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Baptist Health v. Tommy G. Thompson
458 F.3d 768
8th Cir.
2006
Check Treatment
Docket

*3 SMITH, Before HEANEY and GRUENDER, Judges. Circuit GRUENDER, Judge. Circuit Baptist Memorial Medical Center- Memorial”) (“Baptist North Little Rock challenges a decision Payment Prospective System Health and Human lished Department (“HHS”) (“PPS”) denying, Medicare as an incentive for Services efficiently. edu purposes, operate costs and more reimbursement reduce 98-25, (1983), for classroom activity” status H.R.Rep. cational No. at 132 See in con by Baptist incurred reprinted, in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. affiliation with a PPS, with its nection provider hospital receives Under upheld court1 district school. reimbursement a flat rate Medicare dis For reasons decision. patient’s catego- patient each based on below, affirm. cussed Id.; ry treatment. 1395ww(d). *4 I. BACKGROUND a from Congress exempted few costs the Medicare HHS administers PPS, continued allowing reasonable-cost seq., through § 42 et U.S.C. 1395 gram, 1395f(b) § Medicare reimbursement under and Med- Centers for Medicare component treatment”) for, among oth (“pass-through (“CMS”). Secretary The icaid Services things, activi “approved er educational intermediaries, such with fiscal contracts 1395ww(a)(4). § 42 ties.” Con U.S.C. in the instant as Blue Shield Cross/Blue “approved did not educational gress define Medi- audit costs submitted Secretary activities” the statute. The dis- approve or provider hospitals care ap a regulation stating that published 42 See Medicare reimbursement. approve nei proved educational activities included (de- § 1395h; § 42 C.F.R. 405.902 U.S.C. en training of students not “[c]linical ther intermediary). provider A fining fiscal approved in an education rolled may hospital appeal reimbursement 42 provider,” C.F.R. operated intermediary to decision the fiscal 413.85(d)(6)(1986) added), (emphasis nor § Reimbursement Review HHS’s Provider that do not involve activities “[o]ther (“PRRB”). § 42 1395oo. Board operation approved of an education actual the final PRRB’s decision becomes 413.85(d)(7). During § id. program,” agency unless the Secre- decision regula phase of the notice-and-comment affirm, motion, own tary, on his decides publication, Secretary elaborated tion’s Id. modify the decision. reverse “only costs of those 1395oo(f)(l). § di programs operated education medical 1983, Medicare-eligible all costs Prior from by a excluded rectly hospital [are] by provider hospital were reim- incurred 1984) (Jan. Fed.Reg. [PPS].” aon “reasonable cost” basis —es- bursed added).2 (emphasis in- actual costs sentially, hospital’s each for programs In addition to costs dollar-for-dollar curred reimbursed ac- qualify approved educational Secretary long as found the so 413.85, § Congress under 42 1395f(b). tivities C.F.R. § In reasonable. See U.S.C. for an- pass-through treatment established Security Amend- Title YI of the Social educational-activity costs 98-21, category of 65 other Pub.L. 97 Stat. ments (“PPS § by provider hospitals in estab- legislation”), Congress borne (f) 413.85(c)(1), Wilson, Jr., hospital. 42 C.F.R. R. Unit- See The Honorable William (2001). Judge Dis- in 2001 for the Eastern This version became final ed States District inapplicable to the instant trict of Arkansas. and is therefore change made the case. The regula- ''clarify” previous version of promulgated ver- a new 2. The later Fed.Reg. tion at issue here. regulation expressly in- which sion (Jan. 2001). of direct cludes Act Budget separate Reconciliation of ness units and maintained book- the Omnibus (“OBRA 1989”), 101-239, keeping. hospital Pub.L. Each had its own Medi- 4004(b) (1989), number, §in but provider extended care Health Stat. legal entity Reconciliation Act of was the that contracted for the Budget the Omnibus (“OBRA 1990”), 101-508, Pub.L. 104 numbers. (1990). pass-through This Stat. 1388 system, the institution of the PPS After only category treatment includes the costs Baptist Health allocated the costs of the programs clinical school con- among its four hospitals. of, but premises ducted on the not neces- hospital Each then characterized its share sarily directly by, provider operated hos- those costs as educational long pital specified so as certain conditions pass-through activities” and received reim in OBRA 1990 are met. 1990, however, region bursement. In short, pro al hospitals’ activities at CMS office notified the fiscal hospital qualify pass- intermediary vider that do not that the School costs eligible treatment under either C.F.R. were not treat OBRA 1990 provider hospitals 413.85 or are reimbursed as ment because the did *5 part Nursing flat-rate for payment operate PPS School. In re hospital’s operating sponse, normal Baptist costs. Pass- Health moved all Nursing treatment for Baptist educational activi School costs to Memori financially ties is desirable for the al’s provider Baptist books.4 Memorial hospital payment Nursing because the PPS for nor School executed a Memorandum operating essentially depends mal of Agreement costs outlining responsibilities only upon patients the number Baptist support dis Memorial to the school. charged diagnoses, and their and does not Baptist From 1991 to 1994 Memorial directly compensate the costs of education submitted Nursing School costs for al activities.3 treatment, pass-through in- but the fiscal

