delivered the opinion of the court.
The Bank of Commerce, plaintiff in this case, is a corporation created in 1856 by the legislature of Tennessee to engage in the business of discounting notes, buying and selling stock,1 dealing in exchange and gold and silver bullion, and receiving moneys on deposit. Its charter provides that it “ may purchase and hold a lot of ground for the use of the institution as ;a place of business, and at pleasure sell and exchange the sanie, and may hold such real or personal property and estate as njay be conveyed to it to secure debts due the institution, and máy sell and convey the same.” The charter also declares that the *494 institution “ shall pay to the State an annual tax of one-half of one per cent on .each share of capital stock, which shall be in lieu of all other taxes.”
Previous to 1879 the bank purchased with a portion of its capital stock a lot of ground in the city of Memphis, with the improvements thereon, as a place of business, and has held the same ever since. The improvements consist of a three-story brick building, but the bank only uses the first floor for its business, and leases out the cellar and the second and third stories to other parties for a money rent.
. On the 1st of January, 1880, the bank was, and ever since has been, the owner of three other lots in the city of Memphis. It had previously made loans to different parties, and taken as security for their, payment a deed of the lots executed to a trustee. The loans not being paid, the lots were sold under the deed and purchased by the bank. The purchase was made solely to secure a part of the debt; and the bank now holds the lots for sale, and will sell them when practicable to restore to its legitimate business so much of its capital as is invested in them.
In March, 1875, the legislature of the State passed an act defining what property was exempt from taxation by the Constitution, what the legislature had the power to exempt and did exempt, and what was taxable; and declaring that all other property should be assessed and taxed. In the list of property designated as exempt from taxation, that held by the Bank of Commerce was not mentioned, and the act repealed all inconsistent laws.
Under this act, the lot of ground in the city of Memphis, purchased by the plaintiff, with the building upon it and used as a place of business, was assessed and taxed in the years 1879, 3880, and 1881, for State and county purposes. The three lots were also taxedtin like manner for the years 1880 and 1881. The taxes were paid under protest, and the bank commenced the present suit to recover back the money. ' It appears to have been treated in the State court as a suit in equity, and the Chancellor sustained a demurrer to the bill and dismissed the suit. The Supreme Court of the State reversed the decree in part, holding that the bank was not liable for the *495 taxes on so much of the lot and building as was used for its business, but was liable for the taxes on the remainder, and on the three lots. From this latter decree the case is brought to this court by the bank, claiming exemption of the entire prop- - erty from taxation under its charter.
That statutes imposing restrictions upon the taxing power of a State, except so far as they .tend to secure uniformity and equality of assessment, are to be strictly construed is a familiar rule. Against the power nothing is to be taken by inference and presumption. Where a doubt arises as to the existence of the restriction, it is to be decided in favor of the State. The restriction here, consisting in the declaration that a specific tax on each share of the capital stock shall be in lieu of all other taxes, is accompanied with authority to purchase, certain real property, “ for the use of the institution as a place of business.” The bank had no express authority to invest its capital in real property not required for that use. And it is to be presumed that the exemption,, from other, than the designated tax was in consideration that the capital would be employed for its legitimate purposes. It certainly would not be pretended that the corporation, by turning its whole capital into real property and engaging in réal-estate business, could then, by force of the charter, escape liability to taxation for it under the general laws. But if thé exemption could.-not.be carried to that extent, it is • difficult ■ to fix any limit to the amount of real property which, it may hold thus exempt, unless we take that prescribed by the charter. In otir judgment, the limited exemption cannot be extended to property used beyond the actual wants of the corporation in, carrying out the purposes of its creation. As well observed' by the Supreme Court of the State, the contract of exemption, beyond the extent prescribed, ceased when taxable property w.as held for any other purpose.
It is true that the capital stock of a corporation’ may in a general sense be said to be all the property in which the capital ¿s . invested, so that an exemption of the capital stock, without other words of limitation, may operate to exempt all the property of the corporation.
Railroad Companies
v.
Graines,
■ As to the property which was purchased by the bank upon the sale under the trust deed, there is less reason to contend for its exemption from taxation. The express authority con-. ferred upon the corporation to hold real property, except that acquired for the use of the institution as a place of business, was limited to such as might be taken as security for debts; while held for that purpose it was subject to taxation as the property of the debtors. Its liability in this respect, to bear • its proportion of the common burden of government, was not lessened because the bank, deeming it might be more readily disposed of if freed from the debtor’s right of redemption, thought proper to purchase in the title.
. Judgment affirmed,.