We granted this interlocutory appeal to determine whether venue of the case was proper in Clayton County. One defendant in this action — the estate of Dwight Allen Dixon — is located for residency purposes in Clayton County, while the other defendant resides in Henry County. Plaintiff sought to litigate her tort claims in Clayton County under the joint tortfeasor venue provision of the Georgia Constitution. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV. The trial court, however, concluded that venue could not lie in Clayton County because the Dixon estate was insolvent and, therefore, constituted a “nominal party.” Because a defendant is not a “nominal party” merely because it is insolvent, we reverse.
The instant lawsuit arises out of a fatal automobile accident resulting from Dwight Allen Dixon’s attempt to evade the traffic stop of a City of Hampton police officer. While allegedly traveling at a speed in excess of 100 miles per hour, Dixon’s vehicle collided head-on into the vehicle driven by Grashaunda Banks, killing both Dixon and Banks.
Olivia Banks, as mother and natural heir of Grashaunda Banks, subsequently filed this action in Clayton County Superior Court against the City of Hampton and the estate of Dwight Allen Dixon, alleging that the City and Dixon were joint tortfeasors responsible for the death of her daughter.
Following the transfer, a jury trial was conducted but resulted in a hung jury. Banks then filed a renewed motion to have the case transferred back to Clayton County. The trial court denied Banks’ motion. Thereafter, the trial court issued a certificate of immediate review, we granted Banks’ application for interlocutory appeal, and the instant appeal followed.
To resolve this appeal, we must determine whether a party’s financial interest in a case can be dispositive of whether he or she is a “nominal party” for venue purposes. We conclude that it cannot. “Our courts have consistently held that neither the wealth of the plaintiff nor the defendant is relevant. A man’s treatment before the bar of Justice should not vary with his financial condition.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Denton v. Con-Way Southern Express,
Applying this principle in equity cases, the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that jurisdiction and venue are not conferred based on the party with the greatest wealth and ability to pay damages. Specifically, in Screven Oil Mill v. Hudmon,
Likewise, in determining whether a party is “nominal” for diversity of citizenship purposes, federal courts have not focused on the financial interests of the party. See, e.g., Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche,
Based on this persuasive state and federal case law, we conclude that when a plaintiff files a lawsuit where venue is predicated on the joint tortfeasor venue provision of the Georgia Constitution, a nonresident joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a transfer of venue to his resident county based upon his comparative wealth and greater ability to satisfy a judgment. Conversely, a defendant tortfeasor does not constitute a “nominal party” for venue purposes merely because of insolvency.
The City of Hampton contends that Lawson v. Cunningham,
For the foregoing reasons, venue was proper when this case was filed in Clayton County (the resident county of the administrator of the Dixon estate). Accordingly, the case should not have been transferred to Henry County on the legally erroneous ground that the Dixon estate constituted a nominal party. The Henry County Superior Court likewise erred in denying Banks’ motion to transfer venue back to Clayton County on the same basis. We therefore reverse the denial of Banks’ motion to transfer venue, and we remand with instructions for the trial court to transfer venue to Clayton County in accordance with Uniform Superior Court Rule 19.1.
Judgment reversed and case remanded with instruction.
Notes
Banks initially filed this action in Fulton County State Court. However, she later voluntarily dismissed the suit and refiled it in Clayton County Superior Court.
Pursuant to OCGA § 53-6-40 (b), the Clayton County Probate Court appointed the county administrator to administer the Dixon estate for the purpose of defending this lawsuit. Georgia law provides that an estate’s administrator must he sued in his resident county and not the county of his appointment. Hopkins v. Kidd,
The Clayton County Superior Court denied Banks' request for a certificate of immediate review.
Making solvency the determining factor in deciding whether a party is nominal could potentially engender unnecessary satellite litigation, adding further time and expense to the civil litigation process.