Baptist is operated termediary Memorial owned and denied reasonable-cost reim- Inc., Health, by Baptist non-profit corpo- appeal, bursement. On administrative reversed, operated ration that also owned PRRB finding three the costs Medicare-provider hospitals qualified other from pass-through for treatment anas Baptist “approved 1994. Health also activity” owned educational because operated Baptist Nursing Baptist in, School of engaged Memorial “was School”) extent, (“Nursing during significant The operation time. Nursing four and the nursing education The program.” Admin- separate subsidiary CMS, were not corporations acting istrator under the authori- separate but were operated ty Secretary, each busi- vacated the PRRB’s Baptist 3. asserts that Memorial PPS reim- issue not sufficient allow to us determine one, for bursement educational activities actual- assumption whether the is a valid and in ly no provider reimbursement all because a any event resolution of the issue would have hospital quali- with educational activities not appeal. no effect on the outcome of this fying pass-through /for treatment re- payment ceive/the same flat-rate PPS as an attempted Memorial then to further hospital provider identical with no education- among remaining hospi- allocate the costs making al activities whatsoever. this as- tals, intermediary but the fiscal reclassified sertion, Baptist apparently assumes Therefore, only Baptist those costs. Memori- that such educational activities would have no Nursing al was reimbursed for School costs financially indirect beneficial effects on the from 1991 to 1994. hospital. The on record Thompson, Hosp. not Methodist 315 F.3d Baptist Memorial did because decision Cir.2003) (8th How- directly School. operate (quoting Hennepin ever, to the remanded Shalala, the Administrator County Med. Ctr. v. F.3d any a determination of whether PRRB for (8th Cir.1996)); see also qualified school costs (E). 706(2)(A), “We review the district re- costs under OBRA On clinical novo, making court’s decision de our own mand, PRRB all submitted Secretary’s independent review of the de treatment pass-through clinical the APA.” cision under Shalala St. reinstated its under 1990 and also OBRA Ctr., Paul-Ramsey Med. F.3d finding the non-clini- already rejected (8th Cir.1995). cal, classroom, eligible for costs were an treatment as pass-through Secretary’s Interpretation A. activity.” The Administrator the Statute eligi- that the clinical costs were affirmed argues it is under treatment ble capricious for the again but reversed on OBRA 1990 statutory language “ap interpret Baptist Memorial classroom costs because activity” proved educational to include directly operate did not hospital provider di School. rectly operate program. the educational for review of Memorial sued The Chevron test determines whether the court. decision in federal district agency’s permissible interpre rule is a The district court affirmed the Administra- tation of the statute: decision, on Circuit’s relying tor’s the D.C. *6 similar a in dispute resolution of Commu- ask first whether “the intent of [W]e Thompson, 318 nity Care Foundation Congress precise is clear” as “the (D.C.Cir.2003). Baptist F.3d 219 Memori- If, question by “employing at issue.” now the of appeals al denial statutory tools construc- traditional of costs associat- treatment for the classroom tion,” Congress’ in- we determine School, arguing that ed with the clear, tent is “that is the end not a operation” is the “direct But “if the statute is silent or matter.” the permissible interpretation of statute specific ambiguous respect to the with Secretary’s and that it conflicts with the issue, for the court question the interpretation. Baptist Memorial prior agency’s the answer is based on whether that, the direct- argues even under also permissible construction stat- standard, its affiliation with the gap agency’s reading ute.” If the fills a an qualified “approved as inway in a or defines a term reasonable activity.” Legislature’s design, give of light the if controlling weight, even reading II. DISCUSSION court would it is not the answer “the The of final decision the initially if had question have reached under the Administrative Proce- reviewed judicial proceeding.” arisen in a (“APA”), § seq. 5 701 et dure Act U.S.C. Shalala, 448, 522 U.S. Regions Hosp. 1395oo(f)(l) (incorporating § 42 U.S.C. 909, 457, 118 139 L.Ed.2d 895 S.Ct. review). APA “Under standard of omitted) (citations (quoting Chevron APA, is ‘set aside decision Council, Res. v. Natural U.S.A. Inc. arbitrary, an abuse of capricious, if it is Def. 837, 842, 9, 11, Inc., 843 & n. n. 467 U.S. discretion, evi- unsupported substantial ” (1984)). 2778, dence, S.Ct. 81 L.Ed.2d contrary to law.’ St. Luke’s or step analysis, Toyota Under one of the Chevron 681. The relevant issue in both Bragdon we determine whether statute makes Motor and was interpretation Congress clear of to the of “disability” provided the intent of the definition in “approved meaning the term education the Americans Act with Disabilities of 1990 (“ADA”). al not ex Supreme activities.” The statute does Court noted that term, pressly detailed, but Baptist three-part define the Me provid definition5 Congress implicitly morial contends in ed the ADA drawn “almost verba adopted existing pre definition from tim” from “handicapped the definition of regulation. “ap PPS Medicare The term individual” in earlier Rehabilitation Act 1973, proved 706(8)(B), § educational activities” was defined of 29 U.S.C. and the regulations in in Medicare 1966 as “formal in “handicap” definition contained ly organized planned programs study Housing Fair Amendments Act 3602(h)(1). usually engaged § providers in order to Bragdon, U.S.C. U.S. at quality patient 2196; enhance the in an Toyota care see also Mo (1966). tor, § institution.” 20 C.F.R. 405.421 U.S. at In S.Ct. addition, Prior to the sys establishment of the PPS the Court noted that the ADA stated, tem adopted expressly “Except as otherwise holding of a provided Seventh Circuit St. chapter, nothing in this Hickey John’s Hospital, Inc. v. shall chapter apply be construed less (7th Califano, 599 F.2d 808-09 Cir. er standard applied than the standards 1979), interpreted regulation which to under title V of Rehabilitation Act of (29 provider hospital mean that a only need be U.S.C. 790 et seq.) regula or the in,” “engaged rather than “legal opera tions agencies pursuant issued Federal of, tor” Motor, an educational Toyota to such title.” 