Banks v. StateBanks v. State
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2-4. Evidence showing that a knife with which the accused intentionally stabbed the deceased was an instrument likely to produce death, the law of involuntary manslaughter was not involved.
5. If the statement of the accused on trial could be construed as raising an issue of involuntary manslaughter, the court‘s omission to charge the jury on that theory was not erroneous in the absence of a proper request.
6. Conviction of murder was authorized by the evidence.
Roy Banks was convicted of murder, with a recommendation to mercy. He made a motion for new trial on the general grounds, and on the ground that the court failed to charge the law of involuntary manslaughter as defined in the Code,
The State‘s evidence was in substance as follows: The defendant, having just returned from serving a chain-gang sentence, was invited to eat dinner at the boarding-house of Mrs. Fuller. At the dinner, which was about mid afternoon, there were present the defendant, Jack Sills, later deceased, John Gartrell, and Mrs. Fuller. The defendant said, “I am an expert carver, and I will do the carving of the chicken.” It was at this house that the killing occurred several hours later, when the defendant stabbed Jack Sills with the knife used by him in carving the chicken. After they finished dinner the defendant said he would like to go and see his mother. Gartrell said he would take him, but must go first to another home. The two went to the other home, came back, and they and the defendant‘s wife and Mrs. Fuller then went to the home of the defendant‘s mother. Mrs. Fuller and Gartrell stayed in the car while the defendant and his wife were inside the home. Presently the defendant‘s wife came out and called to Gartrell to come quick. He went in and found the defendant cursing his mother, his brother, and his sister, saying that they sent him to prison. Gartrell remonstrated with him for talking thus to his mother. Then the defendant, his wife, Gartrell, and Mrs. Fuller, got in the car and drove off. Gartrell suggested that they had time to go to a show, but the defendant did not care to go to a show, and suggested
The assignment of error on the court‘s omission to charge the jury on the law of involuntary manslaughter is based on the foregoing evidence for the State and lengthy excerpts from the testimony of witnesses for the defendant, who occupied homes near by, as well as the entire statement of the defendant. One of these testified: “I remember when Jack Sills died from knife wounds. I never will forget it. It was between ten and twelve o‘clock. I was up on account of sickness. I saw the boy go up the steps. I saw Roy Banks go up the steps to the door, and the door was latched. He called for Ruth [his wife] several times, and shook the door and kept calling for her. I would not know how long he stood there, and at last this man came to the door and unlocked it.
The movant relied also on his statement to the jury, in part as follows: “And I took my foot and kicked the screen like that, just an ordinary kick. I was not mad with any one. It looked like it took them a long time to get to the door. When I walked in — Jack opened the door — there were three latches on the screen door. He pushed the door wide open with his foot, and made a pass at me with that knife and cut the end of this finger, and cut me on the cheek. I finally knocked the knife out of his hand and reached down and got it with my right hand, and went in, and Johnny and this other woman were in the kitchen, and Ruth was on the middle bed, lying down. Jack took another run at me, and Johnny started out of the kitchen with a brick, and he had me by the neck, and when I saw Johnny coming out of the kitchen with a brick I stabbed him and throwed the knife down. . . That‘s all I can remember. That‘s all there was to it. I had no hard feelings against Johnny or no one. It looked like they were trying to take advantage of me, because I had just come there and had no money. When I knocked on the door the last time, he met me with that knife.”
1. The pauper affidavit transmitted with the record to the Supreme Court was as follows:
“The State of Georgia vs. Roy Banks.
“Personally appeared before the undersigned said defendant, who on oath says that he is because of his poverty unable to pay the costs or give the security otherwise required for supersedeas, and that he is advised by counsel that he has good cause for writ of error. Roy Banks.
“Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of February, 1941. H. Keller Wilson, Notary Public.”
There being nothing on or in the paper to indicate where the alleged affidavit was made, what county or State, and no venue being stated, and nothing to show that the officer attesting the same was authorized to administer the oath, the affidavit was insufficient to relieve the plaintiff in error or his attorney from the payment of costs in bringing the case to this court. Dawson v. Dawson, 106 Ga. 45 (32 S.E. 29).
2. An instrument may be shown to be a weapon likely to produce death, by direct proof as to the character of the weapon, by an exhibition of it to the jury, by evidence as to the nature of the wound, or other evidence such as would warrant the jury in finding that the instrument was one calculated to produce death. Paschal v. State, 125 Ga. 279, 280 (54 S.E. 172); Kennedy v. State, 191 Ga. 22 (11 S.E.2d 179).
3. In the instant case the evidence as to the nature of the wound and the character of the instrument used was sufficient to show that the knife with which the accused stabbed the deceased was a weapon likely to produce death. See Kennedy v. State, supra, and cit.
4. It having been shown by the evidence that the accused, by stabbing with a butcher-knife having a blade about three and three-quarters inches in length and a handle of about the same length, using the knife in such a manner as would naturally tend to destroy human life, inflicted the wound from which the deceased died, and that the wound was intentionally inflicted, the case was not one which under the evidence involved the law of involuntary manslaughter. See Brown v. State, 28 Ga. 199; Warren v. State, 163 Ga. 176 (135 S.E. 735); Higgins v. State, 172 Ga. 221 (157 S.E. 643); Benton v. State, 185 Ga. 254 (194 S.E. 166); Reed v. State, 168 Ga. 731 (5) (149 S.E. 23); Carter v. State, 171 Ga. 406 (155 S.E. 670).
5. In a supplemental statement the defendant said: “I have never cut nobody, never tried to hurt no one, and never felt like I wanted to hurt nobody. I haven‘t got anything against those people.” Even if the foregoing could be construed to inject involuntary manslaughter, the judge would not be required to charge on that theory, since “If this grade of homicide was involved only under the statement of the defendant, the failure of the judge to charge the law applicable thereto, in the absence of a timely request
6. The verdict of murder was supported by the evidence, and the judgment refusing a new trial must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except
ATKINSON, Presiding Justice, who dissents from the ruling in the fourth division of the decision, on the principle ruled in Dorsey v. State, 126 Ga. 633 (55 S.E. 479)