports.
JOB DESCRIPTION: Answers complaints regarding animals. Picks up dead or injured animals or strays, including cats, dogs and other animals. Visits homes to inspect license, vaccination certificates and sick dogs or cats. Institutes quarantines in dog bite cases. Investigates complaints concerning treatment of animals or noncompliance with animal ordinances. Prepares cases and appears in court in legal action. Issues citations in cases or violations of ordinances. Maintains records and prepares periodic and special reports. May bе required to destroy animals in the field. Performs other duties as assigned. WORKING CONDITIONS — Works outside in all kinds of weather. May be exposed to the possibility of bruises, cuts and animal bites. Requires moderatеly light physical effort.
For an ACO to come within the statutory definition of “law enforcement officer,” the ACO’s principal duties under law must be “[ (a) ] to hold in custody any person accused of a criminal offense, [(b)] to maintain public order or [(c)] to make arrests for crimes[.]” Section 41-4-3(D). It suffices if an ACO’s principal duties are either (a) or (b) or (c). We will not distort the рlain language of the statute to adopt Defendants’ contention that the statutory definition requires an ACO’s principal duties to be either both (a) and (b) or both (a) and (c). 2 Plaintiff makes no claim that an ACO’s principal duties include holding persons in custody or making arrests. Thus, the sole question is whether an ACO’s principal duties under law are “to maintain public order.”
The Tоrt Claims Act does not define the phrase “maintain public order.” We note, however, that the statutory definition of law enforcement officer distinguishes between the duty “to maintain public order” and the duty “to make arrests for crimes.” Section 41-4-3(D). This distinction clarifies that the task of maintaining public order can be accomplished without the power to arrеst.
Some additional guidance is provided in decisions from other jurisdictions. The Georgia Supreme Court said, “ ‘Public order’ means the tranquility and security which every person feels under thе protection of the law, a breach of which is an invasion of the protection which the law affords.” Board of Comm’rs of Peace Officers Annuity & Benefit Fund v. Clay,
Although the guidance provided by these authorities is sparse and imprecise, it suggests that the “public order” is disturbed when dogs are barking, biting, knocking over garbage cans, etc. Cf Commonwealth v. Koch,
Thus, Exhibit 1 by itself cannot tell us whether a Las Cruces ACO comes within the dеfinition of “law enforcement officer” in the Tort Claims Act. Two questions remain. First, how much time does the ACO devote to the various duties? An ACO is a “law enforcement officer” only if the majority of the ACO’s time is devoted to the duties of maintaining public order. See Anchondo,
In sum, on the record bеfore us, we cannot determine whether duties with respect to the maintenance of public order constitute the principal duties of a Las Cruces ACO. Because the sole evidence on the issue (the stipulated exhibit) is inadequate to establish that a Las Cruces ACO is not a law enforcement officer within the meaning of the Tort Claims Act, we must reverse the district court’s dismissal and remand for further proceedings. Our reversal does not foreclose the district court from granting summary judgment on the law-enforcement-officer issue after the parties submit additional evidence to that court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. In their brief on appeal Defendants also rely on a Las Cruces municipal ordinance. But Defendants have not indicated where the ordinance appears in the record on appeal or, alternatively, how we can take judicial notice of the ordinance. Ordinarily suсh judicial notice would be improper. See Coe v. City of Albuquerque,
. Defendants find great significance in omission of the comma after "public order." But the New Mexico legislature typically omits the comma after the next-to-last item in a series.