534 U.S. at program to regulatory meet definition S.Ct. 681 (quoting U.S.C. of an “approved 12201(a)); educational activity.” Bragdon, 631-32, U.S. 118 S.Ct. 2196 (quoting support argument that Con- 12201(a)). adoption Based on the gress incorporate intended to defini- identical, language detailed from the earli tion of educational activities” *7 er express statutes and the reference to (1966) § from 20 C.F.R. 405.421 into the the standards set one of the earlier legislation, 1983 PPS statutes and regulations, its associated the cites Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Ken- regulations Court found that the associat Williams, 184, tucky, Inc. v. 122 U.S. ed with the earlier statute appropri 681, (2002), S.Ct. 151 L.Ed.2d 615 guidance ate sources of for interpreting Abbott, Bragdon 624, 524 U.S. terms the in definition the ADA. (1998), 141 L.Ed.2d prop- for the Motor, Toyota 534 U.S. at 193— osition that “Congress’ repetition of a well- 681; S.Ct. Bragdon, at U.S. term established carries the implication S.Ct. 2196. that Congress intended the to term be in construed pre-existing Toyota accordance with and Bragdon sup- Motor do not regulatory interpretations.” Bragdon, port proposition the that Congress implic- 2196; at U.S. Toyo- itly S.Ct. see also incorporate intended to the definition S.Ct., Motor, 193-94, ta 534 U.S. at “approved educational activities” from (B) "disability” The ADAdefined as: impairment; record such an or (A)a (C) being regarded physical impairment having as or mental such an im- substantially pairment. limits one more of the ma- jor individual; 12102(2). life activities of § such 42 U.S.C. (1966) legisla- the treatment in the § into PPS PPS 405.421 20 C.F.R. First, important policy goals ADA tion to the the statutory scheme. three-part, legislation: an 33-word def adopted entire statutes, relevant earlier inition from the amending We are also [20 C.F.R.] term; contrast, in the just single not 42 C.F.R. 413.85 [later 405.421 only “ap used the term legislation PPS clarify to definition allow- ] conspic educational activities” proved education, able for medical costs because incorporate the associated uously failed to are ex- certain medical education costs in the earlier provided definition 24-word payment from under This [PPS]. cluded Second, adopted the ADA regulation. before, necessary was not since all statutes, merely from earlier definition on the costs were reimbursed same rea- definition, regulatory agency’s However, from cost under sonable basis. suggests happened [PPS], to those properly failure define Finally, expressly the ADA ref case. costs, pay- for which medical education from developed standards erenced prospective pay- in addition to ment and its associated applicable earlier statute un- permitted, could result in ments is legislation does not the PPS regulations; necessary and inappropriate payments. circumstances, these do so. Under 1,1983). (Sep. Fed.Reg. Congressional intent to any find cannot Later, response on the comments “approved definition of ed incorporate the proposed regulation, new ex- from 20 C.F.R. ucational activities” plained why requirement opera- of direct (1966), upon in § 405.421 as elaborated St by the tion of the educational into the Hickey progeny, and its John’s necessary imple- provider hospital was Instead, we legislation. agree PPS Congress’ goals: ment Medicare Congress, the D.C. with Circuit number of comments were Comment —A silence, left the definition of ed pass concerning received whether Secretary. Ac ucational activities” lim- of direct education costs is Care, 225.6 Cmty. 318 F.3d at cord only of those ited to a hos- programs medical education proceed step two We now If this is pital directly operates itself. “whether analysis determine Chevron commenters were concerned per on a agency’s is based [definition] costs, such as the costs statute.” Re certain missible construction training enrolled clinical for students Hosp., at 118 S.Ct. 909 gions 522 U.S. omitted). hospital, other than at reg programs proposing (quotation here, from may prospec- not be excluded de ulation issue *8 con- system, tive but rather are why payment the definition of the scribed operating be costs. eligible for sidered to normal activities” made However, cost"). the D.C. argument as of reasonable 6. Memorial also echoes made, argument, aptly regard to this Community Care a Circuit noted in rejected, and in that 'looking history history "reviewing legislative is like legislative of the lone comment in ” friends,’ picking your and out legislation proves unambiguously that over a crowd PPS large as this "friend” in a crowd Congress incorporate to earlier one meant unambigu- H.R.Rep. No. one insufficient to demonstrate regulatory See 98- is definition. Care, Cmty. (1983), Congressional ous intent. reprinted at in 1983 Wald, "approved (quoting Some Observations (stating F.3d at 226 that U.S.C.C.A.N. (as History Legislative the 1981 on in programs in current the Use education defined Term, L.Rev. pro- Supreme Court 68 Iowa regulation, including nursing education Leventhal, J.)). (1983) (quoting grams) paid on the basis would continue be only hospital, that than at Response operat- believe are normal —We ing approved those medical edu- costs. costs of directly by programs operated cation a (Jan. 3,1984).7 Fed.Reg. be hospital prospec- excluded from The explanation why a a system. program If is payment tive direct-operation “ap- institution, by another such operated as proved educational activities” was neces- university, nearby college or must [it] sary goals implement Congress’ for the by majority that far be noted legislation eminently PPS “reasonable by are borne costs of that that ... in light Legislature’s design.” institution, hospital. other and not Regions Hosp., 522 U.S. at hospital may it is true that While Therefore, we hold that the Secre- incur costs associated with some tary’s permissible interpretation rule ais training vision of clinical students en- of the statute. institution, nearby in a hospi- rolled in gains

