189 Ind. 311 | Ind. | 1920
Appellee brought this suit against appellants to recover $24,969.67 and interest, money alleged to have been loaned by it to appellants.. Tbe complaint was in three paragraphs. Tbe first paragraph was for money loaned to tbe appellant Bankers Surety Company by appellee at various times, and in various amounts, as shown by a statement made a part thereof by exhibit and evidenced by promissory
The overruling of the surety company’s motion for a new. trial is assigned as error, and is the only error relied on for a reversal of the judgment. The causes relied on by the appellant surety company in support of its motion are: (1) That the decision of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence; (2) that the decision of the court is contrary to law; and (3)
At this point a brief statement of the undisputed facts may be useful for a better understanding of the questions for decision. In the years 1908 and 1909 appellee was an incorporated company under the laws of Indiana and authorized to make loans. The Bankers Surety Company was also an incorporated com
There is no serious controversy over the surety company’s liability to pay the first $8,000 borrowed from appellee, but as to any further liability to appellee it earnestly denies. Hereafter our attention will be directed exclusively to matters involving the alleged indebtedness of the surety company over and above $8,000. In respect to this indebtedness, it insists that certain findings are not supported by the evidence, and that certain evidence was improperly admitted. These contentions will be considered together.
Appellant insists that, while Walker was its general agent for the purpose of conducting its surety
The authority of Walker to borrow the money on the credit of appellant is the vital question. As we read the record in this case, the above claim of appellant may be admitted, and still there would be a clear liability on its part to the appellee for the repayment of the money received by Walker in excess of the $8,000.
Conceding that Walker, as general agent of appellant, had no authority to borrow the money, a question on which we express no opinion, we may then look to the claim of special authority which appellant denies on the ground that there is no competent evidence in the record showing special authority, nor that the acts of Walker in borrowing the money were at any time ratified by it. Appellant further contends that the trial court’s conclusions of law holding it liable for the money alleged to have been borrowed in excess of the $8,000 rests alone upon Walker’s authority as general agent. We do not so construe the trial court’s findings, nor do we believe the evidence warrants such a limitation to be placed upon them, nor can we agree with appellant .that there is no evidence showing special authority from it to Walker to borrow the money in question, nor that there is no evidence to show ratification.
There is no doubt that Walker, to the knowledge of appellant, looked after paying the bills incurred on account of the original as well as the additional work from the time the contractors became financially unable to proceed with it. No person, other than Walker, at any time, assumed to act in this matter for the company. Walker' testified that when the necessity for additional money for the prosecution of the additional work ordered arose, he went to Cleveland, and, at the home office of the company he laid before its committee in charge of matters of this character the necessity for additional money, and by that committee he was instructed to go ahead and
reference to the declarations and admissions only of the principal which were competent evidence against it to show its relations with Walker who might properly testify to them. 1 Clarke and Skyles, Law of Agency p. 170, §67; Wolf v. Smith (1860), 14 Ind. 360; Butts v. Warren Machine Co. (1914), 55 Ind. App. 347, 103 N. E. 812.
The notes and the indorsements thereon identified as exhibits 9 to 56, inclusive, being the notes executed for money loaned in excess of the first $8,000, .were introduced in evidence over the objections of appellant. Whether this ruling was right or wrong, it was not reversible error, for it affirmatively appearsv from the record that appellant was not thereby harmed. The court found that these notes were not binding obligations of appellant, but it did find in favor of appellee for the money loaned after January ¡4,1909, with six per cent, interest thereon.
If we are correct in holding that the evidence supports the finding that Walker was authorized by appellant to borrow the money and proceed with the work, and also that appellant ratified the acts of Walker in borrowing the money and completing the work, then in either eyent the conclusions of law would be with appellee, and the judgment should stand.
Finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.