145 N.Y.S. 275 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1914
There seems to be no indefiniteness or uncertainty as to the purpose of the trusts erected by the forty-ninth clause of the will of Harriet M. Goodsell, herein' submitted to the court for construction.
In my judgment the language used by her relieves the trust from the criticism which led to the disapproval of that before the court in Matter of Shattuck, 193 N. Y. 446, 86 N. E. 455, and establishes it as one for public uses within the meaning of section 12 of the Personal Property Law. While no individual person or institution is named as the beneficiary of the testatrix’s bounty, the discretion vested in the trustee as to their selection is carefully limited, and extends only for such purposes, and to those, as fall within the contemplation of the statute.
That such a bequest is not void because of indefiniteness of beneficiaries is well settled, and needs no discussion. Matter of Robinson, 203 N. Y. 380, 96 N. E. 925, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1023; Matter of Cunningham, 206 N. Y. 601, 100 N. E. 437.
The stipulation under which this action is submitted shows that the defendants Bowdy, Dye, and Hogenboom fall within the classes of persons described in the will as the intended beneficiaries of Mrs. Goodsell, and that the plaintiff is a membership corporation created under the laws of this state for benevolent and charitable purposes, and that all of the said defendants are worthy, needy, and deserving of a portion of the income of said trust estate; also, that it was specifically intended by the testatrix that plaintiff should receive the income of $5,000.
The scheme of this will is that the principal of the trust funds is to be held intact and the income, only, devoted to the uses and purposes of the trust. It nowhere contemplates a distribution of the principal either outright or by indirection among those -whom the trustee may deem within the purview of its beneficial provisions.
In so directing, the testatrix foresaw that any person likely to become the object of her bounty would doubtless be unable to give security for repayment, and might never be able - or willing to repay; she, therefore, to insure the carrying out of her intention, provided that security need not be required for any such loans, and protected her trustee in their making by, also, providing that in case of nonpayment he shall not be held accountable for the loss occasioned thereby.
Without these two safeguards, a trustee would in all probability feel his only safety lay in outright giving, and the intention of Mrs. Goodsell to in proper cases provide for a return of the moneys advanced, so that it might be used for other beneficiaries, entirely defeated.
Judgment in accordance with the foregoing is directed, with costs to all parties payable from the fund.
Findings and proposed judgment may be submitted for signature.