tal also return. Conflicting B. The PRRB’s In- Prior terpretations example, For it obtains services of (often the trainee direct no cost to In three decisions8 announced itself). do not that type We believe this 1997, involving between 1993 and cost relationship Congress was what in- years PRRB from 1987 to ana it provided pass tended when for a lyzed “approved educational activities” un of the costs of medical “engaged der the John’s Hickey St. in” Rather, programs. education we believe standard, rather than the more strict di Congress that was concerned with those rect-operation originally standard associat itself, programs hospital operates that a 413.85(d)(6) (1986). § ed with 42 C.F.R. it for which incurs substantial direct declined review of those costs. decisions. argues Memorial that it 405.421(d)(6) § revising We are [later capricious for the Secre 413.85(d)(6) (1986) clarify C.F.R. tary change interpretation ] now to his costs of training apply direct-operation clinical standard in programs, disagree. students enrolled case.9 other We Shield, argues specific v. Blue No. PRRB 93-D61 Cross/Blue 21, 1993). (July training” reference to "clinical indicates that direct-operation requirement only in- corollary, Baptist argues 9.As costs, apply tended to to clinical not class- position change Medicare rule- violates However, room costs. the reference to "clin- change procedures training” response ical occurs in to some ("No rule, 1395hh(a)(2) requirement, or specific raised concerns commenters. The policy other statement of ... that establishes response first sentence of the indicates that changes legal gov- a substantive standard regulation requires "approved all erning payment ... ... for services shall take programs,” just medical education clini- promulgated effect it is unless the Secre- programs, "operated training cal directly be However, ....”). tary by regulation agree (Jan. 3, by hospital.” Fed.Reg. provi- with the courts have held that this *9 1984). imposes greater sion no standards than those See, e.g., Erringer established the APA. v. 8. Mary’s The three PRRB are St. decisions 625, (9th Cir.2004) Thompson, 371 F.3d Shield, Med. Ctr. v. Blue PRRB No. Cross/Blue (rejecting argument 1395hh(a)(2) an 15, 1997); (July 97-D82 Barberton Citizens promulgation by "creates Shield, Hosp. v. Blue PRRB regulation APA”). No. Cross/Blue broader than that of the 28, 1994); Therefore, (July 94-D61 St. Hosp. analysis Ann’s applies our APA under the by Baptist change prior of decisions cited Memorial agency’s we an evaluate When position, Secretary’s inconsistent with the deci- are interpreta- sion, they contemporaneous are agency that an not deci-

