17 N.W.2d 372 | Minn. | 1945
The lower court sustained the demurrer "upon the ground * * * that the facts stated do not constitute a cause of action; the alleged cause of action [being] * * * barred by the Statute of Limitations." Defendant asserts that the complaint is demurrable not only on the ground that the action is barred by the statute of limitations, but also that plaintiff's cause of action is within the statute of frauds, in that it is founded on an oral contract not to be performed within a year.
1. Defendant's position is that, even though the balance of commissions was not to be paid until after plaintiff's demand, the demand should have been made within a reasonable time after the cause of action for the commissions accrued; that a reasonable *237 time is the period of the statute of limitations (six years in this case); and therefore that the action should have been commenced before 1935. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that it appears from the contract as alleged in the complaint that the parties contemplated a delay in making the demand to some indefinite time in the future; therefore, that the statutory period for bringing the action is not controlling on the question of reasonable time and that the determination of what is a reasonable time is a question of fact.
This being an action on a contract, ordinarily it would be barred unless commenced within six years after the cause of action accrued. Minn. St. 1941, §
"* * * Where, by the contract of the parties, express or implied, the money or debt which is the subject-matter thereof is payable only upon a demand in fact therefor, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until an actual demand for payment is made. The demand, however, must be made within a reasonable time, which is ordinarily the period of the statute of limitations; but, where the parties contemplated a delay in making the demand to some indefinite *238 time in the future, the statutory period for bringing the action is not controlling as to the question of reasonable time."
The Fallon case was followed and approved in Andrews v. Andrews,
"The evidence to support such a claim against a dead man's estate should be carefully scrutinized by courts, so as to prevent the allowance of stale or fraudulent claims against such estates; but when, as in this case, the facts were found by the trial court upon sufficient evidence, the question becomes simply one of law. The law relevant to the facts found is well settled."
Though we recognize the dissimilarity of facts in the Fallon and Andrews cases, we believe the principle there announced controls decision here. The relationship between the parties in the case at bar was not an ordinary one of creditor and debtor, but rather *239
of employer and employe. That defendant reposed trust and confidence in plaintiff is indicated by the fact that in 1928 he was promoted from sales representative to manager in Minnesota. Whether or not the action is barred under the law in such a situation as this is dependent on the particular circumstances of the case. No attempt can be made to define or declare inflexibly what is a reasonable time in which the demand must be made. Ordinarily, it is a question for the trier of fact. Andrews v. Andrews,
In the Alabama case of Wright v. Paine,
"* * * What is to be considered a reasonable time for this purpose does not appear to be settled by any precise rule. It must depend on circumstances. If no cause for delay can beshown, it would seem reasonable to require the demand to be made within the time limited by the statute for bringing the action." (Italics supplied.)
2. Defendant also asserts that the complaint does not state a cause of action because it was contemplated by the parties that the agreement was not to be performed within one year, and, the contract not being in writing, that it comes within the statute of frauds. We do not agree with this contention. It appears from the complaint that the contract is one which could be performed within a year. No definite time was fixed for the employment. It was an employment at will. It could therefore be terminated at any time by either party. Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co. *240
"* * * If, however, beginning within the year, it [contract] was to continue in force for an indefinite period of time, with the right to either party to terminate it at any moment before the expiration of such year, and its obligations were of such a character that they could all be performed within that period, without contravening any of its terms, then it was without the statute, * * *."
See, also, Stitt v. Rat Portage Lbr. Co.
Order reversed. *241