the mere fact agency position a prior tion contradicts agency. The instant case sions unexplained not fatal. Sudden 1994, years the deals with cost to not take change change does three previous while the decisions covered legitimate prior of reliance on account years cost 1987 to 1989. The first decision arbitrary, capri- interpretation may be Administrator, the on behalf of the Sec- ifBut or an abuse of discretion. cious direct-operation retary, applying the stan- avoided, is not pitfalls change are these in this case was issued while dard point since whole invalidating, previous decisions were issued the three to leave discretion Chevron is result, 1997. As a between SSM ambiguities of a statute vided suggest finding of does not arbitrariness agency. the implementing with Contrary Baptist Memorial’s as- here. (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. Smiley v. Citibank sertion, years because different cost were L.Ed.2d 25 decisions, involved the three PRRB this (internal quotations citations and agency a case an applie[d] is not “[w]here omitted). similarly different standards situated argues that “[w]here Ry. N. & Burlington entities.” Santa Fe different standards agency applies an Co., F.3d at similarly sup fails to situated entities and a rea disparate treatment with port generally, More we do not find the explanation and substantial evidence soned Secretary’s apply decision to the direct- record, action is in the its requirement after the three ear Bur upheld.” and cannot be capricious PRRB decisions to be “sudden and lier Ry. N. Fe lington & Santa Co. Surface Smiley, 517 unexplained.” U.S. (D.C.Cir. Bd., F.3d Transp. ex 116 S.Ct. 1730. The has 2005). point case on is SSM Our closest fully underlying rationale for plained Shalala, Institute Rehabilitation test, as direct-operation discussed (8th Cir.1995). case, In F.3d 266 ante, change applied and the to cost applica determine whether was not sudden years an arbi of a to SSM was regulation tion because HHS notified con trary change position, we relied on beforehand, sister as me and its PRRB that temporaneous decisions letter, August in an morialized at 270. regulation. Id. applied same not be deci contemporaneous final Because be eligible treatment sions, PRRB, by the as rendered oper did provider hospitals not cause decision the Secre consistent with the Again, agree ate School. SSM, tary regarding we held the Secre Circuit, in regard which held with the D.C. arbitrary change tary’s decision on the argument to an identical based holding sug position. Id. Our SSM cases, PRRB “All that we prior three same Secretary’s interpretation if gests can regulated entity properly ask or the contempora with in a case inconsistent explain it agency departure. is that final neous decisions rendered expressly done.” has PRRB, This arbitrary. change would be Care, however, 318 F.3d at Cmty. the three the instant while 1395hh(a)(2) gument. ar- also to Memorial's

778 Secretary’s Baptist is the deci challenge

Neither Memorial does not contrary “legitimate Secretary’s findings sion to reliance on that responsi- “[t]he PRRB prior interpretation” operation in the deci bilities associated with the of a 742, Smiley, nursing sions. 517 at 116 program U.S. S.Ct. reside with the School of (citing 1730 United v. Penn. Nursing, States Indus. Provider” and “the costs 655, 670-675, Chem. 411 Corp., directly U.S. 93 issue were not incurred 1804, Provider, S.Ct. 567 L.Ed.2d but rather were allocated to the Co., 267, Aerospace Instead, NLRB v. Bell 416 U.S. Provider.” Baptist Memorial 1757, (1974)). S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 134 contends that the Nursing oper- School is Legitimate prior reliance on ated a provider Baptist administrative because Memo- be decisions can shown where “some rial and Nursing part new School are of a liability sought single on imposed corporation, be individ Health. Baptist This past uals for actions argument which were taken in fails. The correctly good-faith pronounce that, reliance on [agency] noted Baptist while Health is a cor- Aerospace, ments.” Bell poration operates U.S. at several provider In schools, S.Ct. 1757. the arrange it nursing does not ment between Memorial and qualify itself as a provider under the stat- Nursing (“The in beginning 1395x(u) School could ute. See U.S.C. term not have made in been reliance on ‘provider of services’ a hospital, means decisions, PRRB which were announced critical hospital, access skilled fa- between 1993 and 1997.10 cility, comprehensive outpatient rehabilita- facility, tion home health agency, hos- [or] We conclude that it is not ”). pice Moreover, program .... the fact capricious for the to apply the provider hospital educational direct-operation standard in this case.

institution are under ownership common Application Direct-Opera- C. does not regulations circumvent the

tion Standard determine when costs of the education- al are institution attributable Secretary’s We review the deci hospital vider for Medicare purposes. See sion, direct-operation made under the stan Skalala, Thomas Univ. v. dard, Jefferson Memorial’s classroom U.S. 129 L.Ed.2d 405 costs associated with the (1994) (affirming that a medical college do not qualify pass-through treatment could not redistribute some of an if it supported by determine substan to an asso- tial evidence the record as a whole. ciated provider hospital where both were Chater, (8th Flanery F.3d operated by owned and the same legal Cir.1997). We find that substantial evi entity). supports Secretary’s dence finding that

Baptist Memorial operator short, was not the the Medicare reimbursement School. system on is based costs incurred tions, argues strictly Memorial also that it binding relied is not Secretary.” on the on the Provider Reimbursement Network, Paragon Thompson, Health Inc. ("PRM”), (7th Cir.2001). Manual which as late 1995 con- 251 F.3d Reliance non-provider-operated tinued to state ed- on the would PRM not have been reasonable meeting "engaged ucational light activities in” of the direct communication from eligible test were August treatment. HHS in asserting that the direct- However, PRM, guide "[t]he while useful regu- contained interpreting regula- the Medicare statute and applied. lations be *11 number, by all tion shared of its subsidiar- hospitals, without re- provider individual ownership structure. underlying ies. gard

Indeed, common- Baptist if Memorial’s evidence, the above I cannot Given theory were ac- ownership reimbursement Baptist separate a agree that Memorial is curate, each of no need for there would be entity Baptist Nursing. from School of operated and the four owned my view, Baptist Health owns both. separate Medicare Baptist Health have provided link two direct between the that conclude sub- numbers. We provider ownership common their' supports evidence stantial Baptist a direct qualifies Memorial as not the finding Baptist Memorial was that Indeed, nursing program. vider of activity. the educational operator of two appear subsidiaries have believed agreed to Baptist much: when III. CONCLUSION nursing it programs, host the school’s did direct-operation that re- hold We through agreement so a memorandum of permissible interpretation quirement contract, than, signato- rather since the educational activities” and subsidiary ries have for each been not represent it does Thus, although I agree the same. that we Secretary’s prior inter- change from deference, substantial Secretary’s findings We also hold that accord the pretation. Secretary’s finding supports the evidence not simply sup- substantial does evidence opera- was not Baptist nursing program view that port activity. According- tor provider operated. was not district judgment ly, affirm

court.

HEANEY, Judge, dissenting. Circuit majority’s holding that

I concur in the pass- to limit was entitled al., M., et on behalf of ELIZABETH through for clinical or reimbursement themselves and on behalf others programs those classroom costs to situated, similarly —Appel Plaintiff s hospital. I directly operated lees, dissent, however, from that respectfully opinion Bap- holds portion Health, Baptist subsidiary

tist Nancy al., MONTENEZ, et Memorial, such reim- qualify does not Appellants. Defendants — bursement. No. 05-2750. single corporation. Baptist Health is a operates both Memo- It owns Appeals, United States Court of Nursing. School of rial and Eighth Circuit. not maintain its Baptist Memorial does Feb. Submitted: separate or have own board trustees operate It corporate officers. does Aug. Filed: whatsoever; merely it is independently Rehearing Rehearing En Banc Likewise, Baptist wing Baptist Health. 5, 2006. Denied Oct. op- board trustees controls Health’s school, nursing erations license.

Health holds the school’s one identifica-

Baptist Health has but tax

Case Details

Case Name: Baptist Health v. Tommy G. Thompson
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Date Published: Aug 15, 2006
Citation: 458 F.3d 768
Docket Number: 05-4372
Court Abbreviation: 8th Cir